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Based on research conducted from September 2008 through June 2011, this 
thesis explores the construction of gender and sexuality identities in Cyprus vis-à-vis 
the socio-political, legal and cultural context within which it is enabled or inhibited. 
More specifically, it examines how predominant discourses of nationhood and 
national identity as well as the processes, norms, institutions and mechanisms of 
Europeanization, affect local approaches to the relationship between national 
identity, gender and sexuality.  
Chronologically, the thesis covers the period between the early 1990s – when 
a Cypriot gay man brought a case before the European Court of Human Rights 
against the Republic of Cyprus – up to the present. However, it also makes 
references to the 1974 Turkish invasion and occupation of the island, as well as to 
the events that preceded and followed it, since these have been determinative of the 
importance assigned to Cypriot national identity narratives by local actors. 
Part of the data examined includes fifty-five interviews with prelates of the 
Orthodox Church of Cyprus, Greek-Cypriot political elites, military officials, 
representatives of women’s groups, as well as Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans* and queer individuals and activists. Through the 
utilization of a research design that draws on Foucaultian analysis, queer theory, law 
and national identity studies, the thesis argues that the Cypriot discursive landscape 
both restricts and enables the negotiation and reconfiguration of identity-formation 
processes. Namely, although nationalistic, androcentric, patriarchical and 
heterocentric essentialisms continue to permeate the Cypriot socio-political milieu, 
nationalism is characterized both by inherent contradictions and by the ability to 
reinvent itself.  When this is combined with the influence of external, supranational, 
European discourses of gender, sexuality and identity, then the possibilities of 
gender and sexual agency are augmented, as long as local actors manage to employ 
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‘Cyprus is the country of heroes and saints, not of homosexuals’; ‘No to laws 
opposing our religion, morals and traditions’; ‘Yes to the moral armouring of 
Cyprus’.1 These are some of the slogans written on the banners of protesters against 
the decriminalization of homosexuality – shown in images 1.1 and 1.2 – who, 
headed by members of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus clergy,
2
 flocked outside the 
Parliament whenever legislation that pertained to same-sex sexual activities was 
under review by the Parliamentary Legal Committee, or by the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Republic of Cyprus.
3
 In 1993, in the case of Modinos v. Cyprus,
 4
 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ruled that sections 171, 172 and 173 
of the Cypriot Criminal Code, which criminalized ‘carnal knowledge of any person 
against the order of nature’, constituted a violation of Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (EConvHR).
5
 Therefore, in 1998, after years of 
procrastination and under pressures emanating from the Council of Europe (CoE), 
the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) Parliamentary Assembly was forced to vote on the 









                                                 
1
   See images 1.1 and 1.2 in this chapter and image 3.1 in chapter 3. Image 1.1 shows an Orthodox 
Church of Cyprus clergyman marching outside the Parliament, holding a banner that reads: ‘Yes to 
the moral armouring of Cyprus.’ Image 1.2 shows a group of clergymen and elderly Cypriots. The 
man in the centre holds a banner that reads: ‘No to laws opposing our religion, morals and traditions.’ 
2
   Please note that the word ‘Church’ is capitalized in this thesis when referring to the ‘Orthodox 
Church of Cyprus’. When the word appears lowercased, it denotes Christianity as an institution more 
generally. 
3
   In the RoC, legislation that pertains to same-sex sexual equality was passed or amended from 1998 
to 2002. These legal amendments will be further discussed in chapter 3. 
4
   Modinos v. Cyprus, 1993 (Series A, No. 259).  
5
  Ibid., para. 8. Sections 171, 172 and 173 of the Cypriot Criminal Code (Cap 154) stated: ‘171. Any 
person who a) has carnal knowledge of any person against the order of nature; or b) permits a male 
person to have carnal knowledge of him against the order of nature, is guilty of a felony and is liable 
to imprisonment for five years. 172. Any person who with violence commits either of the offences 
specified in the last preceding section is guilty of a felony and is liable to imprisonment for fourteen 
years. 173. Any person who attempts to commit either of the offences specified in section 171 is 
guilty of felony and is liable to imprisonment for three years, and if the attempt is accompanied with 
violence he is liable to imprisonment for seven years.’ 








THE CHURCH-ORCHESTRATED 1997 DEMONSTRATION AGAINST 
THE DECRIMINALIZATION OF HOMOSEXUALITY AND AGAINST THE 
AMENDMENT OF HOMOSEXUALITY-RELATED DISCRIMINATORY 
LEGAL PROVISIONS  
 
The banner reads: ‘Yes to the moral armouring of Cyprus.’ 
 
Source: Alecos Modinos’s personal archive 







THE CHURCH-ORCHESTRATED 1997 DEMONSTRATION AGAINST 
THE DECRIMINALIZATION OF HOMOSEXUALITY AND AGAINST THE 
AMENDMENT OF HOMOSEXUALITY-RELATED DISCRIMINATORY 
LEGAL PROVISIONS  
 
The banner in the centre reads: ‘No to laws opposing our religion, morals and 
traditions.’ 
 
Source: Alecos Modinos’s personal archive 
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 As a reaction to the prospect of the Parliamentary Assembly amending the 
criminal law, clergymen and Christian Orthodox movements and parishes organized 
under the name ‘Pancyprian Committee for the Fight Against the Decriminalization 
of Homosexuality’ (PAHOK). They fiercely opposed the legal amendments since, 
according to their 1997 and 1998 petitions – shown in images 1.3 and 1.4 – that were  
distributed to members of parliament (MPs) as well as in churches and in 
neighbourhoods, ‘the decriminalization of homosexuality [was] not a mere legal 
amendment’, since it would allow homosexuals ‘to display posters that read “become 
a homosexual”’ and ‘to demand the introduction of homosexual sexual education in 
schools’.6  The Church and its supporting religious groups became extremely 
alarmed at the ‘peril’ of the spread of this new ‘breed’, that is of the homosexual 
whom the law recognizes and protects, since, as they asked in their petitions, ‘how 
are we going to conduct our fight against [Turkish] occupation ... [and] how will 
marriage and the family be protected [if homosexuality is decriminalized]?’7 The 
petitions claimed that PAHOK summoned the ‘Orthodox Greeks of Cyprus’ to 
oppose the decriminalization not because they hated anyone, but because they were 
concerned about their ‘challenged nation’ and they wanted to help homosexuals 
return to God’s path. This is because, according to their reasoning, if homosexuality 
were decriminalized, ‘whose human rights [would be] violated, really? [The human 
rights] of those who have been drawn into the slimy sin of homosexuality, or [the 






                                                 
6
   See images 1.3 and 1.4. Image 1.3 is the May 1997 petition produced and distributed by PAHOK. 
The group constituted primarily by clergymen and elderly religious Greek-Cypriots. What is of 
special interest about the text of this petition is its portrayal of homosexuality as a disease and as a 
foreign trend – the reference to England is illustrative – that threatens the survival of the Greek-
Cypriot national collectivity.  It states: ‘If [homosexuality is] decriminalized, homosexuals will 
become able ... to display posters that read “become a homosexual ([as in] England).’ The text of 
PAHOK’s April 1998 petition, which is shown in image 1.4, is similar but it makes additional 
references to ‘Europe’. For example, the last sentence reads: ‘The government can have its obligations 
towards Europe. The Parliament, however, which represents us, cannot and should not be controlled 
by anybody and [in this manner] violate the will of the people that has elected it.’ 
7
   See images 1.3 and 1.4.  
8
   Ibid.  





THE PETITION OF THE PANCYPRIAN COMMITTEE FOR THE FIGHT 
AGAINST THE DECRIMINALIZATION OF HOMOSEXUALITY, DATED 
13 MAY 1997 









THE PETITION OF THE PANCYPRIAN COMMITTEE FOR THE FIGHT 
AGAINST THE DECRIMINALIZATION OF HOMOSEXUALITY, DATED 8 
April 1998 
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The rhetoric that the Church and its affiliated religious groups employed 
elucidates how discourses about ‘the nation’, nationhood and national identity are 
employed in order to render heterosexual sexual activity as the norm and as the only 
‘appropriate’ and ‘decent’ modality of sexuality. In these discourses, non-
heterosexual people and activities are portrayed as sinful, slimy and – above all – 
dangerous for the national collectivity. Furthermore, according to such discourses, 
rights and claims to rights, as well as the articulators and recipients of claims and 
rights, are not of equal value. Rather, they differ in importance: the human right of 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans* and queer (LGBTQ) people not to be persecuted and 
prosecuted for their sexual choice is inferior to the claim of the ‘decent’ and ‘worthy’ 
‘Orthodox Greeks of Cyprus’ that sexual inequality and heterocentrism’s monopoly 
be perpetuated.   
For the Church and for its supporting religious groups, the idea of (European) 
human rights cannot exist, unless the rights afforded by the EConvHR do not 
challenge the national collectivity’s inclusion and exclusion boundaries and the 
predominant nationalistic discourses about what makes one a ‘decent and worthy 
Orthodox Greek of Cyprus’. As their claim went – according to their 1998 circular 
shown in image 1.5 – ‘this land [i.e., Cyprus] survived its numerous invaders 
because it remained premised on Greek-Orthodox and moral values’.9 Consequently, 
according to the Church and its affiliated religious groups, ‘the Council of Europe ... 
and all sorts of Modinoi’10 should be warned that ‘we will not succumb to, and in the 
end we will reject [the CoE’s] political ... and especially [its] financial support, as if 
it were Judas’s pieces of silver’.11 In the ‘resolution’ that was included in their 1998 
petition – shown in image 1.6 – these opponents of the legal amendment even 
warned MPs that ‘under no circumstances will we vote in the future for those MPs 
                                                 
9
   See image 1.5. Image 1.5 shows a circular distributed by a PAHOK subgroup, the ‘Fighters for 
Moral Values’. Please note the picture from the Book of Genesis and the reference to Saint Paul’s 
letter to the Romans. The circular reads: ‘According to Saint Paul, those men who have succumbed to 
the satisfaction of their unnatural appetites will face God’s wrath. They will face our dynamic 
resistance also ... Upon God’s order Lot and his family left Sodom and Gomorrah, since [God] would 
bury them [i.e., the cities] with fire and sulphur because of their inhabitants’ homosexuality.’  
10
   The then Archbishop of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus publically referred to homosexuals and to 
people who supported or did not oppose the decriminalization of homosexuality as ‘the Modinoi’. 
Namely, he used Alecos Modinos’s name as a derogatory term, in order to refer to people who engage 
in same-sex sexual activities or who do not discriminate against non-heterosexuals. In fact, even 
nowadays, and especially among elderly people, Modinos’s name stands for ‘(male) homosexual’. 
This demonstrates the intensity of the Church’s homophobic campaign and the degree to which it 
demonized Modinos. 
11
   See image 1.5. 
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12
   See image 1.6. Image 1.6 shows PAHOK’s ‘resolution’ that was included in its April 1998 
petition. Interestingly, point 2 reads: ‘We warn that by the passing of this despicable law [i.e., the 
decriminalization legal amendments] our morals and our dignity are being violated, the family 
institution is being threatened, our society is being corrupted, our national strife is jeopardized and, 
lastly, our rights as citizens are being infringed.’ 







CIRCULAR DISTRIBUTED BY THE FIGHTERS FOR MORAL VALUES, 
1998 
 
Source: Alecos Modinos’s personal archive  





THE RESOLUTION OF THE PANCYPRIAN COMMITTEE FOR THE 
FIGHT AGAINST THE DECRIMINALIZATION OF HOMOSEXUALITY, 
DATED 8 April 1998 
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Such approaches towards ‘Europe’ highlight another complexity in the 
already intricate national identity-gender-sexuality relationship, as this is manifested 
in Cyprus. This complexity relates to the double role with which external/ 
‘European’ discourses are vested in places where numerous subjectivities overlap. 
The RoC’s European Union (EU) admission and claims about an organic 
relationship between ‘European’ and ‘Greek-Cypriot’ identity have been employed 
extensively by Greek-Cypriots, in order to portray Turkish and Turkish-Cypriots as 
‘less European’ and consequently as less ‘civilized’ and inferior. Moreover, the 
Greek-Cypriot political elite has employed the European human rights discourse 
extensively, in order to represent the RoC as the victim of human rights violations 
and Turkey as the perpetrator of these violations. By doing so, it has tried to 
strengthen its negotiating position in attempts to find a solution to the ‘Cyprus 
problem’. Therefore, Greek-Cypriots have effectively employed European 
discourses, mechanisms and institutions in order to propel their politico-national 
objectives.
13
 After all, the RoC joined the EU and, therefore, received considerable 
financial assistance and support, while the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ 
(‘TRNC’) was excluded from this process.  
Nonetheless, as the example of the decriminalization of sexuality in Cyprus 
illustrates, when some elements of European discourses came to be seen as 
dangerous for the preservation of the national collectivity, Greek-Cypriots were 
quick to reject them: Complying with the CoE’s demands that the RoC upholds the 
ECtHR Modinos ruling was perceived to involve much more than a ‘mere legal 
amendment’. The decriminalization of homosexuality was seen as a blow against the 
Greek-Cypriot collectivity’s premising pillars, that is, its ‘Greek- Orthodox and 
moral values’, which allegedly had assured its preservation, even under the threat of 
numerous enemies. ‘Europe’s’ institutions, mechanisms and political and financial 
assistance, which in the past had been lauded as a panacea for Cyprus’s politico-
                                                 
13
   Kevin Featherstone, “Introduction: In the Name of ‘Europe’,” in The Politics of Europeanization, 
ed. Kevin Featherstone and Claudio M. Radaelli (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 3-26; 
Kevin Featherstone, “Cyprus and the Onset of Europeanization: Strategic Usage, Structural 
Transformation and Institutional Adaptation,” South European Society and Politics, vol. 5, no. 2 
(2000): 141-64; Oliver P. Richmond, “Shared sovereignty and the politics of peace: valuating the 
EU’s ‘catalytic’ framework in the eastern Mediterranean,” International Affairs, vol. 82, no. 1 (2005): 
149–76; Nathalie Tocci, EU and Conflict Resolution: Promoting Peace in the Backyard (Oxfordshire 
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national problems, were relegated as part of Cyprus’s problems; they were described 
as ‘Judas’s pieces of silver’ to which the Greek-Cypriot national collectivity should 
not succumb. These and other interplays between the local and the 
supranational/transnational, tradition and ‘Europe’, the official and the ‘hidden’, are 
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This work focuses on the case of Cyprus for a number of reasons. Because 
Cyprus is a locale where multiple, overlapping and conflicting characteristics can be 
discerned, its study helps access the various power matrices within which, and the 
various discourses through which, understandings of gender and sexuality are 
formed, negotiated and reconstructed. It is a former British colony, whose history 
has been marked by ethnic conflict. Religion and religiosity, predominant narratives 
about nationhood and national identity, as well as traditional understandings of 
gender and sexuality, continue to have a great impact on Cypriots’ lives. Moreover, 
the Orthodox Church of Cyprus exerts a pivotal role in the country’s political affairs, 
even though the RoC is nominally a liberal democratic state. Although still divided 
into a ‘Greek-Cypriot south’ and a ‘Turkish-Cypriot north’ due to interethnic conflict 
and a Greek junta-supported coup which culminated in the 1974 Turkish invasion 
and continuing occupation of almost half of the island, as of 2004, the RoC is an EU 
member-state.
14
 Therefore, Cyprus is a particularly interesting case and paradigmatic 
of the ways in which local traditions and external/supranational trends interact, as 
well as of the consequences of such interactions on local actors, on their discourses 
and on their perceptions of self and others.  
What also makes Cyprus an interesting case-study is the extent to which 
gender and sexuality have been the subject of concern, scrutiny, anxiety and 
surveillance, even though these issues did not have a place in public dialogue and 
political life until very recently. The management of gender and sexuality as a means 
for preserving social order and political stability is not exclusive to Cyprus,
15
 
although the stakes in this stability are perhaps especially high in postcolonial and 
ethnically divided places, like Cyprus. This is so because in such places the 
preservation of a ‘pure’ national identity and of the ‘authentic’ ways of the 
organization of the national collectivity – like the heterocentric and androcentric 
organization of social relations – are perceived as vital for avoiding penetration or 
‘contamination’ by the ethnic ‘other’. What makes Cyprus distinct, yet representative 
                                                 
14
   A brief discussion of the history of Cyprus as well as of the events and the – admittedly debated – 
reasons that led to the island’s ethnic division will be presented in chapter one. Please also note: the 
occupied north and Turkish-Cypriots were excluded from EU admission. 
15
   See, for example: Ida Blom, Karen Hagemann, and Catherine Hall, ed. Gender Nations: 
Nationalisms and Gender Order in the Long Nineteenth Century. Oxford: Berg, 2000; Nira Yuval-
Davis. Gender and Nation. London: Sage Publications, 1997; Nira Yuval-Davis and Floya Anthias, 
ed. Woman-Nation-State. London: Macmillan, 1989; George L. Mosse. Nationalism and Sexuality: 
Respectability and Abnormal Sexuality in Modern Europe. New York: H. Fertig, 1985; Andrew 
Parker et al., ed. Nationalisms and Sexualities. New York: Routledge, 1992. 
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of other milieux where a multitude of subjectivities and discourses intersect, are the 
ways through which Cypriots – both elites and LGBTQ individuals – negotiate and 
amalgamate otherwise conflicting discourses, ideas and languages – for example, the 
language of ‘the nation’ and the language of ‘Europe and human rights’ – in order to 
define themselves (in the case of LGBTQ individuals) and to justify their politico-
national objectives (in the case of elites).  
In fact, the analysis of the case of Cyprus brings into view research on locales 
that have been marginalized or that have not been sufficiently addressed in Western 
European and Anglo-American scholarship. For example, Cyprus has been the focus 
of both foreign and native political and social science research. However, this 
research centres on the ‘national problem’, its causes and effects.16 The issue of 
sexuality and the numerous social, political, legal and cultural questions that emanate 
from it remain almost completely unaddressed by both Cypriot and foreign 
scholarship. This continues to be the case even though since the early 1990s the 
study of sexual, gender, class, racial, colonial, postcolonial, ethnic and national 
overlapping subjectivities has gained a prominent place, especially in the American 
and English scholarly production. Therefore, this study helps to better understand the 
applicability of Euro-American theoretical models of national identity, gender and 
sexuality to different venues, and to test the limits of these models in describing and 
historicizing what are often assumed to be shared universal realities.  
Consequently, such an analysis throws light on the often-ignored 
complexities of gender and sexuality. By doing so, it allows for their better 
understanding and appreciation of elements that are central in the formation and 
preservation of ideas about national identities and nationhood. The example of the 
decriminalization of homosexuality in Cyprus, which will be extensively discussed 
in the next chapters, is indicative of this perplexed national identity-gender-sexuality 
relationship. The time-frame of the study extends from the early 1990s, when the 
Modinos case was adjudicated by the ECtHR, until June 2011 when the research for 
this study was completed. Nonetheless, references will also be made to the 1974 
events, as well as to the events that preceded and followed the 1974 coup and 
Turkish invasion and occupation, since these are pertinent towards understanding 
predominant perceptions of nationhood and national identity and – by extension – 
                                                 
16
  That is, the Turkish invasion and ongoing occupation of the north part of Cyprus. 
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the impact of official/public and ‘everyday’/symbolic nationalist narratives on the 
construction and permissible demonstration of gender and sexuality identities in 
Cyprus. 
The invocation of ideas pertaining to nationhood and the employment of 
nationalist, and often nationalistic, rhetoric was central in nation-state building 
processes throughout Europe and beyond. Whether elite-orchestrated
17
 or rooted in 
shared ideas, cultural customs and traditions,
18
 whether dynamically or symbolically 
demonstrated, the importance of conceptions of nationhood and of a coherent 
national identity that is shared among a population cannot easily be disputed,
19
 
especially with regard to ethnically divided locales or postcolonial milieux.
20
 
Furthermore, discourses about nationhood and national identity have been employed 
in order to both construct and preserve androcentric and heteronormative perceptions 
                                                 
17
   Eric, Hobsbawm, “Mass-Producing Traditions: Europe, 1870-1914,” in The Invention of 
Tradition, ed. Eric J. Hobsbawm and Terence O. Ranger (Cambridge: Canto, 1992), 263-308; Eric, 
Hobsbawm. Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality. 2
nd
 ed. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992; Ernest Gellner.  Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Blackwell, 
1983; Ernest Gellner, “Nationalism,” Theory and Society, vol. 10, no. 6 (1981): 753-76; Ernest 
Gellner, “Nationalisms and the New World Order,” Bulletin of the American Academy of Arts and 
Sciences, vol. 47, no. 5 (1994): 29-36; John Breuilly. Nationalism and the State. Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1982. 
18
   Anthony D. Smith. The Antiquity of Nations. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004; Anthony D. Smith. 
The Ethnic Origins of Nations. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 1986; Anthony D. Smith. Myths 
and Memories of the Nation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999; Anthony D. Smith. National 
Identity. London: Penguin Books, 1991. 
19
   Michael Billig. Banal Nationalism. London: Sage, 1995; Benedict Anderson. Imagined 
Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso Editions, 1983; 
Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, “Beyond ‘Identity’,” Theory and Society, vol. 29, no. 1 
(2000): 1-47; Rogers Brubaker. Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in 
New Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996; Rogers Brubaker. Ethnicity Without 
Groups. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2004; Rogers Brubaker et al. Nationalist Politics 
and Everyday Ethnicity in a Transylvanian Town. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006; 
Rogers Brubaker, Mara Loveman, Peter Stamatov, “Ethnicity as Cognition,” Theory and Society, vol. 
33, no. 1 (2004): 31-64. 
20
   Specifically about national identity within the Cypriot postcolonial context, see: Vassos Argyrou. 
Tradition and Modernity in the Mediterranean . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996; 
Caesar V. Mavratsas, “The Ideological Contest between Greek-Cypriot Nationalism 1974-1995: 
Politics, Social Memory and Identity,” Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 20, no. 4 (1997): 717-37; 
Yiannis Papadakis, “Greek Cypriot Narratives of History and Collective Identity: Nationalism as a 
Contested Process,” American Ethnologist, vol. 25, no. 2 (1998): 149-65; Nicos Peristianis, “Cypriot 
Nationalism, Dual Identity, and Politics,” in Divided Cyprus: Modernity, History and an Island in 
Conflict, ed. Yiannis Papadakis, Nicos Peristianis, and Gisela Welz (Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
University Press, 2006), 100-120; Rebecca Bryant. Imagining the Modern: The Cultures of 
Nationalism in Cyprus. London: I.B Tauris, 2004; Niyazi Kizilyurek and Sylvaine Gautier-
Kizilyurek, “The Politics of Identity in the Turkish Cypriot Community and the Language Question,” 
International Journal of the Sociology of Language, 168 (2004), 37-54; Yücel Vural and Ahmet 
Rustemli, “Identity Fluctuations in the Turkish Cypriot Community,” Mediterranean Politics, vol. 11, 
no. 3 (2006): 329-48. 
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of ‘acceptable’ gender and sexuality performances and identifications.21 Moreover, 
in our so-called ‘global’ era, local constructions of national identity, gender and 
sexuality are continuously and intensely exposed to transnational and supranational 
discourses, which impact them in various ways, both positive and negative.
22
 
Therefore, discerning the interconnections between local/national official and 
grassroots/personal subaltern discourses of national identity, gender and sexuality, as 
well as the dynamics between national narratives and transnational/supranational 
discourses is intrinsic. This is so because these interconnections and dynamics are at 
the heart of how individual subjectivities and modes of collective life are constituted, 
sanctioned or legitimized. 
Some of the relevant literature demonstrated that although prevailing ideas 
and discourses about nationhood and national identity are formed and employed 
differently at different levels, their ramifications are no less important or perilous 
regardless of whether they are explicitly/actively or subliminally/symbolically 
invoked. For example, Brubaker’s blow against the usefulness of national identity as 
an analytical category and his interpretation of ‘everyday ethnicity’ as a mode of 
making sense of one’s lived reality and social world,23 does not make Billig’s 
argument  about the precariousness of ‘banal’/subliminal/symbolic nationalism less 
convincing.
24
 Moreover, analyses of nationhood and national identity do not, for the 
most part, sufficiently explore the intra-national and intra-ethnic problematics that a 
study of the relationship between ‘everyday’/‘banal’/symbolic nationalism and 
                                                 
21
   Floya Anthias and Nira Yuval-Davis. Racialized Boundaries: Race, Nation, Gender, Colour and 
Class and the Anti-Racist Struggle. London: Routledge, 1992; Blom, Hagemann, and Hall, ed. Gender 
Nations; Tricia Cusack, “Janus and Gender: Women and the Nation’s Backward Look,” Nations and 
Nationalism, vol. 6, no. 4 (2000): 541-61; Nira Yuval-Davis, “Gender and Nation,” Ethnic and Racial 
Studies, vol. 16, no. 4 (1993): 621-32; Yuval-Davis. Gender and Nation; Yuval-Davis and Anthias, 
ed. Woman-Nation-State. Jill Vickers, “Bringing Nations in: Some Methodological and Conceptual 
Issues in Connecting Feminisms with Nationhood and Nationalisms,” International Feminist Journal 
of Politics, vol. 8, no. 1 (2006): 84-109; Sylvia Walby, “Gender, Nations and States in a Global Era,” 
Nations and Nationalism, vol. 6, no. 4 (2000): 523-40. 
22
   Arnaldo Cruz-Malavé and Martin F. Manalansan IV, ed. Queer Globalizations: Citizenship and 
the Afterlife of Colonialism. New York and London: New York University Press, 2002; Martin F. 
Manalansan IV, “In the Shadows of Stonewall: Examining Gay Transnational Politics and the 
Diasporic Dilemma,” GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies, vol. 2, no. 4 (1995): 425-38; 
Elizabeth, A. Povinelli and George Chauncey, “Thinking Sexuality Transnationally: An 
Introduction,” GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies, vol. 5, no. 4 (1999): 439-50; Peter 
Drucker, ed. Different Rainbows. London: Millivres, 2000. Specifically about Turkish-Cypriot local 
identities vis-à-vis global/supranational influences, see: Tarik Bereket and Barry, D. Adam, “The 
Emergence of Gay Identities in Contemporary Turkey,” Sexualities, vol. 9, no. 2 (2006): 131-51. 
23
   Brubaker et al. Nationalist Politics and Everyday Ethnicity. See also: Brubaker, Loveman, and 
Stamatov, “Ethnicity as Cognition,” 31 -64. 
24
   Michael Billig. Banal Nationalism. London: Sage, 1995. 
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gender and sexuality highlights. Furthermore, the nationhood-gender-sexuality 
relationship is further complicated when external, supranational narratives are also 
taken into account. Namely, deciphering whether and how such external discourses 
emasculate local exclusionary ones or actually reinforce symbolic and discursive 
violence against intra-national and extra-national ‘others’ is pertinent in attempts to 
understand identity construction processes. 
This is why this thesis will focus on the role of internal and external 
discourses and officially articulated and ‘hidden transcripts’,25 on their agents, 
recipients, supporters and resisters, as well as on the interaction of such discourses 
and actors at the national, transnational and supranational level. It will analyze these 
issues by raising and addressing a number of questions: What are the effects of local, 
traditional and transnational/supranational approaches towards national identity and 
gender and sexuality subjectivities on Cypriot LGBTQ individuals? What are the 
main actors/forces behind both internal and external discourses, and where does the 
impact of national and supranational/transnational official discourses leave 
grassroots/subaltern agency? Namely, do the supranational/transnational human 
rights and Europeanization discourses expand the boundaries of traditional gender 
and sexual identities (thus facilitating the self-determination and emancipation of 
Cypriot LGBTQ individuals) or are these external discourses just nuances or replicas 
of the norms that already prevail at the national level? Addressing these questions is 
pertinent. This is so because although the mechanisms, institutions and the language 
of ‘Europe’ have been instrumental in rectifying state injustices against individual 
citizens and groups, elite and non-elite actors at the local and national level 
sometimes assume a passive and indifferent, or reactive and hostile position towards 
‘Europe’-induced changes in domestic legal, institutional and societal structures. 26  
The past two decades have witnessed a large increase in scholarly production 
on sexual subjectivities and sexual politics. Queer theorists have focused on the 
                                                 
25
   The term ‘hidden transcripts’ is borrowed from: James C. Scott. Domination and the Arts of 
Resistance: Hidden Transcripts. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990. 
26
   For example, recourse to the ECtHR constitutes one of the ways in which European mechanisms 
and institutions contribute to the rectification of injustices at the national level.  LGBTQ-relevant 
ECtHR litigation will be discussed in chapter three. The negative reaction of the Orthodox Church of 
Cyprus, of the majority of the Greek-Cypriot political elite and of numerous Greek-Cypriots towards 
the decision of the ECtHR in Modinos, as well as the CoE’s demand that homosexuality be 
decriminalized by the RoC illustrate that external/regional influences and decision-making are not 
always welcomed at the local level. These issues will be further discussed in this chapter and in 
chapter three. 
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complex and often indiscernible matrices of power within which attempts to 
articulate and politically situate our sexual selves are circumscribed, while 
postcolonial queer theorists have attempted to recover the experiences of sexual and 
other ‘others’.27 Nonetheless, this research has not always discerned the multiple 
ways in which seemingly opposing discourses – for example, identity and rights 
politics vis-à-vis radical and anti-normalizing politics, or indigenous modalities of 
sexuality vis-à-vis ‘European/Western’ paradigms – often complement each other. 
As it will be discussed in more detail in the chapters that follow, this is more so the 
case in milieux outside the ‘European/Western’ centre, where years of oppression 
have not permitted the development of discourses that would destabilize locally 
predominant, oppressive ones.  
Unfortunately, the relevant existing literature pays, for the most part, little 
attention to this fact. The reason is that most proponents of identity and rights-based 
politics are primarily interested in pointing to the practicability and to the on-the-
ground effectiveness of rights and identities, while they often ignore the power 
structures and perils embedded in such politics.
28
 In a similar way, by remaining 
primarily focused on a radical project, some strands of (mostly early) queer theory 
underemphasize the importance of local particularities and distinctions, questions 
about disruptive politics’ practicability and applicability at different geographical 
contexts and the positive change brought about by identity and rights-based 
politics.
29
 Moreover, even recent mainstream scholarship on national identities 
                                                 
27
   Judith Butler and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s pioneering work on these issues will be referred 
to and discussed throughout the thesis. 
28
   See, for example: Robert Wintemute. Sexual Orientation and Human Rights: The United State 
Constitution, the European Convention, and the Canadian Charter. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995; 
Kees Waaldijk and Mattei Bonini-Baraldi. Sexual Orientation Discrimination in the European Union: 
National Laws and the Employment Equality Directive. The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2006; Kees 
Waaldijk and Andrew Clapham, ed. Homosexuality: A European Community Issue. Essays on 
Lesbian and Gay Rights in European Law and Policy, International Studies in Human Rights Series of 
the European Human Rights Foundation, vol. 26. London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993; 
Andrew Sullivan. Virtually Normal: An Argument About Homosexuality. New York: Knopf, 1995; 
Andrew Sullivan. Same-Sex Marriage: Pro and Con, A Reader. New York: Vintage, 1997. 
29
   See, for example: Diane Richardson, “Locating Sexualities: From Here to Normality,” Sexualities, 
vol. 7, no. 4 (2004): 391-411; Michael Warner, “Introduction: Fear of a Queer Planet,” in Fear of a 
Queer Planet: Queer Politics and Social Theory, ed. Michael Warner (Minneapolis and London: 
Minneapolis University Press, 1993), 3-17; Michael Warner. The Trouble with Normal: Sex, Politics 
and the Ethics of Queer Life. New York: The Free Press, 1999. Jeffrey Weeks describes these 
approaches as the approach of ‘progressivism’ and the approach of ‘continuity’. He argues that both 
approaches fall into ‘traps’: the former is overly optimistic and assumes that transformation is 
inevitable, while the latter is overly pessimistic  and insists that beyond some minor (legal) changes, 
the oppressive power structures remain intact. See: Jeffrey Weeks, “The Remaking of the Erotic and 
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completely ignores questions of gender and sexuality.
30
 This is especially regrettable 
since such omissions overshadow, or merely gloss over, the importance and need to 
approach subjectivities and experiences in ways that do not relegate matrices of 
power and the possibility of exercise of agency. 
Because of its focus on the constructed nature of identities, and since it has 
convincingly argued that the language of rights and identities partakes in those 
discourses that set inflexible limits on gender and sexuality self-understandings, 
queer theory allows us to disaggregate and scrutinize the diverse, and often 
concealed, forces and agents behind predominant, exclusionary discourses which 
demarcate individuals’ possibility for self-formation.31 On the contrary, analyses of 
the impact of identity and litigation-based sexual politics,
 32
 and specifically analyses 
of the impact of European/regional legal language, mechanisms and judicial 
narratives on member-states’ subordinated LGBTQ groups,33 suggest that they have 
                                                                                                                                          
Intimate Life,” Política y Sociedad, vol. 46, no. 1 (2009): 13-25; Jeffrey Weeks. The World We Have 
Won: The Remaking of Erotic and Intimate Life (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), 1-22. 
30
   For example, see: Geoff Eley and Jan Palmowski, ed. Citizenship and National Identity in 
Twentieth-Century Germany. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008; Klaus Eder and 
Bernhard Giesen, ed. European Citizenship: Between National Legacies and Postnational Projects. 
Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2001; Mabel Berezin and Martin Schain, ed. Europe 
without Borders: Remapping Territory, Citizenship, and Identity in a Transnational Age. Baltimore 
and London: John Hopkins University Press, 2003.  
31
   Some examples of such scholarship are: Judith Butler. Gender Trouble: Feminism and the 
Subversion of Identity. New York and London: Routledge, 1990; Judith Butler. Bodies that Matter: 
On the Discursive Limits of “Sex.” New York and London: Routledge, 1993; Judith Butler. Giving an 
Account of Oneself. New York: Fordham University Press, 2005; Didi Herman. Rights of Passage: 
Struggles for Lesbian and Gay Legal Equality. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994; Morris 
Kaplan. Sexual Justice: Democratic Citizenship and the Politics of Desire. New York: Routledge, 
1997; Valerie Lehr. Queer Family Values: Debunking the Myth of the Nuclear Family Philadelphia, 
PA: Temple University Press, 1999; Chet Meeks, “Civil Society and the Sexual Politics of 
Difference,” Sociological Theory, vol. 19, no. 3 (2001): 325-43; Urvashi Vaid. The Mainstreaming of 
Gay and Lesbian Liberation. New York: Anchor Books, 1995; Jeffrey Weeks. Invented Moralities: 
Sexual Values in an Age of Uncertainty. Cambridge and Malden, MA: Polity Press, 1995. 
32
   Some examples of this approach are: Mary Bernstein, “Identity Politics,” Annual Review of 
Sociology, vol. 31 (2005): 47-74; Mary Bernstein, “Celebration and Suppression: The Strategic Uses 
of Identity by the Lesbian and Gay Movement,” The American Journal of Sociology, vol. 103, no. 3 
(1997): 531-65; Mary Bernstein, “Identities and Politics: Towards a Historical Understanding of the 
Lesbian and Gay Movement,” Social Science History, vol. 26, no.  3 (2002): 531-81; Joshua Gamson, 
“Messages of Exclusion: Gender Movement and Symbolic Boundaries,” Gender and Society, vol. 11, 
no. 2 (1997): 178-99; Susan Hekman, “Beyond Identity: Feminism, Identity and Identity Politics,” 
Feminist Theory, vol. 1, no. 3(2000): 289-308; Martha Nussbaum, “The Professor of Parody,” The 
New Republic, 22 February 1999; Stephen Whittle, “Gender Fucking or Fucking Gender?” in 
Blending Genders: Social Aspects of Cross-Dressing and Sex-Changing, ed. Richard Ekins and Dave 
King (London: Routledge, 1996), 196-214; Martha Minow, “Justice Engendered,” in Feminist 
Jurisprudence, ed. Patricia Smith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 217-243; Timothy E. 
Lin, “Social Norms and Judicial Decisionmaking: Examining the Role of Narratives in Same-Sex 
Adoption Cases,” Columbia Law Review, vol. 99, no. 3 (1999): 739-94. 
33
   Wintemute. Sexual Orientation and Human Rights; Alastair Mowbray, “The Creativity of the 
European Court of Human Rights,” Human Rights Law Review, vol. 5, no. 1 (2005): 57-79; 
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been beneficial. Studying these two approaches together is interesting, since it 
reveals how discourses that were once assumed to be unrelated are not only 
interconnected, but they also impact each other. Yet, it also highlights the distinct 
interconnections between discourses at different locales. Namely, addressing the 
issue of gender and sexuality subjectivities in postcolonial and/or ethnically divided 
places – where ideas about nationhood and national identity and traditional and 
religious conceptions are not only still prevalent, but they are also exposed to 
external influences – through the lens of both queer theory and national identity 
theory, underscores the limits of understanding national, gender and sexuality 
identity formation solely as a nationally-based phenomenon.  
Moreover, an attempt to bridge academic discourses about gender and 
sexuality subjectivities and about identity-formation and politics which is based on 
all positions’ shared support for gender and sexual equality, is in a better position to 
discern and avoid the perils of both identity and rights-based approaches and of a 
radical project that could be impractical or unrealizable in specific locales. In this 
way it helps cover some gaps in the existing literature, while it also generates new 
ideas about how external transnational/supranational discourses of sexuality and 
modes of sexual politics could be appropriated by activists at the national level, in 
ways that are compatible with local particularities and historical distinctions.  
In sum, this thesis attempts to approach the national identity-gender-sexuality 
relationship in a manner that the relevant scholarship to date has avoided. We can 
reach a richer and more thorough understanding of the operations of discourses of 
identity, gender and sexuality by examining the articulations of competing, yet not 
necessarily incompatible, visions. This thesis focuses on local and 
transnational/supranational, official and unofficial discourses of nationhood, gender 
and sexuality, on their relationship to power and culture, as well as on their 
interconnections and effects on individuals. By doing so it attempts to highlight daily 
life conditions and experiences that are otherwise obscured. It aims to expand the 
ways in which gender and sexuality subjectivities can be imagined, articulated and 
                                                                                                                                          
Katharina Boele-Woelki, “The Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships within the European 
Union,” Tulane Law Review vol. 82 (2008): 1949-1981; Kelly Kollman, “European Institutions, 
Transnational Networks and National Same-Sex Unions Policy: When Soft Law Hits Harder,” 
Contemporary Politics vol. 15, no. 1(2009): 37-53; Travis, J. Langenkamp, “Finding Fundamental 
Fairness: Protecting the Rights of Homosexuals under European Union Accession Law,” San Diego 
International Law Journal, vol. 4 (2003): 437-66. 
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studied and, in this manner, to represent a new, complimentary focused scholarly 
approach to theories and ideas, whose real currency is measured by their impact on 
people’s lives. 
Before embarking into an analysis of these power dynamics and of the 
questions that they generate, a few caveats are in order. The first one relates to the 
way in which I employ some contested terminology and terms with more than one 
meaning. In this thesis, I use the terms ‘subjectivity’, ‘identification’ and ‘identity’ to 
denote what I understand to be the three stages/products of a process. In part, this is 
so because of the ways in which the interviewees described this process.
34
 By 
‘subjectivity’ I mean the portrayal and construction of certain people and classes of 
people by others. For example, ‘LGBTQ subjectivity’ refers to the way in which 
LGBTQ individuals are perceived and constructed by the predominant forces of the 
social and political milieu in which they are located, without this meaning that they 
have no control over this procedure.
35
 By ‘identification’ I mean individuals’ own 
self-perceptions, while ‘identity’ signifies the assignment of various identifications 
with political meaning. For example, a person who identifies as a man who has sex 
with other men does not necessary understand himself as a ‘gay’ man.36 This is 
because, within the context that I examine (that is, Cyprus) ‘imported’ terms like 
‘gay’ or ‘lesbian’ denote a specific political sexual identity. The Cypriot man who 
has sex with other men identifies as ‘gay’ once he perceives his sexual choice not 
only as part of his personal identity, but also as a political identity.  
I use the term ‘Europeanization’ quite loosely, intending it to refer to the 
involvement with, and participation in, European bodies, institutions and 
mechanisms, to the abidance with the laws and policies of such bodies and to the 
embracing of the ideas and values that these bodies represent – for example, human 
rights. Although I recognize the binaries embedded in concepts like ‘Europe/West 
                                                 
34
   This will be the focus of chapter four.  
35
   Michel Foucault (1978). The History of Sexuality Volume 1: The Will to Knowledge, trans. 
Robert Hurley (London and New York: Penguin Books, 1998), 60. My understanding of the 
formation of subjectivities is in agreement with the Foucaultian concept of ‘subjectivization’: the 
different subject positions in discourse. The fact that subjects are being positioned in discourse does 
not necessarily render subjects passive since subjects are not only products of power, but they are also 
producers of themselves. Such understanding of ‘subject’ and ‘subjectivization’ precludes discourse 
determinism and the essentialization of power. See: Kevin Kendall and Gary Wickham, Using 
Foucault’s Methods (London: Sage, 1999), 54. 
36
   As Weeks explains, ‘homosexual behaviour is widespread; but distinctive roles, categories and 
ways of life have developed only in some cultures, and do not necessarily encompass all forms of 
homosexual activity’. See: Jeffrey Weeks, “Sexual Orientation,” in The Languages of Sexuality 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2011), 191. 
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versus the Rest and/or the non-European/non-West/ the Periphery’,37 in this thesis I 
use these concepts extensively, in order to denote the hierarchies – some of them 
discursive – and the unequal dynamics between the Western European and Anglo-
American ‘centre’, on the one hand, and the rest of the world, on the other hand.38 
Undeniably, these hierarchies and the unequal power and cultural influence balance 
are, to a great extent, the result of discourses of ‘modernity’.39 Such discourses have 
formed the nucleus of colonial projects that have divided the world into 
‘civilized/advanced’ and ‘uncivilized/backward’.40 As the discussion of the case of 
Cyprus will amply demonstrate, the effects of such discourses continue to haunt 
former colonial peoples, thus rendering the idea of the possibility of ‘postcoloniality’ 
– or even, ‘postmodernity’ – questionable.41  
The second caveat relates to my position as a researcher in relation to my 
topic and to the people I interviewed as part of this project. Like many others who 
conduct research on sexual identities, I was asked by interviewees, fellow 
researchers and friends about my motives for choosing to undertake such a project. 
To answer, I adopt Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s comments about her positionality in 
relation to her project, and about the attacks she received from some gay scholars for 
                                                 
37
   I criticize these binarisms in chapter five. 
38
   Martin W. Lewis Karen E. Wigen, The Myth of Continents: A Critique of Metageography 
(Berkeley &Los Angeles, CA & London: University of California Press, 1997), 1-19. 
39
   ‘Modernity’ is an ambiguous term with regard to what it denotes and with regard to the way it has 
been employed over different historical periods and about different milieux. The term becomes even 
more ambiguous when applied to the case of formerly colonial Cyprus where ‘multiple modernities’ 
intersect. See: Jürgen Habermas. The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (1987). Translated by 
Frederick G. Lawrence. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005. For the purposes of this thesis, the terms 
‘modern’, ‘modernity’ and ‘modernization’ are understood in their conventional sense, i.e., they refer 
to the nineteenth-century European societies’ social transformations, which were later transmitted into 
other contexts. 
40
   Edward W. Said (1978). Orientalism. London: Penguin Books, 2003; Anne McClintock, Imperial 
Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest (New York and London: Routledge, 
1995), 1-17 & 391-6; Tony Ballantyne and Antoinette Burton, “Introduction: Bodies, Empires and 
World Histories,” in Bodies in Contact: Rethinking Colonial Encounters in World History, ed. Tony 
Ballantyne and Antoinette Burton (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2005), 1-15; Tony 
Ballantyne and Antoinette Burton, “Postscript: Bodies, Genders, Empires: Reimagining World 
Histories,” in Bodies in Contact: Rethinking Colonial Encounters in World History, ed. Tony 
Ballantyne and Antoinette Burton (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2005), 405-23. 
41
   Ashis Nandy, The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self under Colonialism (Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 1983), xi.; Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “The Making of Americans, the Teaching 
of English, and the Future of Culture Studies,” New Literary History, vol. 21, no. 4 (1990): 794-5; 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “In a Word: Interview with Ellen Rooney,” Differences, vol. 1, no. 2 
(1989): 139. See also: Richard E. Palmer, “Toward a Postmodern Interpretive Self-Awareness,” The 
Journal of Religion, vol. 55, no. 3 (1975): 319. This issue will be extensively discussed in chapter 
five.  
Nayia Kamenou  Page 35 of 343 
 





It is as if one couldn’t say [or be] “heterosexual” in the first person without 
invoking, fatuously, the mendacious pretense of the two terms’ symmetry – as well 
as of their empirical transparency. That was part of what my performative insistence 
was about: a refusal to pretend to make sense within a bifurcated discourse that did 




To explicate, an understanding of gender and sexuality as bifurcated – 
whether this understanding is propelled through heterocentric discourses, or it is 
articulated by some scholars who see it necessary to police gender, sexuality and 
disciplinary borders – fails to account for the way I perceive myself and for the way I 
position myself in relation to my project. 
However, my – or any other researcher’s – motives for studying a topic, is of 
secondary relevance. What is relevant – and what really affects both the process and 
the results of projects like mine – is not the researcher’s standpoint, voice or 
sexuality. Rather, it is the fact that any standpoint or voice – regardless of the 
motives behind it – is always thought of as being related to some kind of vested 
interest. This tendency to look for motives and vested interests in projects about 
sexual identities confirms that sexuality is tangled in webs of power. It also confirms 
that sexuality and sexual identities are not merely the effects of the forces that 
produce them. Engaging with them through research, unearthing the processes of 
their formation and voicing them is unavoidably a political act, since doing so 
unveils the ways in which they could function as weapons against those webs of 
power that attempt to eradicate them, via keeping them invisible.  
An imperative question remains, though: How can ‘research as praxis’ 
actualize in the postmodern/post-positivist era?
44
 How could one create an 
empowering research design and conduct empirical research in an era characterized 
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   Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick. Between Men: English Literature and Male Homosocial Desire. New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1985. 
43
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International Forum, vol. 11, no. 6 (1988): 569.  
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by ‘a crucial disparity between the world and the knowledge we might have of it’?45 
Rather than inhibiting scientific inquiry from reaching ‘the truth’, the 
postmodern/post-positivist turn has pointed out the limitations of science and has 
highlighted the importance of realizing that there is no such thing as ‘reality’ for 
scientific inquiry to grasp and explain. Therefore, what makes good scientific inquiry 
is being attentive to the different ways available of knowing and of making sense of 
human life and experience. The fact that the production and legitimization of 
knowledge has been exposed as being historically and culturally situated does not 
annihilate scientific inquiry. Rather, it prompts scholarship to make its biases part of 
its argument and of its study.
46
 Consequently, the question of legitimization is 
rephrased from establishing ‘the truth’ to deciphering how and why certain truths are 




This idea of reflexivity guided my project throughout. Following Bourdieu’s 
recommendations, I attempted to remain constantly aware of my own biases and of 
my social relation to the topic of my study.
48
 As Foucault phrased it, ‘the object was 
to learn to what extent the effort to think one’s own history can free thought from 
what it silently thinks, and so enable it to think differently’.49 My aim is to promote 
understanding regarding the processes that lead to self-identification and to 
subjectivization by others, as well as regarding the power nexus amidst which these 
processes become possible. My objective is to coordinate theory and praxis and thus 
enhance action that leads to a change of the current status quo, which currently 
alienates certain gender and sexuality identifications.  
In the process of doing so, I have been constantly reflecting on how my value 
commitments insert themselves into my work, and with what consequences.
50
 I have 
also remained constantly aware of the ethical dilemmas raised when one interviews 
people on a sensitive topic such as sexuality, and of the analytic difficulties and 
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shortcomings associated with doing discourse analysis. One of these shortcomings, 
to which discourse analysis is most vulnerable is the circular identification of 
discourses and mental constructs;
51
 namely, citing utterances and interviewees’ 
responses in explanation for these same utterances and responses. But if, according 
to the postmodern/post-positivist argument, there is no such thing as ‘one truth’ to be 
unearthed through research and if interviewees’ articulations about themselves and 
about their experiences do not escape the confines of the interviewees’ socio-
cultural, political context and reality, exactly what is a researcher supposed to study? 
What analytical tools and principles should she employ?  
As Kitzinger explains, balancing the relationship between ‘voice’ and 
‘experience’ and avoiding drawing hasty conclusions about the latter based on the 
former necessitates that the researcher pays attention to the details of both what is 
said – or not said – and of how it is said, while keeping in mind that the act of talking 
constitutes experience at the moment it is articulated.
52
 Based on this principle and 
on her empirical research, she argues in favour of a conversation analysis approach. 
Prioritizing what and especially how questions over why questions as an analytical 
approach is not exclusive to conversation analysis followers. Some forms of 
discourse analysis and narrative analysis also focus on talk as action-constitutive.
53
 
Nevertheless, the aim of this project is not to pay allegiance to a specific 
methodological approach, while remaining blind to the useful insights that other 
approaches might elucidate. Rather, I follow Bourdieu’s ‘methodological 
polytheism’ that calls for the adoption of any techniques that are relevant and useful 
for the purposes of the project.
54
 
Fifty-five interviews were conducted and fifty-five questionnaires were 
distributed to the interviewees from January 2009 to November 2010. The 
interviewees recruited were: twenty Greek-Cypriot ‘elite’ participants – i.e., state, 
political party, military, Orthodox Church clergy and women’s movements 
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members, representatives and officials – and thirty-five Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-
Cypriot self-identified LGBTQ participants. The recruitment of the political elites 
was purposive: I chose to interview both male and female politicians who are 
affiliated with the four major Greek-Cypriot political parties.
55
 In addition to 
controlling for gender and political affiliation/ideology, I chose the specific 
politicians based on a background research that I had conducted on each one of 
them. Namely, I chose to recruit politicians who had been involved in civil rights 
campaigns and/or had participated in parliamentary committees dealing with equality 
issues. I recruited these political elites by contacting them directly – mostly via email 
– or by approaching cabinet staff who arranged for me to meet them. The interview 
questions for political elites were tailored based on each interviewee’s past and 
present political activities and publically articulated positions on certain topics. 
However, the questionnaires were identical for all participants. 
I recruited military officials through ‘snowballing’. I managed to recruit both 
male and female officials and I made sure that they were representative of a large 
age span – mid-twenties to late fifties. Additionally, I made sure to interview 
military officials with different political party affiliations, by asking participants 
already interviewed if they could bring me into contact with colleagues who held 
different positions than themselves on questions such as ‘what do you think of 
Turkish-Cypriots’ or ‘what do you consider to be a favourable solution to the 
national problem’.56  
In their majority, the representatives of women’s movements whom I 
interviewed were elected MPs at the time the interviews were conducted. Therefore, 
I could control for political ideology/political party affiliation. Nevertheless, it was 
hard to assure a large age span among these interviewees, since Cypriot women’s 
movements had been particularly active only for the short period between the late 
1970s and the late 1980s. Therefore, all the interviewees were women in their late 
forties and early fifties. I recruited these women primarily by contacting them 
                                                 
55
   These parties are: The rightist ‘Democratic Rally of Cyprus’ (Δημοκρατικός Συναγερμός, DISY), 
the socialist-centrist ‘Movement for Social Democracy’ (Ενιαία Δημοκρατική Ένωση Κέντρου, 
EDEK), the rightist-centrist ‘Democratic Party’ (Δημοκρατικό Κόμμα, DIKO), and the leftist-
communist ‘Progressive Party for the Working People’ (Ανορθωτικό Κόμμα Εργαζόμενου Λαού, 
AKEL). 
56
   In Cyprus, political party ideologies are more or less centred on these two topics. Therefore, even 
if participants where careful not to name the political party they support, their answers to questions on 
these two issues were more or less indicative of where they stand on the Cypriot politico-ideological 
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directly. The interview questions were tailored to suit each woman’s past and present 
activities pertaining to gender issues. 
With regard to these three subgroups of elites, I had relative flexibility in 
choosing interviewees and controlling for variables. Nevertheless, the situation with 
high-ranking members of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus clergy was much different. 
Conversely to the case of political elites who might feel that they would jeopardize 
their good public image, if they refuse to participate in a research project in which 
their political opponents have already participated, high-ranking clergymen do not 
have to face this ‘peer pressure’. The Church of Cyprus’s official position on the 
issue of homosexuality is one (hostile) and nonnegotiable. Therefore, members of 
the clergy do not want to individually position themselves on the subject, in order 
not to risk saying something that would either contradict the Church’s official 
position, or substantiate the fact that their hostile attitudes towards homosexuality 
have no strong theological basis. Those clergy members I interviewed, I reached 
through personal contacts. In order to assure that they would stay on board and not 
cancel the interview, I had my contacts tell them that my project is about social 
equality within Cypriot society in general. 
It should be noted that I do not assume that the conclusions I draw based on 
interviews with Greek-Cypriot elites are neatly applicable to the socio-political 
milieu in the occupied part of the island. Additionally, I do understand the problem 
created by inadequately disaggregating the concept of ‘official/public agents and 
discourses’ that operate within the Turkish-Cypriot context, since I do not have any 
data available from Turkish-Cypriot elites. Nevertheless, this lack of data is due to 
PhD completion time-limitations and to the difficulties this time-limitation caused in 
making contacts with ‘TRNC’ officials – contacts that were difficult to make, 
partially because I am a national of the RoC.  
What is also important to highlight is my selection of elite and non-elite 
interviewees in relation to the character, structure and composition of Cypriot 
society. Although elite actors’ discourses, narratives and ideas about national 
identity, gender and sexuality might differ according to these actors’ power position 
– for example, community/municipality political elites versus national-level political 
representatives – in the case of the RoC, real decision-making with regard to citizens 
and groups’ rights and liberties lies with national-level, high-ranking political elites, 
such as MPs, since they are in a position to propose and vote upon legislation 
Nayia Kamenou  Page 40 of 343 
 
pertaining to social, legal and political equality. Therefore, and also because of the 
difficulties in recruiting elite interviewees, I chose to interview national-level 
political representatives.  
With regard to non-elite interviewees, though, it seemed necessary to ensure 
the participation of individuals from both rural and urban areas. Although the 
majority of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot LGBTQ interviewees resided in 
the island’s biggest cities – for example, Nicosia, Limassol, Larnaca and Kyrenia – a 
considerable number of them had grown up in suburban areas. However, LGBTQ 
participants’ approaches to national identity, gender and sexuality did not seem to be 
influenced by their place of birth and/or residence. It could be argued that the small 
size of the country accounts, at least partially, for the lack of differences in 
perceptions and ideas among LGBTQ interviewees from urban versus rural/suburban 
areas. Nonetheless, several differences with regard to perceptions about non-
heterosexual sexual identities and LGBTQ rights were found among these 
interviewees. These seem to be attributed to the different degree of exposure of each 
interviewee to ‘Western/European’ external discourses about sexual and gender 
identities and politics. For example, Cypriot LGBTQ interviewees who had attended 
university abroad, travelled, or participated in LGBTQ on-line forums seemed to be 
more acquainted with, and supportive of, LGBTQ identity and rights politics.   
I recruited Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot interviewees through 
‘snowballing’. The majority of the interviews I conducted were one-to-one, although 
I conducted a number of group interviews also. Group interviews were not initially 
one of my chosen methods, since I was concerned with maintaining anonymity and 
confidentiality; they were the only available option when, in some instances, I would 
go meet an individual participant and found a group of friends who also wanted to 
talk to me. Although I had not planned to conduct group interviews, they turned out 
to be very useful. These types of interviews closely resembled participant 
observation and naturally occurring talk. Thus, they afforded me the opportunity to 
get an insight into LGBTQ participants’ conflicting and crossing discourses, as well 
as  into the ways through which they negotiate their different positions on ‘common 
interests’.57   
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The interviews with Greek-Cypriot participants were conducted in Greek and 
I transcribed them and translated them into English. The interviews with Turkish-
Cypriots were conducted in English. It should be pointed out that the issue of 
language and translation highlighted more important points and raised more 
possibilities than it created problems. For example, in their majority, the LGBTQ 
participants initially reacted negatively to the term ‘queer’. Neither in Turkish nor in 
Greek has the term assumed the political impetus it carries in its English form. In 
Turkish and in Greek, the word continues to be used in its literal sense and stands for 
‘strange’, ‘freaky’, ‘comical’ and/or ‘grotesque’. However, after explaining to the 
interviewees the usage of the specific adjective, noun and verb in English, some of 
them were much less reluctant to accept it as an eligible term for describing non-
heterosexual sexual desire. A similar matter arose in relation to the term ‘trans*’. 
Most LGBTQ participants thought that the term stands exclusively for ‘post-surgical 
transsexuals’. Some reported that after having been explained what the term means 
and how it differs and relates to the term ‘transsexual’, they became less negative 
towards it. 
In the past, in positivist and quasi-positivist analyses about approaches to 
social inquiry and about qualitative research methodology in the social sciences, 
leading questions were described as an error to be avoided. Such analyses that drew 
upon August Compte and Emile Durkheim’s sociology warned against the imperfect 
reality that interview data give access to.
58
 However, in non-statistical qualitative 
analyses like the present one, the first problem with rejecting leading questions as a 
bad way of conducting interviews is that there exist no specific criteria to be applied 
in order to tell that a question is leading.  
For example, a question like ‘you do identify as a gay man, right?’ is strongly 
leading, especially when addressed to an interviewee who has never contemplated 
about sexual identity categorizations. A question like ‘how would you describe your 
sexual identity?’ is clearly less suggestive. Nonetheless, and still according to who 
the interviewee is, such a question might still lead the interviewee into a response 
that does not really reflect his self-perception as a sexual being. Namely, when such 
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a question is posed to him, the interviewee might choose the best available answer 
from a pool of existing answers/vocabulary: The interviewee might response ‘I am a 
gay man’, or ‘I am a homosexual’, or ‘I prefer to see myself as queer’. This question 
would appear to be less leading, if the interviewee chose to respond ‘none of the 
terminology commonly used to describe non-heterosexual sexual choice reflects the 
way I perceive myself as a sexual being’. Therefore, it might be more useful to think 
of questions along a continuum, on the one end of which the interviewer provides the 
details of the answer she seeks to get, while on the other end the interviewee 
provides all the details.
59
  
Additionally, whether or not an interviewee will be led into a specific answer 
from a specific question does not only depend on the way the interviewer phrases or 
articulates the question. It also depends on the interviewee’s way of understanding, 
his assumptions and expectations.
60
 Having said that, asking the interviewees to react 
to the terms ‘queer’ and ‘trans*’ before and after I had explained the meaning these 
terms have in English, might be considered as a ‘leading’ method. However, these 
questions aimed to verify my interpretations amidst the difficulties created by the 
language/translation issue. Moreover, they were used to test for contradictory and 
conflicting discourses/positions held by interviewees. 
My approach to the interviewees’ self-articulations and narratives was 
interactional and reflexive. Namely, while conducting and analyzing the interviews, I 
focused on the dialogic process between teller and listener.
61
 The interviews with 
LGBTQs were also active. Namely, they developed into a two-way conversation 
during which I established a climate of mutual disclosure on some aspects.
62
 
Nonetheless, the interviews with elites were of a different type. They were more 
formal, although they were also characterized by reflexivity. However, this 
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reflexivity was premised on an interplay of knowledge and power.
63
 Some elite 
interviewees attempted to position themselves in relation to me as ‘the 
information/knowledge-holder’ versus ‘the non-knower/apprentice’. 
Characteristically, when pressed to comment on the unequal status of women in 
relation to men in the Church’s organizational structure, one bishop dismissed my 
questions by saying that they were stupid and naive and that I was not informed well 
enough about the topic I sought to investigate.
64
  
This is an example of an instance in which elite interviewees try to use the 
interview setting in order to affirm their institutional authority. In this, as well as in 
similar situations, I had no option but to allow power relationships to enter my study 
of power.
65
 I approached this display of power as another context within which my 
research could occur,
66
 and I adopted an agonistic and hard-talk approach towards 
hostile elite interviewees.
67
 Namely, when interviewees would attempt to evade 
addressing certain questions by disturbing the power dynamics between interviewee 
and interviewer, I would push even harder for an answer. In all such instances, this 
approach proved to be particularly effective, since it served as a reminder to the 
agitated interviewee that the researcher is as much of a ‘knower’ of her research field 
as the interviewee is a ‘knower’ of the issues that pertain to his institution and 
institutional role. 
An amalgam of research techniques was used and a variety of participants 
were interviewed for the purposes of this project. Additionally, this thesis treats 
subjects as diverse as nationhood and national identities, colonialism, gender and 
sexuality subjectivities, identifications and identities, forms of sexual politics, 
institutional and grassroots agency and its relationship with local and 
transnational/supranational discourses and power structures. However, I do not 
propose to offer anything like a complete, universal view of the multiple and 
intricate connections that emanate when numerous discourses cross. Nonetheless, I 
do aim to present a comprehensive analysis of the Cypriot discursive landscape 
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within which imaginations, performances and political articulations of gender and 
sexuality become possible. For the purposes of this thesis, the invocation of the case 
of Cyprus aims to serve as an entrance into relatively overlooked questions and 
discussions about how the national identity-gender-sexuality relationship plays out, 
and how it is structured and restructured when the ‘local’ and the ‘supranational’ 
cross.  
I do not want to imply that national identity, gender, sexuality, their 
indigenous forms and their external constructions can be reduced simply to the 
‘West/Europe versus non-West/non-European’ opposition. Such a claim stakes too 
much ground for accurate analyses of geographical and historical particularities and 
it also binds us to binaries and essentialisms which ignore the politics and the forces 
that initially divided the world into the ‘West/Europe’ and the ‘Rest’. However, I do 
believe that targeting discourses of identities at different levels is a way of making 
sense of their importance and their artificiality, as well as of their real and often dire 
impact on people’s lives. 
 
This thesis is divided in five chapters, with each one of them addressing a 
different angle and focusing on a different aspect of the main relationship under 
investigation, namely national identity-gender-sexuality. Chapter one foregrounds 
the ways through which the boundaries of nationhood, gender and sexuality have 
been policed and reinforced in Cyprus, in an era in which the traditional ways of the 
organization of the national collectivity and of its members’ relationships have been 
challenged by external, European influences, as well as by perceived ‘ethnic’ 
enemies – in the case of Cyprus, Turkey. It demonstrates that political and religious 
institutional agents – and specifically, the Orthodox Church of Cyprus – cultivate 
and preserve discourses that have undermined the possibility for flexibility and 
fluidity of social formations and understandings of national identity, gender and 
sexuality, and they circumscribe the available spaces for the exercise of non-elite 
agency. Nonetheless, it reveals that, like LGBTQ individuals, Cypriot elite 
institutional actors are also limited by the confines of the very discourses that they 
themselves propel. Yet, through the examination of some recent examples of public 
discussions about LGBTQ rights in Cyprus, it demonstrates that the Cypriot 
discursive landscape is penetrable by alternative destabilizing narratives.  
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Chapter two reflects on the ways through which the national identity-gender-
sexuality relationship could be reconfigured, in order to broaden the available spaces 
for the articulation of alternative, non-heteronormative narratives of gender and 
sexuality. It focuses on the organization and mobilization of Cypriot women’s 
groups, and it attributes the lack of development of feminist political activism in 
Cyprus to these groups’ close allegiance with, and participation in, nationalistic, 
androcentric and patriarchical projects. However, it shows that this allegiance and 
participation has been more instrumental and strategic than ideological. 
Consequently, it emphasizes the importance of some forms of ‘strategic 
essentialism’68 in milieux where, because of the predominance of patriarchical, 
androcentric and heterocentric nationalist discourses, there are no alternative ways 
for subordinated groups to get a foot into the existing power structures. Additionally, 
it underscores the significance of the employment of European mechanisms, 
institutions and discourses as a way through which the ‘strategic essentialism versus 
identity deconstruction’ dilemma could be prevented or transcended in such locales.  
The third chapter marks two instances in which Cypriot prevalent 
constructions and hierarchies of gender and sexuality were disrupted by Cypriot 
LGBTQ individuals. More specifically, it discusses the development and the socio-
political impact of two legal cases – Modinos v. Cyprus and Marangos v. Cyprus – 
that were adjudicated by the ECtHR and the European Commission on Human 
Rights (EComHR).
69
 Through the examination of the events that preceded and 
followed the adjudication of these cases, as well as through the analysis of the 
several factors that marked the beginning of the formation of a Cypriot politics of 
sexuality, it emphasizes the positive effects of external/transnational discourses and 
mechanisms at the local level. Moreover, it calls into question the applicability of 
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some of queer theory’s tenets in locales like Cyprus, where the choice between 
radical politics of sexuality and identity/rights-based politics of sexuality is not even 
existent, because of the almost complete permeation of the socio-political landscape 
by homophobic discourses. 
Chapter four focuses primarily on Cypriot LGBTQs self-perceptions. It 
reveals the large degree to which homophobic official narratives have negatively 
affected the ways in which Cypriot LGBTQ individuals understand themselves as 
sexual beings, as well as the fact that Cypriot LGBTQs participate in the sanctioning 
of non-heterosexual modalities of sexuality. For instance, it marks in-group 
exclusions and alienations, both intra-ethnic – that is, among Greek-Cypriot 
LGBTQs and among Turkish-Cypriot LGBTQs – and interethnic – that is, between 
Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot LGBTQs. Nevertheless, it illustrates that, 
although some of these exclusions are reinforced by the employment of the 
‘Europe/West versus the Rest’ language, both Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot 
LGBTQ groups’ formation processes and operations have been based on tools and 
opportunities afforded to them by ‘Europe’. 
The thesis closes with chapter five that scrutinizes the essentialisms and 
hierarchies embedded in the concept of Europeanization and in global sexual 
identities, which sometimes reinforce understandings of local cultures and of 
indigenous modalities of sexuality as inferior. It traces the construction of such 
essentialisms and hierarchies in colonial history and in ideas of ‘modernization’, 
which have acted as colonialisms’ ideological pillars. After placing the concepts of 
‘postmodernity’ and ‘postcoloniality’ under the same type of scrutiny, it evaluates 
the applicability of Western European and Anglo-American paradigms of sexuality 
politics in other milieux. This analysis leads to the conclusion that, in places like 
Cyprus, the debates between proponents of radical and mainstream approaches to 
sexual politics offer little insight to local LGBTQ activists. The reason is that, 
because of the hostile environment within which they operate and which they, 
nonetheless, have to affect, the very newly established Cypriot LGBTQ 
organizations do not have the luxury of choosing between ideological approaches, or 
even between types of strategies. The employment of European institutions and 
discourses, and especially of the ECtHR and of the language of human rights is, at 
least currently, the only viable option towards getting a step closer to both 
nominal/legal and substantive equality, even if this implies that Cypriot LGBTQs 
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have to succumb to group identity formation limitations, and to a foreign language 
about non-heterosexual sexuality that conflicts with local/indigenous understandings. 
The following chapters, then, have a dual purpose. First, they emphasize 
local perceptions of nationhood and constructions of national identity as sites 
through which gender and sexuality subjectivities are controlled, and gender and 
sexuality demonstrations, identifications  and identities are rendered as ‘deviant’ or 
‘appropriate’ in relation to the national collectivity’s imagined telos. Thus, the thesis 
marks a fundamental reconception of the nature and workings of public official 
discourses on aspects of life that have been traditionally negated and/or portrayed as 
politically irrelevant. Second, the thesis insists on the centrality of the relationship 
between the local/national and the transnational/supranational. This commitment 
stems from the fact that, in Cyprus, as well as in other places where the discursive 
landscape is dominated by androcentric, patriarchical, homophobic and nationalistic 
discursive power structures, external influences have afforded subaltern groups the 
means to begin to assume some control over their lives. This is so even though this 
process of Cypriots’ self-realization and self-construction is yet to be completed, 
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Theories of nationalism have extensively highlighted the importance of 
constructions of nationhood and national identity towards cultivating a sense of 
belonging and of continuity that, consequently, preserves people’s allegiance to the 
national collective self,
70
 and also maintains nationalist power structures in place.
71
  
Whether real or imagined, invented or constructed, elite-engineered or rooted in the 
past and memory, national identities have the power to define not only community, 
but also group and individual modes of existence. Official public discourses of 
nationalism interact with private ‘hidden’ discourses.72 Whether ‘banal’ and 
symbolic,
73
 or dogmatic and explicit, demonstrations of nationalism have a strong 
impact on subjectivities, like gender and sexuality, which the predominant literature 
does not sufficiently address. Both as an unbound seriality of everyday universals, 
and as a bound seriality of ‘governmentality’,74 nationalism and the politics of 
ethnicity circumscribe the processes through which identities and imaginable lived 
experience are shaped. 
Discerning the possibilities for exercise of agency amidst these processes 
reveals the pervasiveness of such discourses, which manage to reach ‘into the very 
grain of individuals’.75 Nonetheless, it also demonstrates that they are not 
impermeable to alternative radical narratives. Even in milieux that are characterized 
by ethnic divisions and conflict, where the perceived need to protect the national 
collectivity from external threats is rendered as the ultimate priority, schemes of 
agency that prioritize elements and subjectivities other than nationhood and national 
identity, have the ability to destabilize – even to a limited degree – discourses of 
sterile groupism and national exclusivity. Such alternative discourses and schemes of 
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agency gain impetus as the national socio-political status quo gives way to the norms 
of a new global order and to the workings of supranational institutions and 
mechanisms. 
The case of Cyprus is particularly instructive towards eliciting and answering 
various pertinent questions which arise when nationhood and national identity are 
understood as inextricably linked to subjectivities such as gender and sexuality. 
Namely, the example of Cyprus helps demonstrate the impact of nationalist and 
national identity discourses both on individual and on collective narratives about 
gender and sexuality in an ethnically divided locale, where ideas and ideals about the 
need to preserve the national collectivity interact in consonant and dissonant ways 
with international and regional/ ‘European’ discourses. 
The central arguments of this chapter will be developed in three different 
sections. The first section of this chapter will focus on nationalism literature. It will 
discuss its various strands and highlight its shortcomings, which it will subsequently 
attempt to address. It will argue that gender and sexuality subjectivities need to be 
examined as elements that are central in processes of making of the national self. It 
will also argue that questions of exercise of agency over identity formation cannot be 
sufficiently addressed, unless the concept of ‘agency’ is disaggregated and unless the 
agents’ relation to discourses is understood – through a Foucaultian approach – both 
as reciprocal and flexible. 
The second section will focus on the particularities of the case of Cyprus. It 
will discuss the processes of national identity formation among Greek-Cypriots and 
Turkish-Cypriots from the early twentieth century until today. It will evaluate the 
prospects of emasculating nationalistic ideological struggles, both within each ethnic 
collectivity and between them. It will argue that Europeanization and the prospects 
of EU membership have functioned as important catalysts of change in predominant 
nationalist discourses. It will then attempt to identify the main obstacles towards the 
further emasculation of such rhetoric and it will argue that the lack of separation 
between state and Church hinders attempts to bring about discursive and power 
structure changes. However, it will conclude that change is not impossible.  
The last section will focus specifically on the nationhood-gender-sexuality 
relationship. It will discuss the ways through which, in Cyprus, gender has been 
employed in order to ground nationalist discourses. It will discern the essentialisms 
embedded in nationalist interpretations and usages of gender and sexuality and it will 
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argue that some of the Cypriot gender literature is complicit in their perpetuation. It 
will argue that nationalism is a discourse of sexuality in and of itself, since national 
discourses become authoritative of what comes to be perceived by the national 
collectivity as ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ sexual behaviour.76 Specifically about 
Cyprus, it will argue that the criminalization of homosexuality and the intensification 
of inter-ethnic animosity by the British colonizers has augmented Cypriots’ feelings 
of abhorrence towards the ‘other’, be it the ethnic ‘enemy’ or the ‘sexually deviant’ 
individual. 
Finally, this section will discern and analyze the Foucaultian subjectivity-
discourse relationship
77
, as this is exemplified in Cyprus. Namely, it will discuss 
elite and LGBTQ individuals’ relationship with predominant androcentric, 
heteronormative discourses of gender and sexuality. It will argue that these 
discourses have such an impact that they limit not only the imagination and available 
vocabulary of those whom they target, but also of the elites that participate in their 
construction and dissemination. However, it will also argue that this situation is not 
necessarily irrevocable. Agreeing with Kendall and Wickham’s reading of 
Foucaultian ‘subjectivity’,78 the chapter will conclude that self-shaping and action 
over prominent discourses are possible. This is because, as the articulation of 
alternative discourses and the visibility of alternative modalities of gender and 
sexuality are increased, exclusionary discourses lose their impetus, especially if such 
alternatives are couched in the language of ‘Europe’ and ‘human rights’. 
Theories of Nationalism and the Question of Agency in Identity 
Construction 
 
 One of the central questions that theories of nationalism and national identity 
construction examine is how ‘the nation’ was constructed. For the ‘ethno-symbolic’ 
school of thought, which is represented by the seminal work of Anthony D. Smith, 
both the formation of the state and its operations would be impossible without the 
existence of a relatively homogenous ethnic core, and without the existence of a 
sense of identity and ancestry among people which is exemplified in myths, 
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memories, symbols, values and traditions and cultural perceptions.
79
 Smith argues 
that ‘ethnicity’ should not be conflated with ‘nationhood’, which is an invented 
political instrument and a social engineering project, since the past and memory 
necessarily prevent ethnicity’s ex nihilo creation.  
Smith disagrees with approaches that attribute the construction of ‘the nation’ 
to deceitful or self-delusional elite agents – like state officials, prelates, religious 
institutions’ representatives, or intellectual elites – which are represented by the 
work of authors like Eric Hobsbawm.
80
 Rather, he argues without the heritage of pre-
modern ethnic ties that ground national identity, the modern construction of the 
nation would be inconceivable, and the state’s political claims would not resonate 
among its constituency.
81
 Namely, that there exist solid historical and sociological 
grounds for the continuing devotion of people to their nations and national states, to 
which ‘modernist’ ideology is blind. As he explicates, for many people the sense of 
belonging to a nation evokes a sense of continuity over generations and a sense of 
immemorial belonging to an ascribed community that contributes to the preservation 
of the collective self.
82
 
Smith posits his theory as an alternative to arguments which see nationalism 
as a purely instrumental and social engineering elite project and, therefore, do not 
sufficiently explain why people subscribe to it.
83
 Yet, not all such approaches to 
nationalism are liable to Smith’s critique. The work of authors like Ernest Gellner, 
Eric Hobsbawm and John Breuilly, who argue that nations are modern creations that 
have been instrumental in the genesis of capitalism,
 84
 was problematized by 
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 For Anderson, nations have a powerful hold on people’s 
imagination. Essentially, by falling somewhere between theories of nationalism that 
ignore the importance of national sentiment and focus solely on the fabrication of 
history and tradition as a means for achieving political and economic ends, and 
theories that espouse a romantic view of the importance of ethnic, religious and 
cultural memories for people’s lives, Anderson moves ‘the nation’ and nationalism 
debate beyond the ‘mythology versus reality’ pattern of argumentation.  
Anderson makes a serious effort to explain why people subscribe to 
nationalism by transcending Gellner’s functionalist mode of explanation, which is 
based on economic concerns and on the competition over resources. His main 
argument is not one premised on the disjuncture between the ‘appearance’ and the 
‘reality’ of the nation. Rather, it is based on the idea that there is nothing more real 
than this fiction, than this ‘imagined community’.86 His most significant addition is 
his effort to explain nationalism’s appeal on popular imagination. He distinguishes 
between ‘nationalism’ and ‘the politics of ethnicity’ and interprets them as two kinds 
of seriality: the former is the unbound seriality of everyday universals, while the 
latter is the bound seriality of ‘governmentality’.87 According to Anderson, it is the 
unbound seriality of everyday universals that offers individuals the opportunity to 
imagine themselves as members of larger than face-to-face solidarities and to choose 
to act based on these imagined solidarities.
88
 Whereas Smith sees people’s 
willingness to die for the sake of their nation in pre-existing ‘ethnies’, Anderson 
stresses a socially constructed nationalism based on cultural, political and economic 
factors. 
However, none of the aforementioned theories of nationalism sufficiently 
addresses imperative questions about the dialectic and the dynamics between 
public/official discourses and private/ ‘hidden transcripts’ of national identity 
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 In the centre of these theoretical trajectories are collective narratives 
and institutional actions, which are seen as seeking to achieve ideal destined 
missions, or as legitimizing instrumental political, social and economic aims. 
Therefore, these theories do not sufficiently highlight the importance of national 
identity as a debate and as a process/practice, which is shaped through individual 
lived experience.  
Moreover, these theories do not exhaust the questions generated by the 
problem of agency: Could the ideals of nationalism be upheld without recognizing 
the politics of Foucaultian ‘governmentality’ as a ‘legitimate part of the ... modern 
political life of the nation?’ 90 Answering this question necessitates, firstly, 
disaggregating the concept ‘actors/agents of nationalism’,91 secondly, deciphering 
the numerous actors’ relationship vis-à-vis nationalism and national identity and,92 
thirdly, detecting and translating the ways in which different sets of actors 
internalize, articulate, embody or reject, deconstruct and perform ‘the nation’.93 The 
difficulty in answering this question, and the sub-questions that follow from it, 
originates from the ambiguity that characterizes the concepts of ‘identity’ and 
‘nationalism’, when these are used as tools of analysis in the social sciences and the 
humanities. As Brubaker and Cooper argue, ‘identity’ stands either for too little or 
for too much: A constructivist approach to identity – namely, the understanding of 
identity as constructed, fluid and multiple – provides no rationale or vocabulary for 
understanding the sometimes coercive force of external identification. An essentialist 
approach – that is, the understanding of identity as the expression of a core, unified, 
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stable unit like a collective or an individual – necessarily curtails efforts to 
problematize identities’ power on groups and on individuals.94  
Rogers Brubaker addresses questions of agency and of agency’s role in the 
perpetuation of nationalist discourses. He prompts social scientists to stop reifying 
nations as real and substantial entities.
95
 He argues that ‘we can think of a national 
minority … in terms of the field of differentiated and competitive positions or 
stances adopted by different organizations, parties, movements, or individual 
political entrepreneurs … each seeking to monopolize the legitimate representation 
of the group’.96 Studying the ethnically mixed Transylvanian town of Cluj, Brubaker 
concludes that although both the Romanian majority and Hungarian minority remain 
unresponsive to the rhetoric of ethno-national entrepreneurs, to their political 
projects, to their symbolic provocations and to nationalist public discourses in 
general, ethnicity and nationality have significance for these people at the level of 
social everyday life and interaction. Nevertheless, this significance is not 
demonstrated through ethnic tension in everyday life; rather, it is demonstrated ‘in 
everyday encounters, practical categories, commonsense knowledge, cultural idioms, 
cognitive schemas, interactional cues, discursive frames, organizational routines, 
social networks, and institutional reforms’.97 As a way of making sense of the social 
world, as opposed to an analytical frame of reference, this process is what Brubaker 
calls ‘everyday ethnicity’.98 
Brubaker, Loveman and Stamatov point out that the connection between 
public official discourses and popular everyday self-understandings is not 
sufficiently treated in the literature. Therefore, they consider categorization not only 
as a political project and as an everyday social practice, but also as a mental process. 
However, they do so without espousing a radical subjectivism, or a psychologistic 
and individualistic approach. By examining the distribution of ‘groupness’ as mental 
representations within a population – rather than as the content of representations – 
they attribute the appeal and resonance of classification and categorization schemes, 
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as well as the salience of ethnic and national discourses, to cognitive and socio-
cognitive mechanisms, rather than to an irreducible sense of identity and to 
unyielding emotional commitments. Consequently, they shift attention from the 
elitist and biased agency of intellectuals and political entrepreneurs in the 
construction of ethnicity and nationalism, to the less noticed everyday activities of 
common people, and to ethnicity and nationalism as ‘socially shared knowledge of 
social objects’.99 
But could Brubaker’s arguments about the city of Cluj be applied to state-
supported discourses of nationalism which are premised on inequalities and 
exclusions other than ethnic and cultural ones?  How about nationalism and 
‘everyday ethnicity’ in places where, in the name of ‘Europeanization’ and progress, 
diversity and tolerance are only nominally respected, while essentially and 
systematically people’s agency and negotiation over their identities – consciously or 
unconsciously – continues to be circumscribed along elitist constructions of 
normality and abnormality, of laudable or inappropriate attitudes for one’s nation? Is 
‘everyday ethnicity and nationalism’ different from public elite discourses with 
regard to subjectivities such as gender and sexuality, and their ‘appropriate-for-the 
nation’ performances?  
Brubaker’s agency argument disaggregates the concept of ‘actors of 
nationalism’ and opens up new questions about the nature of nationhood. 
Nonetheless, it does not extend to cover subjectivities and categorizations which, 
although they are less explicit and visible in the public and ‘national’ sphere, they 
continue to be treated as ‘deviaces’ from the national collectivity’s norms. The issue 
of whether, how, to what extent and with what consequences national identity is 
related to gender and sexuality, poses a challenge to Brubaker’s agency argument. If 
individual and group agency over the construction of national identity and over the 
negotiation of dominant discourses is possible, how far could individuals and groups 
stretch the limits of what fits into ‘national identity?’ Why is it that, in Cyprus, 
gender and sexuality are still very specifically and rigidly naturalized or demonized 
through the national and religious prism?  
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In seeing ‘everyday ethnicity’ as an alternative to nationalist discourses 
Brubaker, Loveman and Stamatov address subjectivities, individual transcripts and 
agency to a considerable extent. Nevertheless, they omit gender and sexuality 
subjectivities from the list of elements that are used in the process of making sense 
of one’s (national) self. Their scheme of agency over the construction and the 
negotiation of lived experience, and of national and other identities is important 
because it problematizes the omnipotence of dominant discourses and sterile 
groupism. Nonetheless, it needs to be expanded to address multiple subjectivities 
which often intersect. This is because being or not being recognized as a legitimate 
actor who is bestowed with agency over defining nationality and ethnicity is based 
on qualities and inequalities other than those that the predominant nationalism 
literature – including Brubaker’s work – addresses. This is how gender and sexuality 
become not only relevant, but also pertinent to any discussion of nationalism and 
national identity. 
The study of the case of Cyprus helps to do exactly this. Namely, it 
highlights the effects of nationalist and national identity discourses, both on personal 
narratives and on people’s imagination about subjectivities such as gender and 
sexuality which, although they are politically relevant, their relevance is masked or 
denied in the dominant discourses. As the following sections of this chapter will 
demonstrate, ‘the desire for unified nations can never be fully realized, partly 
because the existence of “others” remains necessary for the conceptualization of the 
nation and partly because unity in any community is challenged by the presence of 
different narratives about reality, different cultural traditions, and different sexual 
and ethnic identities’.100  
So, do Cypriots exercise an agency over the negotiation of their national 
identities that deviates from the official gendered and heterocentric nationalist 
discourses, which are proposed by some state, Church and military officials? This 
question needs to be considered in the light of the specific history and cultural 
context of Cyprus, to which the next section will turn.  
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Hierarchies of Agency: National Belonging and Exclusion in 
Cyprus  
 
Previous comparative studies have demonstrated the particularity of Cyprus 
in numerous respects. For example, in Inglehart and Norris’s examination of 
seventy-five societies in the 2000-2001 wave of the World Values Survey, none 
exhibited the characteristics and complexities that make Cyprus a distinct case: an 
ethnically, linguistically and religiously divided society that is coloured by the 
effects of a protracted national conflict, of British colonization, and of the impact of 
two regional powers – that is, Greece and Turkey – and that is simultaneously 
exposed to the supranational elements of globalization and ‘Europeanization’.101 The 
multicultural, multiethnic and multi-religious composition of the island’s population 
and its recent membership into the EU raise key questions about the potency, appeal 
and applicability of the ‘European value system’. Such questions become even more 
intriguing when one takes into account the ongoing pervasiveness of discourses of 
nationhood and national identity. This pervasiveness is partially explained by the 
historical events that marked the island, especially from the 1950s until the early 
2000s. 
 
Setting the Background: The Greek-Cypriot and the Turkish-Cypriot 
Gaze102 
After the long Ottoman period that lasted from 1571 to 1878, Cyprus came 
under British colonial rule.  Greek-Cypriots’ demand for union with Greece took the 
form of armed ‘liberation struggle’ by the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters 
(EOKA) (Εθνική Οργάνωση Κυπρίων Αγωνιστών) from 1955 to 1959, from which 
Greek-Cypriot communists and Turkish-Cypriots were excluded. Primarily – though 
not exclusively – as a result of Greek-Cypriots’ aspirations for unification with 
Greece, in 1956, Turkish-Cypriots called for the partition of the island along ethnic 
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lines. The Turkish-Cypriot Turkish Resistance Organization (TMT) (Türk 
Mukavemet Teşkilatı) was formed in 1957 and acted as rival to EOKA.103 However, 
the negotiations between Britain, Greece and Turkey led to the formation of the 
Republic of Cyprus as a single independent state in 1960, regardless of the 
aspirations of EOKA and TMT. 
From the late 1950s until the late 1960s, Cyprus witnessed a period of 
interethnic conflict and bloodshed. In 1971, EOKA B, an ultra-nationalist Greek-
Cypriot organization whose ultimate goal was union with Greece, was created. 
Supported by the Greek colonels’ regime that was then headed by Brigadier 
Dimitrios Ioannides, EOKA B launched a campaign of killings, violence and 
intimidation against the government of Archbishop Makarios III and against the 
Greek-Cypriot communist party, the Progressive Party of the Working People 
(AKEL) (Aνορθωτικό Kόμμα του Eργαζόμενου Λαού). This culminated in a coup in 
1974.
104
 On the pretext of humanitarian assistance to Turkish-Cypriots, Turkey 
invaded Cyprus and it is still occupying the north part of the island. A large number 
of both Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots were displaced, the former to the south 
and the latter to the north part of the island, and since 1974 the two sides have been 
separated. In 1983, the occupied north was self-declared as an independent state 
under the name ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (‘TRNC’), thus solidifying 
the separation.
105
 The two ethnic communities remained completely separated until 
April 2003, when the ‘TRNC’ opened the Ledra Palace checkpoint and announced 
that it would allow Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots to cross to, and visit the 
other side of the island. The RoC has been a member of the EU since 2004.
106
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Although opinions about this issue vary, especially in the relevant literature 
of previous decades,
107
 the partition of the island is to a considerable degree the 
outcome of nationalist sentiments that were cultivated by the intellectual and 
political elites of the two ethnic groups. The focus of the present analysis will be 
Greek-Cypriot nationalism, because it is the impact of elite agents of the RoC on 
perceptions of gender and sexuality that this chapter ultimately seeks to address. 




The cultivation of Greek-Cypriot nationalism, the ‘preservation’ of Greek-
Cypriots’ national identity and its protection from ethnic ‘others’, as well the 
discourses that supported these processes, have their roots in the ‘Greek 
Enlightenment’. This is the period between the last years of the eighteenth century 
and the first two decades of the nineteenth century, when elite-produced literature in 
Greek introduced, for the first time, the concepts of distinct linguistic nations and 
ethnic identities in the Balkans.
109
 In its internal dimension, that is, inside the borders 
of the new state, Greek nationalism and Greek identity formation involved the Greek 
state providing the normative discourse of the new state institutions – one of which 
was the national army – based on the creation of, and the socialization into, 
nationalistic values. In its external dimension, Greek nationalism and Greek identity 
formation involved the Greek state approaching and placing under the wing of 
‘Hellenism’ the Greek-inhabited and Greek-speaking territories of the Ottoman 
Empire – one of which was Cyprus. It attempted to do so by exporting its 
educational system, press, cultural activities and the allure of a liberating national 
Greek army through its consulates.
110
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 However, elite and state agency towards the assertion of national ideals and 
secular nationalisms rarely – if ever – springs ex nihilo.111 Especially among peoples 
in the monotheistic traditions, like the Greeks, a sense of collective mission and 
destiny, a culturally-based national messianism and beliefs in ethnic chosenness by 
the deity, has provided modern nationalisms with a model and forceful impetus.
112
 
Nevertheless, Greek Orthodoxy and nationalism were not always in the same camp. 
The Patriarchate in Constantinople initially opposed the so-called ‘Great Idea’ 
(Μεγάλη Ιδέα) – that is, the Greek aspiration to recover from the Turks the Aegean, 
Constantinople and large parts of Greek-speaking Asia Minor – and the Greek 
revolution of 1821. It was only after the Orthodox Church had split into 
autocephalous churches that the Church of Greece and religion were ‘nationalized’ 
by the Greek state. Namely, the state instilled the traditional, religious distinction 
between Balkan and Asia Minor populations with nationalistic ideology, while the 
Greek-speaking hierarchy of the previously unified Orthodox Church sacrificed the 
Church’s ideal of ecumenicity on the altar of ethnic and national political 
antagonisms, which it nurtured and spurred.
113
  
Similarly to the Church of Greece, the Church of Cyprus became subject to 
the pressures of nationalism also. The election of nationalist Cyril II as Archbishop 
in 1909 placed the Church in the leadership of the Greek-Cypriot nationalist 
movement against British rule and Turkish presence on the island.
114
 Because of its 
close intellectual links to the Hellenic centre, the Church of Cyprus became the main 
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agency of Greek nationalism in Cyprus.
115
 This relationship between the Church and 
nationalistic politics continues intact into contemporary history.
116
  
Historical examinations of the ways that nationalism was cultivated and 
institutionalized in Greece and in Cyprus reveal similarities. However, in contrast to 
the case of Greece,
117
 in Cyprus, the state and the Orthodox Church’s discourses that 
pertain to ‘proper’ and ‘deviant’ identities – be it national, gender or sexual identities 
– have not been met with strongly articulated oppositional or alternative discourses. 
To different degrees, some political parties, some intellectual thinkers and some civil 
society groups have adopted and continue to reinforce the official trajectory of 
identity delineation, which is based primarily on ethnic and politico-national 
elements. 
Especially in the early and mid-1990s, the public contestation of Cypriot 
identity formation was limited to the clash between Greek-Cypriot nationalism and 
‘Cypriotism’, that is, the ideological position that Cyprus has its own sui generis 
character.
118
 In the past, the literature on community and identity construction in 
Cyprus had, for the most part, limited itself within the same confines. As Caesar 
Mavratsas explains, reducing the contest between Greek-Cypriot nationalism and 
‘Cypriotism’ into a right-left party ideology opposition is an oversimplification of 
the broader picture.
119
 Nonetheless, by not examining other elements, subjectivities 
and agents besides these right-versus-left ideology opposition and its agents which 
affect, and are being affected by, national identity formation, analyses of Cypriot 
national identities remain liable to the very same critique they are projecting. 
Namely, they render mere historical expositions of the political opposition between 
‘right’ and ‘left’ as the most important aspect of identity formation in Cyprus. Even 
nowadays, studies that substantially address national identity construction in Cyprus 
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vis-à-vis subjectivities – such as gender and sexuality – remain limited in number, 
scope and analysis. 
 Mavratsas argues that because of the predominance of Greek-Cypriot 
nationalist ideology in the political culture of the island throughout most of its 
modern history, political discourse and social analysis by Cypriot intellectuals have 
either fully accepted nationalist ideology’s fundamental axioms, or they have 
explained its sociological role by exclusively focusing on external intervention and 
foreign conspiracy.
120
 A considerable number of works have been produced since the 
time Mavratsas made this argument.
121
 Nonetheless, his argument that issues like 
sexuality, the social position of women and the relation between state and religion 
have been ignored in Cypriot scholarship continues to be valid.
 122
  
However, it is vital to move such discussions forward and to explain why 
nationalist ideology has such a great appeal. It is important to determine the political, 
social and cultural dynamics that allow nationalist ideology to remain pervasive and 
to marginalize important societal issues. This is the case especially because such 
issues are rarely publicly discussed, based on the – mostly elite-propelled – 
allegation that they detract from more serious politico-national concerns. It is 
important to disaggregate the actors included in wide-ranging concepts such as ‘the 
state’, ‘the Church’ and ‘civil society’ and, in this way, to explicate why ‘the Greek-
Cypriot community has been historically unable to go through any process of … 
political maturation [that] would require that the Greek Cypriots … raise new 
questions, and come to terms with the present and the future at minimal cost’.123  
Yiannis Papadakis explains that expressions of Greek-Cypriot nationalism 
are formulated not only by the state and by political parties, but also by individual 
social actors. He argues that the articulation of nationalism at these different levels 
results in a dialectical process between ‘above’ and ‘below’, which accounts for the 
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persistence and appeal of specific nationalisms. The main questions that Papadakis 
tries to answer is how the abstract narratives proposed by the state and by political 
parties interact with personal narratives, and how personal and local history becomes 
inextricably linked to the state and political parties’ narratives.124 He borrows from 
Hayden White and argues that, in Cyprus, narrativity expressed through 
commemorations of the nation in the form of military parades, of ceremonies to 
honour national days and national heroes, of war museums and of school textbooks 
that treat the history of a state as equivalent to that of a nation and as the only 
possible way of presenting the past, is related ‘to the impulse to moralize reality, that 
is to identify it with the source of any morality we can imagine’.125 Hence, Papadakis 
concludes with Mavratsas that, in Cyprus, the social and the political domains are 




Nicos Peristianis’s study focuses on individual identifications in the RoC. 
Similarly to Brubaker, but with reference to Cyprus, he argues that identification 
based on polarizations such as Greek-Cypriot nationalism versus ‘Cypriotism’, or 
political right versus political left, does not help us to fully understand the politics of 
identity formation in Cyprus.
127
 He argues that analysis needs to:  
 
move … away from considering ethnic/national identity as an underlying essence 
that must somehow be discovered and [away from considering] attitudes as the 
privileged pathway that provides access to this hidden reality. Rather, the different 
responses or attitudes of people … [should be] seen as actions in themselves … 
which try … to argue for or against a particular public discourse.128  
 
Therefore, conversely to less optimistic positions, Peristianis argues that, 
nowadays, much has weakened the ideological struggle between Greek-Cypriot 
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nationalism and ‘Cypriotism’. This is promising as it might indicate the possibility of 
national identity formation being informed by elements and discourses other than 
nationalist ones. But what is the case with Turkish-Cypriot nationalism? Identities, 
and especially national identities, are formed based not only on notions of similarity, 
but also on notions of difference and opposition. Therefore, an emasculation of 
Turkish-Cypriot nationalism that is similar to – or even greater than – the 
emasculation of Greek-Cypriot nationalism to which Peristianis refers, could lead to 
the de-escalation of nationalist rhetoric of both ethnic groups and, consequently, to 
the de-escalation of this rhetoric’s negative effects on gender and sexuality 
constructions. 
In what could be called ‘the paradox of nationalism’, Greek-Cypriot and 
Turkish-Cypriot nationalisms have been instilled and preserved in a similar fashion. 
As Harry Anastasiou explains, nationalist frameworks resist communicative 
interaction of the opposing parties not because the frameworks of rival nationalist 
groups are different, but because, paradoxically, they tend to be identical in their 
fundamental nature.
129
 Whereas the Greek-Cypriot nationalist agenda was exhibited 
through the attempts to unite Cyprus with Greece and claim the island as purely and 
immemorially Greek, the Turkish-Cypriot nationalist agenda was expressed through 
the pursuit of the ethnic division of the island.
130
 Similarly to Greek-Cypriot 
nationalism, which has its roots in Greek nationalism and in the longing of 
establishing the ‘Self’ as the genuine and legitimate ‘child’ of ‘motherland Greece’ 
while portraying the ‘Other’ as the illegitimate alien, Turkish-Cypriot nationalism 
has its roots in Turkish-Cypriots claiming themselves to be the suppressed – by the 
Greek-Cypriots – ‘child’ of ‘motherland Turkey’. These feelings of injustice and 
insecurity were further nurtured and reinforced by the British colonizers who saw in 
the Turkish-Cypriot minority a strong ally in their attempt to stop Greek-Cypriot 
rebellions against their rule.
131
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The negotiation of national identity discourses and the appeal of the 
‘motherland’ rhetoric started to reveal differences between the two ethnic groups 
some time after the 1974 events. The memory of pain and suffering of each 
community was strongly and constantly reminded and revived through the 
nationalist public political culture of each adversary. The flushing of national 
symbols, the media, school curricula and other means of ideological engineering 
were employed by both sides in this process, which Kerwin Lee Klein calls ‘the 
memory industry’.132 Furthermore, the ‘memory industry’ was combined with the 
negation of the pain and the suffering of the ‘Other’ and this consequently brought 
about and consolidated the institutionalized alienation of the two groups.
133
 While 
this institutional nationalism remained intact and unquestioned by the majority of the 
Greek-Cypriot population until the late 1990s, by the mid-1980s, the Turkish-
Cypriot gaze started to shift and the official ‘Turkishness’ and ‘Turkish nationalism’ 
rhetoric began to be mistrusted and questioned.  
A combination of several factors contributed to bringing about this shift in 
Turkish-Cypriot perceptions of national identity. One of these factors is Turkish-
Cypriots’ approach to organized and institutionalized religion. Conversely to Greek-
Cypriots, they are not influenced by organized religion and they adhere to a very 
strict form of secularism.
134
 For example, in their huge majority, Turkish-Cypriots 
feel outraged with Koran schools and with the teaching of religion by imams at 
schools, and they do not favour religion classes that follow the model in Turkey.
135
 
‘TRNC’s’ strict secularism and its prohibition of mixing religion with politics 
certainly facilitated the pre-mentioned Turkish-Cypriot turn with regard to 
nationalism, national identity and the teaching of history. 
Another contributing element is the recently revised approach to the teaching 
of history in Turkish-Cypriot public schools. As recently as in the late 1990s, both in 
the Greek-Cypriot and in the Turkish-Cypriot public education system, official 
nationalist discourses continued to be disseminated primarily through the taught 
subjects of history and religion. Interestingly, in the mid-2000s, the ‘TRNC’ revised 
the school history curricula and text books. The books that were published in 2004 
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reveal remarkable changes when compared to the old books. Researchers who 
studied these new curricula and text books argue that, by adopting a social-
constructivist approach towards history and, therefore, by presenting nationalism and 
national identity as outcomes of specific historical conditions rather than as 
primordial entities, the new books and curricula move the focus from ‘Turkishness’ 
to ‘Turkish-Cypriotness’ and ‘Cypriotness’. These authors also claim that, by 
recognizing the pain and suffering as a shared condition of both Greek-Cypriots and 
Turkish-Cypriots, these books demoralize national history and free historical 
memory from essentialist narratives. Consequently, the revised books and curricula 
present identity as a matter of choice –not of birth – and as internally diverse and 
evolving, rather than as homogeneous and historically determined.
136
  
A third factor, which probably had the greatest impact on the Turkish-Cypriot 
national identity shift, relates to Turkey’s policy changes towards the ‘TRNC’, 
especially after the mid-1980s. The open interference of Turkey into Turkish-Cypriot 
affairs, the threat of becoming a minority because of population transfers from 
Turkey, the allocation of the Greek-Cypriot occupied properties to the people 
brought from Turkey, as well as the heavy militarization and the exercise of control 
by the Turkish army on all spheres of life, have led Turkish-Cypriots to shift away 
from Turkish nationalism and to start stressing the Turkish-Cypriot and Cypriot 
elements of their national identity.
137
  
According to Lacher and Kaymak, the political regime in the north was able 
to control the construction of public identity patterns among Turkish-Cypriots – or, 
more probably, to suppress the public articulation of anti-nationalistic identities – 
until the early 2000s, when the progressive exhaustion of the ‘TRNC’s’ distributive 
ability culminated and became widely sensed.
138
 Crucial among the mechanisms 
through which Turkish nationalism has been reproduced in the occupied north after 
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1974 was the distribution of invasion spoils. By being in a position to distribute more 
than one third of the island’s land to twenty percent of its population – that is, the 
Turkish-Cypriot ethnic group – the ‘TRNC’ secured mass support. Nonetheless, after 
1983, patronage and clientelism could no longer contain discontent and wide-ranging 
scepticism over both the lack of international recognition, and the quality of the 
‘TRNC’s’ internal sovereignty.139 Lacher and Kaymak explain: 
 
The key result of the development of administrative institutions was unintended. For 
this state generated its own expectations both among its personnel and citizens ... 
Their experience of the real limits on the autonomy of the TRNC’s administration 
created awareness of an increasingly obvious discrepancy between reality and the 
rhetoric of “sovereignty”.140 
 
This situation was further exacerbated by the fact that Turkey increasingly grew less 
willing to continue the generous transfer payments that kept the status quo in place.  
The authors perceive this turn as a chance for alternative visions of political 
community to be developed, since ‘there is ... no Turkish Cypriot ethno-nationalism, 
but a post-national form of identity formation, marked precisely by an absence of a 
singular identity’.141 However, as Michael Billig argued – thus problematizing 
Brubaker, Loveman and Stamatov’s central argument 142 – even nationalisms’ 
‘banal’ demonstrations, like everyday life distinctions and categorizations that are 
expressed in habits of speech or in unquestioned beliefs about one’s nation glorious 
past, reproduce national identity and nationalistic discourses.
143
 This argument could 
also be raised against Peristianis’s conclusion about the now weakened ideological 
struggle between Greek-Cypriot nationalism and ‘Cypriotism’.144 
Although such changes in Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot discourses of 
nationalism are promising towards making reconciliation between the two ethnic 
communities more feasible – and reconciliation will be much more facilitated if, 
similarly to the ‘TRNC’ the current government of the RoC succeeds in its efforts to 
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revise history text books and curricula
145
 – it is important to remain aware of the 
factors that lead to such changes. It is dangerously romantic to unquestionably accept 
that such changes are part of a general attempt to reconstruct political landscapes in 
order to achieve peace and reconciliation.
146
 For example, the Turkish-Cypriot gaze 
changes regarding nationalism and national identity were premised not only on 
ideological, but also on socioeconomic factors.
147
 The disintegration of the material 
basis of the Turkish-Cypriot ethno-national project, the effects of prospective EU 
membership
148
 and the need of ‘TRNC’ policymakers to gain legitimacy on both a 
regional and an international level
149
 cannot be dismissed as some of the reasons 
behind the change drive. An opportunistic and iconic adoption of European 
mechanisms and values by both Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots might 
increase, rather than reduce, antagonism, nationalistic and exclusionary feelings 
among the two groups.
150
  
Truly, not all expressions of nationalism lead to overt conflict. Nevertheless,  
it is overly ambitious to claim that in an ethnically divided milieu, like Cyprus, 
where until very recently one’s being was explicitly moulded based on nationalistic 
official rhetoric, predominant identities are ‘post-national’ or even neutral with 
regard to issues of nationality and ethnicity. What Lacher and Kaymak perceive as 
an absence of a singular (ethnic/national) identity is,
151
 in the best case, a 
hibernation. People and the power regimes might not articulate a militant version on 
national identity, but they might engage in ‘banal’, ‘everyday’ nationalism instead. 
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However, amidst an ethnic conflict situation, there is no assurance that ‘muted’ 
nationalism will be expressed in a less sanguineous way than overt nationalism.  
Even such ‘muted’ nationalism, which continues to permeate Cypriot official 
and predominant discourses, suffices to sanction or ostracize lives, and to include or 
exclude people and subjectivities from the national collectivity. Namely, although 
official predominant discourses are articulated without explicitly referring to 
nationhood or national identity, what they ultimately glorify are modes of existence 
that are premised on the idea of androcentric and heterocentric national exclusivity. 
This reinforces the need to examine the effects of both symbolic and overt official 
discourses of nationalism on certain subjectivities’ invisibility and annihilation. 
Therefore, two sets of questions need to be addressed: Firstly, questions about the 
role of institutional agents in forming, preserving and communicating – banal or 
explicit – nationalist discourses, and secondly, questions of whether and how other 
elements of identity, such as gender and sexuality, have been – or could potentially 
be –affected by changes – or the lack thereof – in such discourses. The following 
subsection will focus on the former set of questions. It will attempt to address them 
by examining the role of the Church of Cyprus vis-à-vis predominant discourses. 
The last section of this chapter will address the latter set of questions. 
 
Who Speaks the Nation? The Pervasive Role of the Church of Cyprus 
 As Meyer and Jepperson explain, ‘agency’ and the ‘authorized agent’ are 
historical and continuous cultural constructions. The system of ‘agency’ is a 
religious and post-religious development, since authority was gradually relocated 
from the transcendental gods, or God, to the church, to the state and subsequently to 
individual souls and to individuals as citizens. Firstly, nature is rationalized and 
those features of humans that are considered to be natural endow the human being 
with justifiable and lawful interests. Secondly, spiritual authority is also rationalized, 
and thus the legitimate agent is attributed with the authority, the capacity and the 
responsibility to act. However, ‘agency’ cannot exist without structures of 
‘otherhood’. The legitimate agent cannot become the subject of action, unless 
provided with an object upon which, for which, or against which to act. ‘Others’ are 
Nayia Kamenou  Page 71 of 343 
 
necessary to justify – or not – an agent’s action on behalf of other individuals.152 The 
importance of this idea rests in the fact that its language may be used to suitably 
describe the processes of gender and sexuality subjectivization in Cyprus. Namely, 
the discourses of some agents aim, on the one hand, to affirm their own authority 
and, on the other hand, to position subjects and subjectivities in the categories of 
‘agents’, recipients of ‘agency’, or illegitimate and unimaginable ‘others’. 
In the case of Cyprus, the Orthodox Church constitutes such a hegemonic 
institutional agent that, historically, has been the main agency of nationalism.
153
 
Because of its wealth, it wields enormous influence on decisions that pertain not 
only to the sphere of politics and ‘national issues’,154 but also to the structure of 
society. It even exerts huge influence on issues that fall within the so-called ‘private 
sphere’, such as marriage, divorce and family formation.155 In times of presidential 
or parliamentary elections, it is very characteristic of high-ranking clergymen – like 
metropolitan bishops, bishops or the archbishop – to openly support – in some cases, 
even financially – specific parties or candidates. The degree to which state and the 
Church remain affiliated is exemplified by the fact that, in the 2006 elections for a 
new archbishop, political parties – including ruling political parties –blatantly 
prompted their voters to support specific bishops. 
In general, the protégés of the clerical leadership are political parties or 
politicians that support its official rhetoric that ‘Hellenorthodox ideals’ 
(Ελληνοχριστιανικά ιδεώδη) and ‘national values’ are the sine qua non of national 
unity and survival, in face of the ‘imminent Turkish threat’.156 These 
‘Hellenorthodox ideals’ and ‘national values’ could be summarized as: Christian 
Orthodox religion; Greek historical and cultural heritage; and devotion to the nation 
and to the heterocentric family.  
Even in current times, the Church continues to attempt to patronize the state 
regarding issues that fell under its authority before the creation of states;
157
 and it 
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   John W. Meyer and Ronald L. Jepperson, “The ‘Actors’ of Modern Society: The Cultural 
Construction of Social Agency,” Sociological Theory, vol. 18, no. 1 (2000): 100-20. 
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   Kizilyurek, “From Traditionalism to Nationalism,” 60. 
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Πολίτης. 27 January 2009, 14.  
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   Politis, «Αγνώμονες οι Κύπριοι», Πολίτης. 19 January 2009, 5; Politis, «Πήρε σκυτάλη ο 
Αρχιεπίσκοπος», Πολίτης. 19 January 2009, 6. 
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does so often supported by nationalist political circles.
158
 This effort to control 
domains other than the religious one is legitimized on the pretext that anything 
which challenges the axioms of religion endangers both individuals’ morality and the 
preservation of the religio-national collectivity. As a metropolitan bishop expressed 
this fear: 
 
I notice a loosening of morals and this is a danger that relates to our spiritual 
existence ... Namely, I believe that the loosening of morals can in some ways affect 
our national identity, its recognition and the dispersal of the cultural values of our 




The Church of Cyprus exerts a pervasive influence on all social and political 
matters. Its influence is so great that social and political institutions’ representatives 
purposefully remain deaf to citizens’ claims that challenge the religio-national 
discourse – for example, LGBTQ claims – because they are afraid of the political 
cost of attending to such claims. While describing his lobbying activities, Alecos 
Modinos, the man who successfully challenged the criminalization of homosexuality 
in the RoC at the ECtHR, reported:  
 
The politicians did not dare to support me openly, because the Church was publicly 
stating on its television channel ... and in press conferences through its 
                                                 
158
   This is not particular to Cyprus, though. Elsewhere also, religious institutions have attempted and 
continue to attempt to maintain their stance as forceful socio-political – as opposed to merely spiritual 
– actors. An extended comparative analysis of the role of religious institutions in socio-political 
affairs is beyond the scope of this analysis. However, some indicative examples include the Catholic 
Church’s support of Franco’s rule in Spain, and the Greek Orthodox Church’s tolerance of the 
colonels’ regime. On this, see, for example: Alfred C. Stepan, “Religion, Democracy and the ‘Two 
Tolerations’,” Journal of Democracy, vol. 11, no. 4 (2000): 37-57. Two more recent examples include 
the cases of post-communist Poland and Romania. Like the Orthodox Church of Cyprus, the Polish 
Catholic Church and the Romanian Orthodox Church continue to oppose the recognition of LGBTQ 
rights. For example, see: Voichita Nachescu, “Hierarchies of Difference: National Identity, Gay and 
Lesbian Rights, and the Church in Postcommunist Romania,” in Sexuality and Gender in 
Postcommunist Eastern Europe and Russia, ed. Aleksandar Štulhofer and Theo Sandfort 
(Binghamton, NY: Haworth Press, 2005), 57-78; Aleksandar Štulhofer and Ivan Rimac, 
“Determinants of Homonegativity in Europe,” Journal of Sex Research, vol. 46, no. 1(2009): 24 -32; 
Lavinia Stan, “Eastern Orthodox Views on Sexuality and the Body,” Women’s Studies International 
Forum, vol. 33 (2010): 38-46; Agnieszka Graff, “Looking at Pictures of Gay Men: Political Uses of 
Homophobia in Contemporary Poland,” Public Culture, vol. 22, no. 3 (2010): 583-603; Conor 
O'Dwyer, “From Conditionality to Persuasion? Europeanization and the Rights of Sexual Minorities 
in Post-Accession Poland,” Journal of European Integration, vol. 32, no. 3 (2010): 229-47. 
159
   “Interview with Metropolitan Bishop 210022”, Interviews with Elites 2009. Interviews by Nayia 
Kamenou. Nicosia, 13 January 2009.  Response to the question: ‘According to your opinion, are there 
any situations or phenomena that have a negative impact or that could have a negative impact on our 
national identity?’    
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representatives ... that the politicians and the MPs who would vote in favour of 
amending the criminal law wouldn’t get reelected.160 Of course, the majority of the 
MPs were already biased, irrespective of the Church’s statements. You have to be a 
very honest politician in order to take the risk and vote for a legal amendment like 
this [i.e., homosexuality’s decriminalization].161 
 
Although the Church of Cyprus is indisputably highly politicized and, as 
such, continues to have a strong say and impact on issues that pertain to the spheres 
of the political, the social, the personal and even the legal, it does not do so in a 
‘dictatorial’ manner. Namely, its discourses continue to exert great influence not 
only because state officials and politicians do not openly and assertively challenge 
them, but also because individuals see the central role that the Church assumes in the 
Cypriot socio-political milieu as positive.  
Yesilada, Noordijk and Webster’s quantitative study on the religiosity and 
social values of Cypriots revealed that, conversely to Turkish-Cypriots, Greek-
Cypriots generally follow organized and formal religion, that is, the Church’s rules 
and dogmas.
162
 As the researchers explain, this finding contradicts previously 
established notions deriving from secularization theory. According to these notions, 
as states develop, as individuals become less insecure, less exposed to 
unemployment, wealthier and more educated, the level of faith in the church and of 
practicing religion declines. The authors argue that this deflection from previously 
established conclusions is related to the unique historical role and to the continued 
influence of the Church of Cyprus in Cypriot politics and economy.
163
 Roudometof 
reports that, according to the 1998 International Survey Programme, Greek-Cypriots 
demonstrated considerable respect towards the Orthodox faith and the Church of 
Cyprus; nearly seventy per cent of the public rejected the view that Cyprus would be 
better off if religion and the Church were less influential.  
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Roudometof also rightly argues that the appeal of Christian Orthodox 
religion and of the Church of Cyprus among Greek-Cypriots is related to the 
Church’s nation-leading role.164 The Church’s role in creating, preserving, and 
disseminating discourses of ‘Hellenorthodox’ nationalism dates back to early 
twentieth century.
165
 Among the various ways through which the Church exercised 
its nation-leading role, one stands out as specifically instrumental towards 
developing Greek-Cypriots’ trust towards the Church. This is the Church’s 
involvement with the ethnic community’s education.166  
Well before the creation of the RoC in 1960, and especially after the 
devastating events of 1974, the Church funded the restoration and the building of 
new schools on its own land. Although in the interviews I conducted high-ranking 
clergymen denied that the Church continues to have the power to impose its 
positions regarding the context of education,
167
 in the past it closely scrutinized the 
content of school subjects such as religion and history.
168
 Even nowadays, the 
Church feverishly opposes the attempt of the current government to develop a plan 
for multicultural and non-nationalistic education.
169
 Therefore, religion via the 
Church becomes a central aspect of identity politics and it constructs subjectivities 




In the interviews, high-ranking clergymen described Greek-Cypriots’ 
national identity as ‘genetically Hellenorthodox’ and although they categorically 
denied that the Church assumes political powers or nurtures societal segregation, 
they said that its position about the content of public education should be taken into 
consideration by the state.
171
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Asked to comment on the ongoing issue of education reform in Cyprus and 
on the role that the Church should have in the process,
172
 a high-ranking clergyman 
stated: 
 
I would say that the Church is an institution whose activities involve the cultivation 
of literacy. And literacy in Cyprus has been cultivated and transmitted through the 
Church’s norms ... The Church has great experience on educational issues. I believe 
that it would be very useful, if its opinion were voiced in some collective institutions 
that make decisions [about educational issues]. [This should be done] without 
[clergymen] demanding a vote [on such decisions] or imposing our own views ... 
The source [of humanities studies and human rights] is the Gospel. Therefore ... we 




Another high-ranking clergyman was more vocal and assertive on the issues 
of Greek-Cypriot national identity, the relationship between church and state and the 
Church’s role in public education. When asked to comment on Greek-Cypriot 




Our national identity is the way through which we live in this country. Namely, our 
Greek heritage, our Greek origins and above all, our Christian experience and our 
way of life for the past 2000 years ... [The fact that] we have this identity constitutes 
a duty and a superiority ... towards other peoples ... All these derive from our DNA 
... Therefore, we declare this identity everyday through our ways, and attitudes, and 





On whether or not the Church becomes involved in state affairs that pertain 
to public school curricula, he commented: 
 
The Church is not going to assign an examiner over school curricula. It goes without 
saying that the school curricula are not, according to my opinion, the Synod’s 
business. It is the job of the Ministry of Education but, de facto, the Ministry of 
                                                 
172
  The question was: ‘According to your opinion, should the Church have a say on the issue of 
educational reform?’ 
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175
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Education cannot trespass certain thresholds. These thresholds are the customs and 




Ten days before the interview with this bishop, the Cyprus Broadcasting 
Corporation (CyBC) had broadcast a show on the issue of the impact of the Church 
on Cypriot society. Specifically, the show was titled, ‘Church: Discourse of love and 
unification or discourse of social segregation?’177 During the discussion among panel 
members in the studio, viewers could call and vote in favour of one of the two 
positions. Forty-nine per cent of the viewers who voted expressed the view that the 
Church communicates a discourse of love and unification, while fifty-one per cent of 
the viewers expressed the view that the Church’s discourse contributes to social 
segregation. I asked the bishop to comment on the specific television show and on 
the results of the telephone vote. What follows is the conversation that my asking of 








I was in Estonia from the 11
th
 until the 18
th
. But tell me, what was the subject? 
The topic was ... [interviewer interrupted by interviewee] 
The topic of the show was the Church. [I know] because I saw something about it in 
the press when I got back. Is this that show on which the bishop of Paphos 
appeared? 
The show ended up discussing the educational reform issue, but the central 
topic [of the show] was [premised on] the question: ‘Church: Discourse of love 
and unification, or discourse of social segregation?’ 
These are slogans. Marketing.  
I will accept this [position]. 
Oh, was this the topic of the discussion? [ironically] 
The title of the show ... [interviewer interrupted by interviewee] 
Say this again! It’s nice! [ironically] 
‘Church: Discourse of love and unification, or discourse of social segregation?’ 
Three thousand viewers called and voted on this. Forty-nine per cent voted in 
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favour of the position that the Church communicates a discourse of love and 
unification, while fifty-one per cent voted in favour of the position that it 
communicates a discourse of social segregation. 
First of all, I didn’t watch the show and, secondly, I consider these [shows] to be set 
up. Directed. 
Ok. Therefore ... [interviewer interrupted by interviewee] 
Do you disagree? Do you disagree? [shouting]  
What I would like to ask you ... [interviewer interrupted by interviewee] 
What answer did metropolitan bishop 210022 give you on this question? [still  
shouting] 
I am afraid that the content of the interviews is conf[idential] ... [interviewer 
interrupted by interviewee] 
What answer did metropolitan bishop 210022 give you on this question? I am not 
going to answer unless ... [still shouting, but even more angrily; then pauses] 
He said that the Church might have made a few mistakes, but he was not 
certain about the validity of the vote results.
179
 
Of course. That one knows about surveys...
180
 
I would like to move on and ask you whether ... [interviewer interrupted by 
interviewee] 
Because they care about viewer numbers and they didn’t want to spoil things for 
themselves. They just wanted to stir the waters ... [To show that] ‘probably we don’t 
need the Church; probably the Church doesn’t know what it’s doing. Probably, the 
Church doesn’t know its role because of the people who currently represent it. 
Probably we need to make these shows just to create noise’. [They thought to 
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Church Vote,” BBC News, 25 September 2006, 
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themselves], ‘since we broadcast the show and we scored high in viewer percentages 
we need, no matter what, to stress what we want [to communicate]: That the Church 
communicates a discourse of segregation, that it confuses people. But we will say 
this mildly, that is [we will claim that there is] a two or three per cent difference 
[between the two positions]’ ... [Their] aim was to shake things up, yet without 




This interview excerpt reveals the bishop’s tendency, which is common 
among other high-ranking clergymen also, to dismiss and negate critiques about the 
role of the Church in Cypriot politics and society. When asked about the role of the 
Church in the formation of public education curricula, this interviewee stressed that 
the Church does not attempt to trump the state, in order to communicate to the 
interviewer that the state and the Church’s roles are separated. However, when 
confronted with the results of the vote by the show’s viewers on the effects of the 
Church’s publically articulated discourses, this bishop blasted numerous accusations 
against the publically owned national television channel and doubted the credibility 
of the voting process. He claimed that the CyBC purposefully raised the topic of the 
role of the Church, that it manipulated the way in which the discussion unfolded and 
that it tampered with the voting results because the ultimate aim was to portray a 
false, negative picture of the Church and of its representatives.  
His great unwillingness to admit to the possibility that the results of the vote 
might be accurately representing the people’s changing perception towards the 
Church was further demonstrated by his stance towards the interviewer: If the 
interviewer believes that the results of the vote are valid and not set up, then the 
interviewer is complicit in the conspiracy against the Church and, therefore, the 
interviewee has no reason to answer the question. The fact that another high-ranking 
clergyman answered the question and admitted that the Church might indeed be on 
the wrong was also distrusted and dismissed since, according to the interviewee, this 
other clergyman is one of those who participated in the distortion of surveys that 
measured Greek-Cypriots’ candidate preferences during the 2006 archbishop 
election campaign period. 
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Given the Church’s approach to nationhood and national identity, as well as 
the extent and the degree of its impact on national politics and societal norms, could 
a change in identity construction and dominant perceptions of gender and sexuality 
actualize? Regardless of the Cypriot Orthodox Church’s traditional influence in 
almost all aspects of social and individual life, its long pre-colonial past as the 
predominant religious body in a diversified and pluralistic religious milieu proves 
that it is not necessarily or irreversibly incompatible with pluralistic ideals.
182
 
Nevertheless, the above examination of the degree of, and of ways in which the 
Orthodox Church of Cyprus and its representatives not only participate in, but also 
generate and disseminate nationalist discourses, makes it hard to imagine how it 
could return to its once ecumenical  and unifying role.  
Moreover, the obstacles presented by the impact of the rhetoric of the Church 
are reinforced by the state and political elites’ unwillingness and/or inability to allow 
the formation and public articulation of alternative, non-nationalistic, non-
heteronormative discourses, modes of identification and expressions of gender and 
sexuality. Once again, the case of public education curricula is particularly 
demonstrative of the ways and of the extent to which official public discourses 
circumscribe alternative understandings and expressions of identities. It shows that 
the state also limits the possibility of a discourse change within the Cypriot milieu.  
In nationalistic, gendered, sexist and homophobic milieux, it is through the 
body and its physique that one is called to assert his ‘national purity’, ‘gender 
morality’ and ‘sexual normality’. Therefore, discourses of ‘appropriate’ corporeality 
and somaticity could not but also be reflected in public school curricula.
 183
 History 
and religion are not the only school subjects through which the alienation of the 
‘other’ becomes possible. Regardless of a government-initiated attempt in 2003 to 
modernize education in general,
184
 and to reorient the home economics curriculum 
towards health and nutrition issues, its end result remains unchanged. Namely, it 
initiates children into the heterocentric and heteronormative Cypriot social system, 
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under British Rule (1878-1960),” Social Compass, vol. 56, no. 1 (2009): 80. 
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   Andreas Demetriou, «Εισαγωγική τοποθέτηση του Υπουργού Παιδείας και Πολιτισμού κ. 
Ανδρέα Δημητρίου», Ministry of Education and Culture, 28 July 2008, 
<http://www.paideia.org.cy/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=54&Itemid=29> (12 
February 2009). 
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which elevates the nuclear family as the only imaginable type of family. The 2007 
and 2008 instructions for teachers of the Cypriot Ministry of Education and Culture 
and of the Greece Home Economics Association for the International Federation for 
Home Economics – from which the Cypriot Ministry of Education and Culture 
draws upon in curricula designing – outline the targets of the course. An indicative 
list includes: 
 
Students to realize … the importance of marriage towards creating a healthy family 
within the conditions of current Cypriot reality … the biological bond between a 
mother and her child … the crisis of the family-as-value because of cohabitation 
outside marriage … that the health of the nation depends on the health of women … 
the position and the role of the two genders in the Christian religion … that the two 
genders are not unequal but different … that abortion is associated with serious 





Even when issues of sex and sexuality are addressed, the focus is placed on 
avoiding contracting sexually transmitted diseases through heterosexual sexual 
intercourse.186 The concerns of adolescents who do not conform to normative 
constructions of gender and sexuality are left denied and unaddressed, as if these 
individuals do not exist, or as if they do not merit recognition of their existence and 
needs.  
This substantiates the argument that, within the Cypriot context, ‘real’ 
Cypriot identity and ‘right’ Cypriot citizenship are equated with having a specific 
religious, gender and sexual identity. The way gender and sexuality and their 
‘appropriate’ performance and embodiment are constructed through Cypriot public 
education demonstrates that: firstly, gender and sexuality constitute grounds for 
inclusion or exclusion from the Cypriot national collectivity, although in the public 
                                                 
185
   Ministry of Education and Culture, «Αναλυτικά προγράμματα οικιακής οικονομίας μέσης 
εκπαίδευσης, 2007», <http://www.moec.gov.cy/mesi/analytika/oikiaki_oikonomia_cur.html> ( 30 
August 2008); Greece Home Economics Association for the International Federation for Home 
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<http://dide.ach.sch.gr/oikiakioikonomia/oikiaki.htm> (30 August 2008). Emphasis added and my 
translation from Greek. 
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   Martha Apostolidou and David Fontana, “Teacher Attitudes towards Health Education in Greek-
speaking Cyprus Schools,” Health Education, vol. 103, no. 2 (2003): 75-82; Martha Apostolidou and 
David Fontana, “Perspectives of Serving Teachers on the Respective Importance of Areas Deemed 
Suitable for Inclusion in the Health Education Curriculum for Cyprus Schools,” The Health Education 
Journal, vol. 60, no. 2 (2001): 173-83. 
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nationalist discourses this inclusion/exclusion is premised not on national identity 
cues, but on the invocation of ‘nature’ and ‘biology’; and secondly, through their 
naturalization and essentialization, corporeality and somaticity become fundamental 
grounds for the generation and perpetuation of exclusionary nationalist discourses. 
For as Githens-Mazer explains, borrowing from Paul Connerton: ‘the performance of 
the nation makes it powerful, in words and oaths, as well as in set postures, gestures 
and movements’.187 
To summarize, the case of Cyprus exemplifies Meyer and Jepperson’s 
argument about the role of ‘authority’ in the demarcation of ‘agency’ and 
‘otherhood’.188 Within the Cypriot context, ‘real’ identity and ‘right’ citizenship are 
equated with performing and/or identifying with a specific religious, gender and 
sexual identity. That is, in order to qualify as the subject and/or object of legitimate 
action, one has to appear and/or identify as Greek-Cypriot, Christian Orthodox, 
heterosexual, masculine –if a man – or feminine – if a woman – and to espouse, or at 
least not challenge, the prevailing dogmas that pertain to what and whom lies within 
the realm of the natural and the thinkable.  
Nationalist Constructions of Gender and Sexuality 
 
There is a close link between gender relations, sexual behaviours and national 
cohesion. Yuval-Davis explains that since gender relations play an important role in 
the nationalist project of preserving the unity and perpetuating the existence of the 
national ‘imagined community,’ these relations are determined by the cultural and 
religious customs/codes and gender constructions/symbols of the national 
collectivity.
189
 Specifically about Cyprus, Yuval-Davis explains that the depiction of 
the mourning mother in photographs and posters was symbolically used in 
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nationalist discourse, in order to embody the pain and anger of the Greek-Cypriot 
collectivity for the Turkish invasion and occupation.
190
  
In Cypriot nationalist discourses, the physical body of the nation is thought of 
as having a soul and spirit, which managed to keep the Greek-Cypriot soul pure and 
chaste even under enslavement. The land is equated with femininity and the 
feminine, that is, with the ideal Cypriot woman, and Cyprus is usually depicted in 
poetry, graphic art and theatre as a mother and as a maiden; as the Virgin Mary 
mourning for her missing sons. And, like the Virgin Mary, this virgin mother – that 
is, Cyprus – is protected by a celibate spiritual father, namely the Cypriot Orthodox 
Church.
191
 In the Greek-Cypriot ‘genealogical’ discourse, in which historical ‘proof’ 
is aimed at demonstrating ‘truths’ that are already taken for granted, Cypriot identity 
and gender relations are trapped in the discourse of a primordialist nationalism that 
could be described, in Sherry Ortner’s terms, as one in which ‘female is to male as 
nature is to culture.’192 These customs and constructions assume an almost 
authoritarian character. They do not allow enough space for internal power conflicts 
within the national collectivity, nor do they allow for interest differences along 
gender lines. They also treat gender as a homogenous category and ignore how 
gender divisions relate to other divisions, such as sexuality.
193
   
These assumptions are reproduced in some of the Cypriot gender literature 
also. This literature does not clearly explicate that, in Cyprus, gender has been sexed 
and naturalized in the name of (re) producing the nation. Moreover, it does not 
sufficiently problematize the essentialisms embedded in gender and sexuality binary 
correlations. Admittedly, some of this literature productively discusses the 
relationship between gender and the nation.
194
 However, its assumptions that 
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‘gender’ stands exclusively for the man/woman, male/female, masculine/feminine 
binary, and that sexuality is correlative to this binary – namely the assumption that 
‘gender’ and ‘sexuality’ stand for either the female, non-transgendered, heterosexual, 
or for the masculine, non-transgendered, heterosexual – need to be further 
challenged and problematized. Instead of depicting the implication of nationalism in 
the construction of exclusionary discourses, some of this literature seeks to remedy 
its evils by ‘adding women and stirring’.195 Such an approach carries the danger of 
overshadowing other important determinants, like sexuality, and of downplaying the 
degree to which such determinants have been purposefully and thoroughly gendered 
in nationalist discourses. 
Maria Hadjipavlou has been writing for years on Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-
Cypriot women’s role towards conflict resolution and identity reconstruction.196 She 
argues that ‘women’s dialogue can challenge the omnipotence of the state and may 
open up a new space whereby a diversity of perspectives and mutual trust can 
emerge’.197 Hadjipavlou rightly criticizes the literature on the Cyprus conflict for not 
mentioning, for the most part, gender power relations as a significant factor in 
Cypriot society, and for consequently tending to perpetuate this conflict.
198
 Although 
this is a valid comment, placing gender in the centre of analyses of power relations 
without questioning the assumptions that the concept of ‘gender’ carries could lead 
to some serious theoretical omissions and to the perpetuation of some perilous 
assumptions that Hadjipavlou herself warns against. For example, she says:  
 
One assumption upon which I work is that both feminist perspectives and conflict 
resolution processes open spaces for mutual acknowledgement of power disparities, 
creation of empathy, the need for ‘emotionality’ which lead to the development of a 
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new shared narrative representing the ‘whole story’ thus avoiding the 
‘compartmentalisation’ of issues which constitute part of the current unresolved 
Cyprus problem’.199  
 
Although Hadjipavlou correctly stresses the diversity of women’s 
experiences, her argument needs be taken a step further. It is important to explicate 
that it is gender-biased to portray ‘woman’ as a generic woman who is emotional and 
compassionate, and ‘man’ as a  generic man who always appears as the perpetuator 
of violence. Essentializing the concepts ‘man’ and ‘woman’ obscures intra and inter-
gender heterogeneity. Additionally, ‘women’ are not always and everywhere 
necessarily the construct of the nation-state’s masculinist, patriarchical and 
nationalist discourses. It is pertinent to question whether this is the case, and if yes, 
to decipher why and how ‘the nation-state’ constructs ‘women’. This is because 
addressing such questions leads us to disaggregate the concept of ‘agent of 
nationalism’ and to explore the possibilities of disrupting such masculinist, 
patriarchical and nationalist discourses. As it has been documented in literature about 
the role of women in national and nationalist projects outside Western contexts, in 
some cases, national projects have served as a site for women’s liberation.200  
For example, specifically regarding Cyprus, a female Greek-Cypriot MP of 
the centre-left in her early fifties who used to be active in a women’s group stated:  
 
Besides our struggles for [a solution to] the national problem, for which we are 
proud, women’s groups have always fought a double fight. And we [i.e., women’s 
groups] think that we did a lot besides the women’s marches [for the national 
problem], which took place after 1980, when the Cypriot problem stagnated, and 
thus everybody ended up focusing on us, and talking about us ... We should always 
keep in mind that the women who participated in these marches have never been 
independent. They were all involved in the Cypriot [political party] structures. But 
beyond this, who pressed their political parties and the parliament to amend the laws 
... pertaining to women’s equality, family, maternity, equal payment? ... What does 
this mean? ... It means that we might be women’s groups that fight for the national 
cause, but we are also women’s groups that try and exert pressure [on the 
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government] to amend the law, in order to help women have a better life within the 




This female politician’s statements substantiate the argument that, especially 
in postcolonial contexts, women’s participation in nationalist projects may constitute 
a route – sometimes the only route – into androcentric and male-controlled political 
structures. Once women enter the political arena, it becomes easier for them to press 
for rights. Therefore, ignoring some parameters of the question about the relationship 
between women’s participation in nationalist projects and women’s emancipation 
and applying conclusions reached by studying ‘Western’ settings to ‘non-Western 
milieux’, runs the risk of perpetuating the very same discourses and binaries that 
gender theory sets out to challenge.  
For instance, some gender theorists who argue in favour of gender 
mainstreaming claim that, in states where a large number of women participate in the 
centres of decision-making, the priorities focus more on peace, on women and on 
equality issues.
202
 Although this argument might indeed apply to some political 
milieux, it is not free of gender biases. By claiming that state policies around issues 
of peace and equality are causally correlated with the number of women participating 
in the centres of political decision, the two – and only two – ‘genders’ are taken for 
granted, while heteronormativity’s work in such essentialist understandings of the 
two – and only two – non-transgendered, biological ‘genders’ is left unquestioned . 
Namely, success is defined by the large number of women participating in politics in 
some counties, and not by these countries’ treatment of gender as dissociated from 
the heterosexual norm and from the ‘man/woman as masculine/feminine and as 
rational/emotional’ binaries. By talking about two realities, those of men and those 
of women, and by focusing on women’s wants and needs that are claimed to be 
different from those of men – for example, want and need for empathy and apology – 
women are naturalized as different from men; and, in the past, this provided a good 
excuse for women to remain excluded from the sphere of political representation.
203
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Specifically about Cyprus, while describing the results of a women’s bi-
communal workshop, Hadjipavlou explains that by working together, Turkish-
Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot women contributed to the mutual understanding of the 
pain and suffering that the conflict has been creating for all women.
204
 Although the 
coming-together of women from the two ethnic communities has unquestionably 
contributed to the deterioration of the boundaries erected by nationalistic official 
rhetoric, one should be careful about highlighting ‘women’s understanding of each 
other’s pain’. Statements of this sort carry with them the peril of reinforcing 
women’s nationalistically-driven symbolization as the carriers of the ‘pain of the 
nation.’ Rather, the different ways in which nations and national projects are 
gendered need to be questioned, while the public and domestic gender regimes that 
support these national projects need be distinguished and disaggregated.
205
 
Another problem with the literature that studies the relationship between 
gender and nationalism is that it tends, for the most part, to focus primarily on 
women,
206
 while it often takes little notice of men who only reappear in these studies 
as the perpetrators of violence. However, addressing the activities and self- 
perceptions of men becomes pertinent, if gender and feminist studies are to be 
seriously and sincerely concerned with the patriarchical character of societies.
207
  
The self-perceptions of men, and especially of heterosexual men, are 
revealing of what a closer study of men could demonstrate about the national 
identity-gender-sexuality relationship. Loizos and Papataxiarchis explain that the 
horror of homosexuality among Greek men is so huge, that its prospect is deflected 
either through heterosexual marriage or through masturbation.
208
 Although Loizos 
and Papataxiarchis do not explicitly apply the argument to Greek-Cypriots, it would 
not be an unfair assumption to say that this behaviour describes Greek-Cypriot men 
also. The fact that the authors mention Cyprus throughout the study as well as the 
fact that, for the most part, Loizos’s work focuses on the Greek-Cypriot social 
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context show that, regarding the subject of male identity demonstrations, the authors 
consider Cypriot society and social attitudes as part of the Greek mainland social 
milieu. Therefore, in the Greek – and Cypriot – context, male masturbation is 
understood as a healthy expression of powerful physical needs. 
 Having discussed how nationalism nurtures and thrives upon essentialist 
conceptions of gender, as well as how essentialist approaches to gender ignore or 
obscure determinants like non-heterosexual sexuality, it is imperative to examine 
how nationalism and sexuality relate. It is vital to comprehend nationalism as a 
discourse of sexuality in and of itself, since its language and demonstrations 
generate, regenerate and become definitive of what counts as ‘normal’ or ‘abnormal’ 
sexual behaviour. Mosse explains that the generation of nineteenth-century European 
nationalisms was accompanied by the creation of ideas about bourgeois proper 
behaviour pertaining to marriage and to sexual relationships. Nationalism and 
propriety were viewed as mutually supporting and sexual passions were redirected 
into the love for one’s nation.209 Consequently, sexual identity and national identity 
essentially merged and the borders of national belonging and exclusion corresponded 
to ‘normal’ sexuality and gender behaviour.210 
The case of Cyprus strongly exemplifies Mosse’s arguments about the 
nationalism-gender-sexuality relationship. It would not be an exaggeration to argue 
that, in Cyprus, humanness is a concept qualified along gender lines. This is most 
evident in the language: in the Cypriot traditional dialect the word άδρωπος 
(άνθρωπος) – that is, ‘human’ – stands for ‘man,’ whereas the word γεναίκα 
(γυναίκα) – that is, ‘woman’ – simply means ‘woman’. In Cyprus, the fear of the 
sexually ‘deviant other’ and the anxiety about homosexuality were combined with 
bigotry and homophobia, since defending a nationalist identity also means defending 
a sexual identity against threats from others. This explains, to take an example, the 
refusal – legal or substantial – to admit women and/or homosexuals on equal 
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As Karayanni argues, Cyprus’s historic turns and especially the effect of the 
British colonizers’ discourses, which spread hatred between the two ethnic 
communities and, for the first time, depicted and de-legalized non-heterosexual male 
sexuality as deviant and inferior, have caused a profound crisis in modern Cypriot 
identity.
 212
 Guarding the boundaries of heterosexual masculinity – even through 
means such as appropriate cultural expression, like dances – became central within 
the Cypriot context, in the attempt of Greek-Cypriots to distinguish themselves from 
the ‘other’ – that is, the Turk – whose image was constructed both as barbarian and 
as effeminate; effeminate, because according to a widely popular Cypriot notion, sex 
between men is a distinctly Eastern, Turkish practice.
213
 
Although in the past this notion might have been popular among Greek-
Cypriots, nowadays it seems that it is not as prevailing. For example, almost all the 
participants I interviewed reported that they never encountered this notion. The few 
– older – interviewees, who reported that, at some point in the past, they had 
encountered this notion, said that they disagree with it.
214
 Nevertheless, it could be 
argued that the negative effects of such notions and discourses that associate non-
heterosexual sexual choice with ‘sin’, ‘unnaturalness’ and ‘sickness’ – the sickness 
primarily of others, and certainly not ours – consciously or subconsciously continue 
to influence both Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots. 
For example, the majority of the elite interviewees expressed the opinion that 
non-heterosexual sexuality is caused by genetic or hormonal anomalies, or that it is 
the result of serious psychological traumas. Characteristically, a male military 
representative in his mid-thirties stated:  
 
If one of those [LGBTQ individuals] is born sick in this way, it’s not his fault. But 
those who bring it upon themselves have nobody to blame but themselves; because 
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A gay male Greek-Cypriot in his mid-thirties reported:  
 
I was called a ‘sinner’ by my family. They even had me go and confess ... The priest 
... was looking at me as if I were a worm, and not a human being.  He said that I had 
… to get rid of the sinful thoughts in order to become a human being, and then go to 




Not surprisingly, based on the aforementioned position of Turkish-Cypriots towards 
religion and religious institutions, the Turkish-Cypriot LGBTQ interviewees 
reported that in the ‘TRNC’ homosexuality is not described as a sin. A Turkish-
Cypriot bisexual woman in her mid-twenties, stated: ‘In north Cyprus most people 
say that homosexuality is a sickness or a trend, but not a sin ... In the north we are 
secular and we don’t practice the Muslim religion’.217  
In Cyprus, defining national identity along sexuality lines has led to a 
repugnance towards men engaging, or thought to be engaging, in receptive same-sex 
sexual activities, as opposed to penetrative same-sex sexual activities that carry less 
– if any – stigma.218  The importance of this argument rests upon the fact that in such 
perceptions and discourses ‘the deviant’ is not defined by the sexual act per se; 
rather, it is the (perceived as) ‘effeminate’ and ‘passive’ male. Such understanding of 
homosexuality has important gender meanings. For what is excluded from the realm 
of the thinkable are  non-essentialist and non-heteronormative  gender performances, 
rather than certain types of sexual activity, since ‘it may be accepted and even 
considered macho for a man to engage in sexual intercourse with another man so 
long as the latter is effeminate and passive’.219 The fact that criminal law in various 
countries, and in Cyprus, never made reference to same-sex genital relations between 
women substantiates this argument, because ‘the absence of this specific female 
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body from the criminal law, where the female body as sexuality is represented, might 
suggest that while same-sex genital relations might be understood as sexuality they 
might also be understood as primarily gender relations’.220 
The interview results support the above argument.  Almost all the elite 
interviewees and one third of the LGBTQ participants said that they are against 
adoption rights for same-sex couples.  As they claimed, a child cannot be brought up 
properly or be accepted by her peers and society, if she grows up without having 
both ‘gender models’ – that is, ‘female’ and ‘male’ – available.  A Greek-Cypriot 
centre-right male MP in his early sixties said:  
 
Ask them this question [i.e., those people who support adoption rights for same-sex 
couples]: What will a child think, if she grows up seeing two women or two men, 
saying to one another ‘we are a couple’, when all the other children have a male 
father and a mother? Isn’t this psychological violence against the child? I do not 
know whether other countries allow it, but this thing cannot happen in Cyprus. And 
where it was allowed, have [these countries] conduct a research, and then we will 
see whether the children who grow up this way will survive it, and what kind of 




Such statements demonstrate that, in Cyprus, attitudes towards non-heterosexuality 
are directly linked to constructions of gender and gender roles, as well as to the 
heteronormative, patriarchical model of the family – since the father has to be ‘male’ 
– which is thought to be the sine qua non of national survival and societal stability. 
 The clergymen I interviewed denied that they treat men and women 
differently,
222
 although studies conducted by other researchers point to the opposite. 
Georgiou’s study showed that, regarding men who have deviated on sexual matters, 
Cypriot Christian Orthodox priests often diverge from the official legalistic rigidity 
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of the Church’s Fathers, as long as these men remain within the limits of 
heterosexuality. Yet, they do not apply this same practice to women, even if they 
remain within the limits of heterosexuality.
223
 
Additionally, the high-ranking Church clergy members’ positions on non-
heterosexuality demonstrate that, for the Church, forgiveness and salvation is 
possible only if the sinner remains within the limits of heterosexuality. A 
metropolitan bishop said that, although LGBTQ people should not be ostracized 
since ‘they were born ill’, they should not be allowed to serve in public positions or 
as educators because, as he claimed, ‘it has been scientifically proven through 
studies that eighty per cent of homosexual people have the potential of becoming 
paedophiles’ and could, therefore, corrupt other people.224 A bishop said that ‘these 
people bring it upon themselves because they are pleased with nothing, so they push 
their senses to the limits, thus deflecting from Christ’s path’.225 
So, do these oppressive discourses really have such power that they reach 
‘into the very grain of individuals, [touch] their bodies and insert [themselves] into 
their actions and attitudes, their discourses, learning processes and everyday lives’, 
as Foucault argues?
226
 To what extent do public, dominant, discourses of sexuality 
penetrate people’s bodies and minds? And how does this penetration affect people’s 
exercising of agency over their own identities, as well as over the naming of 
‘others’? Although evidence produced by interviews cannot be used to accurately 
determine the degree to which Cypriot elite interviewees are authors and/or subjects 
of such discourses, it is pertinent to highlight the fact that the force of such 
discourses is so great, that even those who have the prerogative of constructing and 




                                                 
223
   George J. Georgiou, “Sexual Attitudes of Greek Orthodox Priests in Cyprus,” The Cyprus 
Review, vol. 4, no. 2 (1992): 44-66. 
224
   “Interview with Metropolitan Bishop 210022”. The metropolitan bishop did not specify the 
studies he made reference to. 
225
   “Interview with Bishop 210031”. 
226
   Foucault, “Prison Talk,” 39. 
227
   In accordance with Kendall and Wickham’s understanding of Foucault’s work on the relationship 
between ‘subject’ and ‘discourse’, when I use the term ‘subjectivization’ I refer to the different 
subject positions in discourse. The fact that subjects are positioned in discourse does not necessarily 
render subjects’ role passive, since subjects are not only products of power but they are also producers 
of themselves. Such understanding of ‘subject’ and ‘subjectivization’ precludes discourse 
determinism and the essentialization of power. According to Kendall and Wickham, ‘the triad power, 
knowledge and the subject is so systematic that it makes little sense to consider each component 
separately – they all condition, and form the conditions for, each other. Thus it is inaccurate to suggest 
Nayia Kamenou  Page 92 of 343 
 
For example, as a response to the question ‘in your opinion, what are the 
causes of LGBTQ sexuality’, a left-wing female MP in her mid-fifties, who is also a 
physician, said: 
 
The problem is not always hormonal or biological, like many people think. Usually, 
those [non-heterosexual people] who have a severe biological problem try to change 
sex, and they undergo gender reassignment surgery. In the other category are those 
who have the inclination, either because they grew up in a family where the 
environment allowed them to develop the womanly sense, or – when we talk about 
girls – they are those with minor hormonal imbalances, which could have been 
treated, if their families had realized the problem early on. And there are those 
people who choose it. Maybe that is psychological. For example, from the time they 
are toddlers [they decide:] ‘I want to play with dolls, I want to wear high heels, I 
want to wear dresses, even though I have a weenie’.228 
 
Responding to the same question, a centre-right male politician in his early 
sixties said: 
 
I know what ‘homosexual’, ‘lesbian’ and ‘bisexual’ mean. But what is this? What is 
‘transgender’? I didn’t know that such category existed, and I have some difficulty 
understanding; I mean understanding how this person functions. [Does he/she 
change genders] everyday, or does [he/she] have a gender for two, three years and 
then for the next two, three years, takes on another [gender]? There is definitely a 
psychological anomaly at play in such situations. They could decide to be both 
[genders] like the transsexuals. This is the first time I am hearing about this. There is 
something that is not normal about them beyond genetics. You mean that such a 
person can function properly both as a man [i.e., heterosexual man] and as a gay 
[man] and, if she is a woman, she can function both as a woman [i.e. heterosexual 
woman] and as a lesbian? Something about this doesn’t make sense!229 
                                                                                                                                          
that discourse determines the subject, or that power in the last instance is responsible for the 
production of subjectivity: the circularity of interdependence precludes questions of primacy, since 
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Kendall and Wickham, Using Foucault’s Methods, 54. 
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   “Interview with Politician 210030”, Interviews with Elites 2009. Interviews by Nayia Kamenou. 
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There are numerous interesting – and even conflicting – discourses at work in 
in these politicians’ statements, which need to be disaggregated in order to get a 
better understanding of how predominant discourses of sexuality are both 
constructed by, and impact upon elite agents. In her attempt to rationalize what she 
understands to be a ‘biological sex-gender mismatch’, the female politician identifies 
three possible scenarios: Some LGBTQs suffer from hormonal and psychological 
anomalies that could even be ‘treatable’, that is, their ‘problem’ has to do with 
‘nature’; others have been brought up to be LGBTQ, that is, their ‘problem’ has to 
do with ‘nurture’; in the last category there are the people who, more or less, 
willingly chose not to abide with their ‘biological’ sex and gender roles.  
The male politician’s statement is indicative of elite interviewees’ difficulty 
grasping how non-heterosexual sexuality and gender identifications could ground an 
identity. The male politician is especially puzzled about trans* identities. Once faced 
with identity fluidity, he realizes that the ‘nature’, ‘nurture’ and ‘(bad) choice’ 
arguments do not sufficiently explain all the existing and possible expressions of 
gender. His frustration escalates as he cannot propel an alternative fourth argument 
that could render trans* identities and individuals as ‘abnormal’, and consequently 
justify his repulsion towards them. 
Although none of the three scenarios that the female politician offers are free 
from bigotry, what needs to be highlighted is not only her active participation in the 
perpetuation of heterocentric discourses, but also the fact that her reasoning and her 
articulations remain limited within the prevailing gender and sexuality discourses, 
which render non-heteronormativity as necessarily problematic. That is, the female 
politician seeks to explain and partially ‘justify’ alternative demonstrations of gender 
and non-heterocentric modalities of sexuality. However, at no point does she 
consider the possibility that LGBTQ sexuality and non-binary gender identification 
need not be an anomaly whose causes need to be identified and explained. Similarly, 
besides being indicative of the prejudice that is prevalent among Cypriot elites, the 
male politicians’ statements about trans* individuals also reveal the extent to which 
the elite producers of heterocentric discourses are limited within, and by, their own 
product: Once deprived by the binaries and essentialisms that form the predominant 
gender and sexuality discourses, the male politician is at complete loss and cannot 
even grasp the possibility of being and living outside the heteronormative boundaries 
of the national collectivity.  
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Because of the power of representation and the ability to form and 
communicate public discourse – which they gain either through their election in 
office, or through their assignment in power positions within their parties – political 
elites constitute one of the agents of ‘othering’ that operate within the island’s socio-
political and cultural arena. The elite interviews substantiate the arguments that 
concepts of ‘the nation’ and national identity are both premised on, and also define 
the boundaries of ‘proper’ and ‘normal’ expressions of gender and sexuality.  
According to the elite interviewees, the only imaginable and acceptable 
sexuality for ‘the nation’ is heterosexuality which corresponds to the 
heteronormative male/female gender binary.
230
 When asked about the relationship 
between biological sex, gender and gender roles, the majority of the elite 
interviewees did not distinguish between sex and gender. They characterized both as 
a description and result of nature. Additionally, their understanding of LGBTQ 
identities could be summarized as ‘a man (or a woman) wanting to be, or acting like 
a woman (or like a man)’. The majority of the elite interviewees described non-
heterosexuality as some kind of genetic, hormonal or psychological anomaly and 




But what is the relationship between public/elite and private/grassroots 
discourses? What is the dynamic between public official discourses and personal 
narratives that pertain to non-heterosexual sexuality? The interview results point to 
the fact that public discourses and the official rhetoric of some state and institutional 
elites have managed to penetrate LGBTQ individuals’ self-perceptions to a 
considerable degree.  For example, the majority of the Greek-Cypriot LGBTQ 
interviewees reported than they disagree with adoption for same-sex couples.
232
 One 
Greek-Cypriot female gay participant in her mid-twenties said:  
 
Raising a child is a huge responsibility and gay relationships are more problematic 
than straight ones. In same-sex relationships we have two people who are the same.  
                                                 
230
   Interviews with Elites 2009.  
231
   Ibid.  
232
   The question was: ‘Do you agree or disagree with granting LGBTQ individuals the right to marry 
and adopt children?’ 
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It’s easier for them to have fights and break up and this will have negative effects on 
the child. I hold the same belief about same-sex marriage also.
233
   
 
On the issue of same-sex marriage and adoption, a Turkish-Cypriot male gay 
interviewee in his mid-thirties remarked: ‘It won’t be healthy for the children, 
because of the rules of society. I am not saying that same-sex marriage or adoption is 
against nature, but some orders should not be touched; because if everyone were gay, 
then nobody would have children’.234  
I asked LGBTQ participants whether they think that men should be 
‘masculine’ and women ‘feminine’, regardless of their sexual choice.235 The answers 
to this question revealed the existence of sexist and gender stereotypes among the 
LGBTQ participants.  Almost all the women said that they completely associate with 
the term ‘woman’, that they feel very offended if called ‘tomboys’ and that they do 
not like butch lesbians. Almost all men said that they are very annoyed by effeminate 
gays and that they do not want to be around ‘sissies’ who ‘ridicule themselves’ and 
consequently embarrass the whole male gay community.
236
 The answers did not 
differ between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots.  This raises a crucial question 
about how Cypriot LGBTQs understand ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ gender 
performances. Their answers lead to the conclusion that, even among non-
heterosexual Cypriots, performing virility – if men – and femininity – if women – is 
indistinguishable from self-dignity. Dignity and propriety, as well as their 
accompanying gender performances are, as mentioned before, inextricably linked to 
the belonging and exclusion boundaries that the national community prescribes.
237
   
As Karayanni nicely summarizes it, ‘in male public discourse, the taboo of 
homosexuality confirms male privilege and, through reassurance, generates fresh 
rigour, pleasure, and confidence in embodying a male, heterosexual, and Hellenic 
national identity.’238 And he concludes by explaining that, in Cyprus, homosexuality 
is not just a type of sexual activity. Articulated as identity, it threatens to become an 
‘other’ in a society that sees its purity in expelling all ‘others’. Karayanni rightly 
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vindicates a change of bodily and cultural understandings beyond changes in public 
and official discourses.
 239
 But could Cypriot cultural, corporeal and private 
imaginings change, unless preceded by a change in the rhetoric of the institutions of 
power, that is, the state and the Church?  Two relatively recent events – one took 
place in Greece, while the other took place in Cyprus – exemplify that institutional 
public discourses impede the genesis of alternative gender and sexual imaginings. 
Moreover, they demonstrate that, even when alternative imaginings do exist, these 
are not taken into consideration by the political elite when it makes political, social, 
economic and public-policy decisions. 
On June 3
rd
 2008, and in a climate of oppositions and threats from the Greek 
Orthodox Church and from some political and state elites, the mayor of the Greek 
island of Tilos conducted two same-sex wedding ceremonies.
240
 He explained that 
his act was in accord with human rights values and that conducting the ceremonies 
fell under his administrative authority.
241
 The ceremonies were only of symbolic 
value, since same-sex civil union, as well as the rights that accompany it, have yet to 
be legally recognized in either Greece or Cyprus. Nonetheless, the Greek Supreme 
Court prosecutor warned Mayor Aliferis of the legal repercussions of his ‘breach of 
duty’, although Greek legal scholars explained that there are no grounds for such 
prosecution under the Greek civic code. They explicated that same-sex marriage is a 
social issue whose legality is to be debated and decided in Greek and European 
courts, since the Greek constitution does not make any provisions about the issue.
242
 
In May of 2008, the Cypriot Ombudsman raised the issue of considering the 
recognition of civil unions for both homosexual and heterosexual Cypriot couples, 
arguing that this is in line with human rights values and European law pertaining to 
rights to marriage and family.
243
 Her suggestion was met with opposition from the 
Church, while the state and political party representatives chose to remain less vocal. 
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συμβίωσης: Θεσμοθέτηση συμβίωσης των ομόφυλων ζευγαριών», Πολίτης, 12 May 2008, 4. 
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In June of 2008, following the events in Greece and the Cypriot Ombudsman’s 
suggestions, the CyBC broadcast a discussion show on the issue of partnership rights 
for heterosexual and homosexual cohabiting, unmarried couples. During the show, 
viewers could call and vote either for, or against the legal recognition of civil 
partnerships for same-sex and heterosexual couples.
244
  
Particularly interesting was the panel participants’ focus on the ‘biological 
factors’ that ‘cause’ and ‘justify’ homosexuality. Some scholars on the show panel 
founded their arguments in favour of homosexual people based on claims about 
homosexuality’s ‘biological determinism’ and ‘inevitability’.  However, by 
premising equality on ‘deficient’ biology these scholars essentially presented 
LGBTQ individuals not as the legitimate subjects of equal respect, but of pity. 
Additionally, the problem with such causal approaches is that they leave important 
historical and political questions unaddressed. The imperative issue is not 
discovering whether non-heterosexual sexuality is the result of ‘nature’ or ‘nurture’. 
The crucial task it is to bring to light its interpretations and representations within 
specific socio-cultural contexts, to emphasize the effects of such interpretations and 
representations on the way in which sexual lives are organized and to analyze the 




Such attitudes partly account for the present differences between Cypriot and 
Greek civil society, although a historical examination of the ways in which 
nationalist and sexist discourses were cultivated in the two countries reveals 
numerous similarities. Although the legal framework pertaining to LGBTQ issues is 
very similar in the two countries, Greek society – or at least Greek urban society – is 
much more tolerant towards LGBTQ individuals. In Cyprus, LGBTQ organization 
or mobilization is a very recent phenomenon, whereas in Greece the first substantial 
LGBTQ mobilization took place as early as the 1970s, while there is a number of 
organizations working on, and scholarship pertaining to, LGBTQ issues.
246
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During the CyBC discussion show, Cypriot right-wing politician Tasos 
Mitsopoulos insisted that the religious and cultural values of the Christian Orthodox 
Cyprus could not possibly be allowed to degenerate because of external societal 
influences, which Cypriot society is not ready to embrace.
247
 Yet, the fact that sixty 
per cent out of the fifteen hundred programme viewers who telephoned and voted on 
the issue supported the recognition of same-sex and heterosexual civil partnerships, 
raises multiple and interesting questions about the relationship between public and 
private sexuality discourses. Is Cypriot society open to LGBTQ recognition, while 
the centres of power remain deaf to the people’s will? Do private discourses differ 
from the sexist and homophobic public ones?  
Commenting on the outcome of this vote, political scientist Nikos 
Trimikliniotis made a significant remark.  He argued that the results of the vote do 
not necessarily imply that Cypriot society is ready to fully accept LGBTQ 
individuals as equals among equals. As he explained, they might only point to the 
fact that the recognition of ‘cohabitation contracts’, short of all the rights that 
accompany marriage, is the only allowance that society is willing to make.
248
  The 
above-mentioned positions of elite and LGBTQ interviewees on the rights to 
marriage and adoption for same-sex couples further support this argument. 
Trimikliniotis also noted the absence of lesbians from the discussion panel.
249
 The 
hostess of the show explained that this was due to the difficulty in finding and 
convincing lesbian women to speak publicly – a plausible explanation considering 
the position of women, and specifically of lesbian women, in Cypriot society.  
Cynthia Cockburn reports that when she tried to document lesbian 
subjectivities in Cyprus, she was told that Cypriot lesbian women escape abroad in 
order to be able to freely live their lives. She also mentions that, when Andreas 
Onoufriou was conducting his research on gendered subjectivities among Cypriot 
students, he was not able to find a single case of a Cypriot lesbian woman living in 
Cyprus. Although the research results and the interviews I conducted with both 
Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot lesbian women who reside in Cyprus contradict 
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Cockburn and Onoufriou’s claims, the argument that most Cypriot lesbian women 
are forced into invisibility is valid.
250
  
Nonetheless, this pervasive effect of dominant discourse on non-
heteronormative demonstrations of sexuality and gender is not irreversible. Truly, 
such discourses have led to the silencing of alternative narratives and to the 
invisibility and non-heterocentric modes of existence. However, identity formation 
processes – and their accompanying discourses – are not static. Rather, they are the 
outcomes of debates and of processes which are shaped and reshaped through 
individual and collective lived experience. The example of the debate about civil 
unions in Greece and in Cyprus demonstrates how disruptive instances have the 
ability to initiate a shift in what is publically articulated. For example, the symbolic 
same-sex marriage ceremony in Tilos led to a heated debate about LGBTQ rights in 
Greece, which rapidly spilt over to Cyprus. This new trajectory in public discourses 
consequently affected both institutional elites and the centres of power, and Cypriot 
LGBTQs: The former Cypriot Ombudsman raised the question of recognizing same-
sex civil unions, while – as it will be extensively discussed in chapter five – Cypriot 
LGBTQs started, for the first time, to organize and mobilize not only for non-
interference with their right to privacy, but for complete, substantive equality. 
Significantly, these new alternative institutional and grassroots discourses increased 
their impetus by employing a language that state and political elites cannot negate, 
since they have themselves used it extensively, in order to justify national claims. 
This language is the language of ‘Europe’, ‘Europeanization’ and human rights 
which, as chapters two and three will demonstrate, could become an invaluable tool 
in groups and individuals’ equality struggles. 
Conclusion 
 
 As Brubaker has argued, rendering the abstract concept of ‘the nation’ as the 
central actor behind the construction of national identity omits too many essential 
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questions that pertain to the nature and demonstrations of agency.
251
 For how could 
an abstract concept act as a signifier and as an actor?  Such limited understandings of 
‘agency’ and ‘public discourses’ overlook how determinants other than politico-
national ones, as well as non-heteronormative gender and sexual subjectivities affect 
the negotiation of exercise of agency over identity formation; how public and private 
discourses intersect and influence each other. In order to grant Cypriots with real 
agency over the formation of their identities, interpretive schemes of the social world 
and of experienced reality need to extend Cypriots’ reality and identity-shaping 
culture beyond political ideologies and nationalist loyalties struggles. Further 
examination is needed about whether other categories through which existence could 
be imagined or articulated, have left – or not – the island intact.  
The relevant literature identifies a degree of change in Greek-Cypriot and 
Turkish-Cypriot nationhood narratives and national identity formation processes. 
There exists evidence that besides the politico-national discourses of ‘Greekness’, 
‘Turkishness’ and ‘Cypriotness’, additional elements have started to inform 
Cypriots’ national identity formation.252 Nevertheless, questions about whether and 
how gender and sexuality have been affected by changes in nationalist ideological 
struggles and national identity formation processes need to be addressed. 
In doing so, disaggregating the concept of ‘agent’ and examining the 
subjectivity-discourse relationship more closely and systematically becomes 
pertinent. The Orthodox Church of Cyprus continues to have a pervasive influence 
on the socio-political domain. Through means such as education, it manages to 
demarcate what stands as ‘appropriate’ modes of collective and individual existence. 
Nonetheless, the Church is not the sole agent of nationalism on the island, as the 
state and political elites remain reluctant to allow the articulation of alternative 
discourses and the development of identity formation processes which escape 
androcentric and heteronormative understandings of gender and sexuality.  
This, however, does not preclude other possible scenarios, especially since a 
Foucaultian approach to discourse, power and subjectivity demonstrates that their 
relationship is both changeable and reciprocal. Importantly, in recent years, Cyprus 
has witnessed several important socio-political changes, a number of which are the 
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direct result of the country’s Europeanization. For example, EU admission 
requirements have led both the ‘TRNC’ and the RoC to abandon their previously 
explicitly nationalistic rhetoric in favour of more moderate articulations, which are 
structured around concepts such as ‘European ideals’ and ‘human rights’. At least to 
some degree, these – admittedly strategic and opportunistic – changes are reflected 
in school curricula, in civil society organization and mobilization and even in the 
vocabulary that elites employ when making public statements.  
As the examples of the same-sex union debates in Greece and in Cyprus 
demonstrate, both the weight that the ‘language of Europe’ carries and the fact that it 
has successfully inseminated – at least to some degree – official public discourses, 
has facilitated the articulation of alternative discourses of gender and sexuality. The 
disruption that the ceremonial same-sex marriage in Tilos had created generated an 
opportunity for LGBTQ issues to come to the forefront and to gain momentum as the 
focal point of public debate. This raises the question of how such disruptive 
instances come to maintain momentum, in order to consequently lead to a politics of 
gender and sexuality. How about organized civil society and grassroots movements, 
and their negotiations – or internalizations – of popular official discourses pertaining 
to gender and sexuality? How are gender and sexuality identities constructed and 
negotiated, either sub-culturally and under the official radar or within, and as part of, 
the official structures?  
The rest of the chapters will discuss the ways in which official gender and 
sexuality discourses have been appropriated, negotiated and challenged by civil 
society and grassroots groups. By employing the example of Greek-Cypriot 
women’s groups and movements, chapter two will discuss the dialectic between 
‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ discourses. It will disaggregate the agents of grassroots 
transcripts. Moreover, it will discuss whether and to what extent these agents and a 
transformed attitude towards gender and sexuality could serve as antipodes to 
official narratives. It will question and discuss the strategies and mechanisms 
through which such groups could affect a change of attitudes towards nationalism 
and national identity, a shift in dominant political and social structures, the 
negotiation of collective and individual understandings of gender and sexuality and – 
most importantly – the moulding of disruptive moments into a politics of gender and 
sexuality. 
 






Mobilization Obstacles and 
Opportunities 




















Within a context, like Cyprus, where nationalist discourses prevail, gender 
and sexuality subjectivities have too often been considered as issues of personal 
identification that are unrelated, or trivial when compared, to socio-political ‘public 
sphere’ matters.253 However, although these subjectivities are often effortlessly 
assumed to be unrelated to public life, it is in the public sphere that the effects of 
their stigmatization are being mostly felt. This chapter will encourage a more 
systematic and extended attention to how heteronormative gender binaries and 
heterosexual sexuality manifest themselves, amidst the social and political discourses 
that idealize them. 
This chapter will also highlight the essentialisms that are embedded in some 
feminist discussions of gender and nationalism. Although they are important in that 
they expose nationalism’s great impact on gender subjectivities, analyses which 
focus on the gender-nationalism binary often do not follow through sufficiently those 
questions that pertain to gendered agency, gendered sexuality, personal narratives 
and unofficial discourses.
 254
 A central problem of the gender-nationalism binary is 
that, on the one hand, interpreting nationalism as diametrically contradictory to 
women’s emancipation assumes too much about nationalist discourses’ ability to 
annihilate women’s agency, and often understands women as a cohesive group with 
essentialized characteristics. On the other hand, arguing in favour of ‘feminist 
nationalisms’ ignores questions of sexuality and the problematics of overlapping 
subjectivities, while it leaves unquestioned the structures of power within which 
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‘feminist nationalisms’ become possible. 255 Moreover, questions arise as to whether 
a concept such as ‘feminist nationalism’ is pragmatically viable. This is because 
national, ethnic and cultural specificities, social solidarity and religious homogeny 
have been projected in several settings by the ruling – male and female – elite, in 




The main argument of this chapter is that there exists a self-destructive 
contradiction inherent in nationalist and official discourses that women, sexual 
‘others’ and other national ‘exiles’ could take advantage of. By strategically 
employing nationalism’s contradiction and its ability to reinvent itself, the 
destabilization of exclusionary discourses and the articulation of new grassroots 
narratives of subjectivity and identity become possible. Instead of unquestionably 
siding with either of two positions – that is, ‘anti-nationalist feminism’ or ‘feminist 
nationalism’ – this chapter will highlight how this contradiction allows alternative 
formations and understandings of gender, sexuality and national identities to emerge 
and to disrupt the currently dominant discourses. Furthermore, it will argue that the 
gender-nationalism relationship is especially intricate. Moreover, when sexuality is 
inserted in this binary relationship, several new questions surface. Answering such 
questions helps elucidate numerous pertinent facets of the nation-identities 
relationship. Therefore, raising questions of sexuality is necessary towards reaching 
a complete and coherent understanding of the nature, causes and effects of 
essentialist constructions on subjectivities, self-perceptions, identifications and 
identities, as well as of the ways in which these relate and overlap.
257
  
How, then, do actors express their relationship to essentialist categories? For 
Foucault, ‘where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, 
this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power’.258 But how 
do individuals claim agency and their own spaces within the exiting matrices of 
power? These questions are at the heart of the second and third parts of this chapter 
that will focus on obstacles and opportunities for grassroots mobilization in Cyprus. 
They will draw attention to Cypriot women’s groups, to the difference between 
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feminist movements, women’s movements and women in movements and they will 
assess the usefulness of identities and strategic essentialism for communicating 
movements’ objectives. Cypriot women groups will be studied in relation to local 
institutional forces, in order to discern how the former and the latter interact. The 
ways in which the ‘public’ and the ‘private’, the ‘official’ and the ‘hidden’ are 
intertwined and negotiated will be problematized. It will be argued that, although in 
the case of Cyprus this intertwining currently restrains female agency, it does not 
render it impossible, especially in light of the positive impact of Europeanization on 
local processes of identification and modes of mobilization. 
Approaches to the Gender-Nationalism Relationship: Women as 
Victims and Perpetrators 
 
Beyond its effects on communal life, as Otto Bauer pointedly noted, the idea 
of the ‘nation’ is intrinsically interconnected with ‘ego’.259 Namely, the aura that 
surrounds the nation – that is, the nation’s ‘ego’ – affects individuals’ ‘egos’, self-
perceptions and identities. When making this statement Bauer was referring neither 
to gender nor to sexuality elements of collective and personal ‘ego’ and identity. 
Nonetheless, since ‘the nation’ is a construct that is based on male heterosexual 
needs, objectives and fantasies, the nation’s ‘ego’ is inextricably linked to notions of 
patriarchy. Patriarchical norms and a presumed male superiority allow men to both 
render women as a different ‘Other’ and to control their behaviour pertaining to the 
demonstration of their gender and sexuality. Historically, this control has been 
exercised primarily – but not exclusively – through the creation of moral codes that 
aimed to preserve the established patriarchical, androcentric and heterocentric social 
and political national order.
260
  
Although varying and changing throughout history, nationally prescribed 
femininities and sexualities for women have often been premised on the expectation 
for sexual modesty or purity. Women have been used to represent and embody a 
feminized nation in need of protection by its male guardians from foreign – 
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physical/actual and, or cultural/metaphorical – penetration. Moreover, by 
constructing women as the biological and sexually moral reproducers of the ‘nation’, 
the female body has become both the carrier of the ‘nation’ and the marker of its 
boundaries. In this way, nation, gender and sexuality have intersected, and 
nationalist discourses have become linked to discourses of corporeality and 
somaticity. These processes have had an impact on men also: In a similar manner 
that in the context of national projects ‘womanhood’ has been equated with 
femininity and female sexuality has been equated with procreative heterosexuality 
and modesty, ‘manhood’ has been associated with masculinity, while male sexuality 
has been associated with sexual vigour.
261
 This is because, according to nationalist 
narratives, sexuality that is expressed in ways that fall outside the heteronormative 
boundaries is unimaginable in the case of women, while in the case of men it is the 
sin and/or the perversion of national others.
262
 
Yuval-Davis argues that in nationalism-infused cultures – namely, in 
ethnically divided societies where the nation-state is, or it is imagined to be, facing 
an imminent threat – women’s citizenship is of a dualistic nature. That is to say, it 
both includes and excludes women from the general body of citizens, even if 
formal/legal gender equality is in place. She explains that, although omitted from the 
national production and reproduction literature, it is women who are expected to 
biologically, culturally and symbolically reproduce the nation.
263
 Nonetheless, 
simultaneously excluding and including women and sexual ‘others’ from the body-
politic and from the body of the ‘nation’ is not exclusive to Cyprus. Rather, as 
numerous scholars argued, it has been common practice in nation-building processes 
and in national projects across the globe.
264
 The dissemination and prevalence of 
such notions and practices has its roots in Western theory and social and political 
order, which have created the division of life into the ‘public’ and ‘private’ spheres. 
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Based on this dichotomy, women have been confined in the ‘private’ sphere, while 
nationalisms and nations have been discussed as part of the ‘public’ sphere.265 
This division of the civil sphere into the ‘private’ and ‘public’ domains has 
its roots in Hobbes and Rousseau, who portrayed the transition from the state of 
nature into orderly society based on what they assumed to be exclusively male 
characteristics, namely aggressiveness and reason.
266
 Since, in the past, Western 
political theory has understood women as being close to nature and as unable to 
reason, their control and subordination was interpreted as one of the bases of social 
order.
267
 Consequently, different gender relations came to play an important role in 
all dimensions of national projects. Some of these dimensions include: a) citizenship, 
which was premised on heterosexual marriage and the bourgeois heterocentric 
family; b) race, of whose the ‘purity’ was ‘preserved’ by controlling women’s sexual 
activities; c) and culture and religion, which were constructed around the symbolism 
of women as the biological reproducers of the national collectivity and as the 
transmitters of national culture and honour.
268
  
Since the national project has been defined primarily by men, femininity and 
feminine sexuality have been constructed in relation to masculinist, patriarchical, 
nationalist notions. Moreover, they have been regulated by nation-state policies and 
laws pertaining, for example, to marriage and abortion, as well as by demographic 
engineering methods, such as pronatalist policies.
269
 Pronatalist policies, which 
function as tools of predominantly masculine nationalist projects, seek to maintain or 
establish national and politico-economic superiority, by employing women’s wombs 
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as weapons in the numerical superiority inter-ethnic wars. The examples of Greece 
and Cyprus exemplify this argument. 
Symptomatic of tensions that usually arise when trying to balance 
‘modernity’ and tradition, discourses of population decline – which supposedly 
endangers national sovereignty and existence – took central stage in Greek public 
life in the 1990s.
270
 The ‘demographics problem’ [το δημογραφικό πρόβλημα] was 
portrayed as a central and dire national problem in the Greek press and media and it 
spurred endless political and public debates over the then new position of Greece in 
Europe, over the modernization of the Greek nation-state and over the rights and 
‘national duties’ of Greek women. In the mainstream rightist and centrist press, 
women were usually portrayed as the root of Greece’s problems, since they refused 
to procreate to the levels that they were expected to, and therefore endangered the 
preservation of Greek national identity amidst the threat of hostile neighbours – 
ranging from Macedonia to Albania and Turkey – and of the influx of Kurdish, 
Polish, Filipino and other immigrants. Abortion was portrayed as a sin against the 
nation, Hellenism and Orthodoxy.
271
 
In the case of Cyprus, pronatalist policies were introduced soon after 1974, in 
an attempt to preserve numerical strength over the Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot 
groups. Considering their post-1974 economic and political losses, as well as the fact 
that Turkey had moved large numbers of settlers from Anatolia to the occupied 
north, Greek-Cypriots felt that their national existence was greatly threatened. The 
RoC adopted measures to encourage both larger families and the participation of 
women in the labour force, since reconstructing the economy heavily depended on 
women’s industrial labour. In order to encourage fertility while simultaneously 
allowing women to participate in the economic sphere, marriage and maternity 
allowances were increased, while sex equality measures were introduced to protect 
pregnant women from job dismissal.
272
  
 The fact that the engineering of population growth through the immediate or 
indirect control of women and men’s reproduction is central in nationalist projects is 
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further explicated by the history of abortion laws in Cyprus. Abortion was legally 
prohibited until 1974, when the law was amended under the auspices of the 
ecclesiastical courts. The major factor that led to this change was the raping of 
numerous Greek-Cypriot women by Turkish soldiers during the July and August 
invasions of the island. It is important to note that what prompted this legal reform 
was not rape per se but rape by Turkish soldiers, as well as the fear of the likelihood 
of Greek-Cypriot women bearing the ‘enemy’s’ children.273 Therefore, although this 
reform granted Cypriot women a right over their bodies, which women elsewhere 
had to organize and struggle for years in order to obtain, the reasoning behind the 
reform was far from related to ideas about women’s right to choice. On the contrary, 
it was another expression of institutional power and of its sexual control over 
women, in order to assure the ‘purity’ of the national stock. 
Since national collectivities are composed of family units, the family units’ 
coming into being, their dissolution, their structure and composition and the role of 
each member are determined within the boundaries of the collectivity.
274
 This is 
especially true in the Greek and in the Cypriot context, where the conjugal model 
premises the definition of female and male identities, while it is considered the 
epitome of the sexes’ complementarity and the ultimate achievement of 
personhood.
275
 Since in Greece and in Cyprus the household is seen as the link 
between the ‘private’ and the ‘public’ spheres of life – hence, the importance that the 
state and the Church place on marriage – men and women gain prestige through the 
expression of their ‘different’ ‘natural’ roles within the household.276 
Nonetheless, such examples of nationally constructed female identities do not 
render the gender-nation relationship monolithic, or women as the perpetual and 
necessarily passive victims and objects of men’s control. Through kinship power 
structures and as members of family units and of the ‘national family’, women also 
partake in the regeneration of gendered, sexist and nationalist discourses. They do so 
not only by enforcing the masculinist and patriarchical moral codes and modes of 
thought, but also by participating in the definition and perpetuation of these codes 
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and modes through the employment of ‘othering’ as a means of disciplining those 
women who refuse to abide by the rules of the national collectivity. As Yuval-Davis 
explains: 
 
...very often it is women, especially older women, who are given the roles of the 
cultural reproducers of ‘the nation’ and are empowered to rule on what is 
‘appropriate’ behaviour and appearance and what is not and to exert control over 
other women who might be constructed as ‘deviants’. As very often this is the main 





According to Myria Vassiliadou, in Cyprus, the project of ‘othering’ women 
– in order to preserve ethno-national coherence and moral/sexual purity – continues 
to be conducted primarily by women themselves. Nonetheless, as she explains, this 
process of naming internal ‘others’ is also a means through which Greek-Cypriot 
women create places and in-groups for themselves and acquire a sense of self and 
group identity. The focal point is not who is constructed as the ‘other’ but that 
through the creation of the ‘other’ – the Asian domestic worker, the Eastern 
European prostitute, the female Turkish-Cypriot enemy, the homosexual – women 
assert their being.
278
 Even middle-class, urban Greek-Cypriot women, who proclaim 
to be ‘gender aware’, do not necessarily oppose dominant patriarchical and 
nationalist discourses. The reason behind this was succinctly and accurately phrased 
by Paulo Freire, who argued that ‘during the initial stage of the struggle, the 
oppressed, instead of striving for liberation, tend themselves to become oppressors or 
‘sub-oppressors’.279  
This process of group and personal identity construction which Vassiliadou 
describes puts Bauer’s argument about the interdependence between individuals’ 
‘ego’ and the nation’s ‘ego’ into context. According to Vassiliadou, Greek-Cypriot 
women construct their identities and cast themselves as clean, pure and moral, 
through the ostracizing of the unclean, promiscuous ‘other’. However, such a 
description of Greek-Cypriot women’s identity formation processes – one that sees 
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all women as both victims and culprits of patriarchical and nationalist discourses –
underestimates their ability to reason about, and exercise agency over, their lives. 
Additionally, it portrays patriarchical and nationalist notions as everlasting and 
impermeable.
280
 This is an overly pessimistic approach to the issues of nationalism, 
identity formation and agency. 
Applying the logic of the ‘woman-as-victim’ and/or of the ‘woman-as-co-
perpetrator’ is a simplification of the ways in which nationalism, identity and agency 
intersect. Truly, the history of nationalisms around the world gives some credit to 
such interpretations of women’s agency, or lack thereof. Nonetheless, feminist and 
gender studies research, which has been carried both within and outside the Western 
context, demonstrated that women’s involvement in men-orchestrated nationalist 
projects has not always been forced upon them, or to their disadvantage. A closer 
historical examination of women’s roles and exercise of agency amidst nationalist 
projects shows that women have not always been nationalism’s victims, co-
perpetrators, or a combination of the two.  
According to some strands of feminist and gender theory, nationalism does 
not necessarily contradict women’s projects. Women’s participation in national 
projects differs across geographical locations, historical instances and cultural 
milieux, while the affiliation of some women’s movements with national projects – 
especially outside the Western context – has even proved empowering.281 
‘Feminism’ is not a monolithic concept but, rather, describes a plurality of 
movements. Similarly, nationalism is a broad term, which is descriptive of multiple 
variants. Therefore, nationalism and feminism could be compatible if, for example, 
performing the nurturing, caring and family ‘passive’ roles that nationalist discourses 
prescribe is treated by women themselves as less important than gaining their 
autonomy, exercising agency and actively participating in the public and political 
arenas.
282
 Women in various contexts have strategically employed their ‘passive’, 
auxiliary and men-directed involvement in nationalist and nation-building projects, 
in order to get a foot into the public and political arena that otherwise would have 
been inaccessible to them. In some instances, based on their ‘national contributions’ 
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and on the organizational and other skills that they had acquired by being involved in 
these projects, women pressed for, and consequently won rights and favourable 
public policy implementations. The case of Greek women’s involvement in 
nationalist projects demonstrates how such projects can propel female agency in the 
‘public’ arena. 
Irrespective of its detrimental effects on the general Greek population, the 
Greco-Turkish war of 1897 gave upper and middle-class Greek women the 
opportunity to integrate themselves in national structures by assuming an active role 
in the national war efforts.
283
 Athenian women from upper socioeconomic strata 
assembled around the Ladies’ Journal (Εφημερίς των Κυριών) and its editor, Kalliroi 
Parren. Based on a nationalist discourse that had been constructed primarily by men, 
they attempted to delineate a scope of action in the public sphere for women of their 
strata, which would incorporate them into the national body. Through public 
activities – such as collecting funds, caring for refugees, soldiers and their families, 
training the first Greek nurses and forming alliances with women’s organizations 
abroad – the group drew a lot of attention. Especially after the Greek defeat and 
amidst a new nationalist discourse that focused on the need for national self-
awareness, the group was given an active role in the work of ‘national recovery’.284 
The experience gained through ‘national contribution’ later became the basis for 
further demands for women’s rights and gender-oriented state policies.285 Therefore, 
regardless of whether or not Greek women sincerely believed in the Greek 
nationalist discourse, their activism could be classified as the first wave of feminism 
in Greece. 
This pattern is not exclusive to the Greek context. The case of women’s 
emancipation in Turkey overall resembles the Greek case: It gained its momentum in 
times of national struggles and, initially, did not explicitly contradict masculinist, 
official nationalist discourses. Wars gave Turkish women the opportunity to become 
more involved in public life. Nevertheless, and similarly to the Greek case, Turkish 
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women’s participation in nationalist struggles and in the labour force intensified, 
rather than diminished, their roles as mothers and reproducers of the nation.
 286
  
However, in contrast to the case of Greece, Turkish women did not need to employ 
their contributions to national wars and struggles as the basis for demands of rights 
and liberties. The reason is that they had been granted a lot of rights as part of the 
nationalist efforts guided by male elites to secularize, modernize and ‘Westernize’ 
Turkey. The main legitimizing discourse for the women’s question in Turkey was 
that of Turkish nationalism and Turkish modernization. Therefore, women’s 
mobilization in Turkey operated within the limits of existing political structures and 
manifested its limitations towards significantly altering these structures.
287
  
As the following section on Cypriot women’s groups will reveal, similarly to 
Turkish and Greek women, Cypriot women have been used to some extent as tools 
in nationalist projects. However, nationalism does not always contradict women’s 
projects. The ‘nation’ cannot establish its ‘ego’ and it cannot exist, unless it 
constantly opposes itself to those that it expels. This ‘othering’ that the ‘nation’ 
performs, which is essential to its being, is also its weakest point: If the ‘nation’ 
needs to constantly measure itself to those whom it ostracizes, it means that it is 
neither primordial nor unchanging, although nationalist rhetoric depends on 
cultivating the idea that it is. This paradox, this self-destructive contradiction is 
inherent in all nationalisms that aim not only to differentiate and mark the distance 
between ‘us’ and ‘them’, but also to oppose the ‘other’.  
Nationalisms that are premised on opposition and portray the ‘other’ not only 
as different, but also as threatening towards the national collectivity are especially 
prominent in ethnically divided, gendered and deeply homophobic locales like 
Cyprus. Nonetheless, the fact that the existence of such nationalisms is premised on 
the existence of what they opposes, as well as the fact that their proclaimed 
primordial existence and continuity is being confirmed only by the (imagined) 
existence of novel ‘threats’, opens up opportunities. Those whom the ‘nation’ 
challenges could raise a challenge against the ‘nation’. If the ‘nation’ is shaped based 
on what and whom it opposes, then those who are being opposed, the outcast, have 
an impact on how the ‘nation’, national identity and gender and sexuality 
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constructions are being debated and formed. The next section will examine whether, 
to what degree and why, Cypriot women’s groups have – or have not yet – pursued 
such opportunities. 
Cypriot Women’s Groups and National Projects 
 
Centring Cypriot life around the state-qua-nation without addressing issues of 
agency carries the danger of reinforcing the merging of the social with the politico-
national and of politicizing the personal via nationalizing it. Although among 
Cypriots national sentiments continue to be intense, this does not necessarily imply 
that the sweeping force of official rhetoric has rendered Cypriot civil society 
stagnated and immobilized. Therefore, an approach that places agency, individual 
narratives and ‘the personal’ in the focus of analysis is indispensable. The relevant 
literature has, for the most part, focused on nationalism’s effects on the division of 
the world in nation-states. However, as Yael Tamir explains: 
 
If nationalism was necessary for the development of democracy, it was not because 
it established political equality but because it gave a rationale for the division of the 





Hence, it is vital to also address the division of these democratic – or not so 
democratic – nation-states into the units of so-called ‘public’ and ‘private’ spheres. 
By doing so, the understanding of the nature of national communities and the 
determination of the totality of the effects of nationalism on individual lives and 
subjectivities will be facilitated.  
Similarly to the cases of nineteenth-century Greece and twentieth-century 
Turkey, Greek-Cypriot women’s groups have not – yet – managed to form and 
operate completely outside of the predominant nationalistic and patriarchical socio-
political status quo. Pre-1974 women’s organization and mobilization about purely 
women’s issues existed. Nevertheless, it was the Turkish invasion and occupation 
that triggered not only the creation of multiple women’s organizations, but also their 
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merging even deeper into politico-national discourses and the stronger embracing by 
women of their ‘female roles’ as biological and cultural reproducers of the nation.289  
The Cyprus Federation of Women’s Organizations (POGO) was the first 
women’s organization. Formed in the late 1930s, it is the ‘female branch’ of the 
communist-leftist AKEL and of the leftist Pancyprian Federation of Labour (PEO) 
workers’ union. Its founding ideology is based on Marxism and on ideals of pacifism 
and demilitarization, while its activities focus on ameliorating the position of women 
in the labour force. Nevertheless, even this group stresses the contributions of its 
members to the national struggle against British colonial rule. It does so regardless 
of the fact that, during the period those struggles took place, it was declared illegal 
‘like all the other organizations of the Populist Movement’290– that is, the leftist 
groups and organizations. Other women’s groups, which are affiliated with political 
parties of the political centre and the right, were created much later. Since their 
inception, these other women’s groups – that is, the Socialist Women’s Movement, 
but especially the Democratic Party Women’s Organization (GODIK) and the 
Democratic Rally of Cyprus Women’s Organization (GODISY) – have been closely 
aligned with nationalist discourses.
291
 
 In varying degrees, all Cypriot women’s groups have adhered to official 
discourses of national identity. In the early 1990s, citizen-led activities aiming at the 
reconciliation of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities grew in 
number, mostly because of financial and coordinative assistance by third parties such 
as international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and research groups.
292
 
These activities involved the coming together of groups from the two communities, 
in which both men, but mostly women, participated in order to discuss a collective 
vision for peace.  
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Although, at numerous times, the volunteers who participated in these 
programmes were faced with threats and even physical violence from nationalists – 
who considered rapprochement activities as a betrayal to ‘the national cause’ – they 
continued attending the bi-communal meetings. Yet, ironically, when the issue of 
Cypriot national identity was discussed, the self-proclaimed anti-nationalist 
representatives of the two groups would express disagreeing views.
293
 This 
demonstrates that even those Cypriots who were committed to anti-nationalist and 
peace ideals, regardless of the threats of violence and of the social stigmatization 
they faced, nonetheless felt uncomfortable with embracing a poly-ethnic and 
inclusive national identity. Instead, they insisted on continuing to espouse the 
essentialist official identity constructions of ‘Greek-Cypriotness’ versus ‘Turkish-
Cypriotness’. 
Adhering to the official national identity discourse impeded these 
participants’ self-ascribed objective of embracing ‘otherness’. This constitutes an 
example of how people’s socialization into a nationalistic culture, which defines not 
only the ‘national self’ but also the ‘self’ based on the exclusion of the ‘other’, 
restricts people’s agency over the negotiation of their individual and group identity. 
The effects of this restriction are more evident among Cypriot women and sexual 
‘others.’ This is so because in nationalist, patriarchical and sexist settings, like the 
Cypriot one, challenging the established order carries heavier sanctions for those 
who already rank lower in the socio-political hierarchy.  
Cypriot nationalist rhetoric has not been able to imagine women as the acting 
subject of politics, but only as its passive object and recipient. Therefore, in Cypriot 
official discourses, the active role of women in national matters and in the public 
sphere has been muted. An example of this muting relates to women’s participation 
in the Greek-Cypriot national struggle for liberation from British rule in the mid-
1950s. Numerous women assisted in the struggle by carrying weapons, acting as 
foils for fighters and accompanying men for whom the British had issued arrest 
warrants into the mountain hide-outs by pretending to be their wives, fiancées or 
sisters – thus jeopardizing their socially demanded sexual honour and ‘good name’. 
However, none of them received the accolades given to ex-fighters after 
independence. Their names remained unknown, with the exception of those women 
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who were publicly acclaimed as mothers of the fallen national heroes.
294
 Conversely, 
in official discourses around displacement, refugees and missing persons, women 
have been assigned a central role in the state’s attempts to internationally expose 
Turkey and, in this way, to gain external support for its national prerogatives.  
The images of crying women dressed in black continue to decorate history 
textbooks, the Green Line,
295
 as well as television screens and newspaper front pages 
on the anniversary of the 1974 Turkish invasion.
296
 Images 2.1 and 2.2 are 
demonstrative of the way in which the Greek-Cypriot mourning women have been 
rendered as the symbols of the Greek-Cypriot protests against Turkish invasion and 
occupation. In fact, these grieving women were summoned to participate in nearly 
every state and political-party ‘national cause’ demonstration. Images 2.3 and 2.4 
show posters produced by refugee associations. These associations were formed after 
1974 and demand the return of internally displaced Greek-Cypriots to their occupied 
home-villages. In their vast majority, the numerous posters and photographs that I 
collected from the archives of the refugee association Unconquered Kyrenia 
(Αδούλωτη Κερύνεια), resemble images 2.3 and 2.4 and picture mourning women 
dressed in black, who hold pictures of their missing loved ones. This is not the least 
surprising, considering the fact that it is women and children who suffer the greater 
losses in wars and conflicts. Consequently, images that capture their pain and 
destitution become vital tools in (primarily men-led) national campaigns. 
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IMAGES 2.1 & 2.2: Greek-Cypriot women dressed in black, holding pictures of their 
missing sons and husbands at Ledra Palace and Solomos Plaza, Nicosia, during the 
mid-1990s.  
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IMAGE 2.4 
IMAGES 2.3 & 2.4: Posters produced in the 1980s by the refugee association 
Unconquered Kyrenia, portraying the mothers of the missing and of the fallen soldiers.  
 
Poster 2.3 reads: ‘We demand to know their fates.’ In the context of the Greek-Cypriot 
national project, women and their embodiment of the national pain have been 
extensively used to legitimize politico-national claims for international assistance 
towards the Greek-Cypriot cause, and sanctions against occupier/perpetrator Turkey.  
 
Source: Unconquered Kyrenia Refugee Association Archives 
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Since, in Cyprus, women have traditionally occupied the domestic sphere, the 
loss of their homes, family members, village lives and supportive kinship networks 
has dramatically affected both their social and economic conditions. That is to say, 
the official narrative of the ‘mourning mother’ and ‘widow’ has been premised on 
real and dire post-1974 conditions. Nonetheless, the perpetuation of this 
symbolization of women for decades has been strategically employed and used in the 
pursuit of a ‘comfortable impermanency’ – as former RoC president, Spyros 
Kyprianou, called it – and in the name of national interests – that is, Greek-Cypriots’ 
return to their pre-1974 political, social and economic realities.
297
 
Vassiliadou argues that the position of women vis-à-vis nationalist objectives 
constitutes a continuation of the struggle for independence in the 1950s’ and that 
women passively espouse predominant nationalistic, patriarchical discourses, in 
order to ensure a securer position within the current power structure of Cypriot 
society.
 298
 However, such sweeping claims and generalizations overlook differences 
between women within specific contexts and they appear to reduce women’s agency. 
It is hard to tell whether and to what degree the essentialization of the ‘public-
private’ hierarchy and of the ‘natural’ and ‘nationally proper’ gender and sexuality 
order has been internalized by Cypriot women of all social and economic strata, or 
whether this essentialization continues to affect Cypriot women today in the degree it 
did twenty or thirty years ago.  
Because of the predominance of the ‘national issue’ in all public discussions, 
efforts pertaining to ‘women’s issues’ and women’s  liberation from patriarchy had 
to be pursued without openly contradicting nationalist discourses. This is because, if 
the centres of power – that is the state, the Church and political parties – considered 
that these efforts distracted society away from the ‘national’ cause, they would have 
attempted to curtail them, in the same manner that they have attempted to silence 
claims to sexual equality during the 1990s and early 2000s – claims that gained 
impetus when, in the Modinos v. Cyprus case, the ECtHR ruled that the 
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criminalization of homosexuality by the RoC was incompatible with the rights 
enshrined in the EConvHR.
299
  
The fact that Greek-Cypriot women have often premised their demands for 
rights and public policies on the ‘national good’ rhetoric, as well as the fact that they 
have employed the language of nationalism, especially when addressing national 
elites, cannot be denied. However, it is hard to determine whether this adherence to 
nationalism is sincere, or whether it is a type of strategic ‘political correctness’– that 
is, a manoeuvre for avoiding offending prevailing nationalist sentiments. Since the 
politics of national prerogatives are the predominant politics in Cyprus, it is 
principally through nationalism and its discourses that Cypriot women’s voices 
could be heard and understood. The concept of a dominant national, gender or any 
other identity, no matter how flawed, is strategically useful to those engaged in 
social movements. When projecting claims, women – like other marginalized groups 
– needed to be mindful of their audience and of the prevailing ideology.300 An 
investigation into the nature and work of civil society organizations in Cyprus, and 
especially into women’s groups, substantiates this argument.  
 Civil society organizations existed before 1974 but, for the most part, they 
were premised on nationalist agendas, that is, on the aim to expell British forces 
from the island. Groups founded before and after 1974 have never been completely 
autonomous. Like the various aforementioned women’s groups, they have been 
situated within political parties’ structures, while even the majority of NGOs 
continue to be essentially charity organizations and sports clubs, which do not focus 
on changing political processes or social norms. Political party ideologies and the 
‘right versus left’ rhetoric remain at the core of the majority of Cypriot 
organizations’ structure. The concept of civil society as independent from state and 
party politics continues to be almost inexistent in Cyprus.
301
  
One of the few independent groups that formed after 1974 was a women’s 
group which, through its mobilization, managed to draw international attention and 
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support, although it failed to increase women’s involvement in politics. Women 
Walk Home (WWH), an exclusively women’s group, attempted to confront the 
failure to negotiate a solution to the island’s division. It challenged the idea prevalent 
in the Cypriot context that women cannot be political actors but mere followers, 
symbols and servants. WWH constitutes an important example of Cypriot 
mobilization because its formation, operations and subsequent dissolution, helps 
highlight the operations of power and the structure of politics in Cyprus, which 
remain stubbornly inaccessible and even hostile to citizens who dare to challenge 
them.  
The objective of WWH was ‘the reunification of the divided island of the 
Republic of Cyprus and the peaceful coexistence, without outside interference or 
artificial barriers, of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities’.302 The 
group formed in 1975 and it managed to mobilize some 30,000 women, including a 
large number of international feminist celebrities and female politicians from other 
countries. It also tried to reach out to Turkish-Cypriot women and summon them to 
the cause, though the restrictions on freedom of movement and the difficulties in 
communicating across the divide made this a difficult task. The forms of protest of 
the group were peaceful and unarmed marches, as well as attempts to cross the 
patrolled dividing line. The only weapon they would carry were white flags and 
posters stating, in both Greek and Turkish: ‘we come in peace.’ When, in 1989, a 
number of women were arrested and briefly detained by the Turkish military, WWH 
got attention in the international media. Yet, not even this anti-nationalist group 
managed to escape the dividing effects of nationalist rhetoric. In a mixed-sex 
demonstration in July 1989, which was initiated by a subset of nationalist women 
engaged in partisan politics, nationalist symbols were brandished, thus defying the 
group’s initial cause. This act restated the monopoly of Cypriot politics by political 




The fate of WWH with its initial devotion to values such as peaceful 
coexistence and security, grants some support to the above-mentioned arguments 
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propelled by some theorists that nationalism could prove empowering for women; 
yet, only for some women. Namely, nationalism is empowering for women who are 
already in a privileged position, that is, for heterosexual women who do not 
challenge their nationally prescribed roles as bearers and nurturers, as well as for 
upper strata women who have access to state and political parties’ masculinist power 
structures. Unless ‘empowerment’ is understood as the collective, conscious and 
strategic appropriation of the structures and operations of nationalism by women for 
the purpose of getting a foot in the public arena as a group – or, at least, of 
promoting their chosen female representatives within existing political parties’ 
hierarchies – the nationalism-feminism relationship becomes dangerous. This is 
because when nationalism appears to promote feminism, in essence it may benefit 
some women at the cost of the group and limit even further women’s agency, while 
leaving heteronormativity and the ‘public-private’ rigid dichotomy intact.304 
The interview results substantiate this argument. A female Greek-Cypriot MP 
of the centre-left in her early fifties who was active in WWH reported: 
 
Believe me, I took part in almost all the women’s marches and [these marches] 
weren’t easy. We should always keep in mind that women were [politically] 
independent. [She pauses for two seconds and then continues] Well, no! The women 
were not [politically] independent! They were women who were members of the 
political parties’ women’s groups. Who was independent? Myself? X, Y, Z, A or B? 
Yet, who pressed their political parties and the Parliament to amend the law 
pertaining to women’s rights?305 
 
Although this MP initially said that the women who participated in WWH 
activities were independent, she eventually ‘admitted’ that, in reality, they were not. 
She also recognized the fact that the central figures of WWH – herself, X, Y, Z, A 
and B – are currently elected officials or political parties’ high-ranking members. 
However, she stressed that through their power positions, elite women fought for and 
managed to ameliorate all Cypriot women’s legal position. 
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 Admittedly, in Cyprus, civil society organization and mobilization heavily 
depends on individual initiative and personal capacity. Individuals – scholars, 
journalists and other notable community figures –acting in their personal capacities 
have been successful in some instances.
306
 Nevertheless, as the case of WWH 
demonstrates, placing too much importance on individual – rather than on collective 
– agency might, in some cases, render group activities as the vehicle for personal and 
individualistic gratification. It could be argued that, in Cyprus, this danger of 
opportunism is real, since – until recently –alternative avenues for women to 
penetrate the patriarchical and masculinist status quo and to become engaged in 
politics did not exist.  
However, although this lack of alternative avenues curtails women’s agency, 
it does not render it unthinkable. The female elite that – in one way or another –
managed to penetrate the state and parties’ structures propelled arguments and 
achieved a number of top-down positive legal changes. The personal ambition of 
some women elites is not the major reason for the perpetuation of gender power 
imbalance in Cyprus. Rather, it is the notion of patriarchy that even women elites 
have a hard time challenging. Referring to male colleagues, the same female MP 
said: 
 
The truth of the matter is that they always take advantage of us. And the big truth is 
that many times we [i.e., female politicians] catch ourselves letting things go, 
although we get annoyed. We say to each other: ‘Now, am I going to get up and start 
yelling so that they [that is, male politicians] will say that I create arguments all the 
time? Let it go’ ... How many times do we read in the newspapers, especially during 
European parliament elections, that we [i.e., the party] propose, say, five male 
candidates, Mr. X, Z, Y, T, E and only one female candidate ... How many times did 
they [i.e., male politicians] say: ‘Find a young, beautiful woman to preside.’ Well, 
excuse me! ... And do you know how many times it happened [to me], to be sitting 
around a table, holding a meeting session, and they [that is, male colleagues] say: 
‘[Interviewee’s name], would you go make me coffee?307  
 
This demonstrates that female politicians are constantly reminded by their 
male colleagues of their ‘inferiority’ as women and of their secondary role within the 
                                                 
306
   Demetriou and Gurel, “Human Rights, Civil Society, and Conflict in Cyprus,” 1-53.  
307
   “Interview with Politician 212527”. 
Nayia Kamenou  Page 126 of 343 
 
structures of the party and of the parliament.  The difficulties that women who are 
already in the system have to face in order to maintain their position, demonstrate 
how difficult it is for them to break away from the established male norms. Adopting 
a ‘radical’ approach to feminist politics that would potentially promote not only 
legal, but also the substantive equality of all Cypriot women is not an easily feasible 
task. Therefore, in the first stages of women’s emancipation, assimilation and the 
adoption of the male paradigm is essential for surviving the effects of the 
androcentric patriarchical system.  
As the above-mentioned and the rest of the interviews with Cypriot female 
politicians and activists confirm, even after the country’s accession into the EU, the 
paradigms of political and political party structures from other countries have had 
limited and slow effect on Cypriot politics. Although accession procedures and 
accession per se have created a general shift towards equality in political 
representation – because of both EU-imposed guidelines and of an attempt to align 
with ‘European’ trends – women continue to be under-represented in governmental 
and official positions, while they are not assigned leadership positions within their 
political parties’ structures. This is probably because Cyprus’s efforts, both before 
and after EU accession, were primarily directed towards security and other ‘national’ 
political agenda issues, as well as towards reinforcing official discourses about an 
imperilled and embattled nation at the cost of marginalizing serious social issues.
308
  
This need for women to assimilate in, and adopt the characteristics of the 
system that torments them seems to be the reason why all female elite interviewees 
strongly opposed feminist ideology and activism. Characteristically, all of them 
described feminist ideology and activism as ‘extremist’ and as divisive of the 
Cypriot social collective. One female interviewee in her late fifties who was an 
active member of POGO for more than two decades stated: 
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Cypriots are low profile people ... Personally, I don’t like the word ‘feminist 
movement’ because although I am a very open-minded person, feminism goes 
beyond the limit ... Unfortunately, some feminist movements in Europe went out of 
control and reached the point of upholding [the view] that [women] must have the 
upper hand, meaning [that they must] extinguish men ... Here [in Cyprus] we are 





Even the earnest and most carefully planned women’s bi-communal efforts to 
break with the nationalist and militarist Cypriot culture did not manage to 
completely disavow national politics and to move from a ‘feminist nationalism’ to a 
feminism that reclaims gender, sexual, bodily and emotional freedom, as well as a 
place in discursive structures. In 2002, a diverse group of women formed the NGO 
Hands Across the Divide (HAD). According to Hadjipavlou who was one of the 
principal organizers of the group’s activities, HAD’s stated objectives were: 
 
[The] interconnection between feminist ideology and conflict resolution values … 
the role of change agents … [to] promote a culture of inclusion and tolerance of the 
views of the Other … [and to] voice the anger and impatience at the continuing 
impact of militarism and patriarchy on their [i.e., women’s] daily lives.310  
 
Nonetheless, the effects of official nationalist rhetoric circumscribed this group’s 
feminist and anti-nationalist objectives. Although, consequently, they had some 
impact on eroding these discourses, due to the peril of the group being dismissed, if 
it openly objected official discourses, the bi-communal dialogues remained centred 
on cultivating empathy instead of dynamically tackling the problem of nationalist 
and national identity constructions.
311
 
The difficulties faced by WWH and HAD towards effectively challenging 
nationalist discourses and articulating an anti-essentialist feminism –which focuses 
primarily on women and their needs, rather than on the needs of women as these are 
                                                 
309
   “Interview with Women’s Group Representative 210023”. 
310
   Maria Hadjipavlou, “Cyprus: Peace is Too Precious to be Left to Men Alone,” in Gender 
Mainstreaming in Conflict Transformation: Building Sustainable Peace, ed. Rawwida Baksh-Soodeen 
et al. (London: Commonwealth Secretariat: 2005), 117-31. See pages 119-20 and 125. On the history 
and activities of HAD see also: Cockburn, The Line, 143-68. 
311
   Demetriou and Gurel, “Human Rights, Civil Society, and Conflict in Cyprus,” 39-43. Also: 
Cockburn. The Line, 169-94; Katia Economidou, “Women’s Peace-Building Activities: the Case of 
Cyprus,” Canadian Women’s Studies, vol. 22, no. 2 (Fall 2002-Winter 2003): 133-6. 
Nayia Kamenou  Page 128 of 343 
 
defined and prioritized by nationalism – could be partially attributed to the 
internalization by some women of the sexist and masculinist assumption that the 
androcentric order of things is the norm and the only reality. Hadjipavlou’s results 
from her numerous studies with Cypriot women from all ethnic groups partially 
support this argument. Through questionnaires and focus interviews with Cypriot 
women, she concludes that because they lack an understanding of the concept of 
patriarchy – as there exists no public dialogue or education on such issues – many of 
the women believe that being in control of household affairs renders them socially 
equal to men.
312
 She explains that they see motherhood as the ultimate personal 
gratification while, in a self-oppressive manner, they do not take pride in being 
women. Thus, they tend to value the community and its prescriptions more than their 
individual needs. Additionally, they do not trust other women and in this way they 
reinforce female ‘otherhood’. Hadjipavlou explains that the prioritization of the 
collective over the individual is reflected in Cypriot women’s adherence to religious 
dogmas and moral systems, an example of which is their perception of abortion as 
unacceptable and of marriage as essential. Therefore, she concludes that, in Cyprus, 
‘while on a hypothetical level there is a trend toward liberation and choice, this is not 
manifest in the more directly private realm’.313 
As Hadjipavlou and Vassiliadou’s studies – among others – claim, at least in 
the past, Cypriot women did not escape the local discursive confines: They either 
consciously and strategically remained silent when marginalized because they 
understood that openly challenging nationalist discourses’ monopoly of political 
discussion could alienate them from the nation-state and damage their relatively 
superior status – superior when compared to more ‘otherized’ ‘others’, such as 
immigrant women and homosexuals; or they remained completely unaware of the 
sources and of the agents behind their marginalization and socio-political inequality 
– that is to say, their compliance in nationalist projects was not the result of informed 
choice, but of false consciousness about their role, value and the exclusions that 
permeate the Cypriot context.
314
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The idea that women’s socialization into a masculinist and nationalist culture 
caused them to internalize, at least to some degree, part of its rhetoric cannot be 
completely rejected. The infiltration of private, hidden, non-statist discourses and 
self-perceptions by nationalist rhetoric, has to do with the symbolic violence this 
rhetoric carries. As Bourdieu explains, masculine domination – and to this I would 
add masculinist nationalist domination – is so deeply embedded in our 
consciousness, that we hardly perceive all of its dimensions and demonstrations. 
Masculine domination as symbolic power is eternalized through its dehistorization, 
while this dehistorization takes place within the social institutions of the family, the 
school, the Church and the state.
315
 This probably partially accounts for the fact that, 
at least until the early 2000s, Cypriot women – similarly to women in former 
socialist countries or in religious, traditional milieux – have been slow in taking full 
advantage of the tools and opportunities afforded to them by the EU, which would 
facilitate the formation of a feminist conception of politics and the raising of claims 
for substantive – beyond mere legal – equality. 316 
Nonetheless, overstressing arguments about women’s false consciousness 
and opinions regarding the prevailing patriarchical norms and their own ‘right’ 
position within the existing powers of structures completely annihilates all forms and 
conceptions of female agency. The idea that to a considerable degree, Greek-Cypriot 
women have internalized and have participated in the reproduction of androcentric 
and heteronormative oppressive narratives cannot be completely rejected. However, 
focusing exclusively on this idea, leads to hasty, misinformed and incomplete 
assumptions about the causes of Greek-Cypriot women’s subordination. False 
consciousness could be one of the reasons for their continuing impasse. However, 
there exist other reasons, even more important and pervasive, that need to be 
discerned, if the chances for Greek-Cypriot women’s emancipation are to be 
correctly and realistically evaluated. For example, an explanation of Cypriot 
women’s impasse might be that the momentum that in other parts of the world 
                                                 
315
   Pierre Bourdieu. Masculine Domination. Translated by Richard Nice. Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2001. 
316
   Silke Roth, “Sisterhood and Solidarity? Women’s Organizations in the Expanded European 
Union,” Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State and Society, vol. 14, no. 4 (2007): 460-
87. See page 477-8. Also: Magda Zenon, “The Visibility and Civil Participation of Women in 
Cyprus,” Quaderns de la Mediterrània. (2006): 129-32. The effects of EU gender directives and 
policies in milieux with no feminist theory and practice tradition will be further discussed in the last 
section of this chapter. 
Nayia Kamenou  Page 130 of 343 
 
generated purely feminist movements was missed in Cyprus. A female left-wing 
politician in her late forties who was involved in the activities of POGO explained: 
 
.. work has been done by political parties and unions pertaining to [gender] equality 
issues, and maybe this is one of the reasons that we have not had a feminist 
movement in Cyprus; because the first demands which the feminist movement set 
decades ago in other countries, are demands that, in Cyprus, have been taken up by 
the unions’ movement and by the political parties ... But this [i.e., union and 
political parties’ gender-related activities] got up to a point. We do not see any 
substantial progress [on gender equality issues] beyond this threshold, even though 
more complex acts are needed. But this is because, at this point in time, it is harder 
for a purely feminist movement to be created and to mobilize; because, currently, 




This situation, namely the alienation of Cypriot civil society groups towards 
feminist ideology and methods, is also reflected in the structure and operation of 
Cypriot NGOs.
318
 As a recent independent study revealed, gender hierarchy and a 
system that separates values into ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ ones is characteristic of 
the organization and structure of Cypriot NGOs in general, and even of NGOs that 
work on equality issues, including women’s equality.319 According to the study, 
although in Cyprus women participate in NGOs, their participation in leadership 
positions within NGOs is extremely weak, both because of predominant sexist 
perceptions that see women as incapable to lead and of women’s own lack of 
confidence in their skills. Other obstacles towards women leadership in NGOs that 
the research highlights are family responsibilities, social norms and expectations, 
discrimination, the lack of acknowledgement and reward and poor information and 
training available to women.
320
  
The fact that NGOs are short of funds and volunteers and, therefore, depend 
on state and interstate funding, also limits their possibilities for transforming into 
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democratic and egalitarian representatives of those values that they are supposed to 
be projecting and protecting.
321
 Nevertheless, and although they might limit the span 
and the type of the activities that NGOs undertake, funding concerns do not in any 
way prescribe NGOs’ internal operations and structure, especially when the NGOs in 
question are organizations whose stated mission is the combat of discrimination. 
Additionally, external financial support cannot always be viewed as negative, or as a 
way through which the neoliberal capitalist order regulates newly formed or 
independent states, as some argue.
322
 Especially in the case of Cyprus, the formation 
of a number of NGOs and bi-communal initiatives would not have actualized, unless 
it was assisted and coordinated by external bodies such as the United Nations (UN), 
the EU and international research centres. In places infused by nationalist rhetoric 
and subjectivization discourses, like Cyprus, transnational and international 




The fact that, until now, the majority of Cypriot women’s rights and policies 
have been provided to them by their government (especially in the aftermath of 
1974), by the Church (for example, abortion) or by the EU, has indeed resulted in 
limiting women’s opportunities to initiate action.324 In Cyprus, there never existed a 
women’s movement similar to those generated in other countries mainly in the 1960s 
and 1970s – which were purely feminist movements – or an instance of women’s 
mobilization that was completely disassociated from national or ethnic matters.
325
 
Nonetheless, this lack of an activist culture does not necessarily mean that women’s 
agency and human rights in Cyprus are doomed. A female agency that is restricted 
within existing masculinist structures is not the same as lack of female agency.
326
 
Truly, nationalism is inherently built upon imposed coherence and systematic 
exclusions, and especially on gender and sexuality exclusions. Gender per se 
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presents a challenge to the ‘nation’ and to the purity of national identity. Yet a 
feminist politics as transversal politics, that is politics that places female desire 
above nationalist claims of women’s ‘natural’ gender roles and of the importance of 
‘preservation’ of their sexual purity, is promising. Transversal politics as ‘a 
framework of dialogical politics across differences’ has the power – if not to 
deconstruct – to work around nationalist discourses and to challenge their 
subjectivization projects that subordinate women and other marginalized groups.
 327
 
Admittedly, in their majority, Greek-Cypriot women do not associate with 
the term ‘feminism’. However, their mobilization aims and means could justly be 
described as demonstrations of ‘feminism’, rather than as instances of ‘feminist 
nationalism’. Although they have been implicated in nationalist projects – especially 
until the mid-1990s – their consistent appeals for peace and abolition of suppressive 
gender structures reveals some level of conscious and planned strategy, regardless of 
the concessions they had to make periodically, in order to assure that they would not 
be excluded for the body of the nation-state and from the public sphere. As the next 
section will reveal, this is a type of an anti-essentialist first-step choice when having 
to balance powerful nationalist discourses and masculinist state prerogatives with 
feminist objectives. In many respects, it resembles the strategies that have been 
employed successfully by women in other European countries throughout the history 
of female mobilization. What I will aim to answer next is why, conversely to 
elsewhere within the European context, Cypriot women’s agency has not yet fully 
escaped the confines of what has been previously described as ‘feminist 
nationalism’.  Answering this question becomes more pertinent when the changing 
circumstances – that have been created primarily because of European and global 
alliances – which have weakened the ideological contest between politics of the 
‘right’ and of the ‘left’ and between ‘Hellenocentric’ and ‘Cyprocentric’ definitions 
of identity, are taken into consideration.
328
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Europe and the Periphery: Women’s Movements, Feminist 
Movements and Women in Movements 
 
Although the term ‘feminism’ was not coined until much later,329 issues that 
concern the place of women in the ‘public’ and ‘private’ sphere and their role in 
political life were raised by women as early as the fifteenth century. World War II 
had already created the need for, and facilitated women’s incorporation in the work-
field while in the 1960s, European feminism turned its attention to issues of 
substantive, as opposed to mere legal, equality. Namely, the gender stereotype of the 
woman as mother and wife was challenged, and feminists articulated the demand for 




However, although demands for women’s equal rights in the work field were 
expressed by POGO and workers’ unions in the 1930s, Cyprus has not been part of 
this feminist ideological tradition.
331
 Rather, the demands of POGO and of workers’ 
unions have been premised on Marxist/socialist ideology that located women in the 
working class and did not recognize them as a separate movement. Additionally, due 
to the lack of a specifically ‘female’ ideology and of identification with feminist 
consciousness and its developments, demands for women’s rights in Cyprus have not 
assumed a counter-culture character like elsewhere in Europe during the 1960s. 
Cypriot women have remained closely linked to either ‘left’ or ‘right’ political party 
structures and ideologies, instead of attempting to change them. Moreover, 
consistent with the national ideology that permeated the Cypriot milieu, they have 
not challenged the stereotype of woman as mother and wife. 
Especially right after 1974, Cypriot women’s mobilization and exercise of 
agency was almost exclusively part of nationalist or anti-nationalist/peace projects. 
Ironically, both types of projects were premised on ideas about ‘womanly nature’. 
For example, the claim was made that because historically women have been 
excluded from most forms of power and from power structures, their collective 
understanding of how power should be redistributed differs from men’s 
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 Nevertheless, claiming that women are ‘more willing to cross 
ethnic or national boundaries and borders’,333 or that peace, human rights and 
development could or should be ‘“feminized”’334 reinforces essentialist 
understandings of women and of womanhood.  
Such essentialized and naturalized understanding of women as more 
emotional and peace-prone have permeated the Cypriot literature on women, as well 
as and the ideological underpinnings and structure of Cypriot women’s groups and 
NGOs. For example, writing on her experiences with members of HAD, Katrivanou 
notes that even the HAD activists had internalized sexist and feminized stereotypes, 
which they reproduced and reinforced.
335
 Characteristically, she reports an instance 
in which one HAD woman was accused by the others of ‘not being a woman’, 
because she sided against the 2004 Annan Plan that, among other things, made 
provisions about the unification of the island.
336
 Therefore, she concludes that in 
Cyprus – like elsewhere – the ethnic conflict’s all-encompassing nature causes all 
women and men to be assumed and represented as peace-carriers and war-carriers 
respectively, while the ‘feminine’ and ‘masculine’ ways of negotiating peace, power 
and reality are ‘naturalized’.337 
Nonetheless, this is not a novel phenomenon or one that has been exclusive 
to Cyprus. As Anthias and Yuval-Davis explain, ‘every feminist struggle has a 
specific ethnic (as well as class) context’.338 Sex difference has been central to the 
idea of national self-determination and to the construction of the national and 
international spheres of political agency and influence, during what Glenda Sluga 
calls the ‘apogee of nationalism’ after World War I.339 Sluga argues that gender and 
the history of ‘First World’ feminism are implicated in the history of nationalism, 
since sexual difference has been central to prevailing conceptualizations of the 
principles of nationality and national self-determination, which have been 
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encouraged in the peace processes after the War.
340
 As she explains, during the peace 
processes that followed World War I, organizations of European women – that is, of 
white, female elites – stressed female self-emancipation as the sine qua non of the 
democratization of nations. Thus, feminist and national goals merged. Additionally, 
based on a feminized notion of peace, these women tried to re-conceptualize the 
international political sphere as a more ‘feminine’ one, in which the presence of 
women was both natural and beneficial.
341
 Therefore, it becomes clear that joining, 
rather than challenging, the established order and national projects has been 
successfully employed by various women’s groups around the world.  
In a historical exposition of the development of feminist ideology and 
mobilization in Europe, Karen Offen notes that even nowadays the word ‘feminism’ 
does not resonate well with a considerable part of the European public, as well as 
with many European women, who are, nonetheless, in favour of projects that could 
be described as ‘feminist’.342 As the analysis of interviews with Cypriot female 
politicians and activists illustrated, the phenomenon that Offen describes is 
applicable to the case of Cyprus. This phenomenon can be traced back to the history 
of the development of feminism and feminist ideology in Europe during the 
nineteenth century. In political theory and practice generated in Great Britain and in 
the United States, women’s ‘equality’ assumed a primarily legalistic definition, since 
the primary aim of feminist movements was to gain access to male privilege and 
power by stressing ‘sameness’ between men and women. On the contrary, in 
continental Europe, feminists saw male and female equality as the prerequisite of 
male and female complementarity. Namely, continental European feminists 
celebrated their ‘womanhood’, their ‘natural’ gender and sexual difference, their role 
as mothers and nurturers and couched their claims in the language of ‘equality in 
difference’. Relational feminism – that is, continental European feminism – proposed 
a gender-based, sexual dimorphism-based, yet egalitarian vision of social 
organization, while it understood the non-hierarchical male-female couple and the 
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nuclear family as the basic units of society. ‘Individualist feminism’– that is, Anglo-
American feminism – placed the individual, irrespective of gender, sex (and 




In Cyprus, the national aspirations for unity and ethnic survival in light of the 
threat posed by an opposing ethnic group have resulted in the proliferation of 
discourses that placed the group above the individual. This is probably why Cypriot 
women tend to hold a negative view of ‘feminism’, although they might have been 
active in struggles for women’s equality. As the interview excerpts show, Greek-
Cypriot women understand ‘feminism’ as an extremist form of political act that 
prioritizes egoism and opposes co-national men, instead of creating an equal and 
organic society. 
Offen claims that, since relational feminism has been mostly adhered to 
within the European context, and since it has been faced with less opposition and 
with more success than individualist feminism, it could be the solution towards 
overcoming the contemporary resistance to feminism. Therefore, she argues in 
favour of integrating relational and individualist frameworks, in order to create a 
more fruitful model for contemporary feminist politics, which accommodates 
diversity among women and across national boundaries.
344
  
This position is not without merit. A feminist approach that highlights both 
issues of individual autonomy and of social relations could be more accepted. A 
more popular approach that is less contradictive of existing power structures could 
lead to more positive results. However, it is important to question whom these 
positive results would benefit and whom they would further subjectivize and 
alienate. A relational feminist approach not only carries the peril of essentializing 
and naturalizing socially constructed gender roles; under the rubric of social and 
national order, it could also be used to legitimize gender hierarchies and patriarchy 
both within the family and within the public sphere. Additionally, the relational 
approach is bluntly heteronormative and blind to gender expressions and sexualities 
that do not correspond to the male-female binary. It might prove beneficial for 
heterosexual women who cherish marriage and motherhood but at the cost of other 
groups of people – like lesbian women and same-sex couples who wish to raise 
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families, or heterosexual and LGBTQ individuals who do not see the family as the 
basic unit of society or as the epitome of their self-realization. Like ‘nationalist 
feminism’, this feminist framework is severely destabilized when the element of 
non-heterosexual or non-monogamous sexuality is introduced.  
Furthermore, it is questionable whether preserving, abiding by or working in 
alignment with the current gender and sexuality status quo qualifies as any type of 
‘feminism’. There is a difference between ‘women’s movements’, ‘feminist 
movements’ and ‘women in movements’. Also, the relationship between women’s 
movements and political parties, between women’s movements and other groups, as 
well as between women’s movements and the state create different political 
opportunities for women that can (or not) be gendered.
345
  The tendency to identify 
all types of women’s activism with women’s or feminist movements is problematic 
because it ignores questions of power structures, objectives, interests and much 
more.
346
 Women movements’ relation to political parties and other civil society 
institutional agents can determine their fate. If these agents are conducive to 
women’s issues, they become valuable allies, especially if feminist and women’s 
movements adopt a ‘double militancy’ stance – that is, if they work in conjunction 
with these agents. But if these agents are unreceptive, they can become a serious 
structural barrier to women’s political participation.347  
Furthermore, ‘double militancy’, coalitions and assimilation into the state 
apparatus and political structures carries the danger of benefiting some elite women 
over other women, of limiting the movement’s autonomy, of circumscribing its 
ideological foundations and of restricting its sources of funding. The Greek and 
Cypriot cases described above substantiate this argument. Democratizing Greece was 
a top-down project initiated by political elites after the end of dictatorship in 1974. 
As part of this project political parties gained a stronghold on political process and 
this limited the effects of women’s non-partisan activism, which had developed 
significantly during the national and political struggles of the 1940s through the 
1970s.
348
 Similarly, in Cyprus, women groups’ heavy dependence on political parties 
and their close affiliation with nation-state projects has kept them rooted in a 
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relational feminist framework. Therefore, their ideology and activities have never 
radically contradicted the established order or the discourses pertaining to gender 
roles and sexual behaviour expectations.  
Jill Vickers compared women-friendly policies in numerous European 
democracies that have either a history of ‘continental/ relational’ or of 
‘individualistic’ feminism. She concluded that, in places where women have been 
mobilized by nationalism and have been part of the process of establishing nation-
states – for example, in Finland and Norway – they have managed to ‘get in on the 
ground floor’,349 before political and state institutions became male-controlled. Early 
entry of women into the nation-state, the attainment of citizenship at the same time 
and on the same grounds with their male co-nationals, as well as women-friendly 
policies established during nation-states’ democratization process have been 
legitimized based on women’s participation in, and contribution to national projects. 
Conversely, in places like France and the UK where democratizing women’s 
position occurred a long time after the nation-building process, women continue to 
have lower presence in politics and there exist fewer policies that benefit them.
350
  
The case-studies that Vickers discusses substantiate her argument. 
Nevertheless, nation-state building processes that have actualized amidst political 
and historical circumstances other than those Vickers describes, have not resulted in 
women’s better position or to their integration into political and state institutions, 
even though women have had a strong presence in the nation-state building 
processes. For example, Cypriot women have played a central role in the post-1974 
national project, while even nowadays Cypriot women’s movements work closely 
with political parties and within the existing power structures.
351
 Nevertheless, 
Cypriot women’s presence in politics remains low when compared to other European 
countries.
352
 The fact that Cyprus deviates from the examples described by Vickers 
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is at least partially explainable by Cyprus’s colonial past. As Anne McClintock 
explains: 
 
... no ‘post-colonial’ state anywhere has granted women and men equal access to the 
rights and resources of the nation state. Not only have the needs of ‘post-colonial 
nations’ been largely identified with male conflicts, male aspirations and male 





Colonialism and postcolonialism, along with patriarchical Christianity, continue to 
legitimize women’s exclusion from – or at least their unequal access to – political 
and economic power.
354The Cyprus example supports McClintock’s argument.355 A 
gender-structured understanding of politics, citizenship and societal organization was 
predominant in Cyprus among both ethnic communities, even as recently as the late 
1990s.  
Besides its blindness towards non-heterosexual sexuality, a relational 
feminist framework also reinforces an understanding of citizenship as intrinsically 
gendered, as well as an understanding of the public-private dichotomy as valuable 
for the smooth operation of society. However, a political, social and/or civic 
citizenship of women that does not destabilize both public and private patriarchy 
becomes a mere transition from private to public patriarchy.
356
 Citizenship that 
highlights the role of women as mothers and wives, locates them in the household 
and stresses their domestic and caring ‘duties’ over their participation in the public 
sphere through laws, public policies and special benefits, makes the state the new 
patriarch whose duty is to determine women’s lives by delineating their choices.357 
Nonetheless, feminist approaches that argue in favour of the eradication of the idea 
that women are the primary care-givers within societies have been accused of 
partaking in the ‘neoliberal capitalist project’; a project that seeks to further exploit 
women by refusing them welfare rights and by rewarding their labour only when it is 
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performed in the workplace. Such critiques have been mostly raised regarding the 
relationship between feminism, substantive democracy, corporate capitalism and 
‘corporate globalization’ in the ‘non-Western’ periphery, part of which is Cyprus, 
according to some authors.
358
 
So, what is the answer to the gender ‘sameness versus difference dilemma’? 
European mechanisms, anti-discrimination and tolerance directives that promote 
both equality and human rights in their liberal sense, as well as a minimum state 
welfare system could help address concerns over the position of women in 
globalized economies and/or in nationalism-infused settings. It is hard to deny that 
the changes which the RoC made to its nationalist policies before and after EU 
accession were strategic in order to gain advantage over Turkey. It is also difficult to 
refute the position that, since Cyprus’s EU accession, efforts have been primarily 
directed towards security and other ‘national’ political agenda issues at the cost of 
marginalizing serious social problems.
359
 Nonetheless, this does not mean that 
perceptions of Europe, gender and sexuality in Cyprus will not change in the future.  
EU accession has had ambivalent and even contradictory results on gender 
power structures and on women’s mobilization and networking in several new 
Central and Eastern European member-states. One of the problems has been the 
difficulty in enforcing compliance with top-down reforms.
360
 Nevertheless, through 
time feminist mobilization and networking around gender equality in the EU have 
resulted in both ‘boomerang patterns’ and ‘ping-pong effects’; that is, state resistance 
has been faced with criticism by other member-states, international groups and 
supranational entities, while the EU power centres and member-states have 




Regardless of their usefulness towards ameliorating the position of women 
and challenging traditional understandings of gender, EU policies have not had the 
same effects on altering perceptions of sexuality in all member-states. Not only in 
Cyprus but in other EU member states also, homophobia is still the norm at the 
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popular and elite level.
362
 In order to compensate for the EU’s lack of enforcement 
mechanisms on issues such as gender and sexuality equality, and in order for 
positive effects within member-states’ national contexts to last and not back-fire – 
for example, by the creation of ultra-conservative groups that denounce ‘foreign’ 
involvement in national matters pertaining to the ‘morals’ and to the structure of 
local society – grassroots, ‘bottom-up’ reforms are also needed. A first essential step 
is directing existing EU funded NGOs towards the cultivation of a feminist and anti-
sexist consciousness among EU national populations. Group consciousness in not 
only a prerequisite for the enforcement of EU or externally originated directives. It is 
also a prerequisite for political mobilization in places where democratic and equality 
principles are disregarded in the name of national, political or economic 
prerogatives. 
The cultivation of consciousness through the employment of EU mechanisms 
and institutions also helps overcome the ‘strategic essentialism’ versus ‘identity 
deconstruction’ dilemma. Postmodern theorists of gender are suspicious of 
modernist variations of feminism. As they argue, in the best case, these modernist 
approaches relocate or rename binaries – such as men/women, black/white, 
First/Third World – while, in the worst case, they reinforce them. Identities are 
essentialized and fixed not only internally by the group that assumes them, but also 
by the external political arena that opposes the group and that, in doing so, delineates 
its identity. However, an approach that would completely reject identities and 
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identity politics would leave itself exposed to a number of valid criticisms. One of 
them is that by rejecting identities even for strategic reasons, the need of a notion for 
some version of the subject that is being rejected is actually reinstated and 
reinforced; that is, the need for a universal human position which can operate outside 
of power and its constraints. Butler explains: 
 
Construction is not opposed to agency; it is the necessary scene of agency, the very 
terms in which agency is articulated and becomes culturally intelligible. The critical 
task of feminism in not to establish a point of view outside of constructed identities 
... The critical task is, rather, to locate strategies of subversive repetition enabled by 
those constructions, to affirm the local possibilities of intervention through 
participating in precisely those practices of repetition than constitute identity and, 




Additionally, if all identities are effects and enactments of productive and 
multiple powers that always reside in them, and if identities do not express a way of 
being, then what happens to resistance, agency and especially to concrete political 
actions? It is difficult to support the argument that a politics of gender and sexuality 
is possible while social power cannot be escaped, but only possibly destabilized or 
disrupted.
364
  According to Martha Minow: 
 
By taking another person’s difference into account in awarding goods or distributing 
burdens, you risk reiterating the significance of that difference and, potentially, its 
stigma and stereotyping consequences. But if you do not take another person’s 
difference into account – in a world that has made that difference matter – you may 




In an attempt to address both the critiques against identity politics and the 
critiques against the postmodernist disembodied subject, Susan Hekman argues in 
favour of removing identity entirely from the political realm. What Hekman 
essentially argues for is a middle ground between ‘modernist’ and ‘postmodernist’ 
approaches towards the concept of identity – what she calls ‘identity and a stable 
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sense of selfhood as an ungrounded ground and socially constructed core’– and the 
transcendence, rather than replication, of the errors and essentialisms of identity and 
identity politics.
366
 As she explains: 
 
... political participation should not be predicated on any conception of identity, even 
if a diverse array of identities is available... [and] the political conclusion for 
feminism must be a non-identity politics that defines politics in terms of pragmatic 




Although Hekman’s call is appealing and might indeed help transcend the 
pro-identity versus con-identity argumentative deadlock, it is unclear whether and 
how it would remodel actual political mobilization. Politics of identity are 
sometimes exclusionary towards some group members who do not completely 
affiliate with the group’s identity. Nevertheless, it is questionable how a politics of 
identification based on common interests would have the impetus to assemble and 
mobilize members and assure that these members will remain devoted to, and active 
towards, the group’s stated political cause. This is more the case when the cause 
takes a lot of effort and time to be achieved and/or when it is faced with fierce 
opposition. Another problem that a politics of identification could exacerbate is the 
creation of sub-groups within the group that could attempt to benefit at the group’s 
expense through their access to, and influence on, the centres of power. 
Consequently, regardless of the numerous and valid critiques against identity 
politics and the employment of identities, pragmatically, they seem to remain the 
best approach for fostering a minimal group consciousness and coherence, for 
mobilizing groups and for achieving political aims. Identity politics does not 
necessitate that personal experience remains confined within group political stance, 
while group identities need not necessarily be dogmatically internalized by group 
members. Identities and political stance are most of the times symbolic, non-
ontological, evolving, changing labels and strategic manoeuvres. As such, not only 
do they allow for internal differentiations, but they can also serve towards 
deconstructing categories or identities such as ‘man’, ‘woman’, ‘gay’ and ‘straight’. 
Additionally, a causal link between the achievements and failures of identity-based 
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movements and the fact that these movements are identity-based cannot be assumed, 
unless extensive comparative studies of identity-based movements are undertaken.
368
 
Lastly, and as the next chapter will further emphasize, especially in light of 
globalization, identities and legal approaches – and specifically European identities 
and law – seem to be the best and most effective form of political national, 
international and transnational group organization and mobilization against 
repressive national structures of power. 
Conclusion 
 
Cypriot men and women might have not mobilized around issues of gender 
and sexuality in the ways or to the degree that their European counterparts have. 
Especially before the RoC’s admission into the EU, due to the prevalence and the 
continuance of the ‘national problem’, to the hegemonic role of the Church and to 
the prioritization of the traditional heterosexual family, Cypriot civil society and its 
organizations did not have the chance nor the financial means to mobilize for gender 
and sexual equality. However, as the study of Cypriot women’s movements has 
demonstrated, Cypriot men and women are not mere passive recipients and do not 
necessarily succumb to an identity created for them by oppressive discourses. 
Rather, by working within the confines of nationalist projects and without explicitly 
challenging them or renouncing them, Greek-Cypriot women have managed to gain 
a considerable degree of legal equality. Some women have managed to successfully 
place themselves in the public sphere, which had been completely inaccessible 
before their involvement in the nationalist projects. Cyprus does not share the legacy 
of purely ‘feminist’ movements that characterizes other countries, like the UK and 
the US, which has provided the ideological and organizational model for gender and 
sexuality equality mobilization. Nonetheless, Cypriot women have managed to gain 
a number of gender equality rights through the strategic appropriation of nationalist 
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discourses and of the language of identity. This has created social, legal, political and 
cultural precedents and has sparked a ‘domino effect’ which, through time, could 
lead to more individual-oriented – rather than national community-oriented – rights 
for women and for non-heterosexual individuals.  
Of course, these strategic politics need to be rethought and re-approached 
from a different angle, if they are to continue to be effective. Nationalist discourses 
do not always, necessarily or completely victimize women, or deprive them of their 
ability to exercise agency and propel alternative discourses and claims to equality. 
Equating women’s involvement in national projects with pro-nationalist discourses, 
or interpreting women’s achievements made during, or as part of, national projects 
either as ‘complicity’to, or as demonstrations of, ‘feminist nationalism’ assumes that 
–  conversely to men – women are unable to avoid internalizing nationalist 
discourses. It assumes that no action or agency is possible outside the power 
structures of nationalism and that the exercise of agency is necessarily and 
‘naturally’ gender-specific and gender- derived. Examples of such assumptions are 
claims that women’s struggles for peace and empathy are the result of their 
‘womanly’ nature, sentiments, needs and realities. Yet, alternative and more 
effective strategic politics that challenge all types of inequality depend on cultivating 
both an anti-sexist and an anti-homophobic consciousness. This could be achieved 
through a grassroots educational ethic.  
Ethnic conflict has resulted in an exclusionary state structure, which directs 
its efforts into retaining ethnic exclusivity. These efforts have been supported by 
discourses that promote a selective ethnic and communal – as opposed to an 
individual – understanding of ‘human rights.’ Namely, in Cyprus, the concept of  
‘human rights violations’ stands primarily for the grievances suffered by Greek-
Cypriots as a result of the 1974 Turkish invasion and occupation. The aim is to cast 
Turkey as the perpetrator of gross human rights abuses, the RoC as the protector and 
guarantor of human rights and the solution to the ‘national problem’ as the 
restoration of only those rights that the foe has breached.
369
 Initially, women’s 
groups had to adhere to this understanding of human rights, if they were to achieve 
their aims. However, it is time for them to project a more inclusive understanding of 
human rights and equality. 
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According to Foucault, not only do gender and sexuality have a history, but 
they are also integrally intertwined with institutionalized power structures.
370
 As a 
term that pertains to the personal, the institutional, the social and the political 
‘gender’ must be seen as a subjectivity that intersects with other forms of social 
difference and inequality, such as class, ethnicity, race and sexuality. According to 
Harriet Bradley, all these subjectivities/differences are both social constructs and sets 
of social relations/lived realities: there is a dynamic sense in them. Their 
intersectionality and the individual’s/group’s ‘multiple positioning’ have an effect on 
different access to social resources and power. Therefore, ultimately, difference 
translates into inequality with regards to both material and symbolic aspects. 
 Bradley concludes that the concept of intersectionality of various social 
dynamics is essential to a politically useful gender analysis because not only does it 
help reveal specificities, but it also looks for regularities in patterns of intersection. 
Namely, while intersectionality looks at specific subjectivities such as gender, class, 
or sexuality and at their social positioning in relation to power, its focus remains 
open beyond limited and relativist concentrations on identity and processes of 
identification that – especially in postmodern thinking – tend to ignore valid 
generalizations about structural inequality.
371
 Firstly, notions of somaticity, gender 
and sexuality need to be viewed in relation to nationalism. Secondly, this 
nationalism-gender-sexuality relationship must be understood not only as a cultural, 
but also as a political phenomenon. This is because keeping gender and sexuality 
identifications and nationalism expressions within the realm of the ‘cultural’ masks 
the use of culture by the state and other institutional agents for the purpose of 
accumulating and consolidating their own power.
372
  
The Foucaultian view that institutional power – with its methods of modern 
governance – aims at objectifying the individual and the body is not without merit. 
However, as Brubaker argues, this is not a one-way process. Even amidst these 
                                                 
370
   Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume 1. For a similar argument – yet not made specifically 
about gender and sexuality – about the ways in which institutionalized power structures, and 
especially the State as the Sovereign, identifies, categorizes, alienates and sacrifices/murders see: 
Giorgio Agamben. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, ed. Werner Hamacher and David E. 
Wellbery.  Translated by Daniel  Heller-Roazen. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998. 
371
   Harriet Bradley, Gender (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), 180-4 and 190-4. Bradley’s work is an 
excellent example of how although in their postmodern arguments gender studies focus on individual 
subjectivities and question the reality of group identities, in their modernist arguments they help 
reveal the intersectionality of subjectivities, as well as their social manifestation.  
372
   Michel Foucault (1961). Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason. 
Translated by Richard Howard. New York: Vintage, 1988. 
Nayia Kamenou  Page 147 of 343 
 
methods and processes, though malleable, the individual is not completely powerless 
and calculable. As John Breuilly noted, ‘nationalism is one particular response to the 
distinction between state and society. It seeks to abolish that distinction’.373  Other 
responses are available. An important step is to problematize the discussions that 
interpret gender as ‘men versus women’ and the approaches that focus on ‘gender 
versus nationalism’, by placing sexuality in the centre of analysis. Especially in 
Cyprus, sexuality as a lens of analysis of nationalism and gender has been almost 
completely ignored.  
Therefore, chapter three will focus on the relationship between 
institutionalized heterocentrism/compulsory heterosexuality, nationalist discourses 
and alternative discourses of sexuality. Through the examination of both the legal 
and the social aspects of two cases that were brought before the ECtHR and the 
EComHR against the RoC – the Modinos v. Cyprus and the Maragos v. Cyprus 
cases
374
 – it will raise the question of the relationship between local/national and 
European/supranational discourses of sexuality. It will examine the ways and the 
degree to which Europeanization discourses and institutional mechanisms could 
contribute to the destabilization of exclusionary heteronormative rhetoric and to the 













                                                 
373
   Breuilly, John. Nationalism and the State, 374. 
374
   Marangos v. Cyprus; Modinos v. Cyprus. 






‘Cyprus is the Country of Heroes, Not of 
Homosexuals’: Legalizing and Demonizing 
Non-Heteronormative Sexuality  





















This chapter will examine whether and through which ways Europeanization 
and more specifically, European law and litigation that pertain to LGBTQ issues, 
both affect local legal standards and allow LGBTQ individuals to challenge locally 
prevalent presumptions about same-sex sexuality. This will be done in two steps. 
The first two sections of this chapter will discuss and evaluate two attempts to 
disrupt Cypriot understandings and hierarchies of gender and sexuality by two gay 
male Greek-Cypriots, Alecos Modinos and Stavros Marangos, who took cases to the 
ECtHR and the EComHR.
375
 Modinos challenged the criminalization of 
homosexuality and Marangos the lack of protection against the discrimination that 
homosexuals face in public state institutions. Next, the third section of this chapter 
will assess the impact of supranational legal mechanisms, and more specifically the 
effects of ECtHR litigation, at the local level, while the fourth section will discern 
the promises and pitfalls of legal and identity-based approaches to sexual politics. 
An analysis of the cases of Modinos v. Cyprus and Marangos v. Cyprus is 
pertinent because they draw attention both to developments and to limitations in the 
Commission and the Court’s reasoning and rulings on issues that relate to non-
heterosexuality. Additionally, an examination of the ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ local 
contestations that these cases generated reveals the interdependency between 
nationalist projects and institutionalized heterocentrism/compulsory heterosexuality 
within the Cypriot context. Even more importantly, such an analysis points to the 
fact that the heteronormative Cypriot gender and sexuality status quo is not 
impenetrable by alternative imaginings and articulations/demonstrations of sexuality 
and desire. This is because, although nationalism is inherently built upon 
exclusionary dichotomies – such as heterosexual/homosexual, normal/deviant, 
citizen/enemy – the appeal of nationalist rhetoric decreases as the artificiality of 
these and other binaries is exposed.   
According to Foucault, since discourses of sexuality and systems of power 
are all around us, they are also created, reflected, crystallized and perpetuated 
in/through law. He explains: 
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Power is essentially what dictates its law to sex. Which means first of all that sex is 
placed by power in a binary system: licit and illicit, permitted and forbidden. 
Secondly, power prescribes an “order” for sex that operates at the same time as a 
form of intelligibility: sex is to be deciphered on the basis of its relation to the law. 
And finally, power acts by laying down the rule: power’s hold on sex is maintained 
through language, or rather through the act of discourse that creates, from the very 
fact that it is articulated, a rule of law. It speaks, and that is the rule. The pure form 
of power resides in the function of the legislator; and its mode of action with regard 




Therefore, a focus on law, and especially on European/supranational legal 
narratives, is important because it highlights a number of questions that relate to the 
nationhood-gender-sexuality relationship. How do national trends that pertain to 
gender and sexuality relate to changing European/supranational trends? In which 
ways are the concepts of citizenship and national identity affected, when 
national/local and European/supranational conceptions of gender and sexuality clash 
and/or merge? Are European/supranational discourses emancipatory, or do they 
merely relocate the circumscription of modalities of sexuality from the national to 
the supranational level? This chapter will address these questions, in an attempt to 
discern the ways through which Cypriot dominant, suppressive narratives of gender 
and sexuality could be replaced by alternative ones. 
An attempt to explicate the relationship between legal mechanisms and social 
change draws attention to a number of issues. Firstly, the official and unofficial 
aspects of the Modinos and Marangos cases, which the first two sections of the 
chapter will examine, highlight the importance of addressing questions of agency 
and agency shift. That is, how attempts by LGBTQ individuals and/or groups to 
challenge heteronormative discourses of gender and sexuality become possible and 
how effective they are; through what means and methods an LGBTQ assertion of 
agency could be actualized and what effects it has in locales like Cyprus, where the 
available spaces for legitimate/legitimized political expression and mobilization are 
restricted by the homophobic elite guardians of ‘national’ traditions, values and 
morality.  
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Secondly, the degree to which top-down changes prescribed by 
regional/supranational institutions – like the changes affected as a result of the 
ECtHR  Modinos ruling – successfully alter the local socio-political context and 
result in substantive equality – that is, equality that goes beyond formal equality – 
needs to be examined. Do such top-down changes have any effects on the self-
perceptions of Cypriot LGBTQ individuals and on their political awareness with 
regard to the meaning of ‘sexual equality’, ‘citizenship’, ‘democracy’ and ‘civil 
society’? What are the effects of such changes on the organization of local political 
life and on local elites? To answer these questions, the third section of the chapter 
will contextualize the cases of Modinos and Marangos through the discussion of a 
small selection of other LGBTQ-related cases that the ECtHR examined. This 
discussion does not aim to offer a complete or thorough legal analysis of ECtHR 
LGBTQ-related case-law. Rather, it seeks to highlight the development of the 
ECtHR’s reasoning during the past few decades with regard to LGBTQ issues. This 
will permit me to evaluate the argument that litigation at the regional/European level 
constitutes an important mechanism for progressively achieving LGBTQ substantive 
equality, since European litigation can translate into both legal and socio-political 
change at the national level.
377
 
Lastly, the fourth section of this chapter will present some additional 
arguments that pertain to the question of queer theory’s role in locales like Cyprus, 
where identity-based LGBTQ legal activism at the regional level seems to be 
particularly successful towards promoting legal and socio-political change at the 
local level.
378
 To be sure, for the most part, queer theory has rightly exposed the 
numerous perils that accompany strategic essentialism and legal identity approaches. 
Nevertheless, such approaches – and especially a European legal identities approach 
– seem to be the most effective towards disrupting predominant perceptions of 
sexuality in contexts, like the Cypriot one, where powerful official nationalist 
rhetoric overshadows alternative imaginations of existence and curtails grassroots 
socio-political mobilization attempts. However, the successes of rights and identity 
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approaches do not make the need to scrutinize, castigate and rectify the exclusions 
and essentialisms that these approaches entail less important or less urgent. 
Cypriot examples of assertion of LGBTQ agency challenge the applicability 
of the ‘identity politics versus queer politics’ debate in ‘non-Western’ locales. In 
places where non-heterosexual sexual desires, lives and realities have become visible 
in the public arena only recently, an exclusive employment of one of these two 
approaches does not sufficiently or constructively inform struggles for sexual 
equality. An argument will be made that striving for sexual equality within the 
Cypriot context necessitates a combination of approaches – that is, grassroots 
mobilization based (or not) on identities, lobbying and litigation, as well as queer/ 
anti-normalizing politics.
379
 Therefore, as a conclusion to the discussion of the 
relationship between queer theory and rights/identity-based understandings of sexual 
politics, the fourth section of this chapter will also present a number of ways of 
employing identity/legal strategies effectively while, in accordance with queer 
theory, also remaining aware of the pitfalls that the identity and legal-based 
approaches entail.  
The Modinos v. Cyprus Case: Challenging Cypriot Gender and 
Sexuality Discursive Regimes 
 
The Modinos case constitutes a culmination of the clash between 
predominant discursive regimes, to which gender and sexuality are subjected, and 
alternative discourses that seek to destabilize them. In the early 1980s, Alecos 
Modinos decided to challenge the discriminatory Cypriot Criminal Code sections. 
During a legal conference in 1983, Modinos publicly asked the then attorney general 
whether the Code was going to be amended based on Recommendation 924 of the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE to the Committee of Ministers after the 
Dudgeon decision
380
. The attorney general replied that recommendations are mere 
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Despite Modinos’s intense, decade-long lobbying efforts, the government’s 
official publicly articulated position remained blatantly homophobic. From 1986 to 
1992, various ministers made statements to newspapers that they were not in favour 
of amending the law.
382
 Characteristically, the 1985–88 Minister of Justice and 
Public Order publically stated that the law would be amended ‘only over his dead 
body’.383 As Modinos reported, in one of their private discussions, the Minister of 
Justice told him that ‘women are not prosecuted but men are, because if men get 
penetrated, they become impotent and this is something we cannot afford given the 
Turkish presence on the island’.384 
 Referring to the Cypriot political elite, Achilleas Demetriades, Modinos’s 
lawyer at the ECtHR, reported:  
 
They were making fun of us ... The derision and jeer and taunt were incredible. 
[When I decided to take the case to Strasbourg] they would say to me: ‘Where are 
you going? What are you trying to achieve? You side with “these ones”’. As if 
‘these ones’ are not human beings.385  
 
The RoC ratified the EConvHR in 1962. Modinos was the first individual to 
employ the right of individual petition afforded by Article 25 of the pre-1998 version 
of the EConvHR and to challenge the RoC in the ECtHR.
386
 He filed his case in 
1989, arguing that sections 171, 172 and 173 of the Cypriot Criminal Code 
constituted a violation of Article 8 of the EConvHR. Sections 171, 172 and 173 
criminalized ‘carnal knowledge of any person against the order of nature’,387 while 
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Article 8 of the EConvHR protects the right to respect for private and family life.
388
 
In line with its reasoning in Dudgeon v. United Kingdom and in Norris v. Ireland,
389
 
the ECtHR decided in favour of the applicant.  
Although many aspects of the ECtHR’s reasoning in the Modinos case had 
already been articulated in Dudgeon and Norris, the case is significant because the 
Court reasserted that an applicant could be considered a victim and be negatively 
affected by offending legislation, even in cases where there exists a policy not to 
enforce the legislation – which is what the RoC argued in its defence.390 The 
Modinos eight-to-one judgement – the only dissent came from the ad hoc Cypriot 
Judge Pikis – rejected unequivocally the idea that a state can justifiably criminalize 
male homosexual conduct when it is consensual, when it is between adults and when 
it is undertaken in private.  
Therefore, on 21 May 1998 – and after various draft laws were put before it 
between 1995 and 1998 – the Cypriot House of Representatives was forced to 
decriminalize homosexuality.
391
 None of the parliamentary parties at the time was 
willing to propose an amendment to the law because doing so would contradict the 
Orthodox Church of Cyprus’s position on the issue. The then President of the 
Parliamentary Committee on Legal Affairs tried to alleviate the concerns of MPs by 
stating: ‘Those MPs who will side in favour of the decriminalization will not in any 
way morally justify homosexual conduct; they will merely side in favour of the 
decriminalization because they would have realized what the political cost will be [if 
they will not]’.392 The then Senior Lawyer of the RoC explained to the MPs: 
 
Voting in favour of the legal amendment ... does not mean that the specific [i.e., 
homosexual] conduct will be endorsed. Simply ... the law becomes clearer, thus 
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freeing the police’s hands to prosecute and bring to justice cases of intercourse 




When the law was finally amended, the majority of the MPs publicly stated 
that they would not have voted in favour of the amendment, if they had not been 
pressured by the CoE through its institutions.
394
 The government and the politicians’ 
officially articulated rationale for the amendment was that not complying with the 
ECtHR’s Modinos ruling would imperil the country’s stance in the CoE.395 
Additionally, it would jeopardize its national objectives, since noncompliance with 
European instructions would have a negative impact on the enforcement of the 
ECtHR’s judgement in the Loizidou v. Turkey case,396 which concerned the 
consequences of the 1974 Turkish intervention in Cyprus and the occupation of the 
north part of the island ever since.
397
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Although homosexuality was finally decriminalized in 1998, the amended 
law was more degrading to people of same-sex sexual choice than the previous one. 
It included ambiguous provisions designed to ensure that living as a homosexual in 
Cyprus would be harder than pre-1998. For example, it replaced the gender-neutral 
‘carnal knowledge’ reference contained in the old section 171 with references to 
‘unnatural licentiousness between men’, while it interpreted the concept of ‘public’ 
in the broadest sense.
398
 This procrastination on the part of the Cypriot political elite 
to fully align the RoC’s legislation with regional/European and international trends 
continues, although the offending term was replaced with ‘intercourse between men’ 
in 2000 and the age of consent for heterosexual and homosexual men and women 
was set at seventeen in 2002. 
 The Church, though, was not convinced by the ‘dilemma’ argument or by the 
‘political necessity to Europeanize the country’ rhetoric. For the Church, this 
strategic, politico-national, quid pro quo game was the ultimate threat to Cyprus’s 
national survival. From 1997 to 2002, the late Archbishop Chrysostomos I and other 
high-ranking members of the clergy feverishly engaged in a war of libels and threats 
against anyone who supported or expressed tolerance towards Modinos’s cause. The 
Church’s official and publicly articulated stance was that its moral values do not and 
will not succumb to the wishes of Europe or of anyone else.
399
  
In an interview on national television, the Archbishop scoffed at 
homosexuality and at the Modinos ruling. He said that only enemies of the nation 
would endorse the decriminalization of homosexuality. He also claimed that if 
Cypriots do not stand firm and tell Europe that homosexuality does not conform to 
the moral standpoint of the nation, Europe will eventually tell them to become 
homosexuals, in order to be accepted in the EU.
400
 On several occasions he 
condemned homosexuality as an unutterable sin and tried to intimidate Cypriots by 
invoking ‘the national problem’. According to the late Archbishop, in case of a 
military threat it would be impossible to fight the Turks, if Greek-Cypriot men were 
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not ‘real’ men.401 As Sedgwick argued, whether the ideology is of the right or left, 
religious or secular, or has any account to offer on the status of the ‘nation’, 
nationalism tends to become the form of last resort for every legitimizing – or 
delegitimizing – political appeal.402 
Besides the petitions that PAHOK distributed under the guidance of the 
Church, which urged the public to condemn the legalization of homosexuality, the 
Church also sent letters to MPs calling on them to vote against the 
decriminalization.
403
 PAHOK’s spokesman said that his group would ‘keep track’ of 
MPs who voted in favour of decriminalization and would make sure that, when the 
time comes, it would punish them in the ballot.
404
 On the day of the vote, the 
Archbishop offered free bus rides and gathered children and elderly Cypriots – 
mostly women – outside the parliament, to demonstrate in the name of ‘Christian 
love’ by holding banners which read: ‘Cyprus is the country of saints, not of 
homosexuals!’.405  
The similarities between the woman holding the banner that reads ‘Cyprus is 
the country of saints, not of homosexuals’ in image 3.1 and the women in images 2.1 
to 2.4 in chapter two – and especially the woman in picture 2.4 – are striking. In this 
setting, the black-dressed woman, who has come to symbolize the national 
collectivity’s sorrow for its lost men and its imperilled future due to the wrongdoing 
of external ethnic enemies, serves as the embodiment of a heterocentric and 
religious-based cultural tradition, whose survival is allegedly threatened by internal 
‘others’, that is by non-heterosexual Greek-Cypriots, like Modinos. 
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THE 1998 CHURCH-ORCHESTRATED DEMONSTRATION AGAINST 
THE DECRIMINALIZATION OF HOMOSEXUALITY AND AGAINST THE 
AMENDMENT OF HOMOSEXUALITY-RELATED DISCRIMINATORY 
LEGAL PROVISIONS 
Source: Σελίδες [Selides Magazine]. Nicosia: 3 November 2000 
 
The banner reads: ‘Cyprus is the island of saints and not of homosexuals!’ 
The commentary on the left reads: ‘Cypriot society evolves (?) but racism 
against homosexuals continues to thrive. Luckily, the anachronistic 
homosexuality bill has been modified after all, although there were MPs who 
supported [the view] that our children are in danger because of homosexuals, as 
if [homosexuality is] an infectious disease. As of the priests who gathered 
outside the parliament holding crosses in their hands and shouting against the 
amendment to the [criminal] law, for now, they are dealing with their “house 
matters”, since the “enemy” is “within the walls”. Nonetheless, all this noise 
increases racism against homosexuals even more.’ 
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 Remembering the day of the vote on decriminalization, Demetriades 
commented: ‘What happened with the prelates was a piece of work! It was 
marvellous ... [seeing] all of them together marching outside the parliament against 
the “sinners”, the “Modinoi”!’406 In fact even nowadays, Modinos’s name stands for 
‘(male) homosexual’ especially among older Cypriots. This demonstrates the 
intensity of the Church’s homophobic campaign and the degree to which it 
demonized Modinos. As Mosse explains, in the ‘religion of nationalism’ and in its 
accompanying discourse of respectability, ‘it was no longer the specific sexual acts 
alone that were considered abnormal, but the entire physical and mental structure of 
the person practicing these acts. Such person was excluded from society and the 
nation’.407 Accordingly, in the ‘religion of Greek-Cypriot nationalism’ Modinos was 
demonized as the sexually dissident individual who imperilled the nation’s survival, 
by attempting to alter the gender and sexuality system on which the Greek-Cypriot 
national collectivity was premised. 
 The hostile reaction of the Church and of its supporting groups to the 
prospect of the decriminalization of homosexuality, as well as their forceful attempts 
to portray Modinos and non-heterosexual Greek-Cypriots as dangerous for the 
preservation of the Greek-Cypriot national collectivity become all the more 
interesting, when the internal troubles of the Church between 1996 and 2001 are 
taken into account. In 1996 – that is, before the legal amendments were made and at 
a time when the Church’s campaign against homosexuals was at its peak – the 
Church faced allegations about gay bishops and priests. These kinds of accusations 
were levelled by prelates themselves against ‘internal enemies’, that is, against their 
opponents in Ecclesiastical elections. The accusations against Archimandrite 
Pancratios Meraklis, a then candidate for the Morphou Bishopic, are exemplary.
408
 In 
2000, similar accusations were raised against the then Limassol Metropolitan 
Bishop, Athanasios. The case of Athanasios was eventually brought before the 
District Court of Nicosia.
409
 This internal war – in which the major weapon against 
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one’s opponent was to claim that he was a homosexual – was so fierce, that it led to 
a Major Synod to resolve the issue, which summoned bishops and patriarchs from all 
corners of the Christian Orthodox world.
410
 
Within this climate and torn between pressures emanating from the CoE to 
remove the offending and discriminatory provisions from the 1998 legislation 
pertaining to same-sex sexual activity and pressures emanating from the Church, on 
8 June 2000, the Parliamentary Legal Committee presented the new amended bill to 
the Parliamentary Assembly without this being on the agenda, thus taking the forty-
four MPs who were present off guard. Thirty-three MPs walked out of the assembly 
while of the remaining seventeen, two voted against the amendment to the criminal 
law. Therefore, it passed with only fifteen votes.
411
 The fact that the Parliamentary 
Legal Committee had to resort to taking MPs by surprise, as well as the fact that, 
when faced with the vote to amend the criminal law the vast majority of the MPs 
refused to take a stand, demonstrate the MPs’ unwillingness to deal with the issue.  
The timing that the Parliamentary Legal Committee chose to present to the 
MPs the suggested amended law confirms that the MPs unwillingness was primarily 
the result of the Church’s pressures and threats against them. Although the first 
amendment to the criminal law in 1998 was debated and postponed for years, it was 
dealt with during a period when the high-ranking clergy was preoccupied with 
internal conflicts over sexual and homosexual sexual scandal allegations. Therefore, 
it was less focused on its war against the amendment. According to the Greek-
Cypriot press, the Parliamentary Legal Committee did not preannounce its plan to 
bring the vote on the amendment to the criminal law before the MPs. The Committee 
did so in order to get the MPs to attend the parliamentary assembly meeting and to 
avoid allowing Church and Christian groups to organize demonstrations.
412
 
 As the analysis of the Modinos case and the reactions to it demonstrated, the 
discourse of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus is based on the idea that the 
preservation of the traditional heteronormative family and of an exclusively 
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heterosexual masculine sexuality is the sine qua non of the continuation of Greek-
Cypriot blood lines, of national coherence and of Greek-Cypriots’ military might. 
Any alternative approach, even if purely strategic, is dismissed as ‘unpatriotic’. The 
case also revealed that the Cypriot political elite attempted to balance notions of 
tradition and modernization, as well as national values and the values of 
Europeanization/globalization, in order to propel its politico-national objectives 
through the EU platform.  
 Cypriot political and other institutional actors’ discursive regimes are based 
on the idea that civil society and private agents bear a duty not to jeopardize the 
national project, by seeking to alter the elite-engineered modus operandi of the 
national community. Both the political and the religious representatives have used 
extensively the EU and human rights discourse and legal mechanisms, in order to 
couch and propel national demands. Yet, Modinos’s claim was far from perceived as 
a human rights claim, thus casting doubt on the sincerity of the Cypriot political 
elite’s commitment to the concept of human rights. 
 To be sure, such efforts to preserve, to mould or to alter traditional ideas of 
nationhood and sexuality amidst the Europeanization-national identity conflict, are 
characteristic of other new EU members also. For example, in Romania, arguments 
in favour of a reform of the laws against same-sex sexual practices and identities 
have been couched in the language of Europeanization and European politics. 
Nonetheless, whereas European politics in Romania has enabled social movements 
and actors to place sexuality in the centre of struggles around ‘identity’, 
‘westernization’, ‘international human rights’, ‘globalization’ and 
‘transnationalism’,413 in Cyprus sexuality has remained a marginal issue; the 
collateral damage and price to pay for EU membership.  
Most Greek-Cypriots’ approach to the EU and to Europeanization has been 
inextricably linked to economic prosperity and, mostly, with national and security 
issues. Over the 1990s, EU membership became the central objective of Greek-
Cypriot foreign policy. Being disappointed by – what they perceived as – a failed 
UN approach to the ethno-political problem, both Greece and the RoC anticipated 
that accession would help bring about a favourable settlement. They hoped that 
accession would internationally strengthen the status of the RoC as the only 
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legitimate government of the island and discredit ‘TRNC’s’ claims to sovereignty, 
through the implementation of the acquis communautaire. Moreover, they expected 
that accession would bolster Greek-Cypriots’ claims to the rights to freedom of 
movement and enjoyment of property that occupying Turkey has been violating, 
offer the RoC a platform to present its politico-national cause and increase security, 
since Turkey would be reluctant to attack an EU member-state.
414
   
The lifting of the conditionality to reach a settlement before admission led the 
RoC to harden its stance. As Cyprus entered the EU and the EU benefits were 
delivered to Greek-Cypriots, the RoC – especially under the leadership of hard-liner 
Tassos Papadopoulos – used its membership to strengthen its negotiating position at 
the expense of Turkish-Cypriots. Whereas in the past the Greek-Cypriot leadership 
was phrasing its positions by employing the rhetoric of human rights, after accession 
it started utilizing the language of the acquis communautaire and of EU discourse, in 
order to justify its inflexibility and pressure Turkey. This inflexibility culminated in 
2004, when Papadopoulos called on Greek-Cypriots to reject the Annan Plan.
415
 
Interviews by other researchers with Greek-Cypriot opinion leaders and 
decision makers from politics and the media, state institutions, the academia and 
NGOs revealed that these people view ‘modernization’, ‘westernization’ and 
‘Europeanization’ as the transition from a traditional to the ‘modern’ organization of 
public, political and economic life, without considering the effects of this transition 
on social relations that fall within the ‘private’ realm,416 such as gender and sexual 
hierarchies. As Argyrou explains, ‘westernization’ and ‘modernization’ are a 
mechanism by which, in the context of colonialism and postcolonialism, societies 
‘constitute themselves and are constituted as Western subjects’.417 The culture of 
‘modernity’ that Cypriots embrace serves as a mechanism of legitimation of class, of 
race and ethnic differentiation, of androcentrism and heteronormative masculinity’s 
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perpetuation,  as well as as mask for gender – and, I would also add, for sexual 
choice – differences.418  
Especially in the past, the impact of discourses of nationalism on the modern 
and contemporary history of Cyprus and on local perceptions of ‘national’ vis-à-vis 
‘European’ identity was pervasive. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that although 
the RoC has been more than eager to secure its EU accession and extensively used 
the EU and human rights discourse and legal mechanisms to couch and propel its 
national demands, it did not accept the right of individual petition under what is now 
Article 34 of the EConvHR until 1 January 1989. Although the EConvHR was 
employed by the RoC and by Greek-Cypriots in order to expose and punish Turkey 
for its 1974 invasion and continuing occupation, the acceptance of Article 34 also 
signalled a string of applications to the ECtHR against the RoC by both Greek-
Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots – the first of these cases was the Modinos case.  
Although the RoC’s political elite had invested a lot in the country’s 
accession, membership in the CoE and the EU proved to be far from a panacea. 
Whether or not ‘Europe’ and Europeanization alleviated the RoC’s national 
headaches, they also highlighted a problem common among new EU members: 
Namely, societal reforms and cultural transformation are needed in order for the 
country to be in harmony with the rest of the European ‘family’. Part of these 
reforms involves assuring equal citizenship for all minorities, or for groups and 
individuals who embrace minority views. 
To conclude, in Cyprus – though to a lesser extent than in previous times – 
‘Europe’ continues to be instrumentalized as a bastion against external enemies, 
while the values and ideals that the EU expects its members to adopt are not only 
ignored by the elite, but they are even interpreted as anti-national notions. Namely, 
the concept of ‘human rights’ stands for ‘national rights violated by external 
enemies’ and for a sense of individualism restricted within its masculine, Western 
origins and structures, which bind persons within communal, religious, 
heteronormative and procreative familial embeddings.
419
 The value of equality is 
only paid lip service, while the nation-state continues to define itself based on the 
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expelling of whomever it sees as a threat. Anybody who seeks to remedy social 
injustices – like Modinos – is automatically labelled as a ‘national liability’.  
To be sure, national and patriotic homogeneity dictates the preservation of 
gender and sexuality binaries.
420
 Through its institutional elites, the patriarchical 
state assures the perpetuation of essentialist, sexist, gendered and homophobic 
notions, as well as the creation and public reverence of symbols such as ‘the national 
(masculine) hero’ and ‘the mourning (sexually modest) mother-of-the-nation’, while 
it demonizes and ostracizes (non-heterosexual) ‘others’. However, as the case of 
Modinos and its social effects demonstrated, even in a limited degree and at a slow 
pace, national identity-formation and the negotiation of what constitutes ‘nationally 
acceptable’ demonstrations of sexuality is always a process. Therefore, although in 
Cyprus modalities of same-sex desire continue to be regarded as a ‘national hazard’ 
by the elites, because of Alecos Modinos’s legal activism the criminal law was 
amended. Hence, even though the decriminalization of homosexuality does not 
suffice to bring about LGBTQ equality, it did provide a new and very different 
platform for articulating and negotiating LGBTQ identities, rights and claims to 
substantive equality.  
The Marangos v. Cyprus Case: Challenging LGBTQ 
Discrimination in the Public Sphere 
 
The Modinos v. Cyprus case functioned as a catalyst towards assuring rights 
to privacy for homosexuals. Nonetheless, sexuality does not only pertain to sex and 
to sexual acts; it does not merely name interpersonal relations that remain restricted 
within the ‘private’ sphere of life. Taken as a category of human identification and 
interaction, sexuality names –or, rather, describes – a domain of power relations.421 
Social goods, opportunities and rights – such as custody and adoption rights, 
employment and its security, access to pensions and inheritance of property, among 
other things – are distributed based on the ‘sex-gender-sexuality’ heteronormative 
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Therefore, discrimination against LGBTQ individuals extends beyond sexual 
life per se and beyond the ‘private’ domain into the ‘public’ sphere. The Marangos v. 
Cyprus case points to the artificiality of the ‘private’/ ‘public’ sphere division. It also 
highlights the need for, and the responsibility of, the RoC to move beyond the 
recognition of negative/non-interference rights for non-heterosexual individuals to 
the adoption of protective measures and the removal of discriminatory rules, in order 
to ensure that these individuals are not disadvantaged in the ‘public’ sphere because 
of their sexual choice. 
423
 
In 1974, Marangos left Cyprus and came to the UK to study. On 24 May 
1984, while he was still a student in the UK, his passport expired. The Cyprus High 
Commission in London renewed it until 30 June 1984. Before his passport had re-
expired, Marangos travelled to Athens. The Consular Department of the Embassy of 
Cyprus refused to renew his passport, since he had not served in the National Guard, 
as he was supposed to.
424
  
In 1989, Marangos applied to the Ministry of Defence for exemption from 
military service on the ground that he was a permanent resident abroad, but his 
application was refused. In 1990, he renewed his application claiming that, as a 
homosexual, he could not live in Cyprus given the country’s then existing law, 
which criminalized homosexuality. In 1991, he was exempted from military service 
as a permanent resident abroad, but he was informed that, upon repatriation, he 
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would be liable to a nine-month period of military service.
425
  In 1993, Marangos 
wrote to the minister of defence and to the attorney general alleging that the real 
reason behind the ministry’s reversal of its original decision to reject his application 
was the information he had disclosed about his sexual orientation. Upon his request 
of information pertaining to the case of Marangos, the attorney general received a 
confidential letter from the General Director of the Ministry of Defence that, among 
other things, stated: 
 
(The applicant) has declared ... that he is homosexual and, as you know, 
homosexuals in Cyprus are exempted from military service once their ‘sickness’ is 
certified by a competent conscription board or the committee which examines 
whether prospective conscripts are physically capable for military service. As a 
result it is up to (the applicant) to invoke, if he so wishes, his homosexuality, if he 
permanently settles in Cyprus and reports for the draft within the time limits 
provided by the law. If he does not present himself he will be considered a deserter 




 In the meantime, Marangos had returned to Cyprus but failed to present 
himself to the Conscription Board, although he had received two call-up papers. In 
1994, the International Association for the Protection of Human Rights in Cyprus 
asked the ministry of defence to exempt Marangos from military service, given than 
the National Guard did not accept in its ranks persons who had disclosed their 
homosexuality. It also asked the ministry not to use Marangos’s homosexuality to 
declare him psychiatrically unsuitable for military service, as this would constitute a 
violation both of the RoC’s constitution and of its international obligations.  
Between 1994 and 1995 the ministry responded that the law made no 
provision for exempting homosexuals from their obligation to serve in the National 
Guard and that although homosexuality is not considered to be a disease, the 
‘competent military committee’ examined the presence of personality disorders. In 
reply, the Association invited the minister of defence to clarify whether 
homosexuality was considered a personality disorder. The ministry replied in the 
negative and clarified that if he was drafted, Marangos would go through the same 
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standard examination as other prospective conscripts. The Association continued to 
press for a clarification of the ministry’s stance on homosexuality. Although until 
1995 Marangos kept receiving call-up letters and for a period of time was not 
allowed to travel, he also kept receiving assurances from the Office of the Military 




 Also in 1994, Marangos complained to the then Ombudsman that he had 
been refused employment as an architect in the public sector – specifically at the 
ministry of defence – because of his pending military service obligations. In 1995, he 
lodged another complaint with the Ombudsman, claiming that he had been rejected 
for a part-time job with the Department of Research Statistics, because he wore an 
earring. Later that year, the Ombudsman rejected Marangos’s claim pertaining to the 
Department of Research Statistics, explaining that his candidature had been 
examined by a collective organ that had the right to take into account candidates’ 
appearance, since recruited personnel would have to interact with all strata of 
Cypriot society. 
In 1996, Marangos submitted an application against Cyprus to the EComHR, 
claiming that the prohibition of male homosexual conduct between consenting adults 
in private was in violation of Article 8 of the Convention. He also claimed violations 
of Articles 3, 8 and 14, and 17 with regard to the manner in which he had been 
treated by the Cypriot authorities because he is a homosexual. Article 3 prohibits 
torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, while according to 
Article 17: 
 
Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or 
person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the 
destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to 
a greater extent than is provided for in the Convention.
428  
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Article 14 prohibits discrimination in the enjoyment of any of the Convention rights 
based on ‘any ground, such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, 
birth or other status’. 429  
He also claimed a violation of Article 3(2) of Protocol 4 – ‘no one shall be 
deprived of the right to enter the territory of the State of which he is a national’ – 
because the Cypriot authorities refused to issue him a passport while he was in 
Greece and therefore he could not enter the RoC. Since for a period after his return 
to Cyprus he was not allowed to leave the country, he claimed a violation of Article 
2(2) of Protocol 4 – ‘everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own’. 
Lastly, he raised Articles 6(1) and 13 of the Convention, since he was not provided 
the necessary means and aid to institute court proceedings – Article 6(1) pertains to 
the right to a fair trial and Article 13 to the right to an effective remedy before a 
national authority. 
The Commission declared admissible only his allegation of a violation of 
Article 8, while it dismissed the rest of his complaints. Though in 1997 the EComHR 
found that the criminal law in Cyprus, which had yet to be amended based on the 
Modinos ruling of 1993, constituted a violation of Article 8, in 1998 the ECtHR 
refused to hear Marangos’s Article 8 case, based on the reasoning that the principle 




The fact that the Marangos case involves the military, the bureaucracy and 
the general Cypriot society’s stance towards same-sex sexuality makes it an 
excellent prism for looking at the nexus between law and society with regard to 
LGBTQ issues. From a legal point of view, it would have been very interesting if the 
Commission and the Court had upheld some of Marangos’s claims, for example his 
claims against the Cypriot National Guard.
431
 However, for the purposes of the 
                                                                                                                                          
Article 17. See: Hannes Cannie and Dirk Voorhoof, “The Abuse Clause and Freedom of Expression 
in the European Human Rights Convention: An Added Value for Democracy and Human Rights 
Protection?” Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, vol. 29, no. 1 (2011): 54. 
429
   My italics.  
430
   Marangos v. Cyprus. 
431
   The ECtHR later held that the dismissal of members of the armed forces on grounds of 
homosexuality constitutes a violation of the right of respect for private life. See: Lustig-Prean and 
Beckett v. United Kingdom, 1999 (Series A, No. 259); Smith and Grady v. United Kingdom, 1999 
(No. 33985/96 and 33986/96). The Court rejected the respondent state’s appeal to the threat to 
national security – a legitimate ground for interference according to Article 8 – since this appeal was 
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current analysis, Marangos’s claims of discrimination against homosexuals in the 
military and in employment – that is, in the ‘public’ sphere – will be discussed as 
part of the more general analysis of the question about the RoC’s responsibility to 
render realizable LGBTQ individuals’ rights to equally. 
Article 14 of the EConvHR prohibits discrimination in the enjoyment of 
other Convention rights. Article 19 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU 
empowers the EU to take appropriate measures to combat all discrimination, 
including discrimination based on sexual orientation.
432
 Article 21 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the EU, which came into full legal effect with the entry into 
force of the Treaty of Lisbon in December of 2009, prohibits discrimination by EU 
institutions – and EU member-states when implementing EU law – on any ground, 
including sexual orientation,
433
 while Council Directive 2000/78/EC prohibits 
discrimination in employment and vocational training on the grounds of sexual 
orientation.
434
 Nonetheless, as the Marangos case highlights, in Cyprus, LGBTQ 
claims to equal participation and involvement in the organized life of the political 
community are circumscribed by the predominant nationalist discourses, which 
elevate heteronormativity and heteropatriarchy as the organizing principles of the 
politico-national collectivity. Irrespective of a rapidly transforming 
regional/European legal environment, in Cyprus, the politics of citizenship and 
                                                                                                                                          
based ‘solely upon the negative attitudes of heterosexual personnel towards those of homosexual 
orientation’. It also stated that regulations that express such attitudes are not justified because ‘they 
represent a predisposed bias on the part of a heterosexual majority against a homosexual minority’. 
For an analysis see: Waaldijk and Bonini-Baraldi, Sexual Orientation Discrimination in the European 
Union, 21-3& 38-40. 
432
   European Union, “Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(2008/C 115/0113),” Lisbon: 13 December 2007. Article 19 reads: ‘Without prejudice to the other 
provisions of the Treaties and within the limits of the powers conferred by them upon the Union, the 
Council, acting unanimously in accordance with a special legislative procedure and after obtaining the 
consent of the European Parliament, may take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on 
sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.’ 
433
   European Union, “The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000/C 364/01),” 
Nice: 7 December 2000; European Union, “Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European 
Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community (2007/C 306/01),” Lisbon: 13 December 
2007. 
434
   Council of the European Union, “Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 Establishing a 
General Framework for Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation,” Brussels: 2000. Although 
an examination of CJEU LGBT-related cases is beyond the purposes of this chapter, it is important to 
note that on 10 May 2011, the CJEU delivered its judgement in the case of Jürgen Römer v Freie und 
Hansestadt Hamburg, which dealt with the issue of lower supplementary retirement pension for 
registered same-sex partners. The CJEU ruled that registered same-sex partners must be treated 
equally to married partners and that such pension falls under the meaning of ‘pay’ within the EU 
Employment Framework Directive (Directive 2000/78/EC). See: Jürgen Römer v. Freie und 
Hansestadt Hamburg, 2011(Case C-147/08).  
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national belonging continue to be conflated with heterocentricity and, in this way, 
LGBTQ voices are not allowed into the ‘public’ sphere. 
The Cypriot state’s continued ability to retain norms of heteronormativity 
and heteropatriarchy is founded on the gap that continues to exist between European 
law and national practice, despite their close interrelationship. Regarding 
Marangos’s complaint that homosexuals are excluded from the army after they have 
been certified as ‘physically incapable’ by the Conscription Board, the Commission 
stated that the EConvHR does not guarantee the right to serve in the armed forces.
435
 
By merely highlighting the fact that the Convention does not include provisions 
regarding the way member-states’ armed forces should operate, the Commission 
allowed the RoC and the Cypriot Ministry of Defence to maintain an unwritten 
policy towards conscripts who disclose their non-heterosexual sexual orientation.  
The interviews I conducted with military officials illustrate that prejudice and 
biased practice continue to exist in Cyprus, regardless of whether relevant laws and 
policies are in place. All of the military officials I interviewed – their ages ranged 
from twenty-seven to fifty-one – reported that they are not aware of the existence of 
a specific policy pertaining to homosexuals in the army.
436
 Moreover, they all 
admitted that the way a homosexual conscript is treated falls under the discretion of 
his superiors, while six out of eight interviewees expressed the view that, if a 
homosexual conscript were to disclose his homosexuality to his fellow soldiers, the 
organization and the operations of the National Guard would be negatively 
affected.
437
 These six military officials also expressed the view that allowing 
                                                 
435
   Marangos v. Cyprus. 
436
   “Interviews with Military Officials 210012, 210013, 210014, 210017, 210018, 210019, 210020 
and 210021,” Interviews with Elites 2009. Interviews by Nayia Kamenou. Nicosia, 7-12 January 
2009. When asked whether they know if there exists some kind of written and/or official policy 
pertaining to LGBTQ conscripts and/or personnel, all of the military officials responded in the 
negative. Strikingly, none of these interviewees made reference to the Employment Equality Directive 
2000/78/EC. On 18 March 2004, the RoC House of Representatives adopted Law 58(I)/2004 on equal 
treatment in employment and occupation, which entered into force on 1 May 2004. As Kountouros 
explains, ‘the Law implements the provisions of the Employment Equality Directive, with the 
exception of those relating to persons with disability (which have been transposed by a separate law), 
as well as those provisions of the Race Equality Directive which relate to employment and occupation 
... Law 58(I)/2004 applies to all natural and legal persons in both the private and public sectors’. See: 
Haris Kountouros Summary of Legislation Implementing Directive 2000/78/EC with Respect to 
Sexual Orientation in Cyprus. Written at the request of Kees Waaldijk and Matteo Bonini-Baraldi, 
2005.  
437
   “Interviews with Military Officials 210012, 210014, 210017, 210018, 210019 and 210021”. 
Interestingly, in his partly concurring, partly dissenting opinion in Smith and Grady v. United 
Kingdom the Cypriot ECtHR Judge Loucaides propelled a similar argument. In sum, the majority of 
the military officials supported some form of the (now repealed) US-style ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ 
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homosexuals to disclose their sexuality carries the risk of discrediting the armed 
forces and of offending military dignity. Three of them said that another problem 
with homosexuals in the army is that they are less trustworthy, in the sense that it is 
easier for them to be ‘allured’ by the ‘sexual promises’ of an ‘enemy spy’, that is, a 
Turk, disclose vital military information and in this way jeopardize national security. 
When I asked ‘couldn’t a heterosexual soldier fall into the same trap if approached 
by a woman spy?’ some of the military officials said that because it is harder for 




Another aspect of the Marangos case that the Commission did not fully 
examine but that is of interest is the applicant’s claim of discrimination in access to 
employment.  Marangos argued that the fact that he had been refused a job with the 
Department of Research and Statistics because of his appearance – that is, because of 
the fact that he was wearing an earring – constituted a violation of Article 8. 
However, the Commission disagreed: 
  
... the Convention does not guarantee the right ... to be recruited in public sector 
employment. In any event, even assuming that the authorities’ conduct could give 
rise to an issue under Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of the Convention, in the particular 
circumstances of the case there could be no interference with the right to respect for 
private life ... it has not been established that, if the applicant’s appearance had not 
been taken into consideration, he would have been offered a temporary contract with 




 The plaintiff could not provide the Commission with proof that he would still 
not have been offered the job, even if his appearance satisfied the potential 
employer. Nonetheless, it could be argued that the state’s argument was ill-founded. 
Explaining why Marangos’s application had been rejected by the Department of 
Research and Statistics, the then Cypriot Ombudsman merely stated that his 
candidature had been examined by a collective organ that had the right to take into 
account candidates’ appearance, since recruited personnel would have to interact 
                                                                                                                                          
approach, in order to balance Cypriot homosexuals’ right not to be discriminated at and be excluded 
from the National Guard as ‘ physically incapable’ with the ‘smooth’ operation of the Cypriot armed 
forces.  
438
   “Interviews with Military Officials 210012, 210017 and 210019”. 
439
   Marangos v. Cyprus. See paragraphs on case admissibility. 
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with all strata of Cypriot society.
440
 However, no explanation was given as to how 
wearing an earring would limit Marangos’s ability to interact with all strata of 
Cypriot society. Although it cannot be asserted with certainty, Marangos’s rejection 
based – among other things – on his appearance might be related to his potential 
employer’s expectations pertaining to sexual choice (in)visibility and gender 
performance. One could question whether wearing an earring made Marangos look 
‘feminine’ to his potential employer, whether earrings on men are understood as an 
indication of non-heterosexual sexual choice and consequently, whether Marangos’s 
visible ‘femininity’ and/or non-heterosexual sexual choice was the real reason he 




Directive 2000/78/EC was transposed into Cypriot law on the eve of RoC’s 
accession and a separate law was enacted that appoints the Ombudsman as the 
national equality body whose mandate includes sexual orientation. Nevertheless, 
‘prejudices amongst society and the lack of targeted awareness raising measures 
have so far prevented Cypriot LGBTQ persons from using the equality body 
procedure’.442 Despite the Directive’s introduction and the legal amendments that the 
Modinos case and EU-accession requirements have necessitated, public attitudes and 
perceptions towards homosexuality remain negative. For example, in a study 
commissioned by the Ombudsman Office in 2006, eighty per cent of Greek-Cypriots 
reported that sexual relationships between people of the same gender are always or 
most of the times wrong, while seventy three per cent reported that they do not 
personally know someone who is a homosexual person.
443
 This data suggests that 
regardless of positive legal amendments, Cypriot LGBTQs continue to exist in 
invisibility.  
                                                 
440
   Ibid.  
441
   In Cyprus, especially in previous decades, a man wearing an earring was socially perceived and 
labelled as a rebel or as a trouble-maker if the earring was on his left ear (or if he wore earrings on 
both ears), and as a homosexual if the earring was on his right ear.   
442
   Nicos Trimikliniotis and Corina Demetriou, Legal Study on Homophobia and Discrimination on 
Grounds of Sexual Orientation (Cyprus: Policy Document for SIMFILIOSI, April 2008), 3; See also: 
Nicos Trimikliniotis and Stavros S. Karayanni. The Situation Concerning Homophobia and 
Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation. Cyprus: Policy Document for SIMFILIOSI, March 
2008; ILGA-Europe, “UPR INTERVENTION FOR CYPRUS: The Status of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual 
and Transgender Rights: Submission to the United Nations Human Rights Council for its Universal 
Periodic Review of Cyprus (6
th
 Session),” < http://www.ilga-
europe.org/europe/guide/country_by_country/cyprus> (11 May 2010). 
443
   Cyprus College Research Centre. Attitudes and Perceptions of the Public Towards 
Homosexuality: A Report Prepared for the Office of the Commissioner for Administration 
(Ombudsman). Nicosia: Cyprus College Research Centre, 2006.  
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Nonetheless, as it was demonstrated through the analysis of the Cypriot 
elite’s reaction to the cases of Marangos and, especially of Modinos, such negative 
attitudes towards LGBTQ individuals are preserved, and even encouraged, by 
political elites themselves, as well as by the hostile stance that they adopt when 
making public statements about LGBTQ issues. As the European Region of the 
International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA-Europe) 
and the CoE’s Parliamentary Assembly recently confirmed, the RoC continues to 
remain one of the counties in Europe which are not advancing towards greater 
recognition of LGBTQ rights.
444
 
Supranational Legal Mechanisms and Local Effects: ECtHR and 
EComHR LGBTQ-Related Case-law 
 
The Modinos and Marangos cases epitomize the clash between predominant 
local discursive regimes, to which gender and sexuality are subjected, and 
supranational alternative discourses that seek to destabilize them. However, in the 
case of Modinos, the ECtHR did not go beyond articulating what it had already 
decided in the cases of Dudgeon and Norris. Namely, although the Modinos case 
was successful, it only examined the question of same-sex sexuality vis-à-vis the 
right to privacy, but it did not go beyond the question of homosexuality’s 
criminalization. The Marangos case was declared admissible by the Commission 
based on Marangos’s allegation of a violation of Article 8, while the rest of his 
complaints were dismissed. However, in 1998, the ECtHR refused to hear 
Marangos’s Article 8 case, based on the reasoning that the principle had already been 
established in earlier cases, namely in Dudgeon, Norris and Modinos. Therefore, 
                                                 
444
  ILGA-Europe. Rainbow Europe Map and Index 2011: Legal Situation of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual 
and Trans People in Europe <http://www.ilga-
europe.org/home/news/for_media/media_releases/rainbow_europe_map_index_2011_legal_situation
_of_lesbian_gay_bisexual_trans_people_in_europe> (30 May 2011). According to the ILGA-Europe 
Rainbow Europe Map and Index 2011, which rate European countries’ laws and administrative 
practices that protect or violate the human rights of LGBT people (the map and index do not reflect 
the social situation of LGBT people), based on a scale between 17 (highest score: respect of human 
rights and full legal equality of LGBT people) and -7 (lowest score: gross violation of human rights 
and discrimination against LGBT people), Cyprus scored a very low -2. Only Ukraine (score: -4) and 
Moldova and Belarus (score: -3) fared worse than Cyprus. For comparative reasons, please note that 
the UK was assigned to highest score among the fifty countries under examination (score: 12.5). See 
also: Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly, “Discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation 
and gender identity (Doc. 12087),” Strasbourg: 8 December 2009. 
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although they are important with regard to their social and political effects at the 
local level, the two regional/European LGBTQ-related cases against the RoC – 
Marangos and Modinos – do not fully illustrate the Court’s progressively developing 
reasoning towards LGBTQ issues, especially since the 2000s.  
Primarily as a result of the growing of acceptance of non-heterosexual people 
and of LGBTQ-friendly legal changes in a number of EU member-states, the ECtHR 
has progressively moved from a ‘morality-based’ to a ‘European consensus’ 
approach in its dealing of cases that pertain to sexuality and has demonstrated its 
willingness to interpret the EConvHR dynamically, by setting aside anachronistic 
precedents.
445
 As the discussion of some cases that follows will demonstrate, it has 
also detached ‘sex’ from biological determinism, ‘gender’ from ‘sex’ and the 
concept of ‘family’ from ‘(hetero)sexuality’.  
Although in the past the Court would grant respondent states a wide margin 
of appreciation with regard to the interpretation of the EConvHR, this is no longer 
the case, especially when it examines allegations of infringement of rights to respect 
for private and family life and to non-discrimination.
446
 This development of the 
Court’s reasoning has positive effects at the national level. EConvHR signatory 
states can no longer claim that the persecution, prosecution, lack of recognition or 
unequal treatment of their LGBTQ citizens falls within the scope of their margin of 
appreciation. The ECtHR’s adaption of the ‘European consensus’ approach forces 
such countries to align their laws and policies according to the Court’s prescriptions 
and according to other European countries standards and norms. Once legal 
precedent has been established, all signatory states are essentially bound by it, 
regardless of whether or not applicant complaints were brought against them. 
At the time when the Modinos and Marangos cases were adjudicated, the 
ECtHR had not yet extended the application of the EConvHR rights beyond what 
                                                 
445
   Mowbray, “The Creativity of the European Court of Human Rights,” 57-79; Beate Rudolf, 
“European Court of Human Rights: Legal Status of Postoperative Transsexuals,” International Journal 
of Constitutional Law, vol. 1, no. 4 (2003): 716-21. 
446
 For example, in B v. France, which concerned a French citizen who was registered with the civil 
status registrar as of male sex but had ‘adopted female behaviour from a very early age’ (para. 10), the 
applicant claimed a violation of Article 8, because she was refused the change of her forename. The 
Court found a violation of Article 8 because, as it stated, ‘[the applicant] finds herself daily in a 
situation which, taken as a whole, is not compatible with the respect due to her private life. 
Consequently, even having regard to the State’s margin of appreciation, the fair balance which has to 
be struck between the general interest and the interests of the individual ... has not been attained, and 
there has thus been a violation of Article 8’ (para. 63). See: B v. France, 1992 (No. 13343/87). 
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falls exclusively and narrowly within the meaning of ‘respect for private life’. 
Moreover, the RoC managed to postpone the amendments to the criminal law that 
the Modinos case ruling had necessitated for more than a decade. Therefore, drawing 
conclusions about the impact of European litigation at the national level based solely 
on these two cases is misleading. A closer look into the Court’s reasoning and 
decision-making in more recent LGBTQ-related cases against other EConvHR 
signatory countries, as well as into the impact of such reasoning and decision-
making on the legal framework and the socio-political realities of the responding and 
other European countries, shows that changes at the supranational European level do 
initiate LGBTQ-friendly legal and public policy changes both at the national and the 
transnational level.  Through a short discussion of LGBTQ-related ECtHR case-law, 
this section will address the following two questions: Do legal changes at the 
regional/European/supranational level really have an impact on national legal and 
socio-political realities? And if they do, how broadly are European legal institutions 
willing to interpret ‘LGBTQ equality’? 
The fact that legal changes initiated at the regional level do not always or 
immediately transplant into local social contexts does not mean that they are 
ineffective. Especially in the last decade, the ECtHR has adopted a progressive 
attitude towards LGBTQ issues. Whatever the reason for the adoption of this 
progressive reasoning, the ECtHR is steadily transforming into a forum where 
LGBTQ subjects are granted recognition not only as private individuals, but also as 
parents, family members and as members of society whose relationships deserve 
both abstention from interference, as well as public recognition and support.  
For example, the Court took a dynamic approach in the Grand Chamber case 
of Goodwin v. United Kingdom and restricted the deference recognized to the legal 
developments within the respondent state.
447
 This case concerned the extent of state 
obligation to recognize the new personalities of post-operative transgender 
individuals under Article 8. Although in previous cases the ECtHR had granted the 
UK a wide margin of appreciation and thus had not found a breach, in this case it 
argued that the right to respect for private life under Article 8 had been breached. By 
doing so, it highlighted the ‘clear and uncontested evidence of a continuing 
                                                 
447
   Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 2002 (No. 28957/95). 
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international trend in favour not only of increased social acceptance of transsexuals 
but of legal recognition of the new sexual identity of post-operative transsexuals’.448 
The Goodwin case and the largely identical I. v. United Kingdom case
449
 
demonstrate that, as part of a number of strategies to be used by LGBTQ 
movements, litigation in the ECtHR could be very promising; not only for effecting 
formal legal recognition, but also for achieving substantive equality and 
transformation of legal, societal and cultural norms across Europe. As Rudolf 
explains, these are landmark decisions because the ECtHR found violations not only 
under Article 8 with respect to private life, but also under Article 12 on the right to 
marry and, by doing so, it overturned previous judgements.
450
 Therefore, these cases 
are important in that they highlight the willingness of the ECtHR to interpret the 
Convention dynamically and to set aside anachronistic precedents.  
Positive legal developments regarding LGBTQ issues in CoE member-states 
and in other countries have an impact on how the ECtHR adjudicates on such issues. 
However, the relationship between the ECtHR and states is multidirectional: 
Because of the ECtHR and of some EU member-states’ growing recognition of 
LGBTQ rights, other EU member-states – usually the newly admitted ones, like 
Cyprus – are compelled to review their domestic legal frameworks. For example, in 
2002, because of the precedent set by the ECtHR in the Goodwin case, the Cypriot 
House of Parliament Legal Affairs Committee was forced to examine the issue of 
extending civil marriage rights to trans* individuals.
451
 When asked about the issue, 
an MP stated: ‘In order to get married, the couple must produce documentation 
proving who they are, including birth certificates. If they decide to give false papers 
... we will not be able to do anything about it, because we will not know. However, it 
is not something we will accept.’452 This statement demonstrates that, regardless of 
                                                 
448
   Ibid., para. 85.  
449
   I. v. United Kingdom, 2002 (No. 26580/94). Since this case and the Goodwin case dealt with the 
same issue and since the ECtHR delivered its judgement for both cases on the same day, I. v. United 
Kingdom adds nothing to Goodwin. The two cases are largely identical. 
450
   Rudolf, “European Court of Human Rights”, 716-21. 
451
   “Amendment Planned to Allow Transsexuals to Marry,” Cyprus Mail, 7 December 2002  
<http://www.cyprus-mail.com/cyprus/amendment-planned-allow-transsexuals-marry> (1 March 
2010); “Transsexuals will not be Allowed to Marry in Cyprus, Deputy Insists,” Cyprus Mail, 28 
September 2002  
< http://www.cyprus-mail.com/akis-agapiou/transsexuals-will-not-be-allowed-marry-cyprus-deputy-
insists>  (7 June 2010). 
452
   “Transsexuals Will not be Allowed to Marry in Cyprus”. Considering that in such cases the 
trans* individual, for example a legally male but de facto female person, cannot get married to her 
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some Greek-Cypriot political elites’ unwillingness to grant LGBTQ citizens equal 
citizenship rights and of their attempts to deflect their EU obligations, sooner or later 
they must succumb, even if unwillingly.
453
 Therefore, European laws and litigation 
have the potential to become instruments of transformation at the national level. 
Unlike national law in many European countries, the EConvHR and EU law 
proved to be more open to LGBTQ claims to equal citizenship. Also, in numerous 
jurisdictions, political action was taken on LGBTQ issues only after European court 
proceedings were initiated.
454
 Through their mechanisms, institutions and bodies, the 
EU and the CoE are creating at least soft law norms. EU accession processes that 
compel applicant countries to adopt the acquis communautaire legislation are 
promising, since the acquis can guarantee fundamental protections for LGBTQs 
since it encompasses both binding EU law – for example, directives – and non-
binding pronouncements by authorities – for example, recommendations, resolutions 
and opinions.
455
 Obviously, not all CoE and EU institutions and bodies raise sexual 
orientation issues within the context of enlargement. Nonetheless, both the CoE and 
the European Parliament have done so repeatedly.
456
 Additionally, since Article 6(2) 
of the pre-Lisbon Treaty on European Union linked the EU to the standards set by 
the EConvHR,
457
 it set a foundation for requiring applicant and member-countries to 
comply with the case-law of the ECtHR that pertains to LGBTQ issues.
458
 
                                                                                                                                          
non-trans* legally male partner unless her legal sex is changed, it is unclear what the MP meant by 
‘false papers’. 
453
   On the current legal situation of trans* individuals in Cyprus see: Trimikliniotis and Demetriou, 
Legal Study on Homophobia and Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation, 5; Trimikliniotis 
and Karayanni,  The Situation Concerning Homophobia and Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual 
Orientation, 24-5; Stefano Fabeni and Silvan Agius, Transgender People and the Gender Recast 
Directive: Implementation Guidelines (Brussels: ILGA-Europe, December 2009), 25.GUIDELINES 
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   Boele-Woelki, “The Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships within the European Union,” 
1949-1981. 
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   Kollman, “European Institutions, Transnational Networks and National Same-Sex Unions 
Policy,” 37-53; Langenkamp, “Finding Fundamental Fairness,” 437-66. However, not everybody is 
that optimistic about the potential of the EU mandate towards increasing LGBTQ rights. See: Lela, 
M. Ames, “Beyond Gay Paree: What does the Enlargement of the European Union mean for Same-
Sex Partners?” Emory International Law Review vol. 18 (2004): 503-554. 
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   For example, the aforementioned pressure posed by the CoE and the European Parliament on the 
RoC to comply with the Modinos decision. Other examples include: The Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe (PACE), “Opinion No. 216,” Strasbourg: 26 January 2000; PACE, 
“Recommendation 1470,” Strasbourg: 30 June 2000; PACE, “Recommendation 1474,” Strasbourg: 
26 September 2000; European Parliament, “Resolution on the Multi-Annual Programme 2010-2014 
Regarding the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (Stockholm Programme),” Strasbourg: 25 
November 2009.  See para. 26 &37; Committee of the Ministers of the Council of Europe, 
“Recommendation CM/Rec (2010)5 on Measures to Combat Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual 
Orientation and Gender Identity,” Strasbourg: 31 March 2010. 
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   According to the general provisions section of the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on 
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For example, with regard to the right to marry, the ECtHR dissociated sex 
from chromosomal factors, pointed out that Article 9 of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights leaves out the reference to men and women – as opposed to 
Article 12 of the Convention
459
 – and emphasized that the right to marry and to 
found a family is not based solely on the ability or possibility of procreation.
460
 This 
interpretation of the Court’s stance towards same-sex couples and their right to 
family life is substantiated by its decision and reasoning in the case of Schalk & Kopf 
v. Austria.
461
 The applicants submitted an application against Austria to the ECtHR, 
claiming a violation of Article 12, of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8, 
and of Article 1 of Protocol 1 because they had been refused the right to marry.  
The Court found the applicants’ complaint admissible under Article 12 and 
under Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8, but it found no violation of 
Article 12 or of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8. However, this case is 
important: The ECtHR did not interpret Article 12 as requiring CoE member-
states to allow same-sex couples to marry. Nonetheless, it made it clear that this 
conclusion can change, when more European countries end the exclusion of same-
sex couples from legal marriage.  In particular, the Court decided that the reference 
to ‘men and women’ in Article 12, which was deleted from Article 9 of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, no longer means that ‘the right to marry enshrined in 
Article 12 must in all circumstances be limited to marriage between two persons of 
the opposite sex’.462  Therefore, in the case of Schalk & Kopf v. Austria, the Court 
ruled that same-sex couples enjoy ‘family life’, just as different-sex couples do.463 In 
                                                                                                                                          
European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, Article 6(2) of the pre-Lisbon 
Treaty on European Union is replaced by Article 6 (3), which reads: ‘Fundamental rights, as 
guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall 
constitute general principles of the Union's law.’  
458
   Langenkamp, “Finding Fundamental Fairness”, 458. Article 6 (2) states: ‘The Union shall respect 
fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of Community law.’ 
459
   Article 9 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights states: ‘The right to marry and the right to 
found a family shall be guaranteed in accordance with the national laws governing the exercise of 
these rights.’ 
460
   Rudolf, “European Court of Human Rights”, 717 . 
461
   Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, 2010 (No. 30141/04). 
462
   Ibid., para. 61.  
463
   The most important part of the Court’s judgment for same-sex couples is its finding that Article 
14 was applicable in combination with the ‘respect for family life’ branch of Article 8. See: Schalk 
and Kopf v. Austria, paragraphs 93-94. The paragraphs read: ‘The Court notes that ... a rapid 
evolution of social attitudes towards same-sex couples has taken place in many member States. Since 
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this way, this judgment left open the possibility that the absence of any form 
of registered partnership law for same-sex couples could violate the Convention.  
Pending and future applications by same-sex couples will allow the Court to address 
this issue. 
In the case of E.B. v. France, the Court extended the principle that sexual 
orientation cannot be cited as a negative factor in deciding upon custody cases.
464
  In 
this case, the adoption claim of an unmarried lesbian woman who was cohabiting 
with another woman was rejected by the state based on the woman’s ‘lifestyle’, as 
well as on what the state deemed as inability on her part ‘to provide a child with a 
family image revolving around a parental couple such as to afford safeguards for that 
child’s stable and well-adjusted development’.465 The Court found a violation of 
Article 14 combined with Article 8 and stated that ‘the domestic authorities made a 
distinction based on considerations regarding [the applicant's] sexual orientation, a 
distinction which is not acceptable under the Convention’.466 This is a very important 
decision, since the Court demonstrated transformation in its reasoning pertaining to 
LGBTQ issues: The Court found a violation even though the lesbian woman had no 
genetic link with the – as yet unidentified – child. Recently, the Court declared 
admissible an application from a same-sex couple which concerns adoption by one 
woman of the child born to the other woman through donor insemination – a 
‘second-parent’ adoption case. 467 This case was heard by a Chamber of the Court on 
12 April 2011, and judgement is awaited.
468
 It will be interesting to see whether the 
Court will satisfy the applicants’ claim and extend its reasoning in E.B v. France 
from an individual lesbian woman to a lesbian couple. 
In the same spirit, regarding LGBTQ associations and the right to freedom of 
expression, assembly and association that Articles 10 and 11 guarantee, in 
                                                                                                                                          
then a considerable number of member States have afforded legal recognition to same-sex couples ... 
Certain provisions of EU law also reflect a growing tendency to include same-sex couples in the 
notion of “family” ...  In view of this evolution the Court considers it artificial to maintain the view 
that, in contrast to a different-sex couple, a same-sex couple cannot enjoy “family life” for the 
purposes of Article 8. Consequently the relationship of the applicants, a cohabiting same-sex couple 
living in a stable de facto partnership, falls within the notion of “family life”, just as the relationship 
of a different-sex couple in the same situation would.’ 
464
   E.B. v. France, 2008 (No. 43546/02). 
465
   Ibid., para. 10. 
466
   Ibid., para. 96. 
467
   Gas and Dubois v. France, 2010 (No. 25951/07). 
468
   Chamber Hearing in the Case of Gas and Dubois v. France, 12 April 2011 (Registrar of the Court 
Press Release No. 324). 
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Bączkowski v. Poland the Court found that the state’s refusal to grant a permit for the 
LGBT Pride March in Warsaw in June 2005 constituted a violation of Article 11, as 
well as of Article 14 combined with Article 11.
469
 On the same issue, the Court 
delivered a stronger judgement in Alekseyev v. Russia, which concerned several 
banned LGBT Pride Marches in Moscow.
470
 In this case, the Court unanimously 
decided that there had been a violation of Article 11, of Article 13 in conjunction 
with Article 11 and of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 11. 
Therefore, as the decisions and the reasoning of the Court in the above-
mentioned cases demonstrate, the ECtHR transcended the heterosexual binary and it 
detached sex from biology, gender from sex, gender-identification from biological 
sex and familial relationships from procreation and sexuality. To conclude, 
conversely to earlier critiques of the ECtHR’s approach to LGBTQ issues as 
conservative,
471
 the case-law of the last decade illustrates that the ECtHR has moved 
from a ‘morality-based’ approach to a ‘European-consensus’ approach, which is very 
promising for LGBTQ individuals, couples, families and movements. Therefore, as 
part of a larger strategy, European human rights litigation is of great practical, 
strategic and symbolic value for LGBTQs, since European human rights law and the 
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471
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position to satisfy the demands of LGBTQs, when the respondent state fares better than the majority 
of other signatory states with regard to LGBTQ legal equality.    
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The Promises and Perils of a Legal and Identity-Based 
Approach  
 
The language of rights, including the language of human rights, has the 
ability to correct legal and judicial biases and consequently to alter cultural and 
social norms. This section will suggest how LGBTQ movements could invoke and 
use human rights law and discourse to their benefit, while avoiding the perils that 
might be implicit in the language of human rights. This process involves five 
aspects: LGBTQ narratives; an alternative understanding of morality; the stressing of 
rights over needs and interests; the re-conceptualization of the rights-litigation 
relationship; and NGOs’ activities. 
False stereotypes about marginalized groups result not from personal 
experience, but from cultural transmission in the form of narrative and 
storytelling.
473
 The ‘homosexuality narrative’ reduces LGBTQs to one-dimensional 
creatures and to exclusively sexual beings, which are defined solely by their sex and 
sexuality and which are likely to corrupt or abuse adolescents, if not children. The 
‘family narrative’ presents them as incapable of providing a healthy role model to 
minors and therefore assumes them to be a peril to the institution of the 
(heterocentric) family.
474
 It has been argued that such narratives influence judicial 
decision-making and affect its impartiality towards LGBTQ subjects. However, 
LGBTQ narratives presented in litigation proceedings actually have the power to 
counter prejudices by refuting false stereotypes. Therefore, their articulation in 
popular culture, legal scholarship and courtroom advocacy is necessary in order to 
                                                 
473
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474
   Lin, “Social Norms and Judicial Decisionmaking”, 742; Kimberly Richman, “Lovers, Legal 
Strangers, and Parents: Negotiating Parental and Sexual Identity in Family Law,” Law & Society 
Review Special Issue on Nonbiological Parenting, vol. 36, no. 2 (2002): 294-5. Higher age of consent 
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History of Sexuality in the US,” Trends in History, vol. 4, no. 4 (1990): 211-30; Estelle B. Freedman, 
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American History, vol. 74, no. 1 (1987): 83-106; Estelle, B. Freedman, “Sexuality in Nineteenth-
Century America: Behavior, Ideology, and Politics,” Reviews in American History, vol. 10, no. 4 
(1982): 196-215.    
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inform judges, lawyers and legal scholars and consequently achieve a shift in 
predominant norms and attitudes.
475
  
Judicial narratives can serve as catalysts for changing social norms, since 
they have the ability to incorporate and validate ‘outsider’ narratives.476 By 
validating such narratives, the law and the courts function as social engineers and 
cause these narratives to disseminate into society. This is because judicial decisions 
have effects beyond the parties who appear before the courts.
477
 Moreover, courts 
influence both their own and other societies, since national legal decisions assume 
transnational validity, especially within the EU context. Additionally, these 
influences are not merely symbolic. As the case of Modinos exemplified, they are 
also practical, since they often result in legal amendments at the national level. 
Furthermore, the negotiation of gender and sexual legal identity in court is 
both inevitable and productive and it could be framed as a power struggle, in which 
the stakes are self-determination and self-definition.
478
 Through her American case-
law analysis, Richman concludes that the construction of identity in the law is not a 
one-way process. Through litigation, LGBTQs presented self-images that contradict 
those to which the courts had been accustomed. In doing so, they asserted their own 
understandings and expressions of selfhood and power. By their mere standing 
before the law they have forced it, if not to formally recognize, at least to confront 
and document the existence of alternative sexualities and familial lives.
479
  
Altering predominant negative perceptions also necessitates asserting 
alternative sexualities and gender self-perceptions as not immoral. Instead of trying 
to show that LGBTQ lifestyles are non-oppositional to traditional understandings of 
morality, LGBTQ movements should strive to portray a different understanding of 
morality through the invocation of human rights discourse and the pursuit of 
litigation. According to Nowlin, this should be based on a critical moral thinking that 
is inspired by John Stuart Mill’s understanding of morality as critical morality.480 He 
                                                 
475  For a less optimistic view on the ability to evade judicial biases see: Herman, Rights of Passage, 
128-44.  
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   Lin, “Social Norms and Judicial Decisionmaking”, 739&751. 
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   Richman, “Lovers, Legal Strangers, and Parents”, 290. 
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   Ibid., 317-18. 
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   Christopher Nowlin, “The Protection of Morals under the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,” Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 24, no. 1 (2002): 264-
86. 
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explains that Mill saw morality in utilitarian terms; that is, as a matter of social well-
being or harmfulness and as justice and fairness or social harm and personal injury, 
which arises from breaches of contract. Thus, Mill’s understanding of morality 
dissociates the concept of morality from sexual activity, since the immorality of 
activities relates not necessarily to their unlawfulness, since the law per se could be 
unjust, but to the dishonesty, the unfairness or the selfishness that they involve. 
Consequently, non-heterosexual sexual acts, like all sexual acts, are not per se 
immoral, but only if they are immoral acts involving sexual circumstance; that is, if 
they involve non-consensual exploitation of others. Therefore, legal moralism and 
moral majoritarianism, which are premised on common or established conceptions of 
morality, should be abandoned in favour of a moralism that is premised on 
understanding, pluralism, tolerance and respect for differences.
481
 The ECtHR case-
law analysis illustrated that the Court seems to be moving towards this direction.  
Rights sceptics raised the argument that stressing interests and needs is a 
better strategy than engaging in the ‘myth of rights’, which ignores real life 
experiences and power structures. Hunt disagrees with this position and argues that 
law and rights could affect not only legal change, but not real emancipation and 
social transformation. He explains that the ‘counter-hegemonic’ political strategy 
envisioned by human rights critics actually requires a transition from the ‘discourse 
of interests’ to the ‘discourse of rights’.482 This is because as a transcendent project, 
counter-hegemony necessitates the employment of hegemonic discourses – like the 
human rights discourse – since such an employment introduces elements that 
transcend the discourse itself. Through such a process, elements once dominant are 
being used to eventually give way to new ones.
483
  
 This is true in the case of LGBTQ equality and to the role of the ECtHR 
towards achieving it. ECtHR litigation on privacy and discrimination opened the 
door to the recognition of family and marriage rights and gradually to the recognition 
of adoption, assisted procreation, education, health care, housing, inheritance and 
other rights. Additionally, in this litigation the Court highlighted both the negative 
and the positive obligations that states have towards their citizens. Therefore, the 
                                                 
481
   Ibid., 266-77. 
482
   Alan Hunt, “Rights and Social Movements: Counter-Hegemonic Strategies,” Journal of Law and 
Society, vol. 17, no. 3 (1990): 310. 
483
   Martha Minow, “Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover,” The Yale Law Journal, vol. 
96, no. 8 (1987): 1891; Hunt, “Rights and Social Movements,” 314; Herman, Rights of Passage, 3-11. 
See also: Minow, “Justice engendered,” 217-43. 
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language of human rights and the Court do not conceptualize LGBTQs as solely 
sexual beings, but as citizens who deserve protection and as individuals with 
emotional, intimate and familial relations to one another. Moreover, even if the law 
per se is part of the problem of LGBTQ subordination, arguing that it is possible for 
a movement or a group to achieve transformation and transcendence while refusing 




Williams also stresses the importance of a rights defence.
485
 She argues that 
the view that the utility of rights is gained at the expense of larger issues is erroneous 
because rights are not posed against, but are asserted on behalf of social reform.
486
 
The ‘need versus right’ argument is a word game because unless ‘needs’ are 
transformed into a form of rights, they have no bite. Writing on the black struggle for 
civil rights in the US, Williams explains that although black people were describing 
their needs for generations, this only resulted in legislation overlooking these self-
described needs. Historically, rights served as the political mechanism through which 
this denial of need, of name and reference, of existence and humanity was eventually 
confronted.
487
 Claims to needs and interests are not self-legitimating. To assert a 
need or interest as the basis for this need’s legitimization is a bad, circular argument. 
Conversely, in various and numerous instances, social interests were legitimized 
through the deployment of the rights discourse and of human rights litigation. 
Additionally, there is substantial gain in the pursuit of rights strategies since 
rights do not only stand for litigation. Litigation deployment is but one aspect of a 
‘counter-hegemonic rights strategy’ that is primarily a political rather than a legal 
process. As such, it is responsive to fears that human rights atomize issues or that 
they take away from the political substance of the objectives of social movements.
488
 
Litigation and rights are vehicles to political emancipation, though not exclusively 
and in isolation from other strategies. They do not only involve or premise struggles 
and contests, but they are contestable themselves. Consequently, as part of a 
                                                 
484
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movement’s strategies, judicial analysis of rights does make a difference, but without 
itself being deterministic of conditions and outcomes.
489
 As Williams phrased it, 
‘rights are to law what conscious commitments are to the psyche’.490 This means that 
rights and the law are not themselves constricting, but they become that when they 
are limited in a constricted plane; and it is when they are not challenged from within 
and based on their own terms, or when they are abandoned as inherently problematic 
that the discourses of rights and law remain constricted and become constricting 
towards new discourses. 
For that reason, rights and the law should be interpreted and approached as a 
communal language of social contexts, in which norms can be generated and 
assigned meaning.
 491
 Legal rights are not trumps, but a language of progress with 
only temporal resting points, from which new claims can be made; from which 
conflict is not generated but is given voice. If they are understood and approached as 
a vocabulary for organizing relationships within communities and institutions, rights 
become flexible without this emasculating their legitimacy. In sum, if used critically 
through an interpretive framework, they can shift the balance and create new 
connections between meanings and power.
492
  
There is then, a considerable degree of agreement in the relevant literature 
that the relationship between law, rights, (sexual) identities and human relations is 
dynamic and reciprocal. Though a specific social space and a particular set of 
cultural practices, the law provides the context for political struggles. While it 
delineates the parameters within which the representation of human relations 
becomes possible, its language is not fixed or unchangeable. On the contrary, it has 
the ability and does generate new meaning of the very same legal terms and 
identities through which social relations are produced and policed. Therefore, 
although the truth about sexuality is produced through legal practice, legal practice 
also becomes a vehicle for producing and (re)imagining the truth of sexuality.
493
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Consequently, law and its language ‘ought to be recognized as an important means 
of mobilization, as a way of fashioning the present’.494  
Nonetheless, and specifically for the purposes of this project, the question 
remains whether this relationship between law and the language of rights and 
identities, on the one hand, and social relations (including sexuality) and their 
representations, on the other hand, holds at the transnational level. Moreover, 
opinions divide as to whether it is progress in national legislation and judicial 
interpretations that propels similar changes at the regional and international level,
495
 
or if it is progress on the regional and international levels that disseminates into the 
national level.
496
 However, framing the question in this way obscures the fact that in 
an era of globalization, the relationship between the national and the 
regional/international level is increasingly becoming reciprocal. National changes 
towards LGBTQs – legal, social or cultural – influence the regional and international 
level. Similarly, changes at the regional and international level inspire change at the 
national level. It is an interactive and balanced process. As such, it provides – at least 
partially – a response to accusations that progressive regional courts – such as the 
ECtHR – engage in judicial activism and transcend their interpretive role by 
engaging in a legislative process that trumps national legislative procedures.  
This reciprocal process between the national and the regional/international 
level also draws attention to the role that both national and international NGOs can 
play in the promotion of LGBTQ human rights, especially in countries where 
national laws and policies suppress LGBTQ communities. For example, Canadians 
see themselves as tolerant towards difference and the majority of public opinion 
sides with LGBTQs’ objectives. In Canada, there is no well-organized religious 
opposition against same-sex sexuality,
497
 courts are progressive and the 
administration is sympathetic, if not supportive, of LGBTQ-friendly judicial 
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 In such a setting things are much easier. But where religious, political 
and other opposition to LGBTQ movements thrives – like in the US and in some 
European countries, like Cyprus – international NGOs could function as a link 
between national movements and unite them against state suppression through 
transnational action.  
Hagland argues that the ability of NGOs to interact not only with states but 
with non-state actors also, gives them the character of transnational organizations. 
As such, they unite groups beyond national boundaries and therefore, they are able to 
bypass unfriendly state systems.
499
 In this way, not only do they affect state policies 
by exercising pressure, but they also facilitate the transformation of social and 
cultural attitudes that support oppressive policies. This process begins at home and 
becomes transnational through interaction among non-state actors.
500
 In its turn, 
transnational interaction among non-state actors complements NGOs’ international 
and intergovernmental activity, which is important for increasing LGBTQ 
movements’ visibility and voice within and across states, as well as in international 
fora.  Additionally, since NGOs play an important role in the monitoring and 
advocacy of human rights, international institutions like the United Nations Human 
Rights Committee increasingly rely on their work.
501
  
Several valid claims have been raised about the limitations of the rights 
discourse with regard to achieving substantive equality. For example, Lehr argues 
that by equating ‘freedom’ and ‘exercising choice’ with rights and the institutional 
structures that rights serve – for example, marriage and the heteronormative family – 
the rights language inhibits questioning what ‘freedom’ really means. She argues that 
a rights-based approach does not really challenge power, but only allows the already 
privileged gays and lesbians to gain more access to it, since rights take issues of 
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debate out of politics and thus reduce the importance of collective decision-making 
and of mutual self-creation.
502
 Therefore, Lehr suggests that social movements turn 
to ‘radical democratic politics’, which involve cultural struggle instead of legal 
process. She prompts LGBTQ activists to understand identity as less fixed and as a 
function of history and public discourse and consequently to locate subjects and their 
rights in the contexts of their lives.
503
 Lehr concludes that this radical approach to the 
politics of sexuality would allow LGBTQs to participate in the construction, 
deconstruction and reconstruction of their identities, and to think of themselves not 
as mere subjects but as agents.
504
 
Human rights law and identity discourse’s complicity in the perpetuation of 
essentialisms have been justly and successfully criticized by numerous queer 
theorists. To be sure, law and the language of right and identities are impicated in the 
reinforcement, if not in the creation, of classes of exclusion. However, there are not 
only stakes in law and in rights; there are also opportunities and spaces for 
resistance.
505
 For example, although Leslie J. Moran points to the ‘romantic politics 
of sentimental and nostalgic domesticity’ that grounded the recognition of same-sex 
civil partnership in the UK, he does not reject this politics in total or same-sex civil 
partnership per se. Rather, he argues that this politics ‘needs to be sustained in 
conjunction with a perspective that does not shy away from the perils of domesticity: 
a diabolical romance’.506   
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Butler also explicates that she does not reject rights, although she disagrees 
with the ways they are conceptualized, as well as with the premises on which they 
are recognized and put into practice.
507
 Using lesbian and gay marriage as an 
example, she argues that its promotion as the norm of organizing sexuality and 
kinship reinforces assimilationist and essentialist norms, and thus threatens to render 
illegitimate and abject those sexual and familial arrangements that do not comply to 
its form.
508
 Hence, she proposes disarticulating rights and obligations currently 
associated with marriage so that rights and obligations of kinship may take many 
forms, while marriage is retained only as a symbolic practice, available for those 
who wish to pursue it.
509
  
Through this approach, Butler attempts to move away from the ‘essentialist 
versus constructionist binaries’. She explains that in the language of rights and as 
subjects before the law, individuals and groups have to stand as delineated and as 
defined by sameness in order to secure legal protections or entitlements. These legal 
definitions are not adequately descriptive of who people are. Nonetheless, LGBTQ 
movements need to make legal claims as part of the political task of remaking reality 
and reconstituting the human in ways that are liveable. International human rights 
are a means of intervening in legal, social and political processes by which the 
human is articulated, and of subjecting the human to an ongoing process of 
redefinition and renegotiation.
510
 There is a double path in the language of human 
rights: asserting entitlements in ways that affirm the constitutive role of gender and 
sexuality, but also subjecting these categories to scrutiny. This is a process of 
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Admittedly, the approach that I suggest – one that is based on strategic 
identity politics and aims to secure rights – may imperil those modalities of sexuality 
and desire which legal narratives and the concept of identity do not grasp or include. 
I am not arguing that there is no place for queer conception of sexualities in the 
Cypriot discursive landscape. What I am arguing is that a strategic utilization of 
identities and of the European human rights discourse would actually expand the 
space in which several types of desire could be articulated and expressed. In sum, the 
strategy I propose does not negate queer understandings of sexualities. Rather, 
through the use of already established and institutionalized identities, it seeks to open 
a ‘first door’ for Cypriot LGBTQs out of invisibility and into the current structures 
of power; to allow them to put a foot into the public arena and to be heard.  
As Weeks argues, it is possible to find a way out of the dilemma between the 
‘discourse of rights’ and the ‘discourse of emancipation’. This exit point is what he 
calls ‘radical pluralism’. Weeks’s ‘radical pluralism’ is a language of, and approach 
to (sexual) politics that recognizes the positive value of diversity. As such, ‘radical 
pluralism’ escapes both the difficulties that the assumed universality of rights creates 
when rights are actually placed within specific socio-political and cultural contexts, 
and the uncertainties and conflicts over the meaning, representativeness and aims of 
an emancipatory project.
512
 Nonetheless, Weeks’s radical moral pluralism is 
premised on certain key ideas. One of them is the presupposition of certain ‘rights of 
everyday life’. These are the right to difference, the right to space of personal life, 
the right to exit from minorities and the freedom of voice, which is a ‘public 
freedom’ and ‘the guarantee of all the freedoms and rights of everyday life’.513  
By applying Weeks’s suggestions to the case of Cypriot LGBTQ sexual 
politics, the need to assure the right to speak and to be heard becomes even more 
evident. As the analysis of  the Modinos case highlighted, within the Cypriot context, 
the discourse and the legal mechanisms of ‘Europe’ are currently the most effective 
– if not the only – way for LGBTQs to be heard. This is more the case since 
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progressive and emancipatory political projects – as opposed to cautious and 
strategic initial approaches – carry the peril of backfiring and engendering even direr 
socio-political effects.
514
 Once the freedom to speak and to be heard is guaranteed, 
Cypriot LGBTQs would be able to move away from particularist rights-based 
demands and fight for the freedom to diversity and pluralism.  
In sum, rights through politicized identity employment do not necessarily 
only bind and regulate personhood.
515
 Rather, they can emancipate the subjects 
produced through regulatory discourses – such as LGBTQ subjects – since ‘they 
function to encourage possibility through discursive denial of historically layered 
and institutionally secured bounds, by denying with words the effects of relatively 
wordless, politically invisible, yet potent material constraints’.516 Namely, rights 
transcend the level of the legal and of the political and operate on the level of the 
symbolic. Therefore, they do not only confer a position within temporal and spatial 
power structures.  They also confer the possibility to perpetually push the boundaries 
of the universal or not so universal, historical or a-historical, cultural or a-cultural, 
contextual or a-contextual notion of ‘humanity’. This is a type of an anti-essentialist 
first-step choice, when one has to balance powerful nationalist discourses and 
masculinist state prerogatives with sexual equality objectives. 
Conclusion 
 
The EComHR declared Marangos’s case admissible only based on his 
allegation of an Article 8 violation, while in 1998 the ECtHR refused to examine the 
case, since it reasoned that the principle in question had already been established in 
earlier cases. In the Modinos case, the ECtHR did not go beyond the examination of 
same-sex sexuality vis-à-vis the right to privacy or beyond the examination of the 
legality of homosexuality’s criminalization. Therefore, when viewed solely from a 
legal perspective, these two cases are not as indicative of the development of the 
Court’s reasoning with regard to LGBTQ rights, as cases of the 2000s and 2010s are. 
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Nonetheless, the importance of the Marangos, and especially of the Modinos case 
rests on the fact that they had a great impact on Cypriot society and on Cypriot 
predominant narratives of sexuality. Once questions about non-heterosexual 
sexuality became the focal point of public debate because of these two cases, the 
progressive weakening of institutional discourses became unavoidable.  
This is exactly why legal narratives and mechanisms are so important in 
struggles for sexual equality. Though when seen from a purely legal lens some 
European legal narratives and litigation might appear to be of limited importance, 
their local/national level effects are far greater. Therefore, they constitute the best 
available route towards sexual equality especially in places, like Cyprus, where other 
avenues are limited or even inexistent, as a result of the pervasiveness of oppressive 
official discourses. Moreover, legal narratives and litigation that take place at the 
regional/European level are significant because European legal institutions are norm-
setters. That is, their reasoning and decisions are – more or less willingly and sooner 
or later – adopted by individual states. Nonetheless, the legal and identity approach 
is not without problems. 
In some cases, LGBTQ movements strategically focus on assuming a fixed 
identity, in order to facilitate their entrance into mainstream power politics. 
Nonetheless, an identity structured with the purpose to appeal to a communicative 
environment that is wary of alternative conceptualizations of gender and sexuality is 
inherently problematic. By employing identity politics, social movements may create 
classes of exclusion similar to the ones they oppose. Although the notion of a fixed 
identity assists mobilization, external communication and internal coherence it may 
alienate a number of LGBTQs, if it does not resonate with their self-understandings. 
Therefore, instead of only trying to enter mainstream discourses and their 
institutions, LGBTQ movements also need to discern and challenge the forces that 
necessitate the construction, internalization, and communication of such identities. 
Advocates of progressive ‘politics of freedom’ and ‘radical democracy’ 
correctly expose the perils that the invocation of mainstream discourses entails. To 
be sure, conceptualizing identities as the foundation of rights and as the point of 
reference of desire leaves power-structure problems intact. However, some queer 
theory approaches are also limited, since they do not transcend the objects of their 
own critique – that is liberalism and rights – or articulate practical solutions beyond 
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the rhetorical level. Such approaches understand human rights as conceptualized, 
recognized and exercised on the basis of sexual and gender identities that reinforce 
heterosexuality and other classes of exclusion. Although such scepticism in not 
without merit, it is sometimes based on a narrow understanding of rights and of 
rights’ relation to democratic political processes.  
Empirical findings about the beneficial effects of human rights for excluded 
groups and individuals should not be ignored. There is a transformative and self-
transformative aspect in rights and in the law: Although they shape identities and 
partake in discourses of power they also provide a basis for contesting and 
rearticulating rights and identities. This compels us to find a way to achieve both 
formal and substantive legal, social and cultural equality, while retaining the 
distinctive lives and self-understandings of LGBTQ people. 
 A great part of the answer sought is to be found in LGBTQ human rights 
litigation. In the ECtHR litigation, LGBTQ subjects have been recognized not only 
as private individuals but also as parents, family members and members of society 
who deserve public recognition and support. The Court has progressively 
transcended gender binarism and has detached sex from biology, gender from sex 
and self-identification from sex and gender normativity. Consequently, as part of a 
larger project, European LGBTQ human rights litigation is extremely promising for 
LGBTQ movements. Legal mechanisms are not a panacea to the problems that the 
LGBTQ community faces, but they provide an impetus towards fundamental change. 
Prevailing social ideas help shape the law, so it cannot stand outside culture and 
autonomously change it. But if culture and the law are in productive tension, then the 
law could shape society and culture as much as they shape it. The process is mutual: 
culture gives meaning to law, and law to culture. Therefore, law is flexible enough to 
accept sexuality as a fluid concept.  
An invocation of human rights that could maximize benefits and eliminate 
perils for LGBTQ movements is a process that consists of five aspects. The first 
aspect pertains to LGBTQ narratives. False stereotypes are created by traditional 
narratives that reduce LGBTQs to exclusively sexual creatures that are incapable to 
participate in familial worlds. These narratives affect judicial decision-making on 
LGBTQ issues. Yet, LGBTQ narratives could counter these prejudices, deconstruct 
false stereotypes and shift the norms towards substantive equality.  
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The second aspect involves promoting is an alternative understanding of 
morality. Morality as critical moral thinking is detached from sexual activity, legal 
moralism and moral majoritarianism and it is premised on understanding, pluralism, 
tolerance, and respect of difference.  
The third aspect entails prioritizing rights over needs and interests, since the 
language of rights is vested with legitimacy and, therefore, can propel social change. 
For that reason, the human rights discourse needs to be used as part of a 
transformative and emancipatory project.  
The fourth aspect is premised on the re-conceptualization of the rights-
litigation relationship. Rights do not only stand for litigation. Rights, the law and 
litigation need to be approached as a language through which norms are debated, 
interpreted, generated and reformed.  
The fifth aspect highlights the role of NGOs in the promotion of LGBTQ 
human rights. Through transnational action, NGOs serve as a link between national 
movements, non-state actors across borders and supranational institutions. Such 
multi-sectional invocation of human rights is promising for LGBTQ movements, 
since it helps to move from a formalistic to a substantive approach of equality. It 
does so by understanding gender and sexuality not as types of fixed identity that 
must be moulded to fit restricted settings, but as fundamental dimensions of one’s 
humanity. 
In the past, the discourses and the values that are embedded in the concept of 
‘Europeanization’ have been strategically limited to their external dimensions both 
by the Greek-Cypriot and by the Turkish-Cypriot political elite, in order to gain 
advantage over external enemies.
517
 Nonetheless, as the Modinos v. Cyprus case 
illustrates, through the employment of European mechanisms and values even a 
single individual can redefine agency over the negotiation of identity and place 
sexuality and gender in the centre of public debate and action. More such moves 
could stimulate the generation of a grassroots group consciousness and subsequently 
lead to more extensive social mobilization.  
 However, it should not be ignored that the effectiveness of any type of 
strategy is inextricably linked to individuals and groups’ willingness to mobilize. 
Namely, unless Cypriot LGBTQs realize the importance of political mobilization, 
                                                 
517
   Featherstone, “Cyprus and the Onset of Europeanization,” 145-6; Featherstone, “Introduction: In 
the Name of ‘Europe,” 18. 
Nayia Kamenou  Page 195 of 343 
 
there is not much point in efforts to evaluate the effectiveness of strategic techniques. 
Therefore, Cypriot LGBTQs’ self-perceptions and their views about law, rights and 
political organization and mobilization, as well as the effects of official discourses 
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This chapter examines how Cypriot LGBTQs construct and negotiate self-
perceptions and their identities amidst dominant gender, sexuality and nationhood 
discourses. It explores how both Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot LGBTQ 
individuals  who do not conform to the predominant heteronormative discourse 
understand, interpret, articulate, legitimatize or participate in the disapprobation of 
their sexual desires and practices, in the process of situating themselves within their 
social, political and cultural environment. It discusses how these LGBTQ self-
understandings relate to existing theories about non-heterosexual desire and 
identities. It also examines whether and how the theories and the self-perceptions 
under examination stimulate or inhibit certain types of political mobilization and 
activism. 
Given the preceding discussion about the impact of prevailing nationalist, 
gender and sexuality discourses on the delineation of ‘acceptable’ and ‘imaginable’ 
subjectivities, it is evident that power resides in the ability to name both the ‘Self’ 
and the ‘Other’. What we call ourselves – and what we call others – has immense 
implications for political practice.
518
 Therefore, studying how Cypriot LGBTQs 
construct themselves via naming and narrating the ‘Self’ and to what extent their 
articulations could be perceived as ‘political’ – with the term being broadly defined 
as any action or inaction that has the impetus to challenge the political status quo – is 
important.  
Addressing questions about Cypriot sexual subjectivities and LGBTQ 
identities by drawing upon Cypriot LGBTQ individuals’ own perceptions and self-
perceptions is pertinent. This task is important not only because such questions have 
not been sufficiently addressed in the existing literature, but also because some of the 
few attempts to address such questions were overtly and unapologetically based 
exclusively on heterosexual Cypriots’ perceptions of the non-heterosexual ‘Other’. 
For example, in his PhD thesis, Andreas Onoufriou claims that through his 
interaction with graduate and ex-graduate students, he could not find any female 
student who identified as a lesbian. As a result, he ends up discussing lesbian desire 
based on interviews with heterosexual female participants, ‘who were telling stories 
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of female friends who went through the pains and the fears of negotiating lesbian 
desire’.519 The claim that ‘in his research on gendered subjectivities among students, 
[he] was unable to find a single case he could identify as a lesbian currently living in 
Cyprus’ is reported – and reinforced – by Cynthia Cockburn,520 while very recently, 
Onoufriou once more drew conclusions about lesbian subjectivities in Cyprus based 
solely on female heterosexuals’ narrations about lesbians.521  
To be sure, finding Cypriots who reside in Cyprus and who identify, or admit 
that they identify, as LGBTQ and convincing them to give an interview about their 
sexual identities and self-perceptions is not an easy task. Nonetheless, ‘in proxy’ 
discussions of LGBTQ subjectivities might do more harm than good: Attempting to 
locate and socially situate the ‘other’ – that is, the LGBTQ individual – based 
exclusively on the perceptions and understandings of the ‘dominant’ – that is, of the 
heterosexual male – or of the ‘not-so-othered’ – that is, the heterosexual (white, 
middle or upper-class) female – about the ‘other’ reiterates difference. Moreover, it 
alienates and further silences LGBTQ individuals, while it deprives them of any 
possibility of exercising agency.
522
 
This thesis aims to be both a political and an ethical project. In alignment 
with feminist approaches, the thesis in its whole, but particularly this chapter, aims 
to reclaim and to validate the experiences of Cypriot LGBTQ individuals and 
therefore to challenge the heterocentric and nationalist-centred monopoly of truth.
523
 
Listening to Cypriot LGBTQs and attempting to make sense of their perspectives on 
their own experiences fills in a gap in the currently existing literature. Nonetheless, it 
is important to point out that I do not consider the present work to be ‘truer’ than 
other work about Cypriot sexual subjectivities. Namely,  I do not assume that 
Cypriot LGBTQ voices offer an insight into any kind of reality or that an ontological 
                                                 
519
   Onoufriou, “In Search of Voices,” 213.  
520
   Cockburn, The Line, 135.   
521
   Andreas Onoufriou, “Falling in love with someone from your own sex is like going against 
Cyprus itself...”-discourses towards heterosexual and female-to-female subjectivities at the University 
of Cyprus,” Journal of Gender Studies, vol. 18, no. 1 (2009), 13-23. 
522
    Similar arguments have been raised and elaborated by numerous feminist theorists who have 
attempted to expose the essentialisms embedded in ‘first’ and ‘second wave’ feminism which, 
arguably, were premised on a universal female identity that was, nonetheless, prioritizing the 
experiences and needs of upper and middle-class white women. It is not the purpose of this chapter to 
address the whole variety of such arguments or discuss all the strands of feminist theory that represent 
such arguments. However, bell hooks could be referred to as one of the feminist authors who have 
produced seminal work on feminist essentialisms. For example, see: bell, hooks. Ain’t I a Woman: 
Black Women and Feminism. Boston, MA: South End Press, 1981. 
523
   Kitzinger, Celia, “Feminist Approaches”.  
Nayia Kamenou  Page 199 of 343 
 
and ‘pure’ ‘gay’, ‘lesbian’, ‘bisexual’, ‘trans*’ or ‘queer’ identity, which constitutes 
a prerequisite for speaking and/or understanding ‘true’ LGBTQ ‘essence’, exists.524 
Nevertheless, making arguments about the self-perceptions of Cypriot LGBTQs 
while claiming that it has not been possible to find Cypriot LGBTQs to speak about 
their selves and perceptions, and basing arguments on data collected by working 
only with heterosexual individuals reinforces Cypriot LGBTQs’ invisibility. 
Additionally, it reiterates the difference between the ‘researcher-as-all-knower’ and 
the ‘researched-as-calculable’, as well as the difference between the heterosexual 
subject as the authority over matters of sexuality and the non-heterosexual subject as 
the non-agentic object of science.  
Cypriot LGBTQs self-perceptions are important to study, since they reveal 
the interesting interplay between such self-perceptions and dominant discourses, not 
least that of national identity. Such a study also reveals how LGBTQ identifications 
are implicated in the creation and perpetuation of in-group exclusions and 
alienations. This helps highlight that identities, including gender and sexual 
identities, are not rigid and fixed. Rather, they are formed, debated and reformed as 
part of a constant process of seeking to be recognized and legitimized by those same 
forces that render them ‘inappropriate’ and ‘unthinkable’. Namely, identity 
formation and gender and sexuality articulation are situated within a matrix of 
power, within which each ‘player’ seeks to position herself and secure her position 
by both challenging dominant identities, and by dominating more inferior ‘others’.  
As this chapter will argue, this process also exposes the malleability of gender and 
sexual hierarchies. Therefore, this process is promising towards challenging the 
Cypriot discursive status quo. 
The research problems that this chapter addresses are firstly, how LGBTQ 
participants locally produce contexts for their interaction and secondly, why and to 
what extent they are affected by institutional and socio-cultural constraints. The 
objective is to understand the possibilities and the limits of attempts at social 
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 In deciding how to approach these problems methodologically and 
analytically, I have chosen to employ an amalgam of tools that are used in 
conversation, narrative and discursive analysis, while adopting a Foucaultian 
approach to the question of power/knowledge and of technologies/techniques of the 
self.  
My choice has been informed primarily by the variety of data I collected – 
individual interviews, group interviews, participant observation through naturally 
occurring talk, archive material and questionnaires.
526
 Such a variety of data 
necessitated approaching them from several different angles, in order to make the 
best use of them. In accordance with ‘continental’ Foucaultian discourse analysis,527 
my empirical research material revealed that, in the case of Cyprus, there exist 
numerous overlapping and conflicting, defined or undefined, articulated or non-
articulated ‘discourses’ about each topic. Such discourses were employed by 
different interviewees or by the same interviewee at different instances during the 
interview.
 528
 This forced me to move my attention beyond language-as-language and 
to understand discourse ‘as the result of collusion: [as] the conditions of the political, 
social and linguistic practice [that] impose themselves practically behind the back of 
the subjects, while the actors do not see through the game’.529 The material itself also 
highlighted the need to focus on interrelationships between elements/discourses, 
rather than on individual elements/discourses. 
In order to address the questions that arise from the interplay between 
Cypriot LGBTQ self-perceptions and official dominant discourses, this chapter will 
be based on research data analysis, and specifically on interview analysis, which will 
be structured around themes. Drawing upon Foucault’s work,530 the analysis will be 
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premised on three intersecting and mutually supportive pillars. These are: 
subjectivity, governmentality and power/knowledge.  
According to Foucault, subjectivity formation – also referred to as 
‘subjectivization’ – denotes the different subject positions in discourse. This means 
that the production of the subject and its actions are located within discourse and that 
power is implicated in subjectivity via discourse.
531
 However, even though subject 
formation and positionality are always situated within the confines of discourse, the 
idea and possibility of agency is not annihilated. Rather, discourse determinism and 
the essentialization of power are prevented because the subject/agent-discourse 
relationship is reciprocal and flexible.
 532
 Foucaultian governmentality has a double 
meaning: In the first sense, it refers to the collective way of how we think about 
governing and authority, which is based on collective socio-cultural forms of 
knowledge. In the second sense, it refers to the emergence of new thinking, 
knowledge and techniques of exercising power within specific social contexts.
533
 
Therefore, governmentality is a form of power that is not possessed but that is 
practiced,
534
 while knowledge and power are closely linked, since knowledge is 




The four sets of themes/problems that will be discussed are seen as 
correlative to the subjectivity-governmentality-power/knowledge relationship. 
Additionally, these themes/social problems will be examined through two different 
perspectives, namely, elite and LGBTQ perspectives. The aim is to identify 
disruptions, discontinuities, overlaps and crossings within discourses proffered by 
individual agents within these two interviewee groups; disruptions, discontinuities, 
overlaps and crossings within each group discourse; and/or disruptions, 
discontinuities, overlaps and crossings when group discourses are compared. The 
themes/ problems around which the analysis will be structured are: the victimizing-
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blaming interplay in elite understandings of LGBTQ subjectivity; the legitimization 
and/or sanctioning mechanisms that Cypriot LGBTQs employ in their attempts to 
understand and articulate themselves; the nationhood-sexuality nexus and how this 
impacts LGBTQ identity formation processes and in-group dynamics; and the 
‘Western/European’ binary discourse negotiation by Cypriot LGBTQs and its 
impact on identity and identification processes – or to phrase it otherwise, the 
ways in which this discourse has the ability to both weaken and to reinforce 
exclusions that are based on conceptions of nationhood.  
The ‘Western/European’ binary discourse negotiation data analysis 
section will argue that although ‘Western/European’ discourses alienate the ‘non-
Western/non-European’ ‘Other’ and although Cypriot LGBTQs’ engagement with 
these discourses is unavoidable, the results of this engagement are not 
predetermined. Consequently, the chapter will conclude that, to the degree that such 
discourses do not reflect local modalities of sexuality, conceptions about identity 
and/or understandings of political action, Cypriot LGBTQs need not fully embrace 
them. Rather, they could selectively employ elements of such discourses, as part of 
the process of forming their self-identifications and of challenging dominant 
repressive discourses.  
Research Data Analysis: Findings and Theoretical Implications  
 
Victimizing versus Blaming 
In their attempts to explain non-binary gender identifications and non-
heterosexual sexual choice and to justify their views about non-heteronormative 
gender and sexuality,
536
 the vast majority of both male and female elite interviewees 
assumed at least one of these three positions: a) ‘LGBTQs are the victims of some 
sort of sickness or of deficient nature’; b) ‘LGBTQs are the perpetrators of the 
“crime” of transcending the established/natural/proper norms that pertain to gender 
and sexuality and therefore, nobody is to be blamed for their problematic situation 
but themselves’; c) ‘although they are the victims of some illness and/or although 
they have been less “blessed” (by nature and/or God), Cypriot LGBTQs lose their 
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victim status and they turn into a threat for the Cypriot social net, once they start 
propelling demands – such as the right to family life – based on their 
deficient/problematic existence’. 
I call these three positions homophobia-couched-as-pity, outright 
homophobia and qualified homophobia.
537
 The following excerpt from an interview 
with a high-ranking clergyman is paradigmatic of all three positions/types of 
discourses: 
 
Interviewer: In your opinion, what are the causes of homosexuality? 
Interviewee: I believe that there are two reasons for which a person decides to 
tamper with his nature or use it in a manner other than the normal one; in a manner 
that is different from that through which man is made [i.e., heterosexual sexual 
intercourse]. Firstly, there are hormonal imbalances ... These people who suffer from 
a hormonal imbalance are patients and the Church must see them in a therapeutic 
manner and approach them with lots of love ... like [in the case of] a child who is 
born with leukaemia: Doctors must stand by him until they manage to beat the 
disease. And they do beat the disease. This is also how we [i.e., the Church] 





At this point of the interview, the high-ranking clergyman portrays non-heterosexual 
individuals as the less fortunate of humankind, who need to be embraced with love 
and be provided the spiritual and religious guidance needed in order to overcome 
their ‘inherited’ disease.  This is an example of ‘homophobia-couched-as-pity’ 
discourse. Namely, what must be feared, fought against and eventually eliminated is 
not the homosexual individual; it is the ‘spiritual and/or hormonal disease’ that 
placates him. Nonetheless, he continues to present a second category of people who, 
according to his opinion, deflect from the path of ‘nature and God’: 
 
The other category is constituted by those people who ... have lost their social and 
religious beliefs. They have lost the pillar of the values of life and they are trying to 
satisfy their flesh, or their ego, or their desires by experimenting and by being 
unsatisfied with everything in life. There are numerous people in this state. You see 
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   Some of the arguments propelled by elites that fall into the first two types of positions have 
already been discussed in chapter one. 
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   “Interview with Metropolitan Bishop 210022,” 13 January 2009.  
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these people changing religions, countries, jobs, women [i.e., they engage in 




Here, the prelate moves into the ‘outright homophobia’ discourse. The homosexual 
person in now portrayed as an arrogant and insatiable creature that has voluntarily 
deflected from the path of God and nature. 
While attempting to address the following questions, the interviewee 
employs the ‘qualified homophobia’ discourse: 
 
Interviewer: What about a homosexual person who strives to change but cannot 
change? Will this person be considered an eternal sinner [by the Church]? 
Interviewee: [The Church] must always find new ways to communicate its messages 
and to help these [i.e., homosexual] people find themselves. But this does not mean 
that I will approve of gay and transsexual nightclubs; [This does not mean] that I 
will approve of these people who have such problems being employed as educators 
... It is one thing to accept anyone who suffers from an identity crisis ... and it is 
another thing to allow this sin and this mistake, or whatever it could be called, to be 
cultivated and transmitted to others. 
Interviewer: Earlier, you spoke about the importance of human rights. Let’s talk 
about European human rights law, and specifically about the right to family life. 
What is your opinion about same-sex civil unions? 
Interviewee: I disagree with same-sex civil unions ... These people [i.e., 
homosexuals] need our love, but allowing [such] a sexual union would cause other 
problems ... The groups of these people [i.e., homosexuals] have terrible 
[psychological] complexes and, in their local communities, one can observe that 
serious problems are created for families ... The religious aspect aside ... marriage 
still functions as an institution that protects the family. 
Interviewer: Do you agree or disagree with the decriminalization of homosexuality 
in Cyprus? 
Interviewee: Personally, I am against the criminalization of spiritual diseases [i.e., 
same-sex sexual attraction] ... But I agree with the criminalization of crimes [i.e., 
non-heterosexual sexual conduct]. You see, there is a problem. It has been 
scientifically proven through studies that eighty per cent of homosexual people have 
the potential of becoming paedophiles ... We have a problem.
540
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At this point of the interview, the respondent starts making qualifications about 
which rights should or should not be granted to non-heterosexual individuals. 
According to him, although non-heterosexual individuals are worthy of the Church 
and society’s love and support – since they were unlucky enough to be born ill – 
they should not be allowed to work as educators, enter civil unions or create families. 
This high-ranking member of the clergy also qualifies the love and acceptance that 
the ‘inferior other’ is worthy of: Those spheres of life which – according to his 
opinion – homosexuals would threaten, if they were allowed to participate in them, 
are reserved for the ‘normal’ heterosexuals. Moreover, his answer to the question 
about homosexuality’s decriminalization in Cyprus shows that he is ambivalent 
about whether same-sex sexuality is a ‘crime’ or a ‘spiritual disease’ (or both). 
Nonetheless, he claims that there is a causal relationship between same-sex sexuality 
and paedophilia. Therefore, he concludes that the decriminalization of 
homosexuality can create ‘problems’.  
Examples of qualified homophobia are particularly interesting since they 
reveal not only the justificatory and often conflicting discourses that are employed 
by those who espouse this position, but also the gaps in, and the fluidity of, such 
discourses. Namely, the qualified homophobia position does not outright oppose 
homosexuality and sexual choice equality based either on ‘bad choice’ or ‘deficient 
nature’ claims. Rather, by being based on boundaries and thresholds about what is 
‘acceptable’ and what is not, the qualified homophobia position reveals that norms 
about sexuality are flexible and that, as such, they are also changeable. For example, 
a male military official in his early forties commented: 
 
I do not believe that [being gay] is [morally] permissible. Yet, I do not believe that 
[the right to be gay] should be rejected either. [On the one hand], if someone who is 
a man doesn’t feel like a man,541 we cannot do anything about it. It’s his issue. But, 
on the other hand, I do not believe that it would be positive if governments, 
                                                                                                                                          
 
541
   “Interview with Military Official 210017,” 9 January, 2009. The interviewee perceives gender 
and sexuality as continuous and collapsible categories; that is, he assumes that everyone who desires a 
man, whether male or female, is by definition feminine, and everyone who desires a woman is 
masculine. See: Eve Kosofky Sedgwick, “How to Bring Your Kids up Gay,” Social Text, vol. 29 
(1999): 20.  
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organized groups, associations, etc, were to reach the point of proclaiming that it is 
perfectly normal for a person to be outside his nature. What I mean is that, 
nowadays, we have reached a point where in England, I believe, Elton John – a 
classic example – got married to his boyfriend! It is his right to do whatever he 
wants. Still, the state and the polity cannot grant these people the right to adopt a 
child; because children are pure. When they adopt a four-year old child, how is she 
going to grow up? Now, one might argue that, theoretically, we have taught the 
child [to think] this way. No! Nature says that [a child] should have a mother and a 
father. And let us come to the example of the child who will not have a mother. The 
passive man [in the gay couple] will play the role of the mother. How could this 
work? Under which circumstances will this child grow up? What right do we have to 




The crossings and overlaps of various discourses that this interviewee 
employs in order to position himself on the issue of non-heterosexual sexualities are 
numerous and revealing. Firstly, he points out the ‘paradoxical phenomenon’ of ‘a 
man who does not feel like a man’, which is embedded in gender reductionism and 
binary constructions. However, this interviewee also employs the discourse of rights: 
It is the gay man’s ‘issue’ and ‘right’ to be attracted to other men; it is his personal 
choice. The interviewee’s discourse about ‘personal rights/preferences’ does include 
gay marriage – he states that Elton John had a right to marry his boyfriend. However, 
the interviewee also employs a third and a fourth discourse, which complicate his 
perception of LGBTQ subjectivities: A ‘personal right/choice/issue’ is one that does 
not involve/affect minors, and this is because ‘children are pure’. Besides qualifying 
what ‘rights’ for LGBTQs stand for – that is, LGBTQ rights are permissible when 
‘rights’ are narrowly interpreted as ‘one’s freedom of personal sexual taste’ that 
stops where the discourses of the heteronormative family life and of gender binarism 
begin – he also qualifies ‘homosexuality’ and ‘heterosexuality’: Children are ‘pure’ 
and their purity is imperilled by the ‘impurity’ of same-sex sexuality and sexual 
conduct. However, any ‘impurity’ that sexual conduct as such might carry is not 
attributed to heterosexual sexual conduct. Namely, heterosexual sexual conduct is 
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‘pure’ – since it is ‘dictated’ and ‘sanctioned’ by nature, whereas homosexual sexual 
practices are ‘impure’ and perilous, since they oppose nature.  
This third discourse of ‘purity-impurity’, which is used by the interviewee to 
determine stereotypes for children, is complimented by a fourth discourse, that is, the 
discourse about ‘active’ and ‘passive’ parental roles. The interviewee claims that the 
‘passive’ male in the gay partnership cannot properly assume the role of his ‘passive’ 
correlative in the heterosexual relationship, that is, the role of the woman/mother. 
This discourse renders ‘passivity’ and ‘vigour’ not only as the grounding binary rule 
of sexual relationships, but also of gender relationships and of the harmonic 
operation of the (always heterocentric, nuclear) family. The conclusion drawn from 
this is that same-sex sexuality per se is not necessarily excluded from the realm of 
the thinkable, although it does not partake in the realm of the ‘natural’ and of the 
‘normal’. Rather, what is rendered unthinkable is the crossing of the borders of 
gender binarism which functions as the grounding pillar of ‘governmentality’, as this 
operates saliently within the Cypriot context, even if subjects – like this interviewee 
– merge it with, and mistake it for, ‘deviant’ sexual activity.543 
Such attitudes are reminiscent of Foucault’s argument that the ‘man-man-
woman’ erotic triangle reflects how gender, sex and sexuality relate to power, even 
when the forms they take are not overtly or obviously sexual.
544
 The effects of the 
operations of this triangle are primarily gender-related. As Foucault explains, sexual 
activity between men is a matter of culture and of how power is determined.
545
 
However, the issue of determining and distributing power is inextricably linked to 
policing the borders of gender binarism. This ‘power-governmentality-subjectivity’ 
link with regard to understandings of gender and sexuality can be discerned in the 
majority of interviews with elite participants. The above three excerpts are 
representative of the responses given by politicians, military officials, clergymen and 
representatives of women’s groups about Cypriot LGBTQ subjectivities. During the 
course of their interviews, each of the elite interviewees adopted at least one of the 
three types positions – that is, homophobia-couched-as-pity, outright homophobia, 
and/or qualified homophobia.  
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   This discourse of ‘qualified homophobia’ is prevalent in discussions about LGBTQ subjectivities 
in Cyprus. For an ‘archaeological’, à la Foucault tracing of the genesis of the employment of such 
‘knowledges’ see: Παγκύπρια Εταιρεία Ψυχικής Υγιεινής. Ομοφυλοφιλία. Λευκωσία, 1982. 
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   Sedgwick, Kosofsky Eve, “Gender Asymmetry and Erotic Triangles”, in Between Men, 524-8. 
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Admittedly, members of the clergy were more inclined towards employing 
all three types of positions. This is because as the spokespersons of Orthodox 
Christianity ‘that is based on love’,546 they could not outright blame LGBTQs for 
their sexuality and portray them as criminals. Therefore, they employed the 
homophobia-couched-as-pity rhetoric. However, as spokespersons of the institution 
of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus, which is the main agency of preservation of 
heteronormative familial structures, they could not but reject the idea of same-sex 
civil unions and of non-heterocentric families. Consequently, they also adopted the 
qualified homophobia discourse. Nonetheless, at some instances, the crossing of 
these two types of discourses was further complicated by high-ranking clergymen’s 
employment of the outright homophobia rhetoric. Like other elite interviewees, 
during the course of their interviews prelates could not always abide by the rules of 
‘political correctness’ and would express hostile opinions about LGBTQ individuals 
which, ironically, would attempt to premise them on the dogma of Orthodox 
Christianity that is supposed to be premised on love. What follows are more 
examples of elite discourse crossing and discontinuity, which highlight the 
discrepancies between elites’ intended/politically correct and unintended/politically 
incorrect articulations about Cypriot LGBTQs and about gender and sexuality 
subjectivities. 
In chapter one, I made reference to Georgiou’s study on the sexual attitudes 
of Orthodox priests in Cyprus. This study concluded that priests often diverge from 
the official rigidity of the Church’s Fathers on issues of sexual ‘deviance’, as long as 
the men who deviate remain within the limits of heterosexuality – for example, 
adultery in same-sex marriage. Yet, they do not employ the same practice in the case 
of women, even if ‘sinning’ women do not cross the boundaries of 
heterosexuality.
547
 After summarizing the results of this study, I asked the Bishop 
what the current approach of the Church is towards such matters. He responded that, 
‘what this study describes is a situation of the past. The Church and Christ himself 
have destroyed the gap and the inequality between the two genders. Now, if by 
“gender equality” you mean men becoming women and women becoming men, this 
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   “Interview with Metropolitan Bishop 210022”; “Interview with Bishop 210031.” 
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   Georgiou, “Sexual Attitudes of Greek Orthodox Priests in Cyprus,” 44-66. 
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is an anomaly’.548 My asking for a clarification of what the interviewee understood 
‘gender equality’ to stand for led to the following discussion: 
 
Interviewer: Would you like to further elaborate on this [i.e., gender equality 
according to the Christian Orthodox dogma]? 
Interviewee: … The Holy Scripture says that, by nature, man is the one [who is 
supposed] to keep his home secure. By nature, woman must feel and act as a wife … 
From the moment that the wife feels that she can climb on the man’s neck, the 
household is dissolved. That’s why our society has been dissolved … Nowadays it is 
probably women who have more extramarital relationships, not men.  
… 
Interviewer: Would you agree with women being allowed to act as priests in the 
Orthodox Church of Cyprus? 
Interviewee: If you had understood anything from what I have just said, you would 
have realized that your question is stupid and naïve! [Shouting] 
Interviewer: Why is that? 
Interviewee: No, [it is] not [only] naïve. It is naïve, anyways! [Your question is also] 
pointless! [Still shouting] 
Interviewer: Could you explain to me why? Personally, I understand the concept of 
‘equality’ from a human rights perspective. You … [Interviewer interrupted by 
interviewee] 
Interviewee: If you had any understanding of what I have been explaining to you all 
this time, you wouldn’t be telling me this stuff about human rights! Where do 
human rights start from, and where do they stop? If I dress like a woman tonight and 
go out in the streets, is this a human right? [Shouting even more angrily] 
Interviewer: I don’t understand why … [Interviewer interrupted by interviewee] 
Interviewee: Understand it! Control your ego and you will understand it! [Still 
shouting] 
Interviewer: I beg your pardon? 
Interviewee: Yeah, you heard me! I told you to become a member of the Church! 
This is all because you are not a member of the Church! If you were a pious woman 
who went to Church … [Interviewee’s screaming interrupted by interviewer] 
Interviewer: I am trying to do my job and the reason I am here is because you agreed 
to give me an interview. I would appreciate it, if you could respond to my questions 
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and if you refrained from ad hominem critique. If you could not do that, I could 
always leave, you know. 
Interviewee: Ok, I take it back. But my experiment has worked! Thank you! You 
have really helped me! Now, let me respond to you: Human rights are really fuzzy 
things. Human rights have limits. [Still upset, but more calmly] 
Interviewer: Thank you. What is your opinion about homosexuality? 
Interviewee: I don’t have an opinion! I don’t know this subject! That’s the end of 
this interview! [Screaming again] 




Both because of the way in which the dynamics of the discussion between the 
interviewer and the interviewee developed, and because of the interviewee’s 
complete inability to balance his personal opinions and his institution’s discourses 
with Orthodox Christianity’s alleged values, this example constitutes the culmination 
of conflict in elite interviewees’ discourses. Although initially this Bishop tried to 
communicate to me that he and his institution are advocates of gender equality, when 
pressed to elaborate on his views he could not help but reveal his true feelings about 
gender and sexuality and about non-heterosexual individuals. The bigotry that 
characterizes him is so intense, that he tended to interpret every interview question as 
a challenge to the religious dogma he represents. Consequently, his anger escalated 
to a verbal attack against the interviewer.  
None of the other elite interviewees, including prelates, exemplified such a 
degree of prejudice against same-sex sexuality and gender equality. Nonetheless, it is 
important to highlight that these kinds of opinions were common among the vast 
majority of elite interviewees, even though they did not express them with such 
intensity. All types of elite interviewees – military officials, Church representatives 
and prelates, politicians and representatives of women’s groups – expressed similar 
homophobic and androcentric perceptions of gender and sexuality to varying 
degrees. In general, representatives of women’s groups and politicians propelled the 
most subtle articulations, probably because of the former’s exposure to feminist 
discourse and the latter’s training in the art of diplomacy. As the above interview 
excerpt exemplifies,
550
 military officials expressed their views positions about 
gender and sexuality more ‘tactlessly’ than the rest of the elites, probably because 
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military ideology and culture is less sensitive (if not antithetical and hostile) towards 
non-heteronormative expressions of gender and sexuality. Similarly to politicians, 
prelates and representatives of women’s groups, they also employed conflicting 
discourses. However – probably because of their lack of exposure to alternative 
unbiased discourses and of the fact that they are not restrained either by dogma or 
the ballot – military officials felt no need to justify the discontinuity between the 
various discourses they employed: For example, although the above-mentioned 
interviewee described homosexuality as ‘socially impermissible’ behaviour, he also 
stated that being a homosexual is one’s ‘individual right/choice’.551  
Beyond the loopholes and the disruptions that the crossing and overlap of 
such conflicting and contradictory elite discourses creates, these discourses are 
important because of their impact on Cypriot LGBTQs. The next section will attempt 
to reveal and evaluate the effects of this impact. Are the LGBTQ discourses that the 
next section presents articulated because of, or despite of, predominant elite 
discourses? How does the articulation of ‘discourse within discourse’ differ from the 
articulation of ‘discourse against discourse’, when self-identification and identity 
formation are at stake? How do power/knowledge, governmentality and subjectivity 
interact when gender and sexuality are viewed from the perspective of Cypriot 
LGBTQs? 
 
Legitimization and Sanctioning Mechanisms 
The victimizing-blaming interplay is inextricably linked to attempts to 
legitimize one’s perception of the self and one’s position in the socio-political and 
national body, as well as/or to attempts to render the ‘other’s’ self-perception and 
position as problematic. The ways through which Cypriot elites legitimize 
heteronormativity as the dominant discourse and render LGBTQ subjectivities as 
inferior and/or deficient were discussed in the previous section. What is particularly 
revealing of the ‘power-knowledge-subjectivity’ triadic interplay are Cypriot 
LGBTQs’ narrations and articulations both of the ‘Self’ and of the other ‘Others’, 
with the other ‘Others’ being defined as those LGBTQ individuals who – because of 
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Nayia Kamenou  Page 212 of 343 
 
their ethnicity, excess display of masculinity or femininity or some other reason – are 
aborted from the more or less consolidated group. 
During a group interview with three Greek-Cypriot women in their mid-
twenties and early thirties who identified as lesbians, one of them stated: 
 
I never felt different [in relation to heterosexual women] because I fall in love. I am 
not [different] because, the point is, what I value most is feelings and not sexual 




This interviewee attempts to legitimize her self-perception and sexual attraction to 
other women via ‘moralizing’ them. She invokes the discourse that portrays women 
as sexually modest and emotional and she says that she partakes in it; therefore she 
presents herself as no different from women who are attracted to men. In this process 
of her subjectivity’s legitimization, she also draws upon the discourse of sanctioning 
‘otherness’: Gay men – because they are men – are primarily concerned with sexual 
satisfaction and not with feelings like ‘us’, that is ‘like women’.553 This lesbian 
interviewee defines who she is with regard to her sexual choice by drawing upon the 
difference versus sameness discourse. Namely, she defines the essence of her being 
based on the ‘fact’ that, regardless of her sexual choice, she is a ‘woman’. Since she 
sees herself as a woman who is similar to all other women, she argues that she 
prioritizes love over sex, as opposed to both homosexual and heterosexual men who 
– as she claims – are primarily interested in sex and not in romantic love.  
The difference versus sameness as well as the choice versus determinism 
debate – that is, attributing sexual preference to either choice or genes – have led to 
numerous and long theoretical discussions among gay and lesbian theorists and they 
have been employed by gay and lesbian groups in order to press for rights and 
recognition.
554
 Therefore, it is not surprising that, when asked to comment on their 
sexual choice and sexual identity, most of the Cypriot LGBTQ interviewees 
employed the language of such discourses. It is noteworthy that all the lesbian and 
bisexual female participants distinguished themselves, whom they portrayed as being 
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primarily interested in finding a loving partner, from gay men, whom they described 
as overly sexual. The answers did not differ between Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-
Cypriot women. A Greek-Cypriot gay woman in her early twenties said: 
 
Gay men are completely different from gay women, from lesbians. I think that you 
found the right person to take a stance on this [issue] ... For me, looking for and 
finding someone just for sex would be like two pieces of meat... [She pauses]. I’m 
sorry I’m expressing myself in this manner. To me this is pointless and that’s why I 
have decided that if [a person] is worth it, she will come into my life at some point. 
If the person is not worth it, you get hurt. Of course, in Cyprus, it’s very difficult to 
maintain a relationship. And I don’t mean those two-month relationships. I’m 
talking about a person one can dream with ... [Gay] men don’t have these kinds of 
issues and they don’t mind finding sex anytime and anywhere. I think that [gay] 
women meet each other through friends ... What I mean is that you cannot approach 
a [gay] woman and tell her, ‘you know what, I want to have sex with you’, or 





Additionally, all gay women, both Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot, said 
that they are very annoyed by butch lesbians since they find their ‘excessive 
masculinity’ repulsive. A Greek-Cypriot gay woman in her late twenties said: 
 
It’s a matter of aesthetics. It’s ugly for a woman to be too masculine, regardless of 
whether she is gay or not. No matter what [her sexual choice] is, she must not 
completely lose her femininity. Again, this is a matter of aesthetics, meaning that it 
looks bad when you see a girl who is macho. Even men are not like this [i.e., macho 
like butch lesbians]! ... I don’t call this [i.e., some women’s ‘excessive masculinity’] 
anything but when I see it, I will comment on it. What I mean is that when I see [a 
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   “Interview with LGBTQ Participant 212550,” 4 April 2009. The questions asked by the 
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When asked with whom she prefers spending most of her free time – that is, with 
non-heterosexual or with heterosexual people – another Greek-Cypriot gay woman 
in her mid-twenties said, ‘I don’t mind, but I do not like loud gay people. I think that 
they cross the limits’.557 When asked about her sexual identity, a fourth Greek-
Cypriot gay woman in her mid-twenties said, ‘I don’t like the word “lesbian”. It 
reminds me of butch lesbians. It’s violent, like a disease. I prefer the term “gay”’.558 
A Turkish-Cypriot woman in her mid-twenties said: 
 
I never had bad experiences and people never told me anything [with regard to my 
non-heterosexual sexuality]; just my mother. She was telling me to wear skirts and 
to walk in a girlish manner, but this was because I was always angry about this thing 
[i.e., about her telling me these things], and she didn’t want to talk about it [i.e., 
about my sexual choice], plus she knew I wasn’t going to change so, eventually, she 
stopped telling me these things. When she realized that I’m fine, she stopped 
complaining and asking me to do these things [i.e., dress and act in a more 
‘feminine’ manner].559 
 
The following excerpt from an interview with another Turkish-Cypriot gay 
woman in her early thirties is especially revealing with regard to the ways Greek-
Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot gay women perceive ‘masculine’ lesbians, the ways 
they define themselves in relation to ‘masculine’ lesbians, as well as the ways they 
are defined by others: 
 
Interviewer: How would you describe your sexual identity? 
Interviewee: I don’t like the word ‘lesbian’. We both [i.e., me and my girlfriend] 
don’t like it, I think. But yes, I’m gay. I don’t like the term ‘lesbian’ because it 
reminds me of butch lesbians, that’s why. I’m not manly. I’m not manly at all. And I 
get disturbed if anyone says that I’m a tomboy. No, I wouldn’t fit into [the concept 
of] ‘queer’ but ‘gay’, yes. I would accept the term ‘gay’. 
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Interviewer: Do you think that gender and sex do or should always correlate? 
Interviewee: I’m not that sharp [i.e., opinionated about this issue], although I am a 
bit disturbed by butch lesbians, as I have already told you. I am not really disturbed 
by feminine men, which is interesting. So, probably, this has something to do with 
me. I don’t want to see myself in that way and I am trying to... [She pauses] you 
know! If I see that [i.e., that I look ‘masculine’] in the mirror, I’ll just stop doing 
whatever it is I am doing and I’ll change that [i.e., that image of myself]. 
Interviewer: Why don’t you like butch lesbians? 
Interviewee: First of all, I know that it [i.e., ‘masculinity’] comes from their inside, 
but in the end it looks as if they are pretending. I know that they are not. [On the one 
hand] something [about butch lesbians] tells me that they are not pretending but, on 
the other hand, it doesn’t look right to me. It’s weird. But this doesn’t mean that I 
don’t find it [i.e., ‘masculinity’ in women] attractive. It’s a bit weird in this respect! 
Interviewer: Have you ever received negative or hostile treatment or made to feel 
degraded and embarrassed because of your sexual choice or sexual identity, or 
because of what others assume to be your sexual choice and identity?  
Interviewee: Yes, of course. First of all, as I told you before, the nasty joke that you 
get from childhood is that you are a tomboy. And I still do get it sometimes and my 
friends do get it sometimes and I am really disturbed by it. 
Interviewer: Who told you this? 
Interviewee: It can be your mother. Surprisingly, it happened to me once [i.e., my 
mother said I am a tomboy]. And it happened recently, three years ago. I was 
shocked. And it does come from your grandmother ... They just slap you in the face 
with it. They [i.e., family members] use expressions like that, not [people] from 
around [i.e., strangers] because, as I told you, I am not really...  [She pauses] I don’t 
know. I probably fit into the [heterosexual] stereotype, so that’s why they didn’t 




The above interview excerpts highlight three different issues. Firstly, there is 
the ‘visibility and propriety’ issue.  Both Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot gay 
and bisexual women stressed the importance of looking ‘feminine’ in order not 
disrupt the socially predominant ‘heteronormative aesthetics’. Ideas about bourgeois 
proper sexual and gender behaviour served as one of the pillars of nineteenth-century 
European nationalisms.
561
 The cultivation of such ideas about dignity and modesty, 
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   Mosse, Nationalism and Sexuality, 9, 31, 80, 64, 147, 151.  
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and especially about women’s sexual modesty, are to be found in Cyprus also. Rules 
about women’s gender performances and sexual behaviour have been inextricably 
linked to the belonging and exclusion boundaries of the national community.
562
 Even 
though Turkish-Cypriots are not restricted by religion to the degree that Greek-
Cypriots are,
563
 lesbian and bisexual female interviewees from both ethnic groups 
employed the visibility and propriety discourses. This is because ideas about 
visibility and propriety are not exclusively related to nationalism and religion; they 
are, above all, the products of patriarchy and androcentrism, the presence of which is 




Such patriarchical and androcentric notions are related to the second issue 
that these interview excerpts highlight. This is the ‘othering’ issue. Both Greek-
Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot gay and bisexual women identified as gay or as 
bisexual via distancing themselves from both gay men and from a subclass of gay 
women, that is, butch lesbians, whom they described both as repulsive and as 
attractive. Almost all lesbian and bisexual interviewees distanced themselves from 
gay men and from non-heterosexual women who – according to these interviewees – 
look ‘masculine’. Most importantly, the descriptions, expressions and reasoning they 
employed were similar in both instances of disassociation. Additionally, some of 
these interviewees reported that they dislike butch lesbians although they might be 
attracted to them. This is particularly important. It might point to the fact that these 
women were particularly eager to denounce butch lesbians because although they 
actually find the latter’s gender performances attractive, they also realize that if they 
associate with such a ‘deviant’ gender performance, they will exacerbate their own, 
already severe, social stigmatization. Consequently, in an attempt to distance 
themselves from this sub-group of ‘social outcasts’ they renounce them, even if they 
are attracted by them.  
The similarities in the views of Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot women 
are partly explained by the pervasiveness of patriarchical and androcentric 
conceptions about gender and sexuality. A presumed male superiority has allowed 
men to both ‘otherize’ women and to control their behaviour with regard to the 
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demonstration of their gender and sexuality.
565
 Nonetheless, these same norms have 
circumscribed men’s gender and sexuality also: ‘manhood’ has been associated with 
the performance of machismo and male sexuality has been associated with the 
demonstration of excessive sexual vigour.
566
 Therefore – and since identification 
occurs through the distancing from, and the naming of, internal ‘others’567 – both 
Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot lesbian and bisexual women distanced 
themselves from gay men, whom they described as unemotional and as overly 
sexually active in accordance with phallocentric discourses about ‘manhood’.  
These female interviewees employed gendered and sexist discourses with 
regard to other women also. Namely, they differentiated themselves from the other 
‘others’, that is, from butch lesbians. As it has been argued in chapter two, within the 
context of the national collectivity, women reinforce masculinist and patriarchical 
moral codes through the employment of ‘othering’, which serves as a means of 
disciplining those women who refuse to abide by the rules of the national 
collectivity.
568
 In a similar manner, lesbian and bisexual Cypriot women who see 
‘femininity’ as integral to their identities engage in the reinforcement of androcentric 
and phallocentric discourses, by ‘othering’ non-heterosexual women who do not 
abide by the rules of gender binarism.   
The third issue that these interviews highlight is the ‘family pressure issue’. It 
is noteworthy that most of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot gay and bisexual 
women listed their closest family members, rather that strangers or society in 
general, as the major source of pressure to change their gender performances. 
Moreover, they have named their mothers and grandmothers as those family 
members who pressure them the most. Again, this is explainable by the rules of the 
formation and preservation of national and ethnic collectivities, in the preservation of 
which women partake. It is older women, like mothers and grandmothers, who are 
vested with the social power to enforce masculinist and patriarchical rules of 
‘proper’ behaviour and appearance on the collectivity’s younger female members.569 
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Similarly to gay and bisexual women, gay men also brought up the issue of 
gender performance and ‘aesthetics’. A Greek-Cypriot gay man in his mid-thirties 
commented: 
 
I don’t know if ... [He pauses]. I don’t know how to say this. I am probably negating 
myself by telling you this, but I feel annoyed, I don’t feel comfortable, I don’t feel 
nice. Maybe [what I feel] has to do more with aesthetics than with [sexual and 
gender] identification. I am annoyed by ‘trans*’; I mean ‘trans*’ as an image. But I 
think that this is a matter of aesthetics. For example, if I see a man who is perfectly 
dressed up as a woman and, therefore, he can fool me [into thinking that he is a 
woman], I don’t mind at all. And it did happen to me when I was living in Greece. 
When I was working in a movie theatre, trans* girls would come with their 
boyfriends, but you couldn’t tell that they were not girls. They were really beautiful, 
so ok, no problem. It didn’t bother me. However, I also saw people who liked 




Additionally, almost all gay men said that they are very annoyed by 
effeminate gays and that they do not want to be around ‘sissies’ who make a fool out 
of themselves, thus giving all gay men a bad name.
571
 The following except from an 
interview with a Greek-Cypriot gay male couple – interviewee one was in his mid-
thirties and interviewee two was in his early twenties – is indicative of the ways 
through which Cypriot gay men rationalize their identity both as ‘gay’ and as ‘non-
feminine’, as well as of the social discrimination they face. It also demonstrates that 
age does have some impact on Cypriot gay men’s opinions about these issues: 
 
Interviewer: If you have ever experienced any negative feelings in relation to your 
gender, sexuality or sexual choice, what was the reason? 
Interviewee 1: Basically, I think I was feeling bad about my sexual orientation both 
because of others and because of myself ... And I still feel bad sometimes, because I 
am different. I am proud to be gay, but sometimes I think to myself: ‘Why couldn’t I 
be more normal?’... I make my parents sad and, later on, this might have a negative 
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impact on my son. I must not say anything about [i.e., reveal] my sexuality now. In 
public, I have to act properly. Outside of my house, I have to appear to be straight. 
Because if anything happens, my father is going to know and my ex-wife and my 
son are also going to know. 
.... 
Interviewer : What do people in your social environment  think of you with regard to 
your sexuality?  
Interviewee 1: Now you see me here, in my house, where I am relaxed and merry. In 
public I act appropriately, as I should be, and therefore nobody ever had a chance to 
say anything about me. Besides my ex-wife back then [i.e., when I told her that I am 
gay], nobody has ever said anything [to me or about me], or changed their behaviour 
towards me.  
... 
Interviewer: Do you think that gender and sex do or should always correlate? 
Interviewee 2: No, I don’t mind it [when gender and sex do not correlate]. But ok. 
It’s one thing to say that I don’t mind and it is another thing to say that I’m not 
bothered [by it]; because I might be a bit bothered. Ok, it is not the best thing ever to 
see a feminine man. I don’t like it much. I don’t mind him being like this but I don’t 
like looking at him. I believe the same thing about a woman who is masculine. I 
would go out with them, talk to them, be friends with them, but I think that the 
answer I gave to you has to do with my aesthetics; because if you want to change 
your gender, you should move into the transgender category. For example, my 
partner and I have a relationship, but this doesn’t mean that I have to dress up like a 
woman or get waxed etc. 
Interviewee 1: I don’t like extremes. I don’t like those ridiculous, lame sissies! I 
don’t like them and I don’t want them to be around me! I do not want them to come 
closer to me than one meter! This is because, if someone sees me with them, I will 
have to explain to others why the person sitting next to me is different. I don’t want 
to deal with such situations, that is, having to explain to people I know and to my 
relatives why a sissy is sitting next to me, especially since I would never date 
someone like this. Maybe it has to do with the fact that I grew up in a family [in 
which] military rules [were imposed]. But still, what bothers me is that I will have to 
explain to others. So, I prefer to keep my distances. 
... 
Interviewer : Have you ever felt that your masculinity is being questioned or 
criticized?  
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Interviewee 2: Yes, always; and mostly by my family. For example, they wouldn’t 
let me wear the cloths I wanted. My mother would say: ‘You are not going to wear 
this feminine t-shirt.’ When I was younger, my brother would also criticize me and 
say: ‘Don’t walk this way, don’t sing feminine songs.’ This created a conflict inside 
me. Because my parents would let me be friends with girls and I can remember 
many instances when I played with girls’ toys.  
... 
Interviewer: You said that, in Cyprus, there exists a lot of discrimination based on 
sexual choice and sexual identity. In your opinion, why is that? 
Interviewee 1: I believe that homosexuals themselves are not careful enough. For 
example, for me, it is unthinkable to go for a walk in the city and insult someone 
with my behaviour. I cannot do it. If someone does something that I don’t approve 
of in front of me, I won’t like it. Therefore, I don’t want to hassle other people. I 
cannot stand the provoking behaviour of some feminine gays. When I’m at home it 
is a different thing but in public, among strangers, we should show character. 
Interviewee 2: What my partner is trying to say and what I have realized during the 
six years I have been living as a gay man is that Cypriot gays get accustomed to 
their environment. Why provoke when you know what the situation in society is? 
These are defences that all gay men in Cyprus develop. Society is restrictive, it binds 
you, so protect yourself, create your shield. You do not have to show yourself, 
demonstrate who you really are. If you want to come out and scream it, do it. But 
you have to be logical and know that your act is going to have consequences. For 
example, a lot of people know about me [i.e., about my sexuality]; people that I 
don’t even know. I’ve been exposed a lot. I’ll tell you the story some other time but, 
even as far as in Crete, they know about me. But I don’t mind. I know I’ll find a job 
and I’ll succeed in life. Thank God I’m in a relationship!572 
 
It is obvious that although both men equate self-dignity with non-excessive 
femininity, the older interviewee is much more concerned about his image and the 
visibility of his sexual choice, as well as about the image and visibility of other non-
heterosexual men. As it was argued in chapter one, this raises a crucial question 
about how Cypriot LGBTQs understand ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ gender 
performances. These two gay interviewees’ comments, which are similar to those of 
the majority of LGBTQ interviewees, lead to the conclusion that, for Cypriot 
LGBTQs, performing virility – if men – and sexually reserved femininity – if 
                                                 
572
  “Interview with LGBTQ Participants 212564A and 212564B,” 15 April 2009. 
Nayia Kamenou  Page 221 of 343 
 
women – is indistinguishable from preserving self-dignity. This is because, for both 
Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot LGBTQs, dignity and propriety and their 
accompanying gender performances are inextricably linked to the belonging and 
exclusion boundaries that the national community prescribes.
573
  
 As Sedgwick argued, ‘effeminophobia’ among gay men and phobia of 
‘masculine’ lesbians among gay women are driven by the need to disrupt a long 
tradition that perceives gender and sexuality as continuous and collapsible 
categories; that is, a tradition that assumes that everyone who desires a man, whether 
male or female, is by definition feminine, and everyone who desires a woman is 
masculine.
574
 Nonetheless, such attitudes among gay people alienate the effeminate 
boy/man – and the masculine girl/woman – and contribute to the reinforcement of 
discourses that depathologize non-heterosexual sexuality via pathologizing non-
binary gender identifications.
575
 As the interview excerpts demonstrate, Sedgwick’s 
argument is particularly applicable to the case of Cypriot LGBTQs: In their attempts 
to legitimize and depathologize their non-heterosexual sexuality, Cypriot LGBTQs 
create in-group distinctions and hierarchies. In order to render their sexual choice as 
‘proper’, they pathologize non-binary gender identifications among non-heterosexual 
Cypriots, whom they regard as inferior and ‘abnormal’.576 
 
The Nationhood-Sexuality Nexus in Cypriot LGBTQ Identity 
Formation Processes 
Nationalist discourses are deeply embedded in predominant perceptions and 
understandings of gender and sexuality, while the production of the ‘Self’ as a sexual 
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and gendered being is enmeshed in processes of power. The examination of the 
nationhood-sexuality nexus through Cypriot LGBTQ individuals’ perceptions and 
discourse employment is important, since it raises a number of questions about the 
ways in which Cypriot LGBTQs understand themselves and construct their 
identities. How do predominant discourses about nationhood affect Greek-Cypriot 
and Turkish-Cypriot LGBTQs’ identity formation? In the case of Cypriot LGBTQs, 
do alternative discourses about gender and sexuality coexist, or do they conflict with 
ideas about national, ethnic and/or religious exclusivity? What are the effects of such 
coexistence and/or conflict? The interviews with Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot 
LGBTQ participants demonstrate the particularity of the ways in which they form, 
negotiate and reconstruct their gender, sexual and national identities. 
During a group interview with three self-identified lesbian Greek-Cypriots, 
two of them in their mid-twenties and one of them in her early thirties,
577
 the 
following debate arose: 
 
Interviewer: What do you know about the intimate relationships between non-
heterosexual Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots? What is your opinion about these 
relationships? 
Interviewee 1: The ethnic element plays out a lot [with regard to Greek-Cypriot and 
Turkish-Cypriot same-sex relationships]. You cannot have sex with the enemy. It’s 
like a national betrayal. 
Interviewee 2: Well, I don’t know... [She pauses]. I’m open-minded towards these 
types of relationships. 
Interviewee 3: What? Are you for real? I’m totally against them! This has to do with 
our nationality, not with whether one is gay or not. I feel that these people [i.e., the 
Turkish-Cypriots] have mistreated me. They are guilty for what happened in 1974. 
Interviewee 2: You [to interviewee 1] were in a relationship with a Turkish-Cypriot 
woman for quite a long time, though. 
Interviewee 1: Well... [She pauses]. She was different. 
Interviewee 3: Yes, she was not like the rest of them. 
Interviewer: In which sense? [Silence] 
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Interviewee 1: I consider my national and ethnic identity to be Greek. I feel this way 
partially because of what happened with the Turks. Being Greek has to do with 
values and with our religion.  
Interviewee 2: Well, I feel anything but Greek! Cypriot, yes. But this is not the same 
as Greek. 
Interviewee 3: My national and ethnic identity is Greek. Regardless of its numerous 
occupiers, Cyprus has always been and remains Greek. We have the Greek culture 
and our religion, and these have never changed. 
 
Whether or not they consciously attempt to create the ‘Self’ through a radical 
political process that directly challenges predominant prescriptions of national, 
gender and sexuality identity, subjects remain rooted – though not in fixed positions 
– within the ‘subjectivity-power-knowledge’ matrix, which characterizes their 
historically specific social body. This restricted, yet not defined, subject positionality 
sometimes leads to the production of ‘contradictory subjectivity’.580 These 
interviewees’ perceptions about nationalism and religion on the one hand, and the 
positive view of one of the interviewees’ Turkish-Cypriot ex-girlfriend on the other 
hand, position interviewee one and interviewee three in two different and 
contradicting ways in relation to discourse. As a result of the effects of nationalist 
rhetoric on them, these two women reject the idea of being emotionally and sexually 
involved with the ‘enemy’, that is, with Turkish-Cypriot women. However, their 
positive view of the Turkish-Cypriot ex-girlfriend disrupts the effects of nationalist 
rhetoric. In their attempts to resolve the contradiction they argue that ‘she was 
different from the others’, though they cannot offer any explanation as to how she 
was ‘different’ for other Turkish-Cypriot and, therefore, ‘better’.  
Interviewee two avoids contradiction between the discourses that she 
employs to describe herself by adopting a civic – rather than an ethnic – 
understanding of national identity. Being ‘Cypriot’ – which she sees as something 
that has nothing to do with being ‘Greek’ – spares her from the trouble of having to 
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articulate criteria for labelling Turkish-Cypriots as ‘good’ or ‘bad’. Consequently, 
she also avoids being classified as ‘unpatriotic’ based on her views since, as a 
‘Cypriot’, she does not necessarily have to evaluate Turkish-Cypriots based on 
elements such as religion, culture or ethnicity. 
 Nevertheless, there were a number of interviewees who defined themselves, 
both as Greek-Cypriot and as gay, by completely distancing themselves from, and 
even positioning themselves against, the Turkish-Cypriot ethnic ‘other’. The 
following except from an interview with the aforementioned Greek-Cypriot gay male 
couple is revealing: 
 
Interviewer: What do you know and what do you think about the intimate 
relationships between non-heterosexual Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots?  
... 
Interviewee 2: A guy I know liked this Turkish-Cypriot man and everyone would 
tell him: ‘With a Turkish-Cypriot? Why? Aren’t there any [Greek] Cypriots?’ You 
know, we left aside the fact that he is gay and now the issue is: ‘With a Turkish-
Cypriot?’ [For some people] having sex with a Turkish-Cypriot is ok, but not a 
relationship; whereas with a British [man] or a German [man], or whatever, there is 
no problem. 
Interviewee1: I don’t mind someone having sex with a Turkish-Cypriot, but I don’t 
like the relationships [between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots]. I wouldn’t do 
it. What? Would I pick up a Turkish-Cypriot? He is Turkish-Cypriot! Here is why I 
hold this belief: He is Turkish! 
Interviewee 2: Why not? I met Turkish-Cypriots who are very clever people and to 
them, all these religion and culture issues are complete nonsense. 
Interviewee 1: Would you have sex with a Turkish-Cypriot? [Surprised] 
Interviewee 2: Would you have sex with a British? 
Interviewee 1: Yes! Why not? 
Interviewee 2: Why not with a Turkish-Cypriot? 
Interviewee 1: The British is European! 
Interviewee 2: So what? A Turkish-Cypriot is European too! He lives in the other 
half of Cyprus, which is Europe! 
Interviewee 1: If there is a solution [to the Cyprus problem] and the rest of Cyprus 
becomes part of Europe, I’ll think about it! 
Interviewee 2: Oh! So currently a Turkish-Cypriot is worthless and tomorrow, when 
there will be a solution, he won’t be worthless! 
Nayia Kamenou  Page 225 of 343 
 
Interviewee 1: No! He will still be worthless! I had sex with Turkish-Cypriots many 
times. But just sex! To make Cyprus and Greece proud and fuck the Turk is ok! But 
this is where you draw the line! No relationship! 
… 
Interviewer: How would you describe your ethnicity and national identity? 
... 
Interviewee 1: I don’t hate Turks because I feel I am Greek. But they came and took 
our houses and properties, so why should we like them? I don’t get it! My family 
had so much property and now I cannot call my family’s property and land my own, 
because they remembered to come from Turkey and take it! 
Interviewee 2: Yes, but I know Turkish-Cypriots who are from Larnaca
581
 ... 
[Interrupted by interviewee 1] 
Interviewee 1: There are no Turkish-Cypriots anymore! With all those settlers they 
[i.e., Turkey] brought [to the island], what has been left of Turkish-Cypriots? 
Interviewee 2: There are! 
Interviewee 1: Yeah, right! When they kick out the settlers, let them find the 
Turkish-Cypriots and I will tell them [i.e., the Turkish-Cypriots] ‘Hello my 
friends!’582 
 
The analogy between ‘inter-ethnic’ sexual intercourse dynamics and the 1974 
events was repeated by numerous Greek-Cypriot male gay interviewees. A Greek-
Cypriot gay man in his early thirties reported:  
 
When some [Greek-Cypriot gay men] are having sex with a Turkish-Cypriot, 
especially if the Greek-Cypriot is assuming the passive role, it’s sort of... [He 
pauses]. Do you know what I mean? Sex role dynamics alternate in the case of men. 
It’s not like ‘man-woman’. A man-man [sexual relationship] is very different. A 
Turkish-Cypriot once told a friend of mine: ‘I fucked you like you fucked us in 
1974.’... If I was to be told this, and I am not a racist ... [He pauses]. But hey! ... It’s 
not you [i.e., Turkish-Cypriots] who won against us, it was Turkey... I heard of 
many [Greek-Cypriots] who date Turkish-Cypriots. Because there is anonymity, 
there is no reason it should stop happening. Also, because of what gay Greek-
Cypriots go through within Cypriot society, they hate their country. Thus, they do 
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not care having sex with Turkish-Cypriots ... Personally, I am a bit more protective 
towards my country. Just because Cyprus has hurt them, they don’t care at all. An 
article was written somewhere about this, in a [Greek-Cypriot] online gay magazine 





The usage of gender and sexual metaphors to describe and negotiate ethno-
national conflict is very common. For example, Baruh and Popescu studied the 
major metaphors that are used to organize nationalistic discourse about Cyprus in 
two online forums for Turkish university students. They found that the employment 
of gender and sexual metaphors is very frequent.
584
 Such metaphors are reminiscent 
of the language employed in the nationalist discourses that were discussed in 
chapters one and two, which portray countries as maidens who are in need of 
protection against the enemy’s (sexual) aggressiveness.585 However, in these forums, 
the metaphor was reversed: Sexual aggressiveness was not employed to describe 
national threat; rather, it was referred to as a weapon against the enemy ‘other’ and 
as a means for getting (ethno-national) revenge against past injustices. This is 
because ‘the taboo of homosexuality confirms male privilege and, through 
reassurance, generates fresh rigour, pleasure, and confidence in embodying a male, 
heterosexual ... national identity’, as Karayanni pointedly phrased it.586  
 
The ‘Western/European’ Binary Discourse Negotiation and Identity 
versus Identification 
What is also worth being highlighted is the employment of discourses about 
‘Europe/the West versus the Rest’ by a number of Greek-Cypriot and, to a lesser 
degree, Turkish-Cypriot LGBTQ interviewees. Although as formerly colonial 
subjects Cypriots have been rendered as inferior when compared to their Western, 
European colonizers, it seems that some of them participate in the perpetuation of 
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binary discourses that hierarchically organize the world into a ‘civilized’ 
‘Western/European’ centre and an ‘less civilized’ periphery. This tendency is all the 
more striking since it is to be found among some of the other ‘Others’, namely  
among ‘non-Western/European’ non-heterosexual individuals. In interviews with 
them, while trying to define themselves as non-heterosexual and to position 
themselves within the local matrices of power, some Greek-Cypriot LGBTQs 
replicated the ‘European versus Other’ discursive binarism. That is, the distinguished 
between Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot LGBTQs and described the former as 
‘European’ and ‘modern’ and the latter as ‘non-European’ and ‘backward’.  
The relevant statements by a gay Greek-Cypriot man who was quoted above 
are illustrative of the way in which Greek-Cypriot non-heterosexuals – mostly men –
define themselves both as non-heterosexual and as superior to the other ‘other’, that 
is, the Turkish-Cypriot non-heterosexual individual.
587
 This interviewee attempts to 
define himself as a Greek-Cypriot, as a ‘European’ and as a gay man through a triple 
act: Firstly, he asserts his Greek national identity by ‘othering’ Turkish-Cypriots; 
secondly, he defines ‘Europeans’ as superior to ‘non-European/non-Western’ 
‘others’; and thirdly, he claims that a Greek-Cypriot, European gay man – like 
himself – cannot and must not be romantically engaged with the ‘enemy’, since such 
an act would be diminishing both for him as an individual and for his country which, 
as he reasons, has suffered great pains because of the ‘enemy’.  
Such kind of reasoning demonstrates that although the argument that 
discourses of ‘Europe’ oppose nationalist rhetoric was developed in previous 
chapters of this thesis, discourses about Europe and about Cyprus’s admission into 
the EU do not necessarily have solely a weakening impact on nationalistic 
predominant discourses. Namely, although Europeanization has widened the space 
and offered a language for the articulation of alternative identity discourses, it has 
not yet fully obliterated nationalist rhetoric and its impact on Cypriots’ 
understandings of the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’. As the discussion of the Modinos and 
Marangos cases’ legal, social and political effects demonstrated, when appropriated 
by oppressed groups and individuals, European mechanisms and institutions can help 
bring about change. However, as the interviews with the above-mentioned and other 
Greek-Cypriot LGBTQ interviewees demonstrated, the fact that the non-occupied, 
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primarily Greek-Cypriot inhabited part of the RoC was admitted to the EU while the 
occupied, primarily Turkish-Cypriot part was excluded supplied already existing 
ideas about ethnic superiority with new rigor and impetus. This is a peril that needs 
to be kept in mind when propelling arguments about ‘Europe’s’ impact on 
nationhood and national identities.  
In seeking to narrate and construct themselves, subjects need to have recourse 
to a language. Although the Greek-Cypriot and the Turkish-Cypriot LGBTQ 
interviewees have not fully escaped the confines of local predominant discourses that 
pertain to nationhood, gender and sexuality, almost all of them described the effects 
of Europeanization as positive. However, their comments demonstrate that the 
‘European’ and ‘human rights’ discourse have not affected people and social values 
and views in the same ways or to the same degree that they have affected politicians’ 
attitudes and local institutional arrangements. Commenting on the employment and 
utilization of the ‘European’ and ‘human rights’ discourse by the Turkish-Cypriot 
organization Initiative Against Homophobia, one of its founding members – a gay 
activist man in his mid-thirties – reported: 
 
What we are trying to explain to the politicians was: ‘Ok, you always mention that 
you are more European than the Greek-Cypriot politicians. If you take steps like 
that, if you look at the law which was [articulated] three times at the ECtHR in the 
Norris, in the Dudgeon and in the Modinos cases, [you will realize that] the law we 
currently have [in the ‘TRNC’] was condemned three times [by the ECtHR].’588 
There is no other way to show how ridiculous and meaningless this law is. ‘Europe’ 
is a good pressure tool. The other thing we are trying to explain to them is this: ‘If 
you let the Initiative [help you] make the [legal] amendments before going to Court 
[i.e., before some Turkish-Cypriot LGBTQ applicant resorts to the ECtHR], this will 
help you prove what you are saying to others, to the EU. You are saying about 
yourselves that you are more ‘European’ [than Greek-Cypriot] but you have to prove 
how [this is the case], in a way that makes sense.’589  
 
According to the Turkish-Cypriot activist, the Initiative Against Homophobia 
bases its demands for LGBTQ equality on the ‘European’ and ‘human rights’ 
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discourse. Namely, ‘Europe’ has provided Turkish-Cypriot LGBTQs with a 
language and with the means to organize and mobilize. Nonetheless, regardless of 
the fact that in its official rhetoric the Turkish-Cypriot political leadership attempts 
to establish itself and the ‘TRNC’ as ‘more European’ than the Greek-Cypriots and 
the RoC, its acts do not match its discourse. According to the Initiative 
spokesperson, the Turkish-Cypriot political elite does not move beyond its official 
rhetoric towards the amendment of the laws that pertain to the criminalization of 
homosexuality, in order to prove that it is indeed as ‘Europe-friendly’ as it is 
claiming to be. 
 
A Greek-Cypriot gay activist man in his early thirties stated: 
 
People [in Cyprus] grew up learning how important it is to project a ‘good face’ to 
the outside world. [Would you like to know] another reason that, in Cyprus, there 
are various forms of discrimination against LGBTQ people? It [i.e., the existence of 
discrimination] is also related to the fact that [geographically] we are close to 
Muslim, Asian and African countries so, whether we like it or not, we are affected 
[by their socio-cultural trends]. These are close-minded societies and because we are 
affected by them, we do not broaden our horizons ... I [also] find political leadership 
[in Cyprus] to be extremely problematic: I believe that they [i.e., Cypriot politicians] 
are procrastinating [with regard to addressing LGBTQ issues] and all their acts are 
directed towards winning a seat [in parliament]. Nobody is really trying to change 





Similarly to the Initiative representative, this Greek-Cypriot LGBTQ activist accuses 
the Greek-Cypriot political leadership of not practicing what it is preaching. He 
argues that the Greek-Cypriot political elite employs the ‘Europe’ discourse only as a 
façade to its true aim, which is to get reelected. According to this interviewee, 
‘Europe’ is opportunistically employed by the Cypriot elites in order to firstly, assure 
reelection and secondly, ‘to project a “good face” to the outside world’.591 
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However, even those participants who described the ‘European’ and 
‘Western’ discourse as somewhat conducive towards changing local social attitudes 
and, consequently, achieving LGBTQ equality, were quick to point to its limitations 
and drawbacks. A male gay Greek-Cypriot interviewee in his early thirties reported: 
 
[Cypriot] people haven’t become gay all of a sudden. It’s just that, nowadays, they 
allow themselves to become visible. Is this because they feel a bit more 
comfortable? Is it because they feel more suppressed? Is it because they cannot be 
suppressed anymore? I am not sure why. Maybe it has to do with the fact that 
Cyprus has become a member of the EU. During the past fifteen-twenty years, we 
started coming closer to Europe. More and more young people would go [to study] 
in the United Kingdom and in the United States – especially in these two countries. 
When you come back and you are and feel alive, you go like: ‘Nice. I cannot 
continue being the way I was before I left [Cyprus].’ So, the more young people go 
abroad to study, the more we [i.e., Cypriots] become open-minded; because they 
[i.e., the young people] came out of the box. But whoever does not come out of the 
box remains the same. Unfortunately, our parents are here, in this box. Now, you 
might think I am telling you that there has been a change. Well, yes, but only among 




Beyond the question, which is prevalent in political science debates, of 
whether or not Europeanization and a European identity could affect values and 
ideologies at the local level, Cypriot LBGTQs’ stance towards ‘Europe’ and the 
‘West’ also raises the question of whether the ‘subaltern’ can really ‘speak’. 
According to Spivak, the tendency to conserve the subject of the West, or West as 
the subject in Western literature and discourses, results in the epistemic violence of 
constituting the colonial – and the postcolonial – subject as the ‘Other’.593  Spivak is 
critical of poststructural theory since, as she argues, philosophers and theorists like 
Foucault and Deleuze are blind towards the ‘Other’ as subject. Namely, their oeuvre 
is situated in, and addresses a specific socio-cultural and historical terrain, from 
which the ‘true’ subaltern is excluded. According to Spivak: 
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For the “true” subaltern group, whose identity is its difference, there is no 
unrepresentable subaltern subject that can know and speak itself; the intellectual’s 
solution is not to abstain from representation ... How can we touch the 
consciousness of people, even as we investigate their politics? With what voice-
consciousness can the subaltern speak? ... The planned discontinuity of imperialism 
rigorously distinguishes this project, however old-fashioned its articulation ... All 





As Spivak argues, this tendency is complicit in a hidden essentialist agenda: 
The ‘West’ is produced by the imperialist project – though Foucault and other 
poststructuralists remain ignorant towards this fact – and this constitutes a reflection 
of the European problem of ethnocentrism, in which the ‘subaltern’ cannot speak. 595  
Therefore, beyond addressing the question of whether the language and discourses of 
‘Europe’ and of the ‘West’ are instrumental towards the emancipation of the ‘non-
Western/non-European’ ‘Other’, or whether their employment by ‘non-Western’ 
subjects, such as Cypriot LGBTQs, relocates the ‘West/European versus the 
Rest/Periphery’ power dynamics within the periphery itself – and consequently 
creates divisions among LGBTQ ‘non-Western/European’ subjects – what needs to 
be considered is whether the ‘true subaltern’ could be represented and spoken about 
and whether it could represent and speak itself.  
If one accepts Spivak’s argument – and it is difficult not to, since it 
accurately describes subject formation and representation within discourse – then, 
with regard to sexual subjectivity,  the ‘true subaltern’ has never existed in Cyprus. 
In Cyprus, modalities of sexuality were first spoken about, represented, classified, 
sanctioned and delegitimized through ‘Western/European’ colonial discourses. 
Nowadays, because of the island’s Europeanization, sexual ‘others’ assume 
‘Western/European’ sexual identities in order to speak and describe themselves. In 
this way, Cypriot LGBTQs are actively engaging with those discourses that have 
initially ‘otherized’ them: Cypriot LGBTQs constitute themselves as LGBTQ by 
adopting the ‘Western/European’ sexual identity discourse, and via differentiating 
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themselves from other sexual ‘others’, that is, the ‘subaltern’, ethnically and 
culturally inferior, non-European sexual ‘others’.  
Nonetheless, this is not necessarily bad for Cypriot LGBTQs. Discourse 
Eurocentrism and the effects of colonialism have unquestionably muted alternative 
voices and understandings.
596
 Even if subjectivity cannot exist outside 
(‘Western/European’/external) discourse, subjects are not passively and pervasively 
constituted by discourse. The fact that subjectivity is necessarily positioned within 
discourse does not mean that subjects lack agency because subjects are both products 
of power and discourse and producers of themselves.
597
 Consequently, although 
Cypriot LGBTQ subjects ‘provide the bodies on and through which discourse may 
act ... [they also] form some of the conditions for knowledge’.598 That is to say, 
although processes of identification and sexual identity formation are embedded in 
‘Western’ and ‘European’ discourses, their outcome is not predetermined or 
unavoidable. 
The issue of whether the postcolonial ‘non-Western’ subject can speak and 
narrate itself is closely linked to questions about identity formation, identification 
articulation and political organization and mobilization. As Epstein explains, the 
notions and concepts around which identities crystallize are determinative of the 
nature that LGBTQ politics will have, as well as of their appeal and success.
599
 
Kitzinger argues that gay affirmative research that constructs lesbianism in liberal 
humanistic terms as a form of self-actualization is non-liberating. Additionally, it 
reinforces an oppressive and depoliticized construction of the lesbian, while it 
undermines radical feminist theories of lesbianism. Therefore, it allows male 
supremacy to thrive, while it ignores institutionalized oppression.
600
 Consequently, 
although such rights and identity-based concessions have delivered some positive 
benefits to gay and lesbian people, the price paid for them is denying political 
meaning to lesbianism and relocating it to the sphere of the ‘private’ and 
‘personal’.601 
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Based on arguments like Kitzinger’s – that is, that liberal humanist 
approaches to sexuality subjectivities depoliticize them – and on arguments like 
Spivak’s – that is, that Western discourses ignore and do not allow the ‘subaltern’ to 
speak– what does the future hold for Cypriot LGBTQs? 
When asked to give their opinions about sexual identities and about the 
prospect of LGBTQ organization and political mobilization, the majority of the 
LGBTQ interviewees – both male and female, Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot – 
were reluctant to categorize themselves.
602
 They said that they do not like labels and 
categories. When I asked them to choose a label from the vocabulary available to 
them, most of them adopted the ‘Western-imported’ ‘gay’ label. They reported that 
they prefer the English term ‘gay’ over the Greek terms 
‘ομοφυλόφιλος/ομοφυλόφιλη’ (‘homosexual’) and ‘λεσβία’ (‘lesbian’). When asked 
why they differentiate between the Greek and English terms, they explained that the 
Greek terms carry a lot of stigma while the English, newer – to them – term, seems 
to be less polluted by derogatory innuendos.  
A Greek-Cypriot gay male interviewee in his early thirties reported: ‘You are 
asking me to tell you how I identify with regard to my sexuality. Human being. 
That’s it. I am a human being.’603 A Turkish-Cypriot female interviewee in her mid-
twenties, said: ‘I am a woman who likes everybody!’ 604 Additionally, in their 
majority LGBTQ interviewees argued that although these 
labels/identities/identifications could be and are being used to premise political 
mobilization and activism, they would never mobilize. A Greek-Cypriot gay male 
interviewee in his mid-thirties reported: 
 
In Cyprus, they [i.e., LGBTQ people] cannot do something like this [i.e., engage in 
political mobilization]. There are only five or six pitiable of us [i.e., LGBTQ 
people]. If I appear on television to talk about rights, one hundred people from all 
over the island are going call my father and tell him ‘Your son was on television!’ 
How many are we? There are millions [of LGBTQ people] in the US and in Europe. 
But even if I lived there [i.e., in the US or in Europe] and appeared on television, 
who would care to watch me? No! Of course I wouldn’t feel comfortable being part 
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of such a group [i.e., LGBTQ group] ... There is no way I would appear on 
television, and hold flags, and cry, and write slogans on my body ... The 
decriminalization [of homosexuality] did not affect me in any way; because when 
you go out somewhere and people realize that you are gay, they get annoyed. So, 





 As Judith Butler has phrased it: ‘When the “I” seeks to give an account of 
itself, it can start with itself, but it will find that this self is already implicated in a 
social temporality that exceeds its own capacities for narration.’606 So how could the 
Cypriot LGBTQ subject speak itself? Which language could render its subjectivity – 
with all its traditional, postcolonial, European and post-European complexities – 
legible? How could Cypriot LGBTQs come to recognize and identify the discursive 
processes that are involved in their alienation and consequently challenge them? 
How could the subject produce itself?  
 Although the subject cannot escape from the constraints of 
‘governmentality’, it does partake in the production of knowledge that premises 
‘governmentality’. Another way to phrase this is that although the ‘I’ is subjected to 
discourse, its agency is not annihilated and its positionality is not predetermined, 
since the ‘I’  is not bound to specific, established forms of subject formation; only to 
the sociality of any of a number of possible relations. This offers an occasion for 
self-transformation.
607
 In the case of Cypriot LGBTQs, this occasion of linguistic 
and social transformation is created by the disruption and by the almost parallel 
crossing of locally predominant discourses, which pertain to gender and sexuality, 
and of the ‘imported/European/Western’ human rights discourses. Truly, the former 
negate Cypriot LGBTQ subjectivities, while the latter do not pay sufficient attention 
to their specificities. Nevertheless, the space between these two sets of discourses 
constitutes an open space for LGBTQ subjects, which they could occupy and adjust 
to their needs by prioritizing some and abandoning some other elements of these 
‘local’ and ‘external/imported’ discourses. 
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Two broad meanings can be distinguished in Foucault’s ‘governmentality’. 
In its first sense, ‘governmentality’ refers to the different ways we think about 
governing. This way of thinking is collective and relatively taken for granted: The 
way we think about authority draws upon forms of knowledge that are part of our 
social and cultural product. In its second sense – and this second sense constitutes a 
historically specific version of the first sense – ‘governmentality’ denotes the 
emergence of new forms of thinking about power and of new forms of exercising 
power in certain societal contexts. This emergence is characterized by forms of 
knowledge and techniques/technologies of the human and social sciences, which 
become integral to the art of government of the state as a distinct activity.
608
  
Thus, for Foucault, the state is the result of practices of government and not 
the cause of practices of government, as theories of the state usually maintain. 
‘Governmentality’ is ‘the conduct of conduct’.609 As such, it is applicable both to 
macro-social processes – i.e., to the processes that pertain to the state – and to micro-
social processes – i.e., the processes that pertain to the individual. ‘Governmentality’ 
as a kind of meta-analysis is a tool of examining the objects of political science – 
namely the state, individuals and their formations – rather than a tool for making 
political science.
610
 ‘Governmentality’ is a kind of power, while power is to be 
understood as never merely repressive but rather as productive and as inextricably 
linked to resistance; ‘where there is power there is resistance’.611 Power is not 
possessed, but rather practiced and exercised.
612
  Knowledge goes hand in hand with 
power, since ‘knowledge is being used to select some techniques of [power] over 
others and to implement the chosen techniques in the attempts to impose control or 
management on the objects concerned’.613 Namely, power and knowledge are not the 
same. Rather, knowledge supports power in action, i.e., in governance.
614
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Admittedly, Foucault’s subject is inextricably linked to power’s productivity. 
The subject is a product rather than a producer. Nonetheless, Foucault does not reject 
the subject’s ability for agency. On the contrary, he sees subjects as having an active 
role in producing themselves as subjects subjected to power. It should also be 
stressed that, conversely to the way that it is usually being employed, Foucault’s 
‘subjectivity’ does not stand for the ‘individual’, for the rational being which is the 
origin of human action. Foucault’s subject is historically contingent. And it is this 
subject that becomes the object of technologies and techniques of the self. The 
subject is produced through discourse and its actions are situated within discourse.  
Therefore, since power is involved in subjectivity via discourse, subjects 
affect and form some of the conditions of knowledge.
615
 This reasoning is 
particularly important for the purposes of this study. What this means is that human 
action is not completely externally defined. Rather, it is always positional and 
context-specific. Additionally – and this is also pertinent to the present analysis – the 
different subject positions within discourse could be contradictory and irrational.
616
 
Based on these two important aspects of the ‘power-knowledge-subjectivity’ triad – 
namely, that subjects partake into knowledge and that it is possible for the subject to 
be differentially positioned in discourse in ways that are contradictory and irrational 
– I argue that, in its second sense, ‘governmentality’ is penetrable. Although subjects 
might lack a view and understanding of the operations of ‘governmentality’ in its 
first sense, they could recognize and identify the discursive processes involved in the 
historically specific version of ‘governmentality’ and challenge them. In this manner, 
they will affect some degree of change on the collective unity of government 
mentality which is not readily accessible or examined by those who reside in it, that 
is, by subjects. 
The interview excerpts discussed in this chapter attest to this argument. Elite 
interviewees attempted to justify their negative view of non-heteronormative gender 
and sexuality by employing numerous discourses that, at times, conflicted. These 
discourses were classified under three broader categories of positions/approaches: 
Through the articulation of outrightly homophobic claims, elite interviewees 
described non-heteronormative gender and sexuality as a moral flaw and as a self-
inflicted disease; as a bad choice that renders the non-heterosexual individual as a 
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criminal and a moral villain. Through the employment of the homophobia-couched-
as-pity language, these interviewees interpreted non-heteronormative gender and 
sexuality as an ‘inherited’ flaw or disease, with which non-heterosexual persons are 
cursed. Under such interpretation, the LGBTQ individual merits society’s pity and 
help. However, this pity for the LGBTQ individual’s condition is based on a set of 
conditions that the LGBTQ individual needs to meet. Namely, according to the third 
approach, what I call qualified homophobia, the heterocentric society’s sympathy 
stops where LGBTQ claims begin.  
On a first reading, this last approach might lead to the conclusion that the 
future of Cypriot LGBTQs seems to be gloomy. However, a closer look at this elite-
assumed position reveals that perceptions and norms about gender and sexuality are 
actually flexible and, consequently, changeable. For example, a Greek-Cypriot 
military official reported that although he would not mind same-sex marriages, he 
disapproves of same-sex couples raising children.
617
 This is because his 
rationalization of non-heteronormative gender and sexuality is deeply embedded in 
gender binarism. However, this interviewee’s stance towards LGBTQ sexuality 
constitutes a useful demonstration of the workings of the subjectivity-discourse-
governmentality-power/knowledge relationship and of the fact that the effects of 
these workings are not predetermined. Namely, if gender binarism is challenged – 
that is, if there is a change in the predominant knowledge and discourses about 
sexuality – there will be a change in subjectivity formation – that is, in the way that 
LGBTQ individuals are perceived by their others – and, consequently, a widening of 
the possibility and modes of exercising agency.  
The examination of Cypriot LGBTQs ideas about gender and sexuality led to 
similar conclusions. The interview excerpts discussed in this chapter show that 
LGBTQ Cypriots are enmeshed in, and are limited by heterocentric, patriarchical 
and androcentric binarisms. For example, lesbian and bisexual women were eager to 
distance themselves from ‘sex-addicted’ gay men and ‘masculine’ lesbians, while 
gay men expressed an intense dislike towards ‘effeminate’ gays. Moreover, some of 
the LGBTQ interviewees – Greek-Cypriots mostly – employed a number of in-group 
distinctions and categorizations, which they premised on ethnicity and national 
identity discourses. Some Greek-Cypriot LGBTQs defined themselves as 
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‘European’, via casting Turkish-Cypriot LGBTQs as ‘non-European’ and, therefore, 
‘inferior’.  
It is not only the impact of nationalistic discourses that such attitudes 
demonstrate; they also attest to a replication of the dynamics of colonialist, 
Eurocentric and Western-centric discourses at the local level. Yet, even such 
approaches might prove promising towards the destabilization of the Cypriot 
discursive status quo. The importance of nationalism lies both in its inherent 
contradictions and in its ability to reinvent itself.
618
 In a similar manner, external, 
supranational, ‘European’ discourses have a double potential impact at the national 
level. This chapter demonstrated that ‘Europe’ with its language, mechanisms and 
institutions can function as a vital pressure tool in the hands of Cypriot LGBTQs, if 
they seek recognition and rights from their political elite. Furthermore – as the next 
chapter will demonstrate – it could also lead to the formation of less nationalistic and 
ethnicity-based LGBTQ individual and group identifications and identities, without 
annihilating local understandings and modalities of non-heteronormative gender and 
sexuality.  
My research results and analysis point to the fact that the lack of political 
awareness among Cypriot LGBTQs is not what is keeping them subordinated. They 
are very much aware that one must take responsibility for inventing and producing 
one’s own self as Foucault urges,619 even though their exposure to, or agreement 
with, poststructuralist, queer, identity and rights approaches to sexuality and gender 
is limited, or even inexistent. The issue that needs to be addressed both by Cypriot 
LGBTQs themselves and by scholarly analyses on the topic of constituting the ‘Self’ 
amidst numerous contradicting or parallel discourses is how to engage with, and 
stand in relation to, these discourses; how to invoke them in ways that expand the 
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The previous chapter concluded that although Cypriot LGBTQs are not 
necessarily familiar with, or supportive of poststructuralist and queer approaches to 
gender and sexuality, they are aware that one could and should take responsibility for 
inventing and producing one’s own self, as Foucault urges.620 Nonetheless, they are 
reluctant to do so in a way that openly challenges the sexual status quo. This chapter 
will examine this seeming inconsistency, by analyzing two sets of issues. Firstly, it 
will discern the reasons for Cypriot LGBTQs’ reluctance to challenge locally 
predominant discourses of sexuality through political action. Secondly, it will 
evaluate the prospect, as well as the possible ways, of invoking the existent 
numerous contradicting or parallel discourses of sexuality, in order to expand the 
plane of thinkable and recognizable sexual subjectivities in Cyprus.  
The questions and problems that arise from these two broader issues, and 
which this chapter will address, are numerous. The first concerns the ways in which 
same-sex desires relate to other elements/parameters which inform one’s subjectivity 
and understanding of the self, one of them being national identity. The second 
question that needs to be addressed is how – if at all –local same-sex desires are 
influenced by the types of articulation, demonstration and politicization of same-sex 
desires in other locales, like Western Europe and the US. Therefore, the chapter will 
evaluate the relationship between global/transnational ideas and local understandings 
that pertain to sexual identity, politics and citizenship. Namely, it will attempt to 
discern what happens when local sexual subjectivities are faced with, and challenged 
by external, and specifically by ‘European’ and/or ‘Western’ notions of LGBTQ 
identities, politics and citizenship. To phrase it otherwise, it will examine how the 
vocabulary of ‘European’/ ‘Western’ discourses of sexuality is appropriated by 
Cypriot LGBTQs, as well as what the promises and/or perils of such appropriation 
are. 
The examination of intersections and overlaps of ‘colonial’ and 
‘Eurocentric/Western-centric’ discourses in ‘postcolonial’ settings, like Cyprus, 
elucidates how and why local and global/transnational sexual discourses conflict, 
how and why they are negotiated, as well as how, why and in which ways they 
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become fused. Ultimately, such discursive overlaps at the local level complicate and 
help expand conceptualizations about, and interlinks between power, gender and 
sexuality. Therefore, this chapter will examine the effects of ‘postcolonial’ notions 
of ‘modernity’ on local social organization and identities. It will question whether 
‘postmodernity’ has any currency beyond destabilizing cultural understandings; that 
is, if beyond provocatively questioning ethnographic, historical and theoretical 
accounts of contemporary sexualities, ‘postmodernity’ also emasculates binary 
distinctions and informs/renders feasible any kind of LGBTQ political action. 
The chapter’s first section will focus on the recently emerging Cypriot 
LGBTQ politics. It will describe the formation, structure, operations and strategies of 
the three organizations: the Greek-Cypriot group Cypriot Gay Liberation Movement 
(Απελευθερωτικό Κίνημα Ομοφυλοφίλων Κύπρου) and the Turkish-Cypriot group 
Initiative Against Homophobia, while it will focus primarily on the newly 
established Greek-Cypriot organization Accept-LGBT. It will describe and analyze 
these groups’ engagement with state structures, as well as political and state elites’ 
stance towards these groups. By focusing on some suggestive instances in LGBTQ 
politics and activism in the US,
621
 this section will also engage with ‘assimilationist’ 
and ‘radical’ approaches to sexual equality, and it will evaluate their practicability 
and applicability in ‘non-Western’ contexts, like Cyprus. It will debate whether 
political mobilization that pertains to same-sex sexual desire could benefit from 
either of the two standpoints, from a melange of the two or from a third position that 
emanates from the confrontation.  
The second section of this chapter will attempt to provide an evaluation of 
the up-to-now impact of the newly-established Accept-LGBT on the political, social 
and cultural context within which this group operates. Through a suggestive, as 
opposed to an exhaustive, analysis, this section will try to discern those ways of 
action that seem to work best for sexually dissident groups that aim to communicate 
their aims and objectives to unreceptive audiences. Specifically about Cyprus – yet 
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Nayia Kamenou  Page 242 of 343 
 
in a way that captures issues of sexual equality, citizenship and mobilization in 
comparable locales – this section will examine whether ‘Europeanization’ and 
‘Europe’ constitute a new, distinctive way of negotiating sexuality claims.  
 
Intersections of ‘Westernization’, ‘Eurocentrism’, ‘Modernity’ and 
‘Postmodernity’ in the Cypriot ‘Postcolonial’ Setting 
‘The Occident’ and ‘the Orient’, ‘the West’ and ‘the East’, ‘the West’ and 
‘the Rest’,622 are binarisms that consolidate bifurcated discourses.  Such discourses 
arbitrarily distinguish the universe into inherently unequal and rigidly distinct social, 
cultural, political and economic zones, while these binarisms’ pervasiveness is 
assured by the continuous employment of rigid and unscrutinized geographical 
divisions in the analysis of human condition. The complexity of cultural distinctions 
and the variety of local socio-political operations cannot be grasped through the 
unscrutinized employment of essentialized analytical concepts like continents, 
nation-states, world regions and supra-continental blocks. Rather, it can only be 




Eurocentrism is one of the consolidated bifurcated discourses that such 
binarisms generate and reflect. However, Eurocentrism also generates and 
perpetuates such binarisms.
624
 By ‘Eurocentrism’, I mean the elevation of Europe as 
the centre and as the paradigm of human history and the depiction of the rest of the 
world as ‘primitive’ and ‘lacking’ with regard to cultural, social, political and 
economic achievements, when compared to the paradigm – that is, Europe. By 
‘Westernization’, I mean the elevation and magnification of the north-western parts 
of the globe; that is, Europe and North America or those places that are meant to be 
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   One of the aims of this chapter is to problematize the essentialisms embedded in these and in 
similar binary notions. The fact that at some points in the chapter these terms are used without 
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connotations. 
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   Lewis and Wigen, The Myth of Continents, 1-19. Lewis and Wigen explain that the aim of their 
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   Lewis and Wigen interpret ‘Eurocentrism’ as a ‘by-product of the continental and nation-state 
myths’ (see: Lewis and Wigen, The Myth of Continents, 10). To this, I add – à la Said and Spivak, 
among others – that Eurocentrism both rationalizes and it is being rationalized by the division of the 
world into two (‘European’- ‘non-European’) unequal spheres.   
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captured by the ‘First World’ notion of the now anachronistic metageographical 
tripartite scheme of ‘First, Second and Third World countries’.625  
According to David Lyon, ‘modernity’ is the social order that emerged 
following the Enlightenment, when tradition was either dismissed or marginalized in 
favour of a belief in progress, and in the power of human reason to produce freedom. 
It signifies the consequences of the social and political processes that followed the 
industrial, capitalist and technological developments in Europe. Beyond that, 
modernity – as an economic, technological, political and cultural affair, as the 
constellation of the characteristics of European and Western societies, and in 
conjunction and supported by pseudoscientific social Darwinism – has been seen 
both as an inevitable and as a desirable process. It has been understood as a patent or 
as a set of steps that could be exported and that, if followed, would inexorably lead 
any society to its destined, optimal future. Subsequently, this self-justifying principle 
has also been employed in order to render the colonizing ‘Nation’ as the 
‘evolutionary Family of Man’, both within and outside its borders.626  
Colonialism and Western imperialism are the offshoots of the merging of 
modernity’s logocentrism – which has equated human progress with the 
marginalization of traditional ways of thinking and living – with the ‘Enlightened’ 
countries’ expansionism – which has been self-justified through 
modernizing/‘civilizing’ missions that sought to ‘free’ the ‘non-West/the Rest’, from 
its ‘backwardness’627. As Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak has astutely and succinctly 
phrased it, ‘the most frightening thing about imperialism, its long-term toxic effect, 
what secures it, what cements it, is the benevolent self-representation of the 
imperialist as savior’.628  
In Cyprus – like in other places they had colonized – through legal practice, 
the British attempted to ‘tame’, ‘civilize’ and ‘modernize’ Cypriot life, and to 
                                                 
625
  Given the demise of Soviet and Eastern European communism, the tripartite is anachronistic. 
However, ‘the categorization scheme has survived far longer than was ever warranted, in large part 
because it served the ideological needs of both Cold War American partisans and, on the opposite side 
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Wigen, The Myth of Continents, 4. 
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   Richard, E. Palmer, “Postmodernity and Hermeneutics,” boundary 2, vol. 5, no. 2 (1977): 368.  
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implement ‘a European governmental rationality and categorization’.629 For 
example, combating crime became a priority for British administrators who stressed 
that policing Cypriots’ ‘nature’ was important towards achieving of this task. As 
stated in the handbook for Cypriot police officers, that was published by the British 
administration in 1896, ‘bad characters’ were to be closely surveilled and their 
names, addresses and activities were to be reported to the colonial rulers. Such 
colonial laws categorized certain traditional practices, which were deemed as 
deriving from the ‘nature’ of the colonized, as backward, uncivilized and 
punishable.
630
 As Bryant explains: 
 
In colonial legal practice, however, that “nature” was also “culture”, in contrast to 
the presumably non-cultural individualism enjoyed by British Subjects themselves. 
... In colonial practice, only from the presumably non-cultural vantage point of 
European colonizers was full individualism possible; others were not yet advanced 




Such laws constitute an example of the type of surveillance, discipline and 
punishment that Foucault interprets as the most important demonstration of Western 
governmentality.
632
 For example, the British colonial ‘civilizing’ mission has been 
portrayed by the British colonizers not only as justified, but also as invited by the 
Cypriot colonial subjects themselves.
633
 The following remark by Sir Richard 
Palmer, the British colonial governor of Cyprus, during a meeting of the Royal 
Central Asian Society in London in 1939, is illustrative:  
 
Several thousand years ago a lady called Aphrodite landed in Cyprus, and the island 
was never quite recovered. The people of Cyprus make a luxury of discontent and 
always pretend they do not like being ruled, and yet, like the lady I have mentioned 
as a prototype, they expect to be ruled, and, in fact, prefer it.
634
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The symbolism is self-explanatory: Cyprus, like the promiscuous, wild-natured 
goddess of love, seeks to be dominated by the colonial ruler who is characterized by 
reason. Thus, imperialist colonial ideology is rendered not only justified, but also 
welcomed by the colonized Cypriot subject.   
Nonetheless, and despite its pervasiveness, modernity and the colonial 
discourse that it supported carried in them the seeds of their own demise. As a 
historically created form of consciousness that challenged previously held 
assumptions about human knowledge, nature, social formations and political and 
economic organization, modernity paved the way for its own transcendence. By the 
twentieth century, the civilizing project of Westernization and of colonial 
imperialism started to crumble. The idea of universal knowledge and culture, as well 
as an understanding of modernity as a recipe that can be transplanted anywhere and 
that unavoidably leads to ‘progress’, were severely challenged both by the colonial 
peoples and within Western intellectual circles.  
Within the hubs of its production, modernity had described man as a 
concrete, stable unit and had placed the autonomous self centre stage; man was 
inherently the bearer of civil, political and social rights. Far from its promise though, 
and in order to assure its perpetuation, modernity necessitated hierarchical 
distinctions and categorical inequalities at home, which were similar to those that 
supported the imperialist project in the colonies: Gender, race and class are realms of 
experience that come into existence not in isolation, but in, and though their relation, 
while this relation is pertinent to the control of access to value-producing 
resources.
635
 In this way, the modern individual becomes entangled in a system that 
controls, qualifies and inscribes life within the state order.
636
 This is because ‘the 
“body” is always already a biopolitical body and bare life, and nothing in it or the 
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economy of its pleasure seems to allow us to find solid ground on which to oppose 
the demands of sovereign power’.637 
Beyond a movement or current of thought, ‘postmodernity’ designates a 
larger transformation of thinking and social existence, which has evolved as a 
response to modernity’s failures. It has been even argued that ‘postmodernity’ refers 
to a diverse range of activities that amount to a new era in human history,
638
 since 
nothing ever again could escape being questioned; not even reason and reality. 
Concrete knowledge and its possibility, as well as the modern belief that structures 
of knowledge reflect and legitimize social structures were replaced by flexible 
discourses, and by a deconstructive approach towards modernity’s dichotomies and 
binarisms. Nietzsche’s proclamation that ‘God is dead’ was followed by Foucault’s 
assertion that the sciences of man are dead, because ‘man’ is dead.639  
However, postmodernist, poststructuralist and postcolonial studies have not 
been more immune to critiques than modernist approaches. For example, it has been 
argued that the term ‘postcolonial’ is haunted by the figure of the linear development 
– from ‘the pre-colonial’, to ‘the colonial’, to the ‘postcolonial’ – that it seeks to 
rebuke. Namely, although postcolonialism proclaims the end of an era – that is, the 
era of colonialism – it does so by invoking the same figurative language of linear 
history and progress that has sustained colonialism. Instead of decentring history, it 
recentres it around European time and consequently, shifts the focus away from 
questions of power, domination and exploitation. Similarly to postmodernist and 
poststructuralist approaches, postcolonialist approaches are not free from binary 
oppositions. On the contrary, their essence is premised on the ‘colonial-postcolonial’ 




To be sure, postcolonial experience includes Western hegemony. However, if 
the West is omnipresent, that is, if the West is present both within the West and 
outside it, then it is not possible for a postcolonial critique that is unpolluted from 
colonial experience to arise.
641
 Rather, what postcoloniality does is to engage in what 
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Spivak calls ‘catachrestic criticism’; that is, it confiscates the omnipresent apparatus 
in order to reverse and displace it: 
 
Within the historical frame of exploration, colonization, and decolonization, what is 
being effectively reclaimed is a series of regulative political concepts, the 
supposedly authoritative narrative of whose production was written elsewhere, in the 
social formations of Western Europe. They are thus being reclaimed, indeed 
claimed, as concept metaphors for which no historically adequate referent may be 
advanced from postcolonial space. That does not make the claims less urgent. A 
concept metaphor without an adequate referent may be called a catachresis by the 
definitions of classical rhetoric. These claims to catachreses as foundations also 




Moreover, arguments have been raised that the postmodernist approach is 
more a sensibility than a coherent theoretical stance and tends to mirror the theories 
and concepts that are the object of its critique. For example, it has been argued that 
postmodernist critiques against Eurocentrism do not manage to go further than 
merely revise Eurocentrism’s ethical signposts and render the ‘non-West’ as morally 
and intellectually superior than the West.
643
  However, the raison d'être of 
postmodernist thinking is to call into question the exploitive and individualistic 
character of modern existence. As such, it does not abandon ethical considerations, 
political responsibilities or the rigors of thought, like Habermas argues.
644
 
Regardless of its scrutinizing of universal principles and of its embracement of 
relativism, postmodern thinking does not necessarily lead to the abandonment of 
social and political concerns. As Palmer explains: 
 
being postmodern ... means that one has reached the point of turning against ... all 
confidence that just a little more of this or that – humanizing psychology, cleaning 
up government, teaching “values” (in the abstract), controlling inflation, population, 
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As this chapter will argue through the employment of the US example, the 
‘essentialist versus social constructionist’ controversy – especially during the 1970s 
and 1980s – and the ‘queer versus identity and rights-based approach’ debate – 
especially during the 1990s – among activists and theorists, delineated the ways in 
which questions about the position of non-heterosexual sexuality within matrices of 
power and about notions and forms of (sexual) citizenship are approached. Beyond 
the ways in which such theoretical debates have informed LGBTQ activism in the 
West, what it is also important to examine and what this chapter will focus on is: 
Firstly, whether these debates adequately describe the concerns of LGBTQs 
elsewhere, and especially in postcolonial Cyprus; secondly, whether the approaches 
adopted by LGBTQ groups in the West – as a result of the influences of these two 
debates – are useful when employed by non-Western LGBTQ groups, like Cypriot 
LGBTQ groups, or whether LGBTQs outside the West would fare better if they 
sought an alternative trajectory of action; thirdly, whether ‘Europe’, both as a 
supranational institution and as a new, transnational ‘ethic’  about the ways in which 
‘citizenship’ is defined and practiced, is – or shows the way towards – a new 
distinctive way of doing LGBTQ politics.   
Modernity, Postcoloniality and Cypriot LGBTQ Politics: The 
Gaze at Europe and the West 
 
To be sure, the people within LGBTQ movements who seek narrow reformist 
objectives through non-radical and non-confrontational means are usually those who 
already have a degree of standing in, and access to, mainstream institutions.
646
 
Moreover, the assimilation and ‘sameness’ rhetoric, both across and within (sexual) 
‘categories’ – that is, when LGBTQs say to heterosexuals ‘we are like you’ or when 
non-Western LGBTQs say to Western LGBTQs ‘we are like you’ – creates sameness 
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(a sameness that is already divided hierarchically based on the binaries of the 
heteronormative Western centre, and which is replicated in the periphery) only by 
reinstating difference.
647
 This raises questions about the ability of the LGBTQ 
movements that employ mainstream discourses – one of these discourses being the 
human rights discourse – to move from legitimization and access to rights, to real 
transformation and freedom; to transformation and freedom for all the LGBTQ 
individuals whom they are claiming to be representing and not only for those who 
already have access to, or are part of, the existent structures of power.  
Several voices have warned that the institutionalization of social movements 
might result in legal and political successes, but it distances them from their 
grassroots base and creates divisions within the movement.
648
 Mainstreaming is 
problematic both as a means and as an end. The reason is that access to political 
power and an excessively legislative focus do not secure actual political power to 
influence political outcomes. As a result, the success of such political, legislative or 
legal campaigns is only parochial; it achieves only ‘virtual equality’ and does not 




With regard to LGBTQ politics in the US, it has been argued that while a 
focus on the utilization of identities functions a means of securing group solidarity 
and of representing sexual communities in civil society, sexual politics need to be 
transformed into ‘a politics of anti-normalization’.650 Whereas a politics of 
normalization seeks to share or expand the boundaries of normalcy, an ‘anti-
normalizing politics’ seeks to displace notions of normalcy altogether. Furthermore, 
tt moves beyond the ‘assimilationism versus separatism’ dilemma because it 
challenges the very grounds upon which negotiations of inclusion and exclusion are 
made. Additionally, it challenges sexual and gender identities such as ‘homosexual’, 
‘gay’, ‘lesbian’, ‘women’ and ‘men’, on the grounds that they are inherently 
problematic, since they are not flexible enough to describe a self and a sexual subject 
that is constituted by multiple desires.
651
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As Meeks explains, it is impossible for someone to make claims to rights or 
to equal representation under the law, when the very identity categories through 
which these articulations are being made are problematic.
652
 Therefore, he concludes 
that the aim should be to imagine and treat difference differently and to broaden 
theoretical definitions of civil society beyond formal processes, in order to embrace 
the ‘politics of anti-normalization’, which contest the norms that currently govern 
intimacy and desire.
653
 However, Meeks’s analysis of what the US LGBTQ 
movement’s politics should be is no less open to criticism than assimilationist and 
or/communicative approaches.
654
 Firstly, a ‘politics of anti-normalization’ approach 
downplays the benefits that the invocation of human rights has brought to LGBTQ 
movements, in the same way that assimilationist approaches downplay the perils that 
the language of human rights embeds. Secondly, ‘politics of anti-normalization’ are 
only prima facie promising towards social, cultural and political transformation; for 
their proponents do not explicate how such politics could be divided from law and 
rights, from civil society and its formal processes, from democratization, from 
legitimization and recognition and from the public sphere, while remaining political. 
Thirdly, although this approach highlights the negative effects of a strategic 
utilization of identity on subjects, it does not rebuke the real forces behind the 
construction of essentialist identities. Essentially, the problem with such ‘radical’ 
approaches is that they leave unaddressed the objects of their own critique since:  
 
factionalization, understood as the process whereby one identity excludes another in 
order to fortify its own unity and coherence, makes the mistake of locating the 
problem of difference as that which emerges between one identity and another; but 
difference is the condition of possibility of identity or, rather, its constitutive limit: 





Lisa Duggan and Nan D. Hunter attempt to ‘bridge discourses’ that pertain to 
sexual politics and strategies based on all positions’ shared opposition to dominant 
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power matrices. They attempt to avoid the dangers of identity-based politics and of a 
universalizing project while simultaneously remaining sensitive to local and 
historical distinctions, and while approaching the ‘state’ not as a monolithic centre of 
power, but as a constellation of different agencies, institutions, laws and ordinances. 
Their objective is to find, and point to the ways through which activism and theories 
learn from and inform each other in their common effort to reform the institutions 
and the practices that shape and constrain us.
656
 Their suggested course for sexual 
politics is ‘disestablishment’. It involves supplementing equality and difference 
rhetoric, the language of rights claims for a fixed minority and calls for 
antidiscrimination with elements of the liberal discourse that seeks to separate 
church and state. As they explain:  
 
We might argue that public policy and public institutions may not legitimately 
compel, promote or prefer intergender relationships over intragender attachments. 
Without appropriating too much of the liberal baggage of the discourse of religious 
tolerance, we might borrow from this rhetoric a strategy for reversing the terms of 
antigay propaganda and exposing the myriad ways that state apparatuses promote, 
encourage and produce “special rights” for heterosexuality.657  
 
Furthermore, this proposal involves comparing sexual desire to religion in 
order to highlight it as not natural, fixed or a-historical and, simultaneously, as not 
trivial or shallow. The aim of this approach is to render sexual desire as a ‘lifestyle 
choice’ and as a deep commitment that is resistant to coerced conversion and that 
merits free expression and political protection. As Duggan and Nan argue, this 
‘disestablishment’ approach avoids debates about morality, values and biology and 
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bypasses differences among activists, while it grounds and supports demands for 
freedom of association and freedom of speech.
658
  
Admittedly, these authors make a striking effort to have the best of both 
worlds and they succeed at making proposals that seem to be both transformative 
and effective – at least when applied in the US context. But what would happen in 
the ‘Rest’, that is, in places that are differ from the Anglo-American and Western 
European paradigm? How transferable and flexible is such a proposal, especially 
when the focus is placed on milieux where the state and the church are not separated; 
where heterosexuality is the norm, the only possibility; where ‘rights’ are what 
heterosexuals and other ‘legitimate’ groups get, whereas ‘special group rights’ are 
the allowances made to the classified as ‘less-than-human’ because of pity; where 
biology makes ‘norm’ and ‘proper’; where all of the above  remains unchallenged 
even under the rubric of a (merely nominal) liberal democracy?  
Practices of gay and lesbian rights and lobby politics at the 
European/regional level are not unrelated to binary and hierarchical orders of 
dominance. Gender and sexuality politics simultaneously contest and reinscribe 
those laws and orders that organize human existence and culture around sexual and 
gender identities and identifications.
659
 As the analysis of LGBTQ litigation in the 
ECtHR has demonstrated, since the 1980s, the language and mechanisms of 
European rights and identities has been significant towards promoting LGBTQ rights 
and national-level equality.
660
 However, although such legal and political wins have 
assured some space for LGBTQ individuals within the gender and sexuality status 
quo, they have not demolished its basic pillars or obliterated its organizing logic.  
The fact that the reordering of the gender and sexuality status quo remains a 
difficult task, even when pursued through the invocation and employment of some of 
liberal democracy’s most effective rhetoric and mechanisms – that is, through the 
invocation of the (European) human rights discourse, institutions and mechanisms– 
demonstrates that liberal democratic structures depend on gender and sexuality 
binaries and on normative structures. Drawing on Butler, Beger explains that all 
rules that are connected to the ability to articulate and assert the self in liberal 
humanist discourse are fundamentally connected to gender hierarchies and 
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Although inconspicuous when compared, for 
example, to racism, heteronormativity and heterocentrism are so fundamental to 
Western/European socio-cultural and political structures that their interrogation, 
although paramount, continues to be a difficult task, even in an era of human rights 
proliferation.  
From a queer theory perspective, the problem with human rights is not only 
that they are premised on a gendered perception of humanness. Beyond that, what is 
also problematical, specifically with regard to European LGBTQ rights and 
litigation, is the treatment of gender as the manifestation of biological sex. In the 
tradition of European law, ‘sexual identity’ was treated as a conflation of anatomical 
sex, socially constructed gender and sexuality. As Beger explains:  
 
... the law rests on two assumptions: there are two types of human bodies, and two 
distinct sets of gendered behaviour – including sexual object choice – follow from 
this alleged natural fact. The existence of sexual orientation as a marker of 
difference arises out of the construction of sex and gender as previously described. 
Any legal proceeding concerned with questions of homosexual, transgender, or 
women’s rights contributes to the definition of the relationship between sex and 




Thus, in European law, sexual orientation discrimination was understood as sex 
discrimination, while any relationship between non-heteronormative gender identity 
and sexual orientation was silenced or bypassed.  
 However, regardless of these shortcomings of European human rights 
discourse and litigation, the legal realm constitutes a vehicle towards the shifting of 
the gender and sexuality status quo. Legal narratives that are articulated in 
courtrooms make alternative conceptions of gender and sexuality thinkable.
663
 It 
might be the case that, in European human rights discourse, the concept of 
individuated ‘humanness’ is – or, rather was – premised on normative sexualities and 
gender binaries. Nonetheless, since the concept of humanity is contestable – that is, it 
is not natural, objective or universal but historically and culturally contested – 
LGBTQ individuals could politically invoke this concept. According to Beger, this 
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would imply abandoning the idea of sexual identity as liberation and as a rupture 
from the current sexuality and gender status quo, and instead embracing human 
identity as a political strategy; that is, articulating LGBTQ humanity, freedom, 
equality, recognition, respectability and integrity as a strategy that is intelligible in 




 Nevertheless, the most important and widespread effects of supranational 
legal and political battles are those that are manifested at the national and the 
transnational level. LGBTQ national and transnational movements’ attempts to 
disrupt normative assumptions about gender and sexuality and to push for policy 
changes are inspired and legitimated by legal and political wins at the 
regional/European level. As the case of Cyprus exemplifies, regardless of the legal 
bite that such pro-LGBTQ regional decisions have, and regardless of whether or not 
enforcement mechanisms are in place in order to assure their implementation, the 
mere fact that they emanate from ‘Europe’, from the European centre, carries enough 
symbolic credit for such decisions to be used by local and transnational LGBTQ 
activists in the periphery as a political pressure tool against national/local 
governments.
665
 For example, as the analysis of the Modinos v. Cyprus case and of 
its impact at the local level demonstrated, European mechanisms and discourses have 
been – at least partially – conducive towards Cypriot LGBTQ visibility.  
Nonetheless, as the employment of ‘Western/European’ discourses of 
sexuality by Cypriot LGBTQs demonstrated, to some degree, LGBTQ organization 
and mobilization in Cyprus also seems to affirm those notions that see tolerance 
towards non-heterosexual sexuality, non-heteronormative gender identities and 
LGBTQ equality as part of an evolutionary process, which emanates first in the 
‘advanced’ centre/West/Europe and which is subsequently exported in the 
‘backward’ Periphery/Rest. It also demonstrated that, at least some Cypriot LGBTQs 
perceive Western/European sexuality politics and identities as inappropriate in 
relation to their needs and to their social, cultural and political national/local reality. 
For example, numerous Cypriot LGBTQ interviewees described Cyprus as 
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‘backward’ with regard to LGBTQ issues when compared to other countries, like the 
UK and the US,
666
 while some others claimed that LGBTQ organization and 
mobilization similar to the Western/European example is something that they do not 
approve of.
 667
 Some Greek-Cypriot LGBTQs even employed European/Western 
discourses in order to render themselves as superior when compared to Turkish-




A similar conflict between local discourses of sexuality and 
European/Western ones is evident in the cases of Cypriot LGBTQ organized groups 
also. However, as opposed to some Cypriot LGBTQs who described the idea of 
sexual identities, politics and mobilization as inappropriate for the case of Cyprus, 
the spokespersons of these Cypriot LGBTQ organizations reported that 
European/Western discourses of sexuality and LGBTQ politics have provided them 
with the rational to organize their groups and also helped them to confront locally 
predominant suppressive discourses. The cases of the Greek-Cypriot Cypriot Gay 
Liberation Movement (Απελευθερωτικό Κίνημα Ομοφυλοφίλων Κύπρου, abbreviated 
AKOK) and of the Turkish-Cypriot Initiative Against Homophobia exemplify how 
the European/Western example of sexual politics informs local activists in non-
Western settings. However, the case of AKOK also exemplifies how local, dominant 
perceptions of sexuality – both elite and non-elite – have the power to limit the 
positive effects of European/Western discourses of sexuality on local LGBTQ 
organization and mobilization. 
The Greek-Cypriot AKOK was established in 1987 by the activist Alecos 
Modinos.
669
 Since at the time of the establishment of AKOK homosexuality was 
illegal, the organization was never officially registered as a legal person. Even after 
Modinos’s success at the ECtHR against the RoC and the decriminalization of 
homosexuality, the number of AKOK members remained very low. As Modinos 
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explains, this was a direct result of the stigmatization and demonization he suffered 
by state and political actors, but primarily from the then Archbishop Chrysostomos I, 
and by other high-ranking members of the clergy of the Church of Cyprus.
670
 
Societal intolerance towards non-heterosexual sexual choice and towards its 
demonstration in the public sphere also contributed to keeping AKOK’s number of 
members low. As Modinos explains:  
 
AKOK did not evolve because the Cypriot homosexual, whether a man or a woman, 
experiences the bad elements of [the discrimination against] homosexuality from a 
young age. Although they are not to blame for not being accepted, they might even 
feel guilty [about their homosexuality], although I think that this is less common 
among the younger generation. Therefore, they hide and they camouflage 





The prevalence of such attitudes among Greek-Cypriot LGBTQs is 
confirmed by Hüseyin Çavusoğlu, one of the founding members of the Turkish-
Cypriot group Initiative Against Homophobia. Referring to his attempts to come into 
contact and create links with Greek-Cypriot LGBTQ activists, Çavusoğlu remarked:  
 
The first thing I did when I started [being involved with] the Initiative was to try to 
connect with [people in] the south. And I was a bit disappointed when I figured out 
that there is only Alecos [Modinos], or [Modinos and] very few people around him. 
I was expecting more people. After Cyprus joined the EU, I thought that more 
young people would be involved, but I didn’t manage to reach out to them. There is 
this idea ... and they [i.e., young people] think that if they become [involved with 




Even with low membership numbers, AKOK actively organized and led a 
number of initiatives that pertained to LGBTQ issues. Most notably, Modinos and 
other AKOK members operated a support telephone line in Modinos’s house. 
Additionally, they would emotionally and financially support HIV and AIDS-
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positive individuals at a time when the government had not yet initiated a relevant 
campaign and when being diagnosed with the virus led to social ostracizing, as well 
as to one’s rejection by her own family.673 Another important activity undertaken by 
Modinos was intense lobbying for the amendment of discriminatory language and 
provisions in the Cypriot law, even after homosexuality had been decriminalized. 
Both because of pressures from the CoE and of Modinos’s constant pressures and 
lobbying, the relevant law was reamended and the discriminatory provisions were 
corrected by 2002. 
 Similarly to Modinos, Turkish-Cypriot LGBTQs also employed the language 
and mechanisms of ‘Europe’ in order to press political elites to decriminalize 
homosexuality in the ‘TRNC’. The Turkish-Cypriot Initiative Against Homophobia 
was created in 2007. Although the Initiative’s attempts to convince the ‘TRNC’ 
parliament to decriminalize homosexuality have not yet succeeded, the organization 
managed to be officially recognized and to be registered by the ‘TRNC’ authorities 
as a NGO. As Çavusoğlu reported, the 2009 visit of Michael Cashman – the British 
Labour Member of the European Parliament for West Midlands and co-President of 
the European Parliament’s Intergroup on LGBT Rights – was decisive. He 
explained: 
 
We are a registered organization since the end of April 2009 ... [Initially], we got an 
answer from the District Office that we won’t be registered because of the existing 
law [that criminalizes homosexuality]. But I think that Michael Cashman’s visit and 
his meeting with the President of the Republic [i.e., the ‘TRNC’], with the President 
of the Parliament and with some political parties and NGOs was very effective. 
They got scared of the European representative. Even Mr Talat [i.e., Mehmet Ali 
Talat, the former president of the ‘TRNC’] didn’t understand why we were there 
when we visited him. He thought that we just wanted to register and that this did not 
happen [i.e., he was unaware of what the Initiative represents]. Then he said: ‘I will 
see to it and I will examine what could be done.’ He helped. We got registered while 




As Çavusoğlu argued, it is very important for the ‘TRNC’ political elite to 
show, especially to ‘Europeans’, that the ‘TRNC’ and Turkish-Cypriots are more 
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‘advanced’, ‘modern’ and ‘European’ than their Greek-Cypriot enemies who, 
nonetheless, have been admitted to the EU. As he has explained, by doing so, 
Turkish-Cypriots would prove that they also deserve EU membership, probably even 
more than Greek-Cypriots. Çavusoğlu explained that it is through the strategic 
manipulation of this ‘wish to appear to be more European that the Greek-Cypriots’ 
that the Initiative managed to bypass conservative political elements and get the 
approval by the ‘TRNC’ former president Mehmet Ali Talat himself to officially 
register as an NGO. He reported: 
 
Europe is a good pressure tool ... When Michael Cashman was here he gave an 
interview and he also mentioned this: A couple of years ago – in 2004, before 
Cyprus joined the EU – he was in Cyprus again, in the south part, and he met with 
the political parties about this issue [i.e., the socio-legal status of LGBTQ Greek-
Cypriots]. And he said that he faced more problems and bad opinions [about same-
sex sexuality] in the south. He said that this never happened in the north. We did a 
very good job putting pressure on the [‘TRNC’] government with the help of 
Michael Cashman. We will see what will happen with Europe and Europeanization. 
I am actually shocked that they accepted us as a registered organization, but this is 




Çavusoğlu also stressed the importance of AKOK and of Modinos’s activism 
and success at the ECtHR for the inception and creation of the Initiative. In the initial 
stages of the group’s formation, the Initiative Organizing Committee was in close 
communication with Modinos, from whom it sought advice.
676
 Modinos expressed 
his support for the Turkish-Cypriot group and stressed the importance of cooperation 
towards the amelioration of the lives of all Cypriot LGBTQs.
677
 In striking contrast 
to the Greek-Cypriot AKOK, the Initiative enjoys relatively high membership 
numbers, while its young Organizing Committee members make good use of mass 
media and communication technologies. For example, the group has a profile page 
on Facebook and a webpage that it is often updated, where information can be 
accessed in both Turkish and English.
678
 Additionally, it is affiliated with numerous 
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other national and transnational groups, including ILGA-Europe, while in May of 
2008, it celebrated the International Day Against Homophobia with a march in the 
streets of the occupied part of the capital and with activities aimed at raising 
awareness about same-sex sexuality and about the group’s claim for the 
decriminalization of homosexuality in the ‘TRNC’.679 
The Turkish-Cypriot case is especially important, since it complicates our 
understanding about the relationship between law and claim-making in general, but 
also about the relationship between Cypriot LGBTQs’ legal standing and their 
claims-making capacity: Even though homosexuality remains a criminal offence 
under ‘TRNC’ law, the Turkish-Cypriot political elite seems to be less hostile 
towards LGBTQ organization and mobilization than the Greek-Cypriot political 
elite, even though homosexuality was decriminalized in the RoC. Greek-Cypriot 
elites’ negative stance towards LGBTQ equality is all the more problematic since the 
RoC ratified Protocol No. 12 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms and is a signatory to the 2007 UN Declaration on Sexual 
Orientation and Gender Identity.
680
   
This seeming paradox can be explained, at least partially, by two factors: 
Firstly, in the occupied north, organized religion does not enjoy the status that the 
Orthodox Church of Cyprus does in the non-occupied south. Trying to account for 
the difference in membership rates between the Initiative and AKOK, Çavusoğlu 
explained: ‘Luckily, [in the north] we don’t have the religion and church power 
influence. This allows people to use their minds.’681  Secondly, with its demands for 
EU admission having been met, the Greek-Cypriot political elite no longer needs to 
prove itself to be ‘European’ or ‘Western’ to the degree that the Turkish-Cypriot 
elite does. Namely, for the Greek-Cypriot elite, the discourse of ‘Europe’ lost much 
of its currency once EU admission had been achieved, whereas for the Turkish-
Cypriot elite the language of ‘Europe’ and ‘human rights’ continues to serve political 
aims.  
So, where does this leave struggles for sexual equality at the local level? 
What is the future of Greek-Cypriot LGBTQ activism? Despite the pivotal 
significance of Modinos’s activism towards the amelioration of – at least – the legal 
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aspect of the lives of Greek-Cypriot LGBTQs, AKOK’s important work – and even 
its existence – remained unknown to the Greek-Cypriot mass public. This was not 
least due to Modinos’s demonization by the Church and due to the 1980s, 1990s and 
early 2000s media’s tendency to remain silent with regard to non-heterosexual 
sexuality and other ‘taboo’ issues. This lack of familiarity with the Modinos case is 
widespread among Greek-Cypriot LGBTQs also. Remarkably, almost none of the 
Greek-Cypriot LGBTQ interviewees were aware of Modinos’s ECtHR case or of the 
existence and activities of AKOK.
682
  
Although Modinos has been described to me by numerous foreign LGBTQ 
activists and scholars as a ‘living legend’ with regard to LGBTQ equality 
struggles,
683
 and although he was honoured by ILGA-Europe in 2009 for his 
activism and contribution to European LGBTQ equality at home, he does not enjoy 
similar recognition, even among self-identified LGBTQ individuals. Does this fact 
challenge the actual importance of Modinos’s legal action and of his organization’s 
activities at the local level? Namely, are AKOK and Modinos’s activities merely 
symbolically important at the regional/international level, while they have not really 
impacted the lives of Greek-Cypriot LGBTQs? Is this unawareness of the majority of 
Greek-Cypriot LGBTQ interviewees about AKOK and about the Modinos case 
indicative of the nature of Cypriot civil society and of the prospects for local 
grassroots LGBTQ mobilization?  
Cypriot elites tend to understand ‘modernization’, ‘Westernization’ and 
‘Europeanization’ as the transition from a traditional to the ‘modern’ organization of 
public, political and economic life, without considering the effects of this transition 
on social relations that fall within the ‘private’ realm.684 Moreover, although it is not 
sincerely committed to the concept of human rights, the Greek-Cypriot political elite 
has attempted to balance notions of tradition and modernization, and national values 
and the values of Europeanization/globalization, in order to pursue its politico-
national objectives through the EU platform. However, such explanations and 
approaches do not account for the attitudes of LGBTQ non-elites regarding the aims, 
the objectives, the effects and the importance of organization and mobilization 
around issues of sexuality.  
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As the interviews I conducted with Greek-Cypriot LGBTQs demonstrate, 
their unawareness or limited knowledge about the Modinos ECtHR case and about 
AKOK cannot be hastily interpreted as political unawareness and passivity, which 
could severely hamper LGBTQ organization and mobilization prospects. Rather, it 
seems that it is linked to the concepts of the ‘closet’ and ‘coming out’. For example, 
a Greek-Cypriot male LGBTQ interviewee in his late twenties explained: 
 
Personally, I wouldn’t want to ‘come out’ in the sense of going out there into 
society and yelling it [i.e., that I am gay], because this would draw a lot of attention. 
Many things [about my life] would change. As I told you before, I live my life and 
people probably think that I am a metrosexual. Therefore, people think this is the 
reason that I go to the places I go and do the things I do. I think that if I lived under 
the ‘gay’ label, my life would be much different.685  
 
This interviewee’s rejection of the idea of ‘coming out’ and of a ‘gay 
identity’, which was common among both Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot 
LGBTQ interviewees, is a strong exemplification of the non-Western subject’s 
questioning of Western/European ideas about how self-realization, identification and 
sexual politics are constituted in the ‘Periphery’, that is, in places other than those 
where the ideas of the ‘closet’ and of the ‘coming out’ of have been conceptualized 
as the sine qua non of non-heterosexual sexuality’s articulation and of sexual 
politics’ formation. 
In gay and lesbian scholarship that emanates primarily from the US and the 
UK, ‘coming out of the closet’ has been described as a social and cultural event. It 
has been interpreted as a ‘rite of passage’ that changes individuals’ consciousness 
and shifts the way they understand the world, the ‘Self’ and identity, and 
consequently leads them to espouse new values. Following this logic, ‘coming out of 
the closet’ and renouncing one’s ‘closeted’ self is the process through which one 
becomes ‘gay’.686 However, turning the spotlight on ‘the closet’ and on the 
importance of renouncing it – through such public cultural events as gay pride 
parades – in order to achieve ‘liberation’ according to the European/Western 
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paradigm – leaves the notion of visibility/invisibility unaddressed and the discourses 
that support it unchallenged, while it ignores specific particularities of ‘non-
Western/non-European’ locales.687  
As the interviews with Cypriot LGBTQs demonstrated, this 
visibility/invisibility notion assumes a primary role in their self-identification 
processes.
688
 What needs to be critically examined is: ‘what kind of conceptual space 
is the closet, that confines people who seem neither highly politicized nor self-
reflexively “gay”?’ 689 As Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot understandings and 
negotiations of global/transnational gay culture and politics show, ‘coming out’ and 
the public affirmation of a gay identity is not uniformly seen as self-constituting or 
self-fashioning. Moreover, ‘the closet’ and its denouncing is usually not the primary 
preoccupation of non-heterosexual people.
690
  
The historical specificity of the categories of the ‘closet’, ‘coming out’ and of 
a primary ‘gay’ identity is manifested even in the Western centre that has produced 
and circulated them as the foundational accounts of modern homosexuality. 
Focusing on the sociology – as opposed to the politics – of the closet, some theorists 
of sexuality argue that the closet is not only repressive. Rather, since it creates a 
protected space within which individuals are permitted to fashion a gay self and 
create gay social networks, the closet can also be seen as a strategy of both 
accommodating normative heterosexuality and resisting it.
691
 Seidman, Meeks and 
Traschen argue that emergent social patterns in the US indicate the declining 
significance of the closet in some environments since people seem to fashion their 
lives ‘beyond’ the closet, through (admittedly incomplete) interpersonal, not 
institutional ‘routinization’ and ‘normalization’ of their sexuality. That is, 
individuals develop informal ways through which they integrate their homosexuality 
into their conventional social lives – for example disclosing to family or co-workers 
– and through which they describe some negative feelings about their homosexuality 
– for example describing such feelings as residues of living in a heteronormative 
society.
692
 Besides fear, shame, guilt, considerations over ‘outing’ others and 
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attempts to avoid stereotypical reaction, what also seems to be conducive of 
‘interpersonal routinization’ is the fact that numerous individuals do not experience 
their homosexuality as an identity or as the most important aspect of their identity.
693
 
What also needs to be critically examined is how the concepts of ‘the closet’ 
and ‘coming out’ stand in relation to the operations of heteronormativity. Sedgwick 
convincingly made the argument that a set of the most essential sites for the 
contestation of meaning in twentieth-century Western culture – secrecy/disclosure, 
private/public, ‘the closet’/ ‘coming out’ – is ineffaceably marked by the historical 
specificity of homosocial/homosexual definition.
694
 Although ‘the epistemology of 
the closet’ has been productive of modern Western culture and history, this is no 
reason for scrutinizing those who remain in the closet, while excluding those who 
participate in the heterosexual culture, those who command the closet and whose 
intimate representational needs ‘the closet’ serves.695 According to Sedgwick:  
 
We must know by now ... better than to assume that there is a homosexual ... waiting 
to be uncovered in each of the closets constituting and constituted by the modern 
regime of the closet; yet it is by the homosexual question, which has never so far 
been emptied of its homophobic impulsions, that the energy of their construction 




The ‘normalization and routinization of homosexuality’ trend transcends the 
categories of the ‘closet’ and ‘coming out’ and offers LGBTQ individuals an 
alternative approach to the social management of their sexuality. Simultaneously, 
although it leaves the institutional normalization of heterosexuality unchallenged, it 
decentralizes ‘coming out of the closet’ as the ultimate political act. Furthermore, it 
does not undermine sexual politics; rather, it encourages a post-identity sexual 
politics which challenges the norms that regulate same-sex and heterosexual bodies, 
desires, pleasures and intimate practices.
697
 
Another important factor that needs to be taken into consideration is that 
there are places where Western global/transnational notions of sexual identity pose a 
problem not because of their swiping force against local sexual identities, but 
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because such notions of identity do not exist. In many cultures, including the Cypriot 
one especially before colonization,
698
 same-sex sexualities were – what Peter 
Drucker calls – ‘transgenderal’,699 or continued to exist parallel to emerging gay and 
lesbian identities and communities. ‘Transgenderal’ same-sex sexualities involve 
assigning a gender identity to one sex partner that is different from his or her 
biological sex, while the other sexual partner maintains his or her gender identity as 
a ‘real/proper’ man or woman. In the case of Cyprus, in ‘transgenderal’ same-sex 
sexual relations the ‘real’ man – that is, the man who penetrates another man – is 
often expected to enter a heterosexual marriage and procreate. However, this does 
not apply to the penetrated man.
700
  In Turkey, for example, although secularization 
brought about the rise of gay and lesbian identities, especially in cities like Istanbul, 
Ankara and Izmir,
701




 Therefore, it seems that because of the pre-existence of diverse same-sex 
identities and/or practices in the non-West; because of the non-West’s rapid 
economic and social change due to the rise and export of a global capitalist 
economy; because of cultural influences from the West; and because of major local 
political developments, gay and lesbian identities are characterized by ‘combined 
and uneven social construction’.703 Namely, there is a tension between increasingly 
influential discourses and institutions of homosexuality and heterosexuality, and 
between local sexual ideologies and subjectivities that are often resistant and aspire 
to be anti-hegemonic.
704
  As Povinelli and Chauncey explain: 
  
Homogenization, diversification, hybridization; the local, the global, and the glocal; 
locality, localization, and translocality; globalization and transnationalism; flows, 
linkages, scapes, and circuits: we are witness to a proliferation of conceptual 
conjunctions and neologisms that describe, or more simply that demarcate, the 
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dense, variegated traffic in cultural representations, people, and capita that 




Nonetheless, this does not necessarily mean that a real commonality of 
identity has not been created or that any attempt to systematically conceptualize 
LGBTQ oppression and liberation is essentially Eurocentric.
706
 What needs to be 
investigated is how the Western/European discourse pertaining to LGBTQ struggles 
against the institutional and social legitimization and solidification of compulsory 
heteronormativity might merge with and complement – or at least exist in parallel 
and not antagonize – local understandings of sexual liberation, sexual justice and 
sexual citizenship. The case of the recent formation of a new LGBTQ organization in 
Cyprus, of Accept-LGBT, and of its members’ struggles to balance 
Western/European sexuality discourses with their own indigenous understandings, is 
illustrative of the processes involved in the attempts of non-Western LGBTQs to 
define themselves both as sexual and as political beings, amidst local and hostile, 
and external and unfamiliar discursive influences. 
In October 2009, a group of approximately 30 young Greek-Cypriots, most 
of them educated in Western Europe and in the US, came together and started 
planning the formation a new LGBTQ organization. The group was provisionally 
called the Lesbians, Gays, Bisexuals and Transgendered People of Cyprus 
(LGBTCY), while its members included self-identified gay, bisexual and 
heterosexual individuals. As one of the founding members reported, both a change in 
social values that is inextricably linked to Cyprus’s Europeanization, and the tools 
afforded by the European Community to local NGOs – like financial assistance, 
training and the EU human rights discourse that recognizes LGBTQ rights as human 
rights – have been the cornerstones of the new organization’s inception and the basis 
of its operation. This group member also reported that the Greek-Cypriot LGBTCY 
might seek cooperation with the Turkish-Cypriot Initiative.
707
 It still remains to be 
seen to what extent this new group will work within the current Cypriot structures, or 
whether it will seek a radical change of the local sexuality status quo. Nevertheless, a 
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number of events and discussions that took place, both among the groups’ members 
and between the group and the Greek-Cypriot political elites during the last year, are 
suggestive.  
  I conducted interviews and held numerous discussions with three of the 
founding members of this group, which was subsequently named Accept-LGBT. 
One of the issues discussed by the organization’s members concerned the 
organization’s name. According to Yoryis Regginos of Accept-LGBT’s Steering 
Committee, the ‘T’ in the organization’s acronym stands for ‘transgendered’ – rather 
than for ‘trans*’. Nonetheless, according to Regginos, the groups’ members 
understand and use this term as an ‘umbrella’ term to refer to ‘transgendered’, 
‘transsexual’ and ‘intersexed’ individuals.708 As he explained, the organization’s 
members found it difficult to decide upon the precise interpretation and translation of 
English terminology, although they use it in their discussions.  
As Petros Papadopoulos, another member of the Accept-LGBT Steering 
Committee reported, the problem arises from the fact that a lot of the English 
terminology does not even exist in Greek or, even if it does, its meaning is unclear to 
the groups’ members, as well as to Greek-Cypriot LGBTQs in general. He 
commented:  
 
The Greek translation of [the acronym]‘LGBT’ can be found in Greek translations 
of gay and lesbian theory literature, or even in gay and lesbian theory works by 
Greek scholars. However, while reading these works, I came across various 





The debate over whether to translate the ‘T’ in the English  – and widely used 
by Greek-Cypriot LGBTs – acronym ‘LGBT’ as ‘transgendered’ or ‘transsexual’ 
partially explains why the Cypriot LGBTQ interviewees – both Greek-Cypriot and 
Turkish-Cypriot – expressed intense dislike for the English term ‘queer’, although 
most of them said that they dislike labels and fixed identities like ‘gay’ or ‘lesbian’.  
For example, when asked to describe his sexual identity, a Greek-Cypriot male gay 
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Nayia Kamenou  Page 267 of 343 
 
interviewee in his late thirties reported: ‘Gay, bi, queer ... [pauses]. I never liked 
labels!’710 To the same question, a Greek-Cypriot female participant in her mid-
thirties responded:  
 
Look. Generally, I don’t like identities. I don’t like labelling people. I think that you 
[i.e., somebody] can have whomever you want [as a sexual partner], any time you 
want, as long as the other person wants it too. You don’t need to state to the other 
person: ‘Hi, I’m X, and this is my sexual identity.’ This [statement of sexual 




A Greek-Cypriot man in his early twenties stated:  
 
All this ‘trans*’ and ‘queer’ stuff! According to my opinion, these [identities] are 
not related to homosexuality; for example, when a man wants to dress like a woman. 
According to my opinion, a homosexual is a man who has sex with a man, or a 
woman who has sex with a woman. Not a woman, quote, unquote ‘trapped’ in a 
man’s body ... One is a man, either straight or gay. That’s it!712 
 
Remarkably, Cypriot LGBTQ interviewees treat the concepts ‘gay’, ‘lesbian’ 
and ‘queer’ in exactly the same manner. These terms constitute part of a terminology 
that is – at least until now – foreign to them. The importance of such stances is 
further highlighted if one considers the gay/lesbian-queer opposition, as this has 
infused Western/European theory of sexuality, especially in the 1990s. However, 
although Cypriot LGBTQs are unacquainted with, or even indifferent towards, the 
different connotations that the ‘gay/lesbian’ versus ‘queer’ terms have assumed in 
Western/European sexual politics and theory, they are not ignorant of the fact that 
the language that they employ to describe themselves and their activism is useful ‘to 
the extent that it constitutes a self-critical dimension within activism, a persistent 
reminder to take the time to consider the exclusionary force of one of activism’s 
most treasured contemporary premises’.713 
It seems that, in the case of Cyprus, the Western/European discourse 
pertaining to LGBTQ struggles against the institutional and social solidification and 
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prioritization of compulsory heteronormativity might merge with and complement – 
or at least exist in parallel and not antagonize – local understandings of sexual 
liberation, sexual justice and sexual citizenship. By February 2010, primarily 
because of the difficulties in appropriately translating English terminology into 
Greek, the name with which the organization would apply for registration came 
under discussion by the members of the group, whose number kept increasing. The 
temporary Steering Committee had proposed ΛΟΑΔ (Λεσβίες, Ομοφυλόφιλοι, 
Αμφισεξουαλικοί και Διαφυλικοί) Κύπρου (LGBT Cyprus) and explained:  
 
This is something we discussed during our last meeting. The term ‘διαφυλικοί’, for 
those [of our members] who do not know, is the [Greek] translation of [the term] 
‘transgender’, which refers to individuals whose biological sex does not match their 
gender identity – for example, I was born a woman but inside me I feel like a man, 
and this is being expressed in my way of life and it might lead to a sex change 




In an online member-only vote on the group’s webpage,715 the majority voted 
in favour of the transliteration of the ‘T’ in the English abbreviation ‘LGBT’, i.e., 
‘Τρανς’ (‘Trans*), thus settling the debate over which of the two terms – that is, 
‘transsexual’ (‘διαφυλικός’) or ‘transgender’ (‘διεμφυλικός’) – is the most 
appropriate. Therefore, in May 2010, the organization was officially named ‘Accept- 
LGBT Cyprus’ (in Greek, Accept-ΛΟΑΤ Κύπρου). As a member of Accept-LGBT 
who does not wish to be named stated, ‘knowing the terminology and being 
politically correct and all is nice. Nonetheless, debates like this mean nothing, unless 
we remain united and are clear about what we want to achieve. I personally do not 
care about labels. What I want to see is real change’.716 However, ignoring issues of 
terminology does not merely mean avoiding unnecessary debate and confrontation, 
                                                 
714
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which could divide the group’s members. A group’s inclusion and exclusion rules 
affect its ability to communicate and have its aims and objectives met.
717
  
For example, from its rise – symbolically located in the 1960s – until 
today,
718
 the LGBTQ movement in the US has been characterized by deep 
ideological divisions.
719
 Some activists within the movement and some scholars 
writing about US sexual politics have focused on assuming a more conservative and 
assimilationist  approach and others on adopting a more critical and radical stance 
towards mainstream norms and their supporting institutions.
720
 Gamson’s study of 
the exclusion of the North American Man/Boy Love Association (NAMBLA) from 
the International Lesbian and Gay Association (ILGA) and of female transsexuals 
from the 19
th
 Annual Michigan Womyn’s Music Festival (MWMF), is illustrative of 




NAMBLA has been – and still is – being accused of promoting paedophilia. 
In 1993, NAMBLA’s practical participation in the ILGA became public. As a result, 
ILGA’s consultative status to the United Nations Economic and Social Council was 
imperilled. Therefore, in order both not to risk its consultative status being revoked 
and to distance itself from paedophilia accusations, ILGA decided to expel 
NAMBLA. Similar concerns of organizations about the image they communicate, 
both to their members and to outsiders, and about distinguishing between 
legitimate/socially tolerable and illegitimate/socially intolerable objectives are 
reflected by the MWMF incident also. Transsexual women were initially refused 
entrance to the festival, since a large number of the women involved in the MWMF 
did not recognize them as ‘real’ women and demanded that they should not be 
admitted to the festival.
722
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NAMBLA members and transsexual women threatened the existing symbolic 
boundaries of the gay and lesbian group and of the lesbian feminist group 
respectively. Therefore, under pressure originating both from organization outsiders 
and from insiders, ILGA and the MWMF organizers were forced to redraw their 
inclusion and exclusion boundaries in order to retain solidarity among the group – in 
the case of MWMF – and to retain the ability to communicate their demands to a 
cultural system that devalues non-traditional identities – in the case of ILGA.723  
Gamson distinguishes between symbolic and actual boundaries and between 
symbolic exclusion and practical participation. He argues that identity boundaries are 
nothing but public communication tools that are used for political purposes, since the 
contestation of identity has substantial social, legal and political effects; it influences 
the distribution of resources, services, access and legitimacy. It is not the 
participation of particular people in sexuality and gender movements that is 
threatening. For example, NAMBLA was active in the ILGA for many years before 
its expelling, while transsexual women were quietly allowed in the MWMF after 
their official exclusion. Rather, there exists a gap between practice and public 
discourse that explains debates over inclusion or exclusion as ‘public communication 
strategies’, which depend on a group’s communicative environment – that is, the 
location and nature of its primary audience.
724
 
With regard to the gay and lesbian movement and its campaigns in the US, 
Bernstein also argues that identity deployment is a form of strategic collective action 
that is informed by the movement’s interaction with the state and with state actors, as 
well as by its access to polity and opposition. Because the movement has 
transformed from one seeking cultural transformation to one seeking achievement of 
rights, it has gradually abandoned its emphasis on difference from the heterosexual 
majority in favour of stressing its similarities to it. However, Bernstein does not see 
this trend as problematic. She argues in favour of abandoning essentialist 
characterizations of social movements as either ‘expressive/cultural’ or 
                                                                                                                                          
identities could be perceived by some activists as a threat to group successes that were premised on 
the employment of such essentialist identities. What should also be noted is that this suspicion 
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tendencies of trans* and argue that trans* participates in the replication, confirmation and 
perpetuation of essentialist and stereotyping gender imagery. For example, see: Janice G. Raymond. 
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‘instrumental/political’, since such an approach ignores structural and contextual 
factors.
725
 A shared collective identity is utilized in various ways within movements: 
it is necessary for mobilization; it can be a goal of activism (either gaining 
acceptance of a stigmatized identity or deconstructing categories of identities); and it 
can be utilized as a political strategy for either cultural or instrumental goals.
726
  
The history of the LGBTQ movement in the US demonstrates that political 
and cultural goals are not mutually exclusive. Rather, depending on the conditions in 
which the movement is situated, emphasis is placed either on political or cultural 
strategies. Moreover, these conditions are more determinative for the movement than 
a notion of fixed identity, since the impact of constructed identities depends on the 
cultural and political climate in which they are communicated and contested. For 
example, in seeking cultural and political change, the sexual liberation movements 
that emerged in the 1960s employed the discourse of emancipation and developed 
radical – though vague – political strategies that sought to eradicate all forms of 
exclusion and suppression. However, by the late 1970s and 1980s when both 
opposition and political access increased, they assumed an assimilationist approach 
and reoriented identity politics towards the attainment of particular group-specific 
rights.
727
 By 1986, given the government’s lack of response to the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic and the defeat in Bowers v. Hardwick,
728
 a large number of LGBTQ 
activists and scholars turned to criticizing dominant cultural practices through the 
espousal of the language of queer politics. This shift between approaches 
demonstrates that both political and cultural strategies have the ability to influence 
and even transform both political structures and dominant cultural patterns. 
Consequently, distinguishing them or categorizing movements either as identity-




                                                 
725
   Bernstein, “Celebration and Suppression”, 531-65; Bernstein, “Identities and Politics,” 531-81. 
Bernstein explains that cultural goals include challenging dominant constructions of masculinity and 
femininity and homophobia and heteronormativity, whereas political goals include changing laws and 
policies in order to gain new rights, benefits and increased protection. See: Bernstein, “Identities and 
Politics”, 536.  
726
   Bernstein, “Celebration and Suppression,” 533-5; Bernstein, “Identities and Politics,” 532-9. 
727
   Weeks, “The Sexual Citizen,” 48. 
728
   Bowers v. Hardwick, 1986 (478 US 186). 
729
   Bernstein, “Identities and Politics,” 537-71. For a similar point of view and a comparison 
between the LGBT movements in Britain, Canada and the US, see: Rayside, “The Structuring of 
Sexual Minority Activist Opportunities in the Political Mainstream,” 23-55. 
Nayia Kamenou  Page 272 of 343 
 
To summarize, the US LGBT movement has managed to achieve a degree of 
formal legal equality by adopting mainstream discourses. Yet, this assimilationist 
approach is far from unproblematic. It glosses over the fact that the need to assume 
gender and sexual identities in order to challenge their current boundaries proves that 
there are certain forces which produce and have a stake in maintaining these very 
same social and legal constructions. On the one hand, identity categories such as 
race, sex or gender, form the basis of legal protections and benefits. On the other 
hand, forming one’s identity based on rigid categories violates a person’s sense of 
the self.
730
 Therefore, it is important – both for activists and scholars – to maintain a 
double consciousness regarding identities. To be sure, identities are cultural creations 
and social constructions. Nonetheless, even though fictitious, they remain significant 
since as the case of LGBTQ activism in the US demonstrates, ‘they provide the 
means through which we negotiate the hazards of everyday life in a world in a 
process of constant change’.731 
Although it has not yet been formally addressed by the organization, Accept-
LGBT’s stance towards sexuality identities, membership rules and, by extension, its 
public face and image, is something that already concerns some of its members.  For 
example, when I was in Cyprus in July 2010, I saw one of the group’s members 
whom I had previously interviewed. He approached me and asked for my advice as 
an ‘expert’. He explained that although this was not something that he had brought 
up for discussion during the group’s meetings, he was concerned by the fact that 
although the ‘LGBT’ acronym constituted part of the group’s official name, there 
were no trans* members in the group. He said that he knew some Greek-Cypriot 
male-to-female trans* people, but he was hesitant about asking them to join the 
group. He explained that because they were so ‘flamboyant’ and because he thought 
that one of them was working as a prostitute, he was worried about jeopardizing the 
group’s image. I said that the dilemma was about what kind of organization its 
members wanted Accept-LGBT to be. Almost apologetically, he replied: 
 
I know we need to be all good and nice gays and lesbians, if the Church and the 
politicians are not to stone us to death! This is why I side in favour of gay marriage, 
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you know? What I want is freedom, but I know that we cannot win, unless we play 
their game. Still, they [trans* individuals] should be represented. Well, after all, we 




Besides other debates that might arise among the organization’s members 
with regard to identity and representation, what this ‘lost-in-translation’ incident 
highlights is, most importantly, the pervasiveness of Western/European terminology, 
ideas and even values in relation to LGBTQ identification, organization and 
mobilization in the ‘Periphery’. What it also demonstrates is that regardless of the 
applicability – or lack thereof – of Western/European sexual and gender identities in 
non-Western milieux, the question of ‘freedom versus assimilation’ is one that 
troubles ‘non-Western’ Cypriot LGBTQs also. Although Cypriot LGBTQs do not 
enjoy the Western/European rights that have been won elsewhere based on identity 
politics and litigation – for example same-sex marriage, civil unions or adoption – 
they are already concerned about the effects of identity politics, mainstreaming and 
assimilation on their indigenous modalities of desire. The importance of this rests on 
the fact that it might indicate that Cypriot non-heterosexuals value gender and 
sexuality fluidity, as well as indigenous ways of making sense of gender and 
sexuality more that rights, which necessitate assuming a fixed – even if merely 
strategic – identity. 
For example, as Tarik Bereket and Barry D. Adam report based on interviews 
with Turkish non-heterosexuals, local gay identities are ‘syncretic’. Although gay 
(gey) identities have been taken up by Turkish men, the active-passive distinction 
(actif-pasif) remains the primary organizer of sexual relations among men. 
‘Lubunya’ or ‘pasif gey’ are the terms used to describe men who assume the 
penetrated role and who assume and declare a feminine gender identity, while the 
term ‘laço’ or ‘actif gey’ is used to describe men who assume the penetrating role 
and assume and declare an ultra-macho gender identity. The sex roles between a 
lubunya and a laço are strictly observed, although some interviewees reported that 
laços often assume a ‘passive’ role during sex, although never with ‘their’ lubunya. 
This reversal of sexual roles is something that takes place in total secrecy, usually 
between a laço and a stranger.  
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What is also interesting is that the gey identity was described by interviewees 
in terms of gender. As they reported, the gey Turkish man is one who avoids the 
extreme gender bifurcation and identifies as someone between a laço and a lubunya. 
Men who identify as gey form relationships only with men who also identify as gey; 
with people of the same gender identification.
733
 Similar understandings of same-sex 
sexualities that are based on the different gender identification of the same-sex 
partners are also reported to exist within the Greek context.
734
 As Dennis Altman 
explains, even in places where a strong homosexual tradition predates the Western 
impact, it is Westernization that introduces the idea of a homosexual identity.
735
 
The case of gay identities in contemporary Turkey that Bereket and Adam 
describe,
736
 Karayanni’s analysis of Greek-Cypriot expressions of sexuality737 and 
Loizos and Papataxiarchis’s’ work on Greek and Greek-Cypriot gender 
subjectivities
738
 prove that local modalities of desire and of gender performance did 
exist before the sweeping  globalization of Western/European gender and sexual 
identity stereotypes. The new challenge in locales like Cyprus consists of moulding 
these new political global stereotypes, images, values, ideals and ideas based on 
local needs and understandings; namely, shaping these new concepts and this new 
language whose aim is to speak a way of being that – until recently – was silenced, 
in ways that local LGBTQs see fit for their aims and purposes. 
The argument that in the case of Cyprus – and elsewhere –official elite-led 
attempts to build the country and its’ people ‘modernity’ are based on Eurocentric 
ideology and on the reproduction of a colonialist rhetoric that is mounted against the 
cultural ‘other’, i.e. the Turkish-Cypriot, is hard to dismiss. As Argyrou argues, since 
in such and in similar locales ‘modernity’ constitutes a historically constructed 
instrument of cultural and ethnic division and of the reproduction of one’s own 
subjectivization, it seems that ‘modernity’ is neither a destination to be reached, nor 
an object to be appropriated.
739
 However, and without denying the ‘West’ and 
‘modernity’s’ complicity in domination, I argue that these mechanisms of 
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subjectivization could serve as tools of emancipation once their ‘victims’ become 
aware of their position in the power game, the rules of the game and their available 
options.  
The ways in which Greek-Cypriot LGBTQs consciously organize and 
mobilize within the ambit of the existing structures supports the argument that when 
rupture from the system is not a viable option, a temporal appropriation of the 
system’s logic and mechanisms could afford Greek-Cypriot LGBTQ activists with 
the tools and the legitimacy needed, in order to negotiate their current stance on the 
chessboard of socio-political relations. In the process, local modalities of sexuality 
and same-sex desire, as well as local sexual identities, will be influenced by both the 
socio-cultural context within which they emerge and by transnational discourses of 
sexuality. The fact that the articulation and communication of LGBTQ identities in 
Cyprus is currently in a flux does not undermine the importance of sexual identities 
or their centrality to Cypriot LGBTQs’ sense of the self. Such identities are not per 
se under negotiation. Rather, what is being negotiated are the means through which 
such identities can be named and articulated in ways that do not violate LGBTQ 
Cypriots’ self-understandings; the means for rendering these identities legible in the 
wider socio-political and cultural context and malleable enough in order to allow for 
cross-cultural and cross-border LGBTQ alliances. 
What’s next for Cypriot LGBTQ Activism? 
 
Before further discussing Cypriot LGBTQ activism, I ought to clarify what I 
am aiming and what I am not aiming to do in the process of building my argument. 
Restaging the process of Accept-LGBT’s formation and of Cypriot LGBTQ 
activism’s development, and delivering a judgment on how the group’s founding and 
other members ought to have acted or should act in the future is beyond the purpose 
of the current analysis. This is because, firstly, it is still too early to make 
judgements and draw conclusions about the group’s patterns of internal organization 
and external communication; and, secondly, even if such task were possible, it would 
not have any effects on what the focal point of the current analysis is. Instead, I am 
interested in analyzing some of the patterns of organization of Accept-LGBT by 
focusing on the social, cultural and political goals that its members articulate, as well 
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as on the actual social, cultural and political effects – if any – that their practices had 
from the time of the creation of the group until today.
740
 I will attempt to do so by 
examining the reaction of Accept-LGBT activists to, and interaction with elite 
discourses that pertain to LGBTQ issues that have been publically articulated since 
17 May 2010, when Accept-LGBT was formally launched. In order to do this, I will 
use information that I collected through personal interviews and unofficial/non-
recorded conversations with Accept-LGBT members.
741
 I will also draw upon media 
and press coverage on the organization and its activities, as well as on media and 
press information on elites’ responses to the activities of Accept-LGBT.742 
Even while the Modinos case was debated at the ECtHR, the major Greek-
Cypriot newspapers referred to its development only sporadically.
743
 When they 
would refer to it, relevant articles were kept very short, they were published in the 
pages towards the end – usually near the wedding announcements, advertisements or 
obituaries sections – and they were merely descriptive. If any comment was made, it 
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“Elsewheres: Greek LGBT Activists and the Imagination of a Movement,” PhD Thesis, Rice 
University, Houston TX, 2005.   
741
   By ‘unofficial/non-recorded conversations with Accept-LGBT members’, I mean conversations 
that I had with some of the group’s members outside the context of the official recorded interviews, 
yet still for the purposes of this project. Some of the group members are friends, while I keep in 
contact with some other group members, whom I interviewed as part of my research. Therefore, I had 
the chance to engage in one-to-one conversations and group discussions with these people before 
and/or after the official interviews with them. 
742
   The idea of forming Accept-LGBT Cyprus arose in October 2009 but the organization was not 
officially launched until May 2010, i.e., after I had completed the interviews with elites. Therefore, it 
was not possible to get the elite interviewees’ opinions specifically on Accept-LGBT Cyprus, 
although some of them positioned themselves regarding the possibility of LGBTQ activism and 
mobilization. 
743
   Cyprus Press Information Office (PIO) newspaper archive research covering the period between 
1980 and 2010. I looked for articles about LGBT and gender/ women’s issues – legal, social, cultural 
and ‘medical’. My choosing to look for articles that had been published between 1980 and 2010 was 
purposeful. Namely, since this thesis aims to examine constructions of gender and sexuality identities 
in relation to constructions of national identity and national/nationalist narratives and discourses, I 
chose to start by looking for material published in 1980, since the early 1980s more or less constitute 
the era during which the RoC constructed and widely – i.e., both nationally and internationally – 
began to articulate its official discourse in relation to the 1974 events. I chose to look at four Greek-
Cypriot ‘major’ newspapers: «Φιλελεύθερος» (Phileleftheros), «Χαραυγή» (Haravgi), «Σημερινή» 
(Simeri) and «Μάχη» (Machi). By ‘major newpapers’ I do not mean those with the biggest issue sales. 
Rather, these four newspapers represent the four major Cypriot political/ideological stands, since each 
of them –as almost all the Greek-Cypriot newspapers up until the 2000s – is affiliated/supports one of 
the major Greek-Cypriot political parties (that is, DIKO, AKEL, DISY and EDEK). I also looked at 
two newspapers published in English: The Cyprus Mail and the Cyprus Weekly. Although sometimes 
–  especially in articles published in the 1980s and up until the mid-1990s – a ‘tone’ of Western 
superiority over the ‘less advanced Cypriots’ can be detected in the ‘voice’ of these two newspapers 
(for example, Cypriot negative social attitudes and discriminatory public policy decisions are 
explained away through the employment of the ‘West v. Cyprus’ binary), in general, these 
newspapers maintain a neutral stance with regard to national and human rights – including gender and 
sexuality rights – issues. 
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was very negative and it usually defamed non-heterosexual individuals via criticizing 
Modinos’s lack of ‘moral values’.744 Gay and lesbian issues gained a slightly more 
prominent position in the Cypriot press and media after Modinos won the case at the 
ECtHR. However, even then, press articles and radio and television programmes 
focused on the legal aspects of homosexuality. The commonly shared argument was 
the ‘need’ to abide by the Modinos ruling due to political concerns over the standing 
of the RoC in the CoE, the country’s EU admission prospects and the prospects for 
regional/EU support to the RoC with regard to the negotiation of the ‘national 
problem’.745 When the media would engage with aspects other than legal ones, the 
positions articulated and the arguments propelled would remain limited and solely 
address questions of the type: ‘Is homosexuality biologically determined’ – or 
otherwise phrased, ‘is it infectious?’; ‘What do our (Christian Orthodox) religious 
dogma and Church have to say about  homosexuality?’; ‘Is there anything that 
parents could do to “help” (i.e., “cure”) their (problematic) homosexual children?’; 
‘How do psychology and psychiatry explain this “condition”?’.746  
After the legal amendments that the Modinos ruling had prescribed were 
made, LGBTQ issues were again pushed into invisibility and were almost 
completely banished from public dialogue. Questions pertaining to LGBTQ lives 
were taken up again in the late 2000s, largely because of the dealing by the 
Ombudman’s Office with complaints brought to it by LGBTQ individuals residing in 
Cyprus. These complaints concerned the RoC’s legal framework pertaining to the 
right to asylum for foreigners facing persecution in their home countries because of 
their non-heterosexuality, as well as to the rights to residence and employment for 
Cypriot nationals’ same-sex partners. 747  Nevertheless, these cases did not really 
enjoy media coverage.  
                                                 
744
   According to my research, the general pattern was as follows: left-leaning Χαραυγή did not go 
beyond the exposition of mere facts, while centre-rightist-leaning Φιλελεύθερος (to a moderate 
degree), and right-leaning Σημερινή and Μάχη (to a high degree) employed discriminatory language 
against LGBT individuals and/or attacked Modinos.  
745
   See chapter three.  
746
   Based on PIO archive research results and analysis.  
747
   However, the Office’s suggestions and efforts to ameliorate LGBT individuals’ legal standing are 
made public and are available from the Ombudsman’s Office to those interested in the topic. The 
Office was created in 1991. Iliana Nicolaou, the Cypriot Ombudsman from 18 December 1998 until 
16 March 2011, has made proposals to the government with regard to the need to address LGBTQ 
legal and social issues. See, for example: Office of the Commissioner for Administration 
(Ombudsman), “Annual Report of the Authority against Racism and Discrimination (suggestion 
granting asylum to Iranian partner of Cypriot gay citizen; suggestion for equal treatment with regard 
to residence and work rights towards Canadian husband of Cypriot gay citizen),” Nicosia: 2008. 
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The first relatively major ‘break’ of LGBTQ issues into the public sphere and 
public discourse took place in the summer of 2008. Although as two different 
countries Greece and the RoC have different legal frameworks, the conduct of two 
same-sex wedding ceremonies by the mayor of the Greek island of Tilos and the 
debates and events that followed this event, sparked a reaction in the Greek-Cypriot 
media. The moral ‘appropriateness’, the possible socio-cultural effects and the 
possibility of legal recognition of same-sex civil unions became the topic of a 
primetime show on the CyBC.
748
 Since then, LGBTQ topics continue to appear in 
the Greek-Cypriot press and media – especially the privately-owned – and even 
make headlines. For example, the free weekly newspaper of the island’s capital, 
named City, devoted two whole issues to homophobia.
 749
 Nevertheless, it is 
important to note the more reserved stance by the publically owned national 
television channel: Although in the past the CyBC had broadcast a discussion show 
on the issue of same-sex civil unions,
750
 it refused to show anti-discrimination 
advertisements that were part of a European Commission-funded campaign by the 
Ombudsman’s Office. The CyBC’s director at the time deemed one advertisement 
that featured a lesbian openly discussing her same-sex relationship as ‘inappropriate’ 
for the Cypriot audience. Nonetheless, the privately-owned television channels did 
not share this opinion and broadcast the advert.
 751
 The CyBC director’s decision was 
criticized in the Cypriot press and, in this way, generated a new wave of public 
debate over same-sex sexuality issues. Therefore, through such events that 
culminated in May 2010 with the official launch of Accept-LGBT, the predominant 




Even before the idea for the formation a new LGBT organization was born in 
October 2009, the need to finally address several LGBT issues, which became 
pressing because of the RoC’s continuing reluctance to abide by developing 
                                                 
748
   Το συζητάμε, 2 June 2008. See chapter one for a discussion.  
749
   City, issue no. 160, 15-21 May 2009; City, issue no. 214, 25 June-1 July 2010. 
750
   Το συζητάμε, 2 June 2008. 
751
   Patrick Dewhurst, “CyBC refused to show anti-discrimination advert,” Cyprus Mail, 15 June 
2010. 
<www.cyprus-mail.com/cyprus/cybc-refused-show-anti-discrimination-advert/20100615> (17 July 
2010).  
752
    Reporters from all the major Cypriot newspapers were present at, and reported on the group’s 
press conference, which took place on 17 May 2010.  
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European trends pertaining to LGBT rights, became apparent.
753
 Due to a number of 
complaints about RoC’s refusal to recognize same-sex civil unions and marriages of 
Cypriot nationals with foreigners that had taken place abroad, in July 2009, the 
former Cypriot Ombudsman, Iliana Nicolaiou, and the Cypriot Authority against 
Racism and Discrimination submitted to the government a report that referred to the 




While Accept-LGBT was still in the initial stages of its formation, a gay male 
individual submitted to the Ombudsman’s Office a complaint about the lack of 
legislation pertaining to same-sex civil marriage. After examining the case, the 
Ombudsman suggested the examination of the complaint by the Attorney General 
Office.
755
 It is important to note that, in his report to the Ombudsman, the 
complainant made extensive reference to ECtHR litigation in order to justify the 
grounds and merits of his request.
756
  
The complainant had the official support of the new LGBT organization and 
of Modinos’s AKOK, while by the time he submitted his complaint, the 
Ombudsman’s Office had already made numerous suggestions to the government 
regarding LGBT issues. Because of the resonance of the complainant’s claim among 
Cypriot LGBTQ activists and because of the suggestions made by the Ombudsman’s 
Office, the political elite finally started sensing that ignoring the complaint would 
not be tolerated – at least not by the Cypriot LGBTQs, who had started organizing 
and mobilizing. The complaint was directed to the legal services of the RoC and on 
12 April 2010, the attorney general’s decision was announced to the complainant. In 
                                                 
753
   These developing trends are discussed in detail in chapter three.  
754
   Office of the Commissioner for Administration (Ombudsman), “Report of the Authority against 
Racism and Discrimination regarding the respect of the regulation for equal treatment of same-sex 
couples in to civil union, in the ambit of Directive 2004/38/EC, which refers to the rights of EU 
citizens and their family members to freely travel and reside in member states’ territory, File Number 
ΑΚΡ 40/2009, ΑΚΡ 76/2009,” Nicosia: 31 July 2009 (Έκθεση της Αρχής κατά του Ρατσισμού και 
των Διακρίσεων αναφορικά με το σεβασμό της αρχής της ίσης μεταχείρισης των ομόφυλων 
ζευγαριών σε σχέση καταχωρημένης συμβίωσης, στα πλαίσια εφαρμογής της Οδηγίας 2004/38/ΕΚ 
σχετικά με το δικαίωμα των πολιτών της Ένωσης και των μελών των οικογενειών τους να 
κυκλοφορούν ελεύθερα στην επικράτεια των κρατών μελών, Αρ. Φακ. ΑΚΡ 40/2009, ΑΚΡ 76/2009. 
Λευκωσία, 31 Ιουλίου 2009).  
755
   Office of the Commissioner for Administration (Ombudsman), “Report of the  Authority against 
Racism and Discrimination regarding the legal recognition same-sex couples’ relationships, File 
Number ΑΚΡ 142/2009, ΑΚΡ 16/2010,” Nicosia: 2010 (Έκθεση της Αρχής κατά του Ρατσισμού και 
των Διακρίσεων αναφορικά με τη νομική κατοχύρωση των σχέσεων των ομόφυλων ζευγαριών, Αρ. 
Φακ. ΑΚΡ 142/2009, ΑΚΡ 16/2010. Λευκωσία, 2010). 
756
   Among other cases: Kozak v. Poland, 2010 (No. 13102/02); L. and V. v. Austria, 2003 (No. 
39392/98 & 39829/98); S.L. v. Austria, 2003 (No. 45330/99). 
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sum, the decision argued that amending the law falls under the authority of the 
legislative branch. Therefore, the attorney general and the governments’ legal branch 
were not in a position to make any amendments to the law. The decision also 
stressed that the relevant ministry – that is, the Ministry of Interior – had no 
obligation under international law and under human rights law to amend the law in 
question; if it ever decided to do so, it would be a matter of discretion.
757
  
Two aspects of this case need to be noted. The first, and most obvious one, is 
the fact that the development of this case was being covered in the press since its 
submission to the Ombudsman’s Office. Besides reporting the facts of this case, 
newspapers dealt with the social dimensions of the possible recognition of same-sex 
civil unions also, as well as with the consequences of the current lack of such 
recognition on Cypriot LGBTQs. Moreover, the attorney general’s decision was 
published in all major newspapers and was accompanied by comments for and 
against the recognition, while numerous readers’ letters and opinion articles were 
also published.
758
 What is of great importance to highlight is that, in their majority, 
these readers’ letters and opinion articles were supportive of the complainant’s claim 
for recognition of same-sex civil unions. Although these letters and opinions cannot 
substantiate the claim that a general shift in public opinion towards LGBTQ people 
and their rights has occurred, it could be argued that Greek-Cypriot public opinion 
has started to be inseminated and affected by LGBTQ discourses that link sexual 
equality claims to the language of European human rights. The second aspect that 
needs to be noted is the less prominent one: the discourse that the Attorney General’s 
Office employed in order to justify its decision to keep a hands-off position and not 
to press the government to deal with the issue.  
In the mid-1990s and early 2000s, while balancing the costs and benefits of 
abiding with the Modinos ruling, the Greek-Cypriot elite employed the rhetoric of 
                                                 
757
   The letter to complainant from the legal services of the RoC, a copy of which was give to me by 
the complainant himself, stated:  ‘Θα πρέπει όμως να τονίσω ότι το καθ’ ύλην υπουργείο δεν έχει 
καμία υποχρέωση απορρέουσα από το Διεθνές Δίκαιο και το Δίκαιο των Ανθρωπίνων Δικαιωμάτων 
να τροποποιήσει την εν λόγω νομοθεσία. Αν το πράξει, αυτό επαφίεται στη διακριτική του ευχέρεια.’ 
(‘However, I must stress that the ministry responsible [for matters pertaining to marriage] has no 
obligation under international law or human rights law to amend the legislation in question. If it does 
so, this would be a matter [that falls under] its discretion.’). The same argument was also propelled by 
the Cypriot Supreme Court in its ruling over a case concerning the recognition of a same-sex civil 
marriage conducted in Canada between a Canadian and a Cypriot citizen. See: Politis, «Το Ανώτατο 
απέρριψε προσφυγή ζευγαριού ομοφυλοφίλων», Πολίτης. 24 July 2010, 51. 
758
   For example, see relevant articles and commentary in the newspapers Politis and Cyprus Mail 
from 12 April 2010 to 26 April 2010. Available online at:  <www. politis-news.com> and 
<www.cyprus-mail.com>. 
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‘unless we succumb to Europe, our national aims will be jeopardized’. It did so in 
order to justify its compliance with an official, regional legal ruling,
759
 which was 
premised on one of the basic pillars of liberal democracy – that is, the respect of 
privacy and self-determination of the individual. This being the case, the government 
of a country that was aspiring to join the EU needed not to offer any further 
justification. In the mid-2000s case that pertained to the claim for recognition of 
same-sex marriages the legal arm of the state once again prioritized the ‘nation-state’ 
(over the ‘state’ that in the 1990s was aspiring to become part of a regional 
organization – the EU – which, among other things, represents a set of values), but 
did so by turning its mid-1990s and early 2000s argument on its head: The RoCs 
refusal to recognize civil unions is a result of the lack of exercise of pressure and of 
the lack of relevant CoE enforcement mechanisms. Therefore, the argument that, in 
Cyprus, the recognition or abuse of human rights is not a matter of principle or of 
shared ‘European’ values but, rather, a decision that is informed primarily by 
national interests is confirmed. 
A further issue became prominent because of this case and of the fact that it 
attracted so much attention in the national media: The issue of ‘morality’ – or rather, 
lack thereof – of same-sex desire and of its ‘detrimental’ social impact arose again in 
attempts to ground opposition to same-sex civil unions. An  – at that time – MP of 
the right-wing party DISY, Andreas Themistocleous, made numerous public 
statements not solely regarding the specific case, but also regarding homosexuality 
as a question of ‘morals’. During a live radio show in April 2010, Themistocleous 
unleashed a verbal attack against LGBTQ people. While debating with the then 
Ombudsman, Iliana Nicolaou, about the legalization of same-sex civil unions he 
said: ‘Just because there exist among us paedophiles, people who practice bestiality, 
necrophiliacs and other criminals, should the state legitimize their status too?’760 His 
statements immediately sparked a huge wave of reactions, not only from his political 
opponents but from the wider civil society also. Within hours of his statements, a 
                                                 
759
   Vasileiou, «Βουλευτές: Ευρωπαίοι κατ’ανάγκη»; Machi, «Ανεκτέλεστη κινδυνεύει να μείνει η 
απόφαση για την Τιτίνα Λοϊζίδου»; Hellicar, “Government Pleads with Deputies to Allow Gay Sex”; 
Levy and Long, “Repressive ‘reform’ in Cyprus”; Kambas, “Cyprus Should Lift Gay Ban”. 
760
   Elias Hazou, “Some People are Gay, Get Over It,” Cyprus Mail, 27 April 2010  
<www.cyprus-mail.com/cyprus/some-people-are-gay-get-over-it/20100427> (5 May 2010). See also: 
Jacqueline Agathocleous, “Europe Report Shows LGBT Rights in Cyprus Low,” Cyprus Mail, 24 
June 2011  
<www.cyprus-mail.com/cyprus/europe-report-shows-lgbt-rights-cyprus-low/20110624> (1 
September 2011).  
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group called ‘MP Themistocleous’s statements about homosexuality are 
inacceptable’ was created on Facebook and within few days almost two thousand 
people joined the group.
761
  
The newspapers were bombarded with readers’ letters criticizing the MP’s 
bigotry and homophobia. However, Themistocleous continued to make public 
statements of the same nature. Even when after a month of public pressure and 
criticism his party president, Nikos Anastasiades, made a statement denouncing the 
MP’s behaviour and calling him to order,762 Themistocleous continued his attempts 
to prove that his statements were justified. He insisted on his positions even after the 
European Parliament’s Intergroup on LGBT Rights released a statement criticizing 
his behaviour.
763
 The MP refused to withdraw his statements and went as far as 
claiming that the sole victim in this incident was himself because – as he claimed –
the Intergroup, his party and Cypriot society wanted to deprive him from his right of 
freedom of expression.
764
 However – and regardless of the reasons that led him to 
make these statements and insist on his homophobic positions – with his stance, 
Themistocleous only succeeded in summoning a large diverse group that consisted 
of LGBTQ individuals, heterosexual LGBTQ-friendly citizens, youth organizations, 
educators, other MPs and politicians and even Christian Orthodox religious groups’ 
representatives,
765
 who forcefully opposed public homophobic discourses and 
institutionalized homophobia.  
The aforementioned Facebook group, which was set up by some Accept-
LGBT members, continued to exist until April 2011 and it helped summon a 
continuously growing number of citizens to the LGBTQ cause for sexual equality. 
The reactions of the wider Cypriot public to Themistocleous’s statements served as a 
‘testing of the waters’ for the new organization, which has now managed to gain a 
space and a voice in the Cypriot socio-political arena:  Besides the fact that it keeps 
                                                 
761
   Politis, «Facebook εναντίον βουλευτή», Πολίτης. 26 April 2010, 3. 
762
   Politis, «Μέτρα για τους…απείθαρχους», Πολίτης. 12 May 2010, 4. Nonetheless, DISY clarified 
that its disapproval of Themistocleous’s comments does not affect the party’s position on the issue of 
recognition of same-sex civil unions, which remains negative. 
763
   European Parliament’s Intergroup on LGBT Rights, “Intergroup writes to Member of the Cyprus 
Parliament on Homophobic Remarks (Intergroup Letter of 31 May 2010)” <www.lgbt-
ep.eu/intergroup-documents/intergroup-writes-to-member-of-the-cyprus-parliament-on-homophobic-
remarks/> (14 July 2010). 
764
   See also Themistocleous’s letter to the Intergroup’s co-presidents Michael Cashman and Ulrike 
Lunacek.  Politis, «Ανοικτή επιστολή στους Cashman και Lunacek», Πολίτης. 25 July 2010, 64. 
765
   Alithia, «Ναι σε συμβίωση ομοφύλων», Interview with Mr. Andreas Pitsellides, Αλήθεια. 4 May 
2010 <http://alithia.com.cy/alithia_v2/front-
end/main.php?action=nptext&page=&design=default&nptext-id=59163/> (5 May 2010).  
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growing in size, it organizes numerous conferences, symposia, art festivals and 
exhibitions; its members have formed links with other national and transnational 
LGBTQ groups, like the Homosexual and Lesbian Community of Greece 
(Ομοφυλοφιλική Λεσβιακή Κοινότητα Ελλάδας) and ILGA-Europe. The possibility of 
organizing the first Pride Parade in Cyprus in 2012 is currently under consideration 
by Accept-LGBT, while the group participated in the 2011 Athens Pride Parade and 
was funded and assisted by ILGA-Europe in order to conduct the first large-scale 
survey on Cypriot LGBT perceptions and attitudes. Additionally, in light of the May 
2011 parliamentary elections, Accept-LGBT lobbied candidate MPs from all 
political parties.  
As Petros Papadopoulos of Accept-LGBT reported, the number of 
prospective MPs that responded to the organization’s lobbying was much higher than 
the activists expected. However, he also pointed out that both he and the 
organization as a whole remain sceptical towards the supportive responses they 
received. He said: 
 
Surprisingly, we got a lot of positive responses. We expected to be dismissed, at 
least by some [prospective MPs]. It’s hard to believe, but the DISY [the rightist 
party] candidates were the most supportive. Some people from DIKO [the right-
centrist party] and from EDEK [the socialist-centrist party] were also pretty 
supportive. The AKEL [i.e., the communist-leftist governing party] people are the 
ones who kept silent. They have not yet responded to the letter we sent them. They 
are already governing so, I don’t know. Maybe they have less at stake by not 
assuring our votes? But we do not really think or expect much of this [supportive 
response by prospective MPs] anyways. They [i.e., prospective MPs] always give 
you the sweet talking when elections are around the corner. Talking, talking, 
talking... [Pauses]. We will see how supportive they are of our cause, after they 




Papadopoulos’s pessimistic view of Cypriot politicians’ ‘true’ interest in the 
Accept-LGBT cause is supported by the fact that the relevant RoC authorities have 
not yet accommodated the organization’s request to be officially registered and 
recognized as a legal person. As an Accept-LGBT member reported, in February 
                                                 
766
   “Discussion with Petros Papadopoulos,” Nicosia, 19 April 2011. 
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2011, the Ministry of Interior requested four ministers – the ministers of 
employment, justice, education and health – to submit their observations and 
recommendations as to how they would respond to the request of Accept-LGBT, 
while the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Interior, Mr. Lazaros Savvides, 
stated that before reaching a decision, he would also consult the Church of 
Cyprus.
767
 This approach by the RoC to the group’s request to be officially 
recognized likely constitutes a discriminatory interference with the right to freedom 
of association that article Article 11 of the EConvHR protects since soliciting four 
ministries is excessive, while there is no reasoning to support the Church’s 
entitlement to have a saying on this issue.
768
 
However, regardless of the remaining obstacles, it seems that this is a very 
good time for Cypriot LGBTQ activists to organize and mobilize: Not only do they 
have the open support and assistance of external regional bodies and transnational 
LGBT organizations, such as ILGA-Europe; the local environment also seems to be 
offering fertile ground for pushing the boundaries of social imagination with regard 
to the construction and expression of gender and sexuality identities. The 
opportunities are there and Accept’s response to these opportunities has been quick 
and effective. Nonetheless, practical and ideological/theoretical problems still 
remain. It might be the case that external attacks by political elites, like 
Themistocleous, help bring activists together, reach across to other parts of civil 
society and form alliances within and across national borders. However, the 
existence of these types of stimuli cannot be guaranteed. The important issue of 
framing the human rights agenda in LGBTQ activism in a more constructive manner 
remains.
769
 With this issue in mind, it is important for LGBTQ groups, and 
especially newly formed groups that operate in closed and traditional social 
environments, like Accept-LGBT, to be aware of: a) their stance in the matrix of 
power, both locally and in relation to the ‘West’; b) their available options, as well as 
the best ways to combine them and make the best usage of them; c) the fact that 
there are limits to the ideological sacrifices that any group can make in the name of 
                                                 
767
   “Email communication with Accept-LGBT Activist,” 20 February 2011.  
768
    I am grateful to Professor Robert Wintemute for this insight.  
769
   Cruz-Malavé and Manalansan IV, ed. Queer Globalizations. 
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strategic purposes, if it is to preserve its unity and its aims and objectives clear both 
for group members and for external audiences.
770
  
Becoming and remaining aware of these issues necessitates embracing what 
Stychin calls the ‘double movement of globalization’.771 Stychin highlights the need 
for LGBTQ activism to balance the notion of the globalization/transnational nature 
of human rights as a criterion of progress with a degree of resistance to (or, at least, 
with the qualified acceptance of) the notion of globalization of same-sex sexualities 
as identities. The events and reactions described in this section seem to suggest that, 
even at this embryonic stage, Accept-LGBT has managed to reach a considerable 
level of understanding of this ‘double movement’. Although Cypriot LGBTQ 
activists constructively use the language of universal human rights and European 
rights to gain sexual equality, they also embrace multiple and intersecting identities. 
Human rights and multiple identities allow them to ground their demands for the 
country’s ‘Europeanization’ with regard to its legal framework and set of embraced 
values without negating local modalities of desire that do not fit neatly into the 
‘European/Western’ model of LGBTQ identities. 
Conclusion 
 
The discussion of some instances of ‘Western’, and specifically of US, 
politics of sexuality highlighted some of the ideological and practical problems that, 
more often than not, LGBTQ groups need to tackle in the process of defining their 
aims, objectives and identity, as well as in their attempts to communicate their aims, 
objectives and identities to unreceptive audiences.  
                                                 
770
   For example, interviews and discussions with Cypriot LGBTQs and with Accept-LGBT Cyprus 
members revealed that, in their majority, these people attribute sexual choice to biology, ‘nature’ and 
genes. Confirming or discrediting this position is irrelevant to the purposes of this study. However, 
the implications of such arguments, which are premised on biological determinisms, on the impetus of 
Cypriot sexual politics is something that Cypriot LGBTQs should think about. If sexual equality is 
grounded in biology and genes and if ‘problematic’ genes could one day be isolated and controlled 
for, where does this leave sexual politics? Even if non-heterosexuality were biologically determined, 
Cypriot LGBTQ activists should consider whether this is the line of argument that they want to 
prioritize in their struggles for equality. This issue, i.e., the ‘gay gene’ debate and its political 
implications, has been extensively addressed in the literature. For example, see: David Fernbach, 
“Biology and Gay Identity,” New Left Review, no. 228 (March-April 1998): 47-66. 
771
   Carl F. Stychin, “Same-Sex Sexualities and the Globalization of Human Rights Discourse,” 
McGill Law Journal, vol. 49 (2004): 951-68.   
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Useful links can be drawn between the case of such ‘Western’ movements 
and the case of the newly-formed LGBTQ movement in Cyprus. For example, 
Facebook was employed by Cypriot LGBTQs in order to expose an MP’s 
homophobic comments and to summon a large number of supporters against the 
bigotry of some Cypriot political elites. It could be argued that such moves 
contribute to the erosion of political and institutional discursive monopoly. This 
chapter showed that the language of ‘Europe’ works as a valuable pressure tool in 
the hands of Cypriot LGBTQs, since the local political elite cannot disregard the 
need to abide with European norms and rules: Individual ‘European-minded’ 
politicians have better prospects for reelection, while both the Greek-Cypriot and the 
Turkish-Cypriot political elites heavily depend on Europe for the satisfaction of their 
respective ethno-national objectives.  
Nonetheless, although European discourses, institutions and mechanisms 
proved to be effective for Cypriot LGBTQs as a group, the language of ‘Europe’ is 
also being employed by some Cypriot LGBTQs – mostly Greek-Cypriots – in order 
to render Turkish-Cypriot LGBTQs as inferior, that is as ‘non-European/non-
Western’.  This raises the question of how local/individual and ‘European/Western’ 
discourses of sexuality need to be balanced in order to achieve sexual equality while 
avoiding in-groups exclusions. Namely, how and to what extent legal and identity 
sexual politics need to be scrutinized based on queer theory considerations, if they 
are to maintain their beneficial impact on the lives of all Cypriot LGBTQs. 
Admittedly, diasporic movements and the technological advances in the field 
of mass media and communication have had a profound impact both on LGBTQ 
culture and on LGBTQ activism and politics.
772
 Ideologies, practices and images 
travel from the ‘West’ to the ‘Rest’ and vice versa while, through transnational 
alliances, LGBTQ activism increasingly assumes the characteristics of a globalized 
movement. It is still too early to discern all the effects of this trend both in the ‘West’ 
and in the rest of the world. Has it increased public space for public self-
representation and public debates? It certainly has. Has it facilitated the connection 
among sexual expressions and a unity of speech? It has to a considerable degree. 
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However, does it contribute to the fostering of Duggan and Hunter’s concept of 
‘sexual dissent’, which involves the emasculation of hierarchical relations?773  
It has been argued that the cultural production, circulation and reception of a 
presumably international/global LGBTQ movement is problematic, since this 
process is essentially defining LGBTQ liberation by ‘tracing the trajectories of 
modernity’.774 Allegedly, the rhetoric of a transnational LGBTQ movement and of 
transnational LGBTQ identities silences questions about the legitimization of the 
circulation of ideas, processes, practices and political strategies, which are deployed 
to either justify/establish or resist the search for local/indigenous  modalities of 
sexuality and the imposition of international egalitarian notions. The subordination 
of local subjectivities by transnational structures and the hierarchical relations 
between ‘metropolises’ and ‘peripheries’ is concealed under the rubric of the terms 
‘gay’, ‘bisexual’, ‘trans*’ and even ‘queer’. 775  However, a closer look at 
Western/European discourses of sexuality and categories of sexual identity reveals 
that they are not monolithic or inflexible. On the contrary, they are adopted in 
multiple and constantly negotiated ways in different cultural and social settings, as 
part of the process of formulating hegemonic or counter-hegemonic responses to 
global/transnational LGBTQ agendas. 
Although the Cypriot politics of sexuality and Cypriot LGBTQ organization 
and mobilization are currently in the initial stages of their formation, groups like the 
Greek-Cypriot Accept-LGBT and the Turkish-Cypriot Initiative Against 
Homophobia have already faced the need to negotiate and balance often conflicting 
local understandings of gender, sexuality, identity, rights and politics with 
‘Western/European’ discourses that pertain to these issues. As the interviews with 
Cypriot LGBTQs demonstrated, both organized groups and individuals find 
themselves in a similar negotiating position, when they attempt to understand and 
articulate themselves as sexual and political beings. However, striking a balance 
between local conceptions and individual self-identifications on the one hand, and 
increasingly pervasive transnational ‘European/Western’ discourses of sexuality on 
the other hand, is not impossible, although it is not an inevitable or an uncomplicated 
process.  
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Therefore, what needs to be kept in mind both by LGBTQ activists in ‘non-
Western’ milieux and by scholars who study sexual subjectivities and politics in 
such locales is that unless external European/Western discourses and paradigms of 
political activism are scrutinized and selectively employed by local LGBTQ 
movements based on their particular needs and aims, then such discourses and 
paradigms carry the peril of merely replicating – or, even worse, reinforcing – those 
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It has been a long while since the ‘essentialism versus constructionism’ 
debate with regard to sexual categories and identities was put to rest in Anglo-
American scholarship, since forceful arguments about the historical specificity of 
such categories and of identities in general made the sustention of claims about 
essential and intrinsic attributes impossible.
776
 Moreover, the perils of assuming 
Western experience and Western paradigms of the organization of, and mobilization 
around sexuality to be transferable to places and/or beneficial for peoples with 
different socio-cultural patterns and experiences, have been substantially 
highlighted.
777
 Arguments have also been raised, especially by ‘Western/European’ 
LGBTQ activists and legal scholars, about the pitfalls of cultural relativist 
approaches to non-heterosexuality and about the inherent universality of human 
sexual rights – and especially of European rights that pertain to sexuality.778 What 
remains obscure, though, are the dynamics and the effects generated through the 
employment of such ‘Western/European’ approaches in locales like Cyprus, which 
are simultaneously ‘European’ and ‘non-European’; that is, they are European based 
on geographical and political categorizations but non-European when viewed 
through the prism of local culture and locally predominant discourses.  
So, how do Cypriots – elites and non-elites – engage with ‘Europe’ and react 
to the values, ideas and discourses that their recent Europeanization entails? How are 
national, gender and sexual identities formed and/or reformed in the interaction of 
indigenous norms and external influences?  These questions constituted the focus of 
this thesis, which argued that – like all concepts – the concept of ‘Europe’, as well as 
its language, institutions and mechanisms, are employable in numerous ways. 
Moreover, they have the potential to ground and support different, often 
contradicting, elite and non-elite objectives.  
The case of Cyprus exemplifies this argument: In their attempts to propel 
their objectives, elite political and institutional agents – like Cypriot politicians and 
prelates of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus – and non-elite actors – like Cypriot 
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women and LGBTQs –have assumed different positions in relation to European and 
to national discourses at different times. Whether or not such attempts have been 
successful, they point to the fact that the country’s Europeanization does have an 
impact on locally predominant values and understandings of nationhood, gender and 
sexuality. Moreover, the engagement with ‘Europe’ exposes the artificialities 
embedded in nationalistic and heteropatriarchal elite-propelled discourses and helps 
subordinated groups, like women and LGBTQs, to come out of invisibility, 
publically articulate their wants and needs and be heard. Nonetheless, as the events 
surrounding the decriminalization of sexuality in Cyprus illustrate, this is neither as 
easy nor an immediate process. 
According to the Cypriot Orthodox Church-supported PAHOK’s mid-1990s 
statement about the possibility of homosexuality’s decriminalization, ‘those men 
who have succumbed to the satisfaction of their unnatural desires will face God’s 
wrath ... [and] our dynamic resistance’.779 Regardless of the CoE’s prescriptions to 
the RoC to comply with the Modinos ECtHR ruling,
780
 the Church and its affiliated 
religious groups, which united under the umbrella of PAHOK, held the view that the 
legalization of homosexuality needed to be opposed since ‘homosexuality is a sinful 
and slimy act that goes against nature and God’s law’.781 Moreover, as their 
reasoning went, ‘the government can have its obligations towards Europe. The 
Parliament, however, which represents us, cannot and should not be controlled by 





By upholding this despicable law [i.e., the decriminalization legal provisions] our 
morals and dignity are being challenged, our children are put at imminent risk, the 
family institution is being threatened, our society is being corrupted, our national 
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These statements illustrate that in nationalist discourses, ideas about 
‘morality’, ‘dignity’ and ‘propriety’, as well as the preservation of the social 
institution of the heteropatriarchal family, are rendered as the premising pillars of the 
national collectivity and of the ‘nation’s’ struggles against external – namely, Turkey 
– and internal – that is, non-heterosexual Cypriots – enemies. The existence of these 
patriarchical, androcentric and heterocentric ideas and institutions is based on the 
castigation of alternative discourses – for example, the European human rights 
discourse that recognizes LGBTQ rights as human rights – and narratives about 
gender, sexuality and the organization of familial lives. Moreover, it is not solely 
non-heterosexual sexual acts and their legalization that are portrayed as deadly in 
religio-nationalist discourses. The people who embody such acts and the demand that 
the law and the polity recognize their existence are demonized. Their entire mental 
and physical structure is rendered as slimy, abnormal, sinful and dangerous for the 
survival of the national collectivity.
784
 
To be sure, the debate over the decriminalization of homosexuality did not 
generate the Cypriot predominant nationalist discourses or the essentialist 
perceptions of gender and sexuality. Yet, the preoccupation with gender and 
sexuality and with their physical embodiment has always been a recurrent theme in 
narratives about the ‘nation’, as well as in state and institutional attempts to police its 
inclusion and exclusion boundaries. For example, as feminist and gender theory has 
amply demonstrated, ideas about ‘womanhood’, ‘manhood’, female sexual modesty 
and male sexual vigour are recurrent themes in nation-building narratives,
785
 even 
though the mainstream literature on nationhood and national identities tends to 
ignore questions about gender and sexuality. Although the ‘nation’s’ policing and 
regulation activities have been primarily directed towards women, men  have not 
been excluded from control, even though the scholarship on national identities, 
gender and sexuality has been slow in fully discerning the impact of national 
identities and nationalist discourses on both men and women.
786
 This is all the more 
unfortunate since not raising or sufficiently addressing such questions implicitly 
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reinforces or leaves unchallenged essentialist and binary approaches. Such 
approaches tend to lead to hasty conclusions and to dangerous generalizations since 
they equate ‘gender’ with ‘women’, ‘sex’ with ‘gender’, ‘sex’ with ‘sexuality’ and 
assume women to be ‘emotional’ and ‘peace loving’, while they present – primarily 
heterosexual – men as the nationalistically driven creators of conflict.787  
Sex differences are constituted through political societies rather than being 
constitutive of political societies. This is to say that political societies reproduce 
themselves by producing sex and gender dichotomies of masculinity and femininity 
through the control of women, the policing of the processes of reproduction and the 
regulation of the relationships between women and men. This control is exercised 
through marriage and other kinship rules, while the sex and gender system is 
essentially the difference that results from the rules that place bearers and non-
bearers into a particular relationship with one another.
788
 In Cyprus, the continuing 
predominance of such essentialisms and binarisms is exemplified both through 
official elite-articulated discourses and through the internalization of these 
discourses by non-elite agents. For example, even though conscious and strategic to 
a considerable degree, the participation of Cypriot women in nationalist projects and 
their implication in the perpetuation of exclusionary essentialist discourses 
substantiates the argument that unless we move from the study of women’s history to 
the study of gender as a relational category, numerous forms of ‘othering’ remain 
unaddressed. 
Indeed, the problematization of the national identity/nationhood-gender 
relationship needs to be complicated further by the concept of sexuality. A study of 
sexuality unearths the omissions and generalizations of, as well as the binarisms and 
essentialisms embedded in Cypriot national identity and gender literature. Moreover, 
it illustrates the penetrative force of such essentialisms, binaries and homophobic 
discourses. Even non-heterosexual Cypriots tend to see their lives, their familial 
worlds, their emotional needs and their status as the recipients of rights as inferior 
when compared to the heterosexual norm and to those who abide by it. Finally, and 
most importantly, disruptive instances in which sexuality becomes the focus of 
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public debate – in the case of Cyprus, examples of such instances are the Modinos 
and Marangos cases and the claims submitted to the Ombudsman by Cypriot citizens 
for the recognition of same-sex civil unions
789
 – initiate the process of heterocentric 
nationalist rhetoric’s destruction. 
This thesis showed that nationalist discourses have had a considerable degree 
of impact on the shaping of the Cypriot discursive landscape. However, contrary to 
earlier analyses about the impact of nationalist rhetoric,
 790
 it is gradually becoming 
obvious that such discourses have been neither omnipresent and omnipotent, nor 
unsurpassable. Although in the past they have limited non-elite and subaltern 
agency, they have not managed to render it unthinkable – even though the powerful 
political institution of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus has invested a lot of effort 
into cultivating and preserving exclusionary discourses, while the political elite has 
either supported or tolerated the Church’s stance.  
Nationalism includes the seeds of its own destruction and subsequent 
reinvention. Namely, since the ‘nation’ and ideas about the existence of a coherent 
national identity cannot exist unless they constantly measure themselves to what they 
expel, it becomes apparent that the idea of the ‘nation’ and of ‘national identity’ is 
not unchanging or impenetrable. The ‘Self’ is constituted through its distancing from 
the ‘Other’.791 Therefore, the ostracized ‘Other’ does have an impact of how national 
identities and the borders of national collectivity are debated and formed. Cypriot 
women’s engagement with androcentric and patriarchical nationalist discourses 
allowed some of them – admittedly middle and upper-class educated women – to 
enter the existing power structures. Once they had become part of the system, they 
extensively employed European discourses, mechanisms and institutions, managing 
to gain women-specific rights and to promote gender-oriented public policy 
implementation. In the past, the discourses, mechanisms and institutions of Europe 
had been strategically and opportunistically employed exclusively by the male 
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Greek-Cypriot political elite, in order to legitimize nationalist objectives.
792
 
However, by initially adopting the predominant nationalist rhetoric, Cypriot women 
won a place in the public and political sphere and consequently based their demands 
and claims on European standards about the position of women. In this way, they 
initiated the process of the reconfiguration of the nation-gender relationship. With 
the help of ‘Europe’ and through a form of ‘strategic essentialism’793 Cypriot women 
successfully engaged in transversal politics. This approach enabled them ‘if not to 
deconstruct ...  to work around nationalist discourses and to challenge their 
subjectivization projects, not only against women but against all marginalized 
groups’. 794 In this way, they highlighted those Europeanization elements and 
processes that protect and support subordinate classes.  
 The appropriation of ‘Europe’ has functioned in a similar manner in the case 
of Cypriot LGBTQs. Due to the limited spaces and opportunities for the formation of 
alternative discourses of sexuality and of sexual politics of ‘anti-normalization’,795 
the heated debate of ‘strategic essentialism/rights and identities politics versus 
identity deconstruction/radical politics’, which marked Anglo-American scholarship 
and activism in previous decades,
796
 has been absent in Cyprus. This absence 
substantiates arguments made in this thesis that outside the ‘Western/European’ 
context, the exclusive adoption of one of these two approaches is not informative or 
useful for local LGBTQs. Nonetheless, over time, Cypriot LGBTQs have managed 
to turn the dominant elite-propelled nationalist rhetoric on its head and become 
visible in the public sphere, even though the ideological wars of the 
‘Western/European’ politics of sexuality have not been characteristic of the case of 
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Cyprus. ‘Europe’ and its discourses, mechanisms and institutions have been 
extremely conducive towards initiating this process. 
The pre-mid-1990s silence over, and invisibility of non-heterosexual 
modalities of sexuality was complemented by references to ‘European human 
rights’, in order to represent the Greek-Cypriot collectivity as inherently Christian 
Orthodox, Greek, heterosexual and as the victim of human rights abuses by 
Turkey.
797
 However, because of Modinos’s activism, the Modinos ECtHR case and 
this case’s impact on the Cypriot socio-political terrain, sexuality surfaced as a topic 
of public discussion, yet without escaping Foucault’s ‘repressive hypothesis’.798 
Non-heterosexuality was criminalized and indigenous modalities of sexuality were 
placed within the confines of law for the first time, with the transplantation of the 
infamous Labouchere Amendment to the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885 into 
colonial Cyprus by the British.
799
 ‘On the subject of sex, silence became the rule’,800 
while the taboo of homosexuality empowered the notion of heterosexual national 
identity.
801
 The disruption that the Modinos and Marangos cases created led to the 
breaking of this silence and to the emergence of public debates about the legal and 
social status of Cypriot non-heterosexuals. However, because of their gaining of 
voice, non-heterosexual individuals were even more intensely and loudly portrayed 




 This surfacing of debates about non-heterosexuality in the public domain had 
both positive and negative effects. To be sure, homosexuality and the ‘stereotypical’ 
homosexual man, who was located in the face of Alecos Modinos, were demonized 
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as lethal for the survival of the Greek-Cypriot national collectivity and of its 
‘Hellenorthodox’ values.  Foucaultian ‘bio-power’ gained more impetus and rigour 
through the stimulation of discourses of sexuality, which functioned as the 
prerequisites of the extension of state power into the regulation of bodies and 
lives.
803
 Nonetheless, this public manifestation of alternative discourses of sexuality 
also exposed one of the major artificialities and myths of the predominant local 
nationalist discourses. Namely, it became obvious that the country’s EU admission 
necessitated the adoption of policies and norms that recognized and protected 
individual lives and human dignity. As a result of the ECtHR’s decision in the 
Loizidou case,
804
 ‘Europe’ was being lauded as a panacea for the RoC’s national, 
Turkey-inflicted headaches. However, after the ECtHR Modinos ruling, it was no 
longer perceived as such. The Church and its affiliated groups described ‘Europe’ 
and European political officials as the ‘Chief Priests’ who were forcing Greek-
Cypriots to sell out their ‘morals’ and ‘values’ for ‘thirty pieces of silver’,805 while 
the Cypriot political elite tried to communicate the idea that the decriminalization of 
homosexuality was the heavy price the RoC had to pay in order to assure the 




The case of the Turkish-Cypriot organization Initiative Against Homophobia 
and especially the case of the Greek-Cypriot Accept-LGBT group exemplify the 
second step in the process of the destabilization of the discursive status quo through 
the employment of discourses, institutions and mechanisms of ‘Europe’, which the 
Modinos and Marangos cases had set in motion. The centrality of the ideas, 
mechanism and institutions of ‘Europe’ in Accept’s aims and activities is reflected in 
its statute. Accept’s mission includes ‘the demand of basic human rights and the 
fight against prejudice and discrimination against LGBT individuals’, as well as ‘the 
promotion and the implementation of policies, laws, programs and jurisprudence of 
the European Union and the Council of Europe with regard to combating 
discrimination and promoting the principle of equality, especially regarding sexual 
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orientation and social gender’.807 As some of the founding members of Accept 
reported, the group’s creation has been premised on the idea of human rights that the 
EU and the CoE promote, as well as on the funding, training and support available to 
local groups by the ‘European’ centre.808 This highlights a great degree of change 
since the mid-1990s when the issue of the decriminalization of homosexuality was 
being debated, with regard to the way in which ‘Europe’ and external, transnational 
and international discourses are being appropriated and employed by non-elite 
Cypriots. ‘Europe’ is no longer the remedy to injustices that take place at the 
national level against LGBTQ people; it is the reason why there should not be any 
injustice in the first place.  
The stance of part of the political elite towards Accept’s request to respond to 
a set of questions that pertained to LGBTQ rights and social equality during the 2011 
parliamentary elections political campaign season, substantiates the argument that 
opportunistic elite views of ‘Europe’ are progressively giving way to an 
understanding of  ‘Europe’ as the bastion of liberal democratic values. This is more 
so among younger Greek-Cypriot politicians. Accept had prepared a set of questions 
that it sent to numerous candidates from different political parties, asking them to 
respond. Some of the questions targeted politicians’ stance towards the former 
Ombudsman’s suggestions for recognition of same-sex civil union and towards 
European/regional attempts to eradicate all forms of homophobia.
809
 Candidates’ 
attempts to appeal to LGBTQ voters and/or political party efforts to portray their 
young new candidates as open-minded and progressive cannot be rejected as reasons 
for the numerous supportive responses to Accept’s questions. However, the 
argument that a sincere ‘Europe-driven’ change is taking place in elite political 
discourses about sexuality cannot be rejected either.  
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Admittedly, there are numerous essentialisms and hierarchies embedded in 
‘European’ discourses and global/transnational LGBTQ identities.810 For example, 
some Greek-Cypriot LGBTQ interviewees employed ‘Europe’ and the RoC’s EU 
admission in order to substantiate their perceptions of the other ‘others’– that is, of 
Turkish-Cypriot LGBTQs – as inferior, backward, and uncivilized. Moreover, as the 
case of Cyprus illustrates, Western European and Anglo-American paradigms of 
sexual identities and politics often conflict with, or do not sufficiently inform local 
understandings of sexuality.
811
 Even so, potentially, ‘Europe’s’ language, 
mechanisms and discourses have a changing effect on local discourses and power 
relations. The existing examples of organization and mobilization around issues of 
sexuality in Cyprus prove that, regardless of the fact that some individual Cypriots 
employ the language of ‘Europe’ in ways that reinforce in-group and inter-ethnic 
divisions, Cypriot LGBTQ groups would probably not have existed if the language 
and tools of ‘Europe’ had not been available. Therefore, and in this manner 
contributing to the currently existing literature, this study and analysis of Cypriot 
LGBTQ organizations showed that there is a third way of pursuing the politics of 
sexuality, which the ‘queer theory versus  rights/identity-based approaches’ scholarly 
debate has not fully explored. That is a politics of sexuality that is empowered by 
external/transnational legal and identity discourses, but that is also moulded to fit 
local activists and LGBTQs’ particular needs and objectives. 
There is a dialectical and productive relationship between the abstract 
character of rights and the particularity and determinative character of identities. The 
universal and the particular are not opposed and liberal democracy is not defined by 
opposing individual rights. Rather, liberal democracy and rights support and 
presuppose one another, thus leaving a space for the relation between the universal 
and the particular to be contested and reformulated. Therefore, according to this 
reasoning, although rights shape identities, they simultaneously provide a basis for 
contesting and rearticulating new rights and identities. 812  
                                                 
810
   Cruz-Malavé and Manalansan, ed. Queer Globalizations; Manalansan , “In the Shadows of 
Stonewall,”  425-38; Povinelli and Chauncey, “Thinking Sexuality Transnationally,” 439-50; 
Drucker, ed. Different Rainbows. 
811
   For example, see:  Bereket and Adam, “The Emergence of Gay Identities in Contemporary 
Turkey,” 131-51. 
812
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the Social Function of Rights,” Political Theory, vol. 28, no. 4 (2000): 451-68. 
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The case of Cyprus confirms Butler’s point that the ability of rights and 
identities to stretch and shrink according to particular and/or local circumstances is 
not the major reason behind the inevitability of essentialisms, binarisms, hierarchies 
and of the rights and identities discourses that are based on them. In an attempt to 
reorient the discussion about rights and identities, Butler challenges the idea that 
postmodern bodies and sexual identities are the product of freely chosen decisions 
and argues that their construction is neither artificial nor dispensable. Construction 
remains a constitutive constraint even after having deconstructed heterosexuality, 
homosexuality and all the other classifications that are based on male and female 
anatomy.
813
  She concludes that even if homosexuality transcends the domain of 
what is culturally possible, there is a relation to be identified between the abjection 
of homosexuality by the heterosexual binary and heterosexual identification because 
of the mere fact that the two are mutually exclusive. Disavowing heterosexuality and 
refusing to identify with it means that, at some point, identification with it has 
already been made.
814
  This argument is reminiscent of the Foucaultian view that 
subjects are simultaneously products of discursive power and producers of 
themselves, though within the ambit of discourse.
815
 This line of argument is also 
helpful in understanding the case of Cyprus. Although both Cypriot LGBTQ self-
understandings and Cypriot elite perceptions about gender and sexuality are located 
within a specific discursive context, the possibility of agency is not annihilated: 
Discourse guidelines how the ‘Self’ or the ‘Other’ speaks and is spoken about, but 
the act of the articulation and the result of the articulation are not given or 
predetermined.  
This thesis argued that this logic applies to the relationship between the 
‘local’ and the ‘external/European/transnational’ also. Namely, although ‘Western’ 
and ‘European’ discourses may reinforce cultural hierarchies, their appropriation at 
the local level remains flexible in the hands of the indigenous excluded groups and 
individuals who find in them a first – if not the only – way into the existing power 
structures and, consequently, out of invisibility. It demonstrated that discourses of 
nationhood and national identity always have had, and continue to have, 
                                                 
813
   Butler, Bodies that Matter. For a similar argument about the ‘fictitiousness’ and ‘significance’ of 
sexual identities, see: Weeks, “The Sexual Citizen,” 46. See also: Jeffrey Weeks, “Remembering 
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ramifications far beyond those that the mainstream nationalism and national 
identities literature has addressed. In the case of Cyprus, gender and sexuality 
become occasions for reflecting on such ramifications, as well as for evaluating their 
impact in locales beyond the hubs of the production of the majority of scholarly 
literature  – that is, in places outside the of ‘West/Europe’.  
Sexuality remains a zone of management, containment, regulation and 
conformity, but also of resistance. In Cyprus, the regulation of sexuality through – 
among other things – the criminalization of male homosexuality, was part of the 
British colonial mission to ‘civilize’ the ‘primitive’ Cypriot subject.816 As it is 
usually the case in formerly colonial/postcolonial milieux, in the pursing of their 
national struggles, formerly oppressed peoples replicate such repressive discourses 
and practices.
 817
 In the case of Cyprus, the colonial narratives that had named and 
classified non-heterosexuality as a vice resurfaced with new rigor and slightly 
modified as part of nationalist missions. These missions were headed primarily by 
the Orthodox Church of Cyprus and aimed to keep Cyprus ‘pure’ and safe from 
external and internal enemies. In this way, nationalist discourses about the ‘ethnic 
other’ who threatens ‘our’ survival have been accompanied by discourses about the 
sexually ‘normal’, ‘deviant’ and ‘pathological’, which have their roots in the era of 
the island’s colonial domination.  
Therefore, until the mid-1990s, the non-heterosexual Cypriot individual 
remained invisible and constrained within the unspeakable discourse that had 
constructed him as ‘despicable’. In the mid-1990s though, because of Modinos’s 
attempts to have the RoC amend its criminal law with regard to homosexuality, 
Modinos and ‘all sorts of Modinoi’818 were ruthlessly attacked and publically 
portrayed as the culprits behind the Greek-Cypriot national collectivity’s need to sell 
out its values and morals to ‘Europe’. According to Cypriot religio-nationalist 
narratives, Modinos and non-heterosexual people were to have no rights, if such 
rights challenged the heterocentric predominant norms. However, and although as a 
result of the Modinos case homosexual people have been demonized and publically 
humiliated by the Church and by its supporting groups to a degree like never before, 
                                                 
816
   Bryant, Imagining the Modern, 48-51; Papadakis, “Aphrodite Delights,” 237-50.  
817
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818
   Circular distributed by the religious group Fighters for Moral Values. See image 1.5 in 
introduction.  
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the Modinos and Marangos cases initiated a process through which, eventually, the 
dissonance between nationalistic employments of ‘Europe’ and the real, liberal rights 
and values that ‘Europe’ represents was irreversibly unearthed. Almost two decades 
later, the newly formed Cypriot LGBTQ groups Accept and Initiative started 
following Modinos’s lead and premising the new wave of Cypriot politics of 
sexuality on the language, values and tools that have become available to them 
through the country’s Europeanization.   
To be sure, ‘Europe’ and Europeanization discourses, mechanisms and 
institutions are not free from concealed remnants of a quasi-modernist/colonial logic 
that sees the world as hierarchically compartmentalized.  Nonetheless, as the 
employment and analysis of the case of Cyprus demonstrated, local modalities of 
sexuality and local identity formation processes are much more flexible and resilient 
than scenarios about an amalgamating globalization presents them to be. Cypriot 
LGBTQs, like LGBTQs in other locales with similar characteristics, have 
consistently exercised agency in their encounters with various discourses – both 
friendly and unfriendly, both local and external – even though the exercise of this 
agency has not always been easy or apparent. 
In conclusion, there is more than one way in which the idea of 
Europeanization and the discourses and mechanisms of ‘Europe’ can be interpreted 
and employed by people at the local level. These ways are sometimes contradictory. 
For example, whereas in the past the language of ‘Europe’ had been explicitly 
appropriated by the Greek-Cypriot political elite in an opportunistic manner in order 
to propel politico-national objectives, the ECtHR’s decision in the Modinos case  – 
and the CoE’s demand that the RoC abided by it – made clear to the RoC’s political 
and institutional elites that the respect of citizens’ private life is not to be sacrificed 
at the altar of hegemonic, nationalistic, androcentric and heteronormative discourses. 
The Modinos ruling created an important precedent for Cypriot LGBTQs. Namely, 
through its legal and institutional mechanisms, as well as through its non-
discrimination discourses, ‘Europe’ proved to be an ally and a lever against local 
exclusionary and discriminatory discourses and practices.  
Strikingly, ‘Europe’ and the language of human rights have been repeatedly 
employed both by the Greek-Cypriot and the Turkish-Cypriot political elite in order 
to render their respective ethnic groups as the victims of the ethnic ‘other’. ‘Europe’ 
has also been used by some non-elite actors. It has been utilized by some Greek-
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Cypriot LGBTQs in order to portray Turkish-Cypriot LGBTQs as inferior and 
backward and to present themselves as superior, more ‘modern’ and more 
‘European’. This distancing of the ‘Self’ from the ‘Other’ is probably a sine qua non 
of any attempt to define one’s self or group and, as Brubaker argued, constitutes a 
less precarious form of ‘everyday ethnicity’.819 Nevertheless, this tendency is 
particularly unfortunate since by ‘othering’ Turkish-Cypriot LGBTQs, these Greek-
Cypriot LGBTQs participate in the perpetuation of symbolic, yet dangerous, national 
and nationalistic discourses, which are to be blamed for their own exclusion from the 
Greek-Cypriot national collectivity. 
Nonetheless, this potential double-role of such external, transnational and 
supranational trends and narratives about gender and sexuality is of utmost 
importance. This is because the result of the interaction between internal frameworks 
and local level power structures and global/transnational paradigms is not 
predetermined. Rather, as the analysis of the case of Cyprus illustrated, it allows 
people at the local/national level to invoke external norms, trends and discourses in 
those ways that would allow them to restructure their cultures and local socio-
political realities as they see fit. Even more importantly, the appropriation of 
European external discourses by local non-elite agents constitutes an effective way 
of challenging locally hegemonic nationalistic, heterocentric and androcentric 
discourses. This will eventually lead to replacing elite nationalist-based schemes of 
social organization with more inclusive ones; with narratives that prioritize respect 
for difference – be it sexual, gender, ethnic, national or religious – over difference. 
Sexuality’s oxymoronic status as both the object of local and transnational 
discourses, and as the force behind subaltern agency formation and demonstration 
means that, in order to fully comprehend it, we have to escape easy assumptions and 
generalizations about its role and impact on collective and individual lives both in 
the ‘West/Europe’ and in the ‘Rest’.  This thesis attempted to respond to this 
challenge by approaching sexuality as a multifaceted and powerful analytical tool, 
which is indispensible in any scholarly attempt – be it a work on nationhood and 
national identities, on gender or on sexuality – to understand the nature and the 
dynamics of discursive ‘wars’ and interconnections, as well as local and global 
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circuits of power and their impact on real lives and stories. This is precisely because 
if approached in this manner, sexuality as an analytical concept allows us to navigate 
the dynamic and reciprocal relationship between the ‘official’ and the ‘hidden’, the 
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